dismissed EB-1A Case: Athletics

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 16169358 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: MAY 26, 2021 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Extraordinary Ability) 
The Petitioner, a sports agent, seeks to classify the Beneficiary, al lcoach advisor, as an individual 
of extraordinary ability. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b )(1 )(A), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(l)(A). This first preference classification makes immigrant visas available to those who 
can demonstrate their extraordinary ability through sustained national or international acclaim and 
whose achievements have been recognized in their field through extensive documentation . 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish that: ( 1) the Petitioner had satisfied at least three of ten initial evidentiary criteria, as required; 
and (2) the Beneficiary will continue to work in his area of expertise. The matter is now before us on 
appeal. 
In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
Section 203(b)(l)(A) of the Act makes immigrant visas available to individuals with extraordinary 
ability if: 
(i) the alien has extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or 
athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international 
acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field through 
extensive documentation, 
(ii) the alien seeks to enter the United States to continue work m the area of 
extraordinary ability, and 
(iii) the alien's entry into the United States will substantially benefit prospectively the 
United States. 
The term "extraordinary ability" refers only to those individuals in "that small percentage who have 
risen to the very top of the field of endeavor." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). The implementing regulation 
at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) sets forth a multi-part analysis. First, a petitioner can demonstrate 
international recognition of his or her achievements in the field through a one-time achievement (that 
is, a major, internationally recognized award). If that petitioner does not submit this evidence, then 
he or she must provide sufficient qualifying documentation that meets at least three of the ten criteria 
listed at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x) (including items such as awards, published material in certain 
media, and scholarly articles). 
Where a petitioner meets these initial evidence requirements, we then consider the totality of the 
material provided in a final merits determination and assess whether the record shows sustained 
national or international acclaim and demonstrates that the individual is among the small percentage 
at the very top of the field of endeavor. See Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) 
( discussing a two-part review where the documentation is first counted and then, if fulfilling the 
required number of criteria, considered in the context of a final merits determination); see also 
Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2013); Rijal v. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 
(W.D. Wash. 2011). 
II. ANALYSIS 
Thf Renefjcjarywas a professionalc=]player from 1990 to 2003, playing forlocal teams and, in 1995, 
the_ !National Team. The Beneficir ultiiately played for 23 different teams id I Europe, 
and the Middle East, returning to his nativ upon his retirement. At the time the Petitioner filed 
~etition, the Beneficiary was employed as an advisor and head coach for I I 
L__J and as a I I coach advisor for I I a youth team in the._l ______ ____._ 
League. In response to a request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner submitted an undated letter from 
I hffering the Beneficiary a foll-time position as al I coach. The Petitioner has not shown 
that the Beneficiary's position with I I lasted beyond the 2019 season; local newspaper 
coverage indicated that the appointment was for the one season. 
The Petitioner states that the Beneficiary "advices [sic] and coaches for I I which use his name 
and knowledge to attract investors." The Beneficiary entered the United States as a B-1 nonimmigrant 
tourist, and later changed status to O-lA nonimmigrant with extraordinary ability in athletics. We 
acknowledge that O-lA nonimmigrant status relates to extraordinary ability. Nevertheless, the record 
of proceeding for the approved nonimmigrant petition is not before us, and we cannot determine 
whether the facts in that case were the same as those in the present proceeding, or whether the 
nonimmigrant petition was approved in error. 
A. Evidentiary Criteria 
Because the Petitioner has not indicated or shown that the Beneficiary received a major, internationally 
recognized award, the Petitioner must submit evidence to satisfy at least three of the alternate 
regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). The Petitioner initially claimed to have satisfied 
seven of these criteria, summarized below: 
• (i), Lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards; 
2 
• (ii), Membership in associations that require outstanding achievements; 
• (iii), Published material about the individual in professional or major media; 
• (iv), Participation as a judge of the work of others; 
• (v), Original contributions of major significance; 
• (viii), Leading or critical role for distinguished organizations or establishments; and 
• (ix), High remuneration for services. 
The Director concluded that the Petitioner's evidence had not met any of the criteria. On appeal, the 
Petitioner maintains that its evidence meets six of the above criteria. The Petitioner does not contest 
the Director's conclusions regarding the criterion numbered (v), and therefore we consider that issue 
to be abandoned. 1 
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's evidence is sufficient to meet, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, at least three criteria, numbered (i), (ii), and (iii). 
Documentation of the alien 's receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized 
prizes or awards for excellence in the.field of endeavor. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i) 
The Petitioner shows that the Beneficiary played for thel I team I I when, in 1996, that team 
won the.__ _______ __. The Petitioner has established the significance of this prize. For example, 
according to an NBC Sports article in the record I I I f Evidence regarding other prizes and awards is less 
persuasive, and the Petitioner has submitted evidence of various second-place finishes without 
establishing that the runners-up received any actual prizes or awards, but the evidence about thel I I I is sufficient to satisfy this criterion. 
Documentation of the alien's membership in associations in the field for which 
classification is sought, which require outstanding achievements of their members, as 
judged by recognized national or international experts in their disciplines or fields. 
8 C.FR. § 204.5(h)(3)(ii) 
From the submitted evidence, we conclude that the Beneficiary's membership in thel I national 
team is a qualifying membership, or comparable to such membership under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4). 
Published material about the alien in professional or major trade publications or other 
major media, relating to the alien's work in the field for which classification is sought. 
Such evidence shall include the title, date, and author of the material, and any necessa,y 
translation. 8 C.FR. § 204.5(h)(3)(iii) 
Much of the record consists of newspaper articles, mostly published between 1989 and 2003. At least 
some of these publications qualify as major media. The Director discounted these materials because "the 
1 See Matter of R-A-M-, 25 T&N Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012) (stating that when a filing party fails to appeal an issue 
addressed in an adverse decision, that issue is waived). See also Sepulveda v. U.S. Att:v Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 
(11th Cir. 2005), citing United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998); Hristov v. Roark, No. 09-
CV-27312011, 2011 WL 4711885 at *1, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (plaintiffs claims were abandoned as he failed to 
raise them on appeal to the AAO). 
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articles are not about the beneficiary and his work as~ lcoach." Nevertheless, many of the articles 
are primarily about the Beneficiary and his work as al lplayer. The distinction between a player and 
a coach is an important, but separate, issue, which we will discuss further below. 
The above conclusions suffice to show that the Petitioner's evidence meets at least three criteria under 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). Detailed discussion of the remaining criteria would not change the outcome 
of this appeal, but all of the evidence submitted to satisfy the remaining criteria has been considered 
in the context of the final merits determination discussed below. 2 
B. Final Merits Determination 
Because the Petitioner submitted the required initial evidence, we will evaluate whether she has 
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Beneficiary's sustained national or 
international acclaim and that he is one of the small percentage at the very top of the field of endeavor, 
and that his achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation. In a 
final merits determination, we analyze a beneficiary's accomplishments and weigh the totality of the 
evidence to determine if their successes are sufficient to demonstrate that they have extraordinary 
ability in the field of endeavor. See section 203(b )(1 )(A)(i) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2), (3); 
see also Kazarian, 596 F.3d at 1119-20. 3 In this matter, we determine that the Petitioner has not 
established eligibility. 
The Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary is eligible for classification "as a player of extraordinary 
ability," and most of the submitted evidence concerns the Beneficiary's career as a player. The 
Beneficiary was the subject of frequent newspaper coverage in the 1990s, and many of these stories 
indicated that the Beneficiary was responsible for winning matches that were important for the various 
~ for which he played. With further support, these materials might have established that the 
Beneficiary earned national acclaim as al I player in the 1990s. As it stands, much of the evidence 
lacks necessary context. For instance, the record shows that the Beneficiary signed a four-year contract 
with aD for $600,000 plus substantial benefits, but he left thatOwithin about 18 months, and 
ultimately played for 23 teams during his career. The record lacks sufficient information to show whether 
2 One point, however, bears mentioning. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iv) calls for evidence of the beneficiary's 
participation, either individually or on a panel, as a judge of the work of others in the same or an allied field of specification for 
which classification is sought. When the Petitioner filed the petition in December 2018, she did not claim that the Beneficiary 
had acted as a judge in this manner She added this c'.aim in her February 2020 response to the RFE, and submitted a letter 
from the chief executive officer ofl I who stated that the Beneficiary's work there involved judging the 
"technical ability" and "tactical ability" of prospective. 
In the denial notice, the Director stated that this letter does not establish work as a judge prior to the petition's December 2018 
filing date. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), which requires the Petitioner to meet all eligibility requirements at the time of filing. 
On appeal, counsel for the Petitioner disputes the Director's conclusion, and purports to quote from the letter, stating that the 
Beneficiary had worked withl ~'since August of 2018 as ~ I Coach helping our staff coach teams and identify 
new talent." This statement would place the Beneficiary's judging activity before Decemb~. The letter, however, does 
not contain this passage. It states that the Beneficiary "has worked with us since 2019 as aL__Jcoach Advisor helping our 
staff coach teams and identify new talent" ( emphasis added). Previously, counsel had accurately quoted this same sentence 
from the letter. Counsel also specifically identifies the letter as "RFE Response, Exhibit G," demonstrating that there is no 
confusion as to which letter counsel is quoting. 
3 See also 6 USC1S Policy Manual F.2(B)(2), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual (stating that USCIS officers should then 
evaluate the evidence together when considering the petition in its entirety to determine if the petitioner has established, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the required high level of expertise for the immigrant classification). 
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these frequent moves were the result of increasing demand for his services by the most prominent teams, 
or other reasons not inherently reflective of acclaim. 
The key issue in this proceeding, and the reason underlying the Director's denial of the petition, is that 
the Beneficiary is no longer a professional I I player, and does not seek to enter the United States in 
order to play at a professional level. These undisputed facts led the Director to conclude that the 
Beneficiary does not seek to enter the United States to continue working in his area of expertise, and 
colored the Director's conclusions about the initial evidence submitted under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). 
Whatever recognition the Beneficiary may have earned as a player in the 1990s, the statute requires 
sustained national or international acclaim; evidence of past acclaim cannot suffice to establish eligibility. 
But the Beneficiary retired from playing about 15 years before the filing of the petition. The Petitioner 
has submitted substantially less published material about the Beneficiary since that time, much of which 
is nostalgic or retrospective in nature rather than indicating that the Beneficiary's continued activities 
attract news coverage in their own right. For example, a 2018 article from thd I states 
that the Beneficiary "was well-known in the 90s." As early as 2001, before the Beneficiary retired, an 
article in another paper indicated that he "wants to return [to] the glories he achieved in the early 1990s." 
On appeal, the Petitioner cites two unpublished appellate decisions from 2016. These decisions have no 
binding authority as precedent, but there are also factors in both decisions that distinguish them from the 
case at hand. First, the Petitioner cites Matter of K-S-Y-, ID# 14269 (AAO Mar. 9, 2016), in which we 
stated: "We may conclude that coaching is within an athlete's area of expertise under section 
203(b)(l)(A)(ii) of the Act if (1) the individual's national or international athletic acclaim was recent, 
and (2) he or she sustained that acclaim upon transition to coaching at a national level." Id. at 6. In 
that case, the Petitioner "filed the ... petition ... within seven months of his last major competitive 
achievement." Id. In the present case, the Petitioner has not shown that the Beneficiary meets either 
of these two conditions. The Beneficiary had retired from the sport 15 years before the filing date, and 
the record does not show that any acclaim he earned as an athlete has continued into his coaching career. 
The Petitioner also cites Matter of X-N-, ID# 15507 (AAO Apr. 20, 2016), stating that we 
"acknowledged that a coach's athletic success reflects his or her expertise in the sport." The Petitioner 
quotes a sentence fragment: "the Petitioner's expertise in gymnastics generally is supported by his own 
prior success as a gymnast." Id. at 4. This fragment, however, omits key context evident in the complete 
sentence: "Though not determinative of his preeminence as a coach, the Petitioner's expertise in 
gymnastics generally is supported by his own prior success as a gymnast." Id. (emphasis added). We 
did not state or imply that prior acclaim as an athlete was sufficient, in itself: to demonstrate acclaim 
as a coach, or to permanently establish eligibility regardless of the former athlete's subsequent career. 
Rather, we devoted considerable attention to that petitioner's achievements as a coach, noting that 
"[h ]e has trained students at the highest levels for over fifteen years," with several of those students 
winning gold medals in national-level competitions. The Petitioner has not established that the 
Beneficiary in the present case has reached a comparable level of achievement. 
In a new (2010) lettr submitted on appeal, a professiona~ I coach claims that the Beneficiary worked 
for him "as a coach from 2006 to 2017." But an earlier letter from this same individual contradicts 
this assertion. The coach stated in 2018 that the Beneficiary "has been working as myl I Technical 
Advisor since 2008." This earlier letter does not indicate that the Beneficiary had any experience as a 
5 
coach, rather than as an advisor reporting to a coach, before he entered the United States a few months 
prior to the petition's filing date. The revision of this claim on appeal raises questions of credibility, 
particularly in light of counsel's misquoting of th~ I letter to backdate the Beneficiary's activity 
there. Unresolved material inconsistencies may lead us to reevaluate the reliability and sufficiency of 
other evidence submitted in support of the requested immigration benefit. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 
582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
When weighing the conflicting assertions about the extent of the Beneficiary's coaching work abroad, we 
note the Petitioner's submission of a book published in 2012,I 1 , I 
which includes an interview with the Beneficiary. The translation submitted by the Petitioner does not 
mention any then-current coaching work. Rather, it states that the Beneficiary "[ c ]urrently ... manages 
his assets ... and invests in courses to start his coaching career." The initial submission also included 
letters dated 2017 and 2018 from various prominent! I players, none of whom indicated that the 
Beneficiary had ever worked as a coach. The players state, instead, that the Beneficiary has worked "as 
a technical advisor fo~ !teams in! I (the wording varies slightly from letter to letter). 
The record does not unambiguously establish that the Beneficiary had any coaching experience at all 
before 2018, and the small amount of evidence the Petitioner has submitted about the Beneficiary's recent 
work does not indicate that he has earned acclaim for his post-athletic career. The record does not 
establish that the U.S. teams that employed him at the time of filing compete at the highest levels 
nationally or internationally. 
As noted above, the Petitioner cited the Beneficiary's recent work witH las evidence of his activity 
as a judge. While the Beneficiary's evaluation of children during team tryouts may technically qualify as 
'judging," this activity is inherent to coaching at all levels of competition, and it does not serve to 
distinguish the Beneficiary from others in the same occupation. Judging the abilities o~ I players 
between seven and ten years of age ( ages shown on team rosters in the record) neither requires, nor causes, 
sustained national or international acclaim for the person doing the judging. 
The record does not show that the Beneficiary has earned sustained national or international acclaim 
that continued into his post-competitive career. Therefore, the Petitioner has not established that the 
Beneficiary is eligible for the classification sought. 
C. Continued Work/Prospective Benefit 
As noted above, the Director concluded that the Beneficiary will not continue working in his area of 
expertise because he is no longer playing competitively. For the reasons already discussed above, we 
generally agree with the Petitioner's assertion that the Beneficiary's area of expertise isl I which 
is broad enough to encompass coaching and other related activities. The Director also concluded that 
the Petitioner did establish that the Beneficiary's entry will substantially beneT prospTtively the 
United States, but the only basis the Director cited to support this conclusion is the popularity 
I l rather than any discussion of how the Beneficiary's work coaching a 
children's team would inherently be of substantial benefit not only to that team but to the United States. 
Therefore, there is reason to question both of these determinations by the Director. Nevertheless, 
because the Petitioner has not met the threshold requirement of sustained national or international 
acclaim, we need not explore these two other determinations in greater detail. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner seeks a highly restrictive visa classification for the Beneficiary, intended for individuals 
who have reached the top of their respective fields, and who remain there at the time of filing. U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services has long held that even athletes performing at the major league 
level do not automatically meet the "extraordinary ability" standard. Matter of Price, 20 I&N Dec. 
953, 954 (Assoc. Comm'r 1994). Here, the Beneficiary previously played at what amounts to a major 
league level, but his career as a player ended years ago, and the Petitioner has not shown that the 
Beneficiary's subsequent work has attracted recognition indicative of the required sustained national 
or international acclaim or consistent with a "career of acclaimed work in the field" as contemplated 
by Congress. H.R. Rep. No. 101-723, 59 (Sept. 19, 1990); see also section 203(b)(l)(A) of the 
Act. Moreover, the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the Beneficiary is one of the small 
percentage who has risen to the very top of his current field of endeavor. See section 203(b)(l)(A) of 
the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). The record minimally documents the Beneficiary's coaching 
work, and does not indicate that he is a top coach, or coach advisor, in the field. 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated the Beneficiary's eligibility as an individual of extraordinary 
ability. The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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