dismissed EB-1A Case: Athletics

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: AUG. 6, 2024 In Re: 30967695 
Appeal of Nebraska Service Center Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (Extraordinary Ability) 
The Petitioner is an athlete who seeks classification as an alien of extraordinary ability. See Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(A). This first preference 
classification makes immigrant visas available to those who can demonstrate their extraordinary ability 
through sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in 
their field through extensive documentation. 
The Nebraska Service Center Director denied the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers 
(petition), concluding the record did not establish that the Petitioner had a major, internationally 
recognized award, nor did she demonstrate that she met at least three of the ten regulatory criteria. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate 
eligibility to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the 
questions in this matter de nova. Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
To qualify under this immigrant classification, the statute requires the filing party demonstrate: 
• The foreign national enjoys extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or 
athletics; 
• They seek to enter the country to continue working in the area of extraordinary ability; and 
• The foreign national's entry into the United States will substantially benefit the country in the 
future. 
Section 203(b)(l)(A)(i)-(iii) of the Act. The term "extraordinary ability" refers only to those 
individuals in "that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor." 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(2). 
The implementing regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) sets forth a multi-step analysis. In the first 
step, a petitioner can demonstrate international recognition of his or her achievements in the field 
through a one-time achievement (that is, a major, internationally recognized award). If that petitioner 
does not submit this evidence, then he or she must provide sufficient qualifying documentation that 
meets at least three of the ten criteria listed at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x) (including items such as 
awards, published material in certain media, and scholarly articles). 
Where a petitioner meets these initial evidence requirements, we then move to the second step to 
consider the totality of the material provided in a final merits determination and assess whether the 
record shows sustained national or international acclaim and demonstrates that the individual is among 
the small percentage at the very top of the field of endeavor. See Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 
1121 (9th Cir. 20 I 0) ( discussing a two-step review where the documentation is first counted and then, 
if fulfilling the required number of criteria, considered in the context of a final merits determination); 
see also Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2022). 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Petitioner is a "musher," the person who drives a team of dogs in a dogsledding competition. She 
has achieved top placements and finishes in various dogsledding categories. 
A. One-time Achievement 
In the initial filing before the Director, the Petitioner claimed 
I I first place finishes is a one-time achievement of the sort that establishes el i gibility for 
classification as an alien of extraordinary ability." She provided photographs of certificates and 
medals, as well as ______ rankings for the 2017 International Federation of Sleddog 
Sports (IFSS), results from other events such as the 2016-2017 I and letters from the IFSS 
president and vice president. 1 
After the Director notified the Petitioner the submitted material did not rise to the standard of a 
one-time achievement, she offered revised letters from those in the sport and media coverage of the 
competitions and championships. The Director concluded the awards were not major, internationally 
recognized awards. The Director acknowledged the evidence but found the Petitioner did not show 
that any of the media sources were at a level needed to show that her achievements were major, 
internationally recognized awards. 
In the appeal, the Petitioner claims the Director added substantive requirements to the one-time 
achievement concept effectively eliminating dogsledding. On this issue, the Director's analysis 
described the context in which a person might demonstrate that an award that rises to a one-time 
achievement "that is, a major, international recognized award." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). The denial 
decision reflects: 
Given Congress's intent to restrict this category to "that small percentage of individuals 
who have risen to the very top of their field of endeavor," the regulation permitting 
eligibility based on a one-time achievement must be interpreted very narrowly, with 
only a small handful of awards qualifying as major, internationally recognized awards. 
1 The IFSS is the primary dogsledding governing body worldwide. 
2 
See H.R. Rep. 101-723, 59 (Sept. 19, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 
1990 WL 200418 at *6739. The House Report specifically cited the Nobel Prize as an 
example of a one-time achievement; other examples which enjoy major, international 
recognition may include the Pulitzer Prize, the Academy Award, and ( most relevant for 
athletics) an Olympic Medal. The regulation is consistent with this legislative history, 
stating that a one-time achievement must be a major, internationally recognized award. 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). The selection of Nobel Laureates, the example provided by 
Congress, is reported in the top media internationally regardless of the nationality of 
the awardees, reflects a familiar name to the public at large, and includes a large cash 
prize. While an internationally recognized award could conceivably constitute a 
one-time achievement without meeting all of those elements, it is clear from the 
examples provided by Congress that the award must be global and internationally 
recognized in the field as one of the top awards. 
We disagree with the Petitioner when she asserts the Director added substantive requirements in the 
examples associated with Nobel Laureat selections. In fact, the Director stated that "an internationally 
recognized award could conceivably constitute a one-time achievement without meeting all of those 
elements." As a result, the Director was not mandating every one of those factors be satisfied, or any; 
only that they were salient illustrations stemming from the one example we have within the legislative 
record. 
The Petitioner accuses the Director's approach of "effectively eliminating the field of sled dog racing 
(and a multitude of others) for which this means of qualification might occur." She continues 
discussing congress who, she asserts, did not elect to take an approach similar to the Director's, "likely 
because it would severely limit the range of fields in which and [sic] individual could qualify as an 
alien of extraordinary ability based on winning top awards in the field." 
But the Petitioner does not grapple with congress' creation of a highly restrictive requirement for an 
award that a person generally will only receive once in their lifetime, and the example the legislators 
offered was the Nobel Prize; although not every award must equal that stature. So, it was congress 
that set the bar so high for a one-time achievement which could result in some fields being precluded 
from consideration under that provision. Congress further indicated foreign nationals "can also qualify 
on the basis of a career of acclaimed work in the field." H.R. Rep. 101-723, 59 (Sept. 19, 1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 1990 WL 200418 at *6739. And in response, the agency 
promulgated the ten regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x) that one may satisfy instead of 
a one-time achievement. 
Next, the Petitioner states that USCIS is required to focus on her standing in the field and claims it is 
the regulation and the statute implementing such a necessity. But the brief doesn't cite to what part of 
the statute or the regulation mandates such a requirement. The Petitioner then states the Director 
instead focuses solely on the award's public notoriety and that nothing in the statute or regulations or 
the slight reference in the House Report supports that approach. The broader context for this 
requirement is the awareness of award itself, and that it be "a one-time achievement (that is, a major, 
international recognized award)." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). If the proper focus is not supposed to be on 
the award's notoriety, we are unsure what the Petitioner attempts to alter it to within these proceedings. 
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Not all sports or fields issue awards that would qualify as a one-time achievement. For example, even 
though the following sports have a global or international governing body and include competitors 
from around the world, their awards are not widely covered by major international media outlets: 
tchoukball; kabaddi; or korfball. Even though the dogsledding sport may be slightly more familiar to 
the public than these examples, after reviewing the Petitioner's claims and evidence, it appears the 
events and competitions the Petitioner claims do not issue awards that would qualify as a one-time 
achievement. 
In situations where an award does not rise to a one-time achievement, a foreign national may still 
qualify for this highly restrictive immigrant classification by satisfying at least three of the regulatory 
criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). The one-time achievement requirement is arguably the most 
difficult provision to satisfy within the most restrictive employment-based visa category in U.S. 
immigration law. And simply because a major, internationally recognized award may not exist in a 
particular field or sport, we should not moderate the regulation's one-time achievement requirements. 
Doing so would undermine its apotheosis, reduce the honor and prestige associated with achieving 
such a distinguished accolade, and diminish the value for those who have trnly earned it. Because the 
Petitioner appears unable to demonstrate any of her accomplishments qualify as a one-time 
achievement, this does not exempt her from meeting the high bar that 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) sets. 
The Petitioner next turns her focus to claim that neither Congress nor the regulation limited qualifying 
awards to those that are broadly familiar to the public. With this contention, we disagree. Again, the 
example in the House Report was the Nobel Prize; widely known to the public. And the Director 
offered additional examples of "the Pulitzer Prize, the Academy Award, and (most relevant for 
athletics) an Olympic Medal." A common thread for each being they are well-known in the public 
beyond the issuing entities and broader than the award recipients' field. 
She argues that the proper question is what the award signifies regarding the individual's standing in 
the field relative to others, but she offers no support for this statement. In fact, comparing one's 
achievements to others in the field appears to be closer to what the regulation mandates that USCIS 
officers determine under the high salary or other significantly high remuneration criterion (8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(ix); see generally 6 USCIS Policy Manual F.2(B)(l), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policyrnanual), and under the commercial success criterion (8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(x); see generally 6 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, F.2(B)(l). And comparing a 
petitioner's standing in the field relative to others may also occur within a final merits determination 
(id. at F.2(B)(2)). 
Now in the appeal, the Petitioner states that she will "supplement the record here with additional media 
articles from various sources to reinforce that the IFSS championship events are well-recognized 
globally as the top international competitions in the field of sled dog racing." First and to reiterate, 
not all sports or fields will have awards recognizing one's efforts that rise to the level of a one-time 
achievement. Second, the Petitioner presents this statement without identifying what specific new 
evidence they are submitting, or more importantly how each form of evidence supports her claims of 
eligibility. 
Third, the Petitioner was put on notice of an evidentiary requirement (by statute, regulation, form 
instrnctions, request for evidence (RFE), etc.) and was given a reasonable opportunity to provide the 
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evidence. Except in exigent circumstances and at USCIS discretion, any new evidence submitted on 
appeal pertaining to this requirement will not be considered, and the appeal on this issue will be 
adjudicated based on the evidence in the record as it existed before the Director. See Matter of 
Furtado, 28 I&N Dec. 794, 801-02 (BIA 2024) and Matter of Izaguirre, 27 I&N Dec. 67, 71 (BIA 
2017) ( citing Matter ofSoriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764, 766 (BIA 1988)); see also Matter of Obaigbena, 
19 I&N Dec. 533, 537 (BIA 1988). If the Petitioner had wanted the submitted evidence to be 
considered, she should have submitted the documents when prompted and in response to the Director's 
RFE. Id. Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of this new evidence 
submitted on appeal. 
And even if we were to consider it, the majority of the material appears to be from an aggregating 
service that provides access to various resources, to include newspapers. She offered only that 
service's extraction of numerous articles without any supporting documentation regarding the entity 
that originally published each article. It is unclear what the Petitioner is asserting for this evidence 
other than to demonstrate that over the decades, sources from differing countries have published 
articles about dogsledding. This does not support her claims that her 
finishes amount to a one-time achievement. 
The remaining two forms of new evidence don't aid her in this effort either. The first is from an 
unidentified publisher titled~---------------------- and the 
second form of evidence appears to be from the IFSS website, but the document does not contain a 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that reflects the actual source. At any rate, neither of these 
documents demonstrate her accomplishments equate to a one-time achievement. 
The Petitioner's appeal brief twice mentions letters she submitted from those in the sport. Specifically, 
the Petitioner stated: "The primacy ofIFSS championships in the field is confirmed by several experts 
in the field, whose opinions are contained in the record." She further stated: "The decision noted in 
passing but did not discuss, the multiple opinions of experts in the field regarding the significance of 
[the Petitioner's] awards." That comprises all the Petitioner's statements on appeal relating to letters 
in the record and she offers no insight on which letters we should evaluate, nor for what content. 
In visa petition proceedings, it is a petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration 
benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 
(BIA 2013). Commensurate with that burden is the responsibility for explaining the significance of 
proffered evidence. Repaka v. Beers, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1219 (S.D. Cal. 2014). Filing parties 
should not submit large quantities of evidence without notifying the appellate body of the specific 
documentation that corroborates their claims within such large material, as doing so places an undue 
burden on the appellate body to search through the documentation without the aid of the filing party's 
knowledge. Toquero v. INS, 956 F.2d 193, 196 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992). 
It is the filing party's responsibility to inform us of what errors the adjudicator committed and how 
their claims and evidence satisfy which eligibility requirements. Id.; Spear Mktg., Inc. v. 
BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586,599 (5th Cir. 2015); S.E.C. v. Thomas, 965 F.2d 825, 827 (10th 
Cir. 1992); see also Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1540 n.3 (10th 
Cir. 1996) ( concluding that where the evidence in the record is voluminous, it is imperative that an 
appellant provide specific references to record); Uli v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 950, 957 (8th Cir. 2008) 
5 
( citing to Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 2008) and noting when a case includes 
voluminous background materials, it is necessary to specifically identify the material one relies on to 
come to their conclusion). 
But even if we made our way through the file reviewing each letter, we note that because we have 
already determined that the Petitioner has not described what evidence adequately supports the 
prospect that her accolades are "a one-time achievement (that is, a major, international recognized 
award)," letters from those in the industry will generally be insufficient to make such a demonstration 
as they will effectively contain claims that are not corroborated elsewhere in the record. 
USCIS may-in its discretion-use statements from others in the field that were submitted as expert 
testimony as advisory statements. See Matter ofCaron International, 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Comm'r 
1988). However, USCIS is ultimately responsible for making the final determination regarding a 
foreign national's eligibility for the benefit sought. Id. The submission of letters from experts 
supporting a petition is not presumptive evidence of eligibility. USCIS may give less weight to an 
opinion that is not corroborated, is not in accord with other information, or is in any way 
questionable. See id. at 795; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500, 502 n.2 (BIA 2008) (noting 
that expert opinion testimony does not purport to be evidence as to "fact"). 2 Because the Petitioner 
has failed to identify the letters or discuss their content she relies on, we will not address the letters in 
detail here. 
For all of the reasons stated above, we conclude that the Petitioner has not received a one-time 
achievement that is, a major, internationally recognized award. 
B. Evidentiary Criteria 
Because the Petitioner has not indicated or established that she has received a major, internationally 
recognized award, she must satisfy at least three of the alternate regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). Before the Director, the Petitioner claimed she met three of the regulatory 
criteria. The Director decided that the Petitioner satisfied two of the criteria relating to lesser prizes 
or awards and performing in a leading or critical role, but that she had not satisfied the criteria 
associated with membership. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that she meets the membership 
criterion. After reviewing all the evidence in the record, we agree with the Director on each of the 
criteria discussed above. 
2 We note that one element of the V-K- decision was overruled within Matter ofZ-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015); 
however, this does not affect the portion of V-K- we cite to here. The Z-Z-O- decision clearly limited its adverse treatment 
of the V-K- decision to the issue of "an Immigration Judge's predictive findings of what may or may not occur in the 
future ... " Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. at 590, which was related to the standard of review when evaluating an Immigration 
Judge's findings relating to an asylum applicant's reasonable fear claims. The Z-Z-O- decision made no mention of the 
evidentiary weight of expert testimony. The limit to the overruling nature of Z-Z-O- is illustrated within a footnote in 
which the BIA stated that other than the standard of review for predictive factual findings, it did not address and would 
not disturb other conclusions in the V-K- decision. Z-Z-O-, 26 l&N Dec. at 593 n.3. Consequently, the portion of the 
V-K- decision cited above remains effective. 
6 
Documentation of the alien 's membership in associations in the field for which classification 
is sought, which require outstanding achievements oftheir members, as judged by recognized 
national or international experts in their disciplines or fields. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(ii). 
This criterion contains several evidentiary elements the Petitioner must satisfy. First, the Petitioner 
must demonstrate that she is a member of an association in her field. Second, the Petitioner must 
demonstrate both of the following: (1) the associations utilize nationally or internationally recognized 
experts to judge the achievements of prospective members to determine if the achievements are 
outstanding, and (2) the associations use this outstanding determination as a condition of eligibility 
for prospective membership. 
The Petitioner claimed her membership as part of two dogsled teams. The Director determined that 
the Petitioner did not meet the requirements of this criterion. The Director only evaluated the United 
States Federation of Sleddog Sports (USFSS) team membership, but that may be due to the lack of 
clarity in the Petitioner's correspondence. Within the initial filing, she did not assert a claim under 
this criterion. And in a bulleted list responding to the Director's RFE, the cover letter only mentions 
she "was selected as a member of two associations (national sleddog racing teams)" without specifying 
which teams. 
On appeal, the Petitioner discusses both the USFSS team and the Czech national dogsled team 
memberships. The only evidence the Petitioner offers relating to her place on the Czech national 
dogsledding team is the letter from Jiri Nesnera, the president of the "Czech association sleddog sports, 
z.s." The Petitioner did not submit evidence that this association and the Czech national dogsledding 
team are one and the same. This has an adverse effect on this evidence and it garners diminished 
evidentiary value. 
Even setting that aside, this letter does not establish that the Petitioner has met all of this criterion's 
requirements. Specifically, Mr. Nesnera states the Petitioner "is a member of Czech association 
sleddog sports, z.s. and for her high performance results and experiences in sleddog sports she was 2 
times joined to official Czech republic representants, and she had great results for our country." 
Although Mr. Nesnera indicates she was chosen to be a member of his association for her high 
performance, this does not mean that his association requires such high performances for all of its 
members. Nor does his letter establish his association uses that determination as a condition of 
eligibility for prospective membership. 
Turning to the USFSS team, the evidence the Petitioner provided from USFSS contained two sections: 
one for eligibility criteria, and one for selection criteria. Because of the regulation's plain language 
regarding "membership in associations ... which require outstanding achievements of their members," 
the eligibility criteria are the most important element because those specify who the USFSS will admit 
as members. Here, the eligibility criteria are: 
• The competitor or applicant must be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident with an exception for 
anyone who doesn't fit those criteria requiring USFSS board approval; 
• Applicants must have a valid IFSS driver identification number; 
• The applicant must be a USFSS member in good standing with dues paid prior to filing the 
application; 
7 
• Preselected and non-preselected candidates must meet the application deadlines; and 
• In addition to the preselected candidates, USFSS will select three athletes per class based on 
performance results. 
Relating to the USFSS membership the Director stated: 
According to the summary of the USFSS Team USA Selection Rules, to be eligible a 
competitor must have a valid IFSS driver identification number, must be a USFSS 
members in good standing, and provide race results for the classes applied for. There 
is no requirements that a competitor or member have a significant or outstanding finish 
in a race, achieve a notable medal or any other evidence of outstanding achievement to 
qualify. While the petitioner may, or may not, have been chosen for her past successes, 
the eligibility requirements submitted with this petitioner do not require outstanding 
achievements of all members. 
The Petitioner's appeal briefretlects she provided the team selection criteria and she claims that past 
performance, especially in IFSSI !finishes are the primary factors 
in selection. But, in this particular case, because of the manner that USFSS organized its Official 
Selection Rules, the selection criteria are subordinate to the eligibility criteria. In other words, the 
eligibility criteria serve as the foundational requirements for team membership. These criteria are 
non-negotiable and must be met by all individuals seeking to join the team. In contrast, the selection 
criteria function as a secondary set of factors. They are applied only to candidates who have already 
satisfied the eligibility criteria and are used to determine the order of preference among qualified 
applicants. 
Despite the Petitioner refuting the Director's analysis and determination, we agree with the Director's 
decision. On appeal, the Petitioner does not argue which of the bulleted eligibility criteria above 
demonstrates the USFSS team requires outstanding achievements simply to qualify for consideration 
as a team member. And she is incorrect in the assertion that past performance, especially in IFSS 
______________ finishes are the primary factors that determine who can be a 
team member. Those considerations fall under the subordinate area of what the USFSS characterizes 
as the selection criteria, but it is their eligibility criteria that determines who can be a team member, 
and those criteria do not mandate outstanding achievements. 
"The petitioner must show that membership in the association requires outstanding achievements in 
the field for which classification is sought, as judged by recognized national or international experts." 
See generally 6 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, F.2(B)(l )). Based on the eligibility criteria, it is clear 
that the USFSS is not an association that holds such a requirement. 
And within the letter from the USFSS' former president, Mike Marsch, he discusses membership in 
the organization stating that "[i]in order to be selected for Team USA, previous competitive racing 
success at the highest level is key." Mr. Marsch went on to list some of the subordinate selection 
criteria that we have concluded are not determinative of who the team will accept as members. He 
further states the USFSS "board did in fact approve [the Petitioner] as a member of Team USA based 
upon her high achievements in international competition." The test as stated in the regulation is not 
the reason any one individual was approved as a member. Instead, it is what the organization mandates 
8 
for all candidates at the membership level the Petitioner is asserting. As a result, we do not find Mr. 
Marsch's correspondence to be any more persuasive than the USFSS' eligibility criteria listed in its 
Official Selection Rules. 
We therefore conclude that the Petitioner has not submitted evidence that meets the plain language 
requirements of this criterion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not submitted the required initial evidence of either a one-time achievement or 
documents that meet at least three of the ten criteria. As a result, we do not need to provide the type 
of final merits determination referenced in Kazarian, 596 F.3d at 1119-20. Nevertheless, we advise 
that we have reviewed the record in the aggregate, concluding it does not support a finding that the 
Petitioner has established the acclaim and recognition required for the classification sought. 
The Petitioner seeks a highly restrictive visa classification, intended for individuals already at the top 
of their respective fields, rather than for individuals progressing toward that goal. USCIS has long 
held that even athletes performing at the major league level do not automatically meet the 
"extraordinary ability" standard. Matter of Price, 20 I&N Dec. 953, 954 (Assoc. Comm'r 1994). 
Here, the Petitioner has not shown the significance of their work is indicative of the required sustained 
national or international acclaim or that it is consistent with a "career of acclaimed work in the field" 
as contemplated by Congress. H.R. Rep. No. lO1-723, 59 (Sept. 19, 1990); see also section 
203(b)(1 )(A). Moreover, the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the Petitioner has garnered 
national or international acclaim in the field, and they are one of the small percentage who has risen 
to the very top of the field of endeavor. See section 203(b)(l)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). 
For the reasons discussed above, the Petitioner has not demonstrated her eligibility as an individual of 
extraordinary ability. The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered 
as an independent and alternate basis for the decision. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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