dismissed EB-1A Case: Athletics (Tennis Coaching)

Pt JW .TC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 0 CT 2 9 2009 
SRC 08 081 52572 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Alien of Extraordinary Ability Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1153(b)(l)(A) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa 
petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner seeks classification as an "alien of extraordinary ability" in athletics, pursuant to section 
203(b)(l)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(A). The director 
determined the petitioner had not established the sustained national or international acclaim necessary 
to qualify for classification as an alien of extraordinary ability. 
On appeal, counsel submits a brief. For the reasons discussed below, we uphold the director's overall 
determination that the petitioner has not established her eligibility for the exclusive classification 
sought. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part, that: 
(1) Priority workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are 
aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(A) Aliens with extraordinary ability. -- An alien is described in this subparagraph if -- 
(i) the alien has extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, 
business, or athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or 
international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the 
field through extensive documentation, 
(ii) the alien seeks to enter the United States to continue work in the area of 
extraordinary ability, and 
(iii) the alien's entry into the United States will substantially benefit 
prospectively the United States. 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) have consistently recognized that Congress intended to set a very high standard for individuals 
seeking immigrant visas as aliens of extraordinary ability. See 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60898-9 (Nov. 29, 
1991). As used in this section, the term "extraordinary ability" means a level of expertise indicating 
that the individual is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of 
endeavor. 8 C.F.R. $204.5(h)(2). The specific requirements for supporting documents to establish that 
an alien has sustained national or international acclaim and recognition in his or her field of expertise 
are set forth in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(3). The relevant criteria will be addressed below. 
It should be reiterated, however, that the petitioner must show that she has sustained national or 
international acclaim at the very top level. 
This petition seeks to classifj the petitioner as an alien with extraordinary ability as an assistant tennis 
coach. First, we will not narrow the petitioner's field to assistant coaches. Rather, she must compare 
with the most experienced and renowned tennis coaches nationally, including head coaches. 
As stated by the director in the request for additional evidence, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h) 
requires the beneficiary to "continue work in the area of expertise." The petitioner intends to work as 
a coach in the United States. While a tennis player and a coach certainly share knowledge of tennis, 
the two rely on very different sets of basic skills. Thus, competitive athletics and coaching are not 
the same area of expertise. See Lee v. I.N.S., 237 F. Supp. 2d 914,918 (N.D. Ill. 2002). In response 
to the director's request, the petitioner noted the discussion of this issue in the memorandum by 
Michael Aytes, Acting Associate Director, Domestic Operations, USCIS, AFM Update: Chapter 22: 
Employment-based Petitions (AD03-Ol), HQPRD70123.12 (Sept. 12,2006). 
We recognize that there exists a nexus between playing and coaching a given sport. To assume that 
every extraordinary athlete's area of expertise includes coaching, however, would be too speculative. 
To resolve this issue, the following balance is appropriate. In a case where an alien has clearly 
achieved recent national or international acclaim as an athlete and has sustained that acclaim in the 
field of coaching at a national level, we can consider the totality of the evidence as establishing an 
overall pattern of sustained acclaim and extraordinary ability such that we can conclude that 
coaching is within the petitioner's area of expertise. Specifically, in such a case we will consider the 
level at which the alien acts as coach. A coach who has an established successful history of coaching 
athletes who compete regularly at the national level has a credible claim; a coach of novices does 
not. 
In the response to the director's request for additional evidence, counsel asserted that the evidence of 
the petitioner's accomplishments as a competitor and coach show "an overall pattern of sustained 
acclaim and extraordinary ability." Counsel references the above memorandum again on appeal. 
Nothing in the memorandum referenced by counsel suggests that the petitioner may rely on a vague 
"overall pattern of sustained acclaim" without first establishing extraordinary ability as an athlete (as 
defined in the pertinent regulations). Rather, if the petitioner is unable to meet the regulatory 
evidentiary requirements as a coach but is able to do so with recent evidence as an athlete, she may 
then present evidence that coaching also falls within her area of expertise. Thus, we will examine 
below whether the petitioner has demonstrated her extraordinary ability as an athlete or a coach. For 
the reasons discussed below, the petitioner does not meet the necessary criteria as an athlete. Thus, 
she must meet the necessary evidentiary criteria as a coach rather than simply demonstrate that 
coaching is within her area of expertise. As will be discussed below, she has not established that she 
meets the necessary evidentiary criteria as a coach. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5(h)(3) indicates that an alien can establish sustained national or 
international acclaim through evidence of a one-time achievement (that is, a major, international 
recognized award). Barring the alien's receipt of such an award, the regulation outlines ten criteria, at 
least three of which must be satisfied for an alien to establish the sustained acclaim necessary to qualify 
as an alien of extraordinary ability. 
At the outset, we note that the petitioner relies heavily on letters, two of which are unsigned and, thus, 
have no evidentiary value. In addressing whether or not the petitioner had established that she has 
performed a qualifying leading or critical role pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(3)(viii), the director 
stated: "The evidentiary requirements of this criterion heavily favor objective evidence that exists 
because of the petitioner's acclaim, rather than materials (such as witness letters) created specifically to 
assist the petitioner with her visa petition." 
On appeal, counsel asserts that it is unreasonable to require "pre-existing" rather than "solicited" letters 
and asserts that the letters submitted fall under the comparable evidence standard set forth at 8 C.F.R. 
5 204.5(h)(4). 
Counsel misunderstands the director's concerns. We agree with the director that witness letters alone 
cannot support eligibility under this classification, which, according to section 203(b)(l)(A)(i), requires 
"extensive evidence." The opinions of experts in the field, while not without weight, cannot form the 
cornerstone of a successful claim of sustained national or international acclaim. USCIS may, in its 
discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. See Matter of Caron 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 79 1, 795 (Comm'r. 1988). However, USCIS is ultimately responsible for 
making the final determination regarding an alien's eligibility for the benefit sought. Id. 
 The 
submission of letters from experts supporting the petition is not presumptive evidence of eligibility; 
USCIS may evaluate the content of those letters as to whether they support the alien's eligibility. See 
id. at 795. USCIS may even give less weight to an opinion that is not corroborated, in accord with 
other information or is in any way questionable. Id. at 795; see also Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm'r. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l. 
Comm'r. 1972)). 
Ultimately, objective evidence other than letters (solicited or otherwise) in existence prior to the 
preparation of the petition carries greater weight than new materials prepared especially for 
submission with the petition. We agree with the director's implication that an individual with 
sustained national or international acclaim should be able to produce unsolicited materials other than 
letters reflecting that acclaim. See also Kazarian v. USCIS, - F. 3d -, 2009 WL 2836453, *5 (9' 
Cir. 2009). 
Nevertheless, regarding the leading or critical role criterion at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(3)(viii), it would 
appear that letters from employers could serve as appropriate evidence of the nature of the petitioner's 
role for those employers, see 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(g)(l), although employment contracts and organizational 
charts are also useful. Thus, while we concur with the director that, in general, letters must be 
supported by preexisting objective evidence other than letters to establish eligibility for the 
- 
classification sought, we withdraw the implication that they cannot serve as probative evidence relating 
to 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(3)(viii). 
Page 5 
We acknowledge that the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5(h)(4) allows the submission of comparable 
evidence where the regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(3) are not "readily applicable." First, the 
petitioner has not demonstrated that the regulatory criteria are not readily applicable to her occupation. 
Significantly, she claims to meet several of those criteria. Regardless, we are not persuaded that 
general affirmations of acclaim or talent from peers selected by the petitioner are comparable to the 
objective evidence required under the ten regulatory criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. fj 204.5(h)(3). See 
generally Kazarian, 2009 WL 2836453 at "5. Thus, we will not consider the letters as comparable 
evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5(h)(4) and will instead consider those letters only insofar as they 
address the regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(3). 
The petitioner initially submitted evidence without any explanation as to which criteria that evidence is 
purported to meet. In response to the director's request for additional evidence and again on appeal, 
counsel addresses the following criteria under 8 C.F.R. fj 204.5(h)(3).' 
Documentation ofthe alien's receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or 
awards for excellence in thejeld of endeavor. 
Regarding her success as a competitor, the petitioner submitted Romanian championship awards and 
U.S. collegiate awards. While the professional awards carry more weight than the collegiate awards 
given the existence of professional championships in the sport, we are satisfied that the petitioner meets 
this criterion as an athlete. For the reasons discussed below, however, the petitioner does not meet any 
other criterion as an athlete. 
We note that the record contains evidence that some awards exist for tennis coaches. For example, 
at Georgia Tech, received the U.S. Tennis ~ssociaiion 
(USTA)/Intercollegiate Tennis Association (ITA) National Coach of the Year title in 2007. Thus, it 
- 
appears that this criterion is readily applicable and we need not consider comparable evidence under 
this criterion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(4). Nevertheless, as the director considered the issue of 
whether the petitioner might meet this criterion though comparable evidence, we will also consider 
whether the petitioner has demonstrated qualifLing awards or prizes received by athletes directly under 
her tutelage at the time. Before discussing the evidence, we note that the petitioner must establish 
eligibility as of the date the petition was filed, January 11, 2008. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(l), (12); 
Ogundipe v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); Matter of Katigbak, 4 I&N Dec. 45, 49 
(Reg'l. Comrn'r. 1971). Thus, awards issued after that date cannot be considered. See Matter of 
Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Comm'r. 1998) (citing Matter of Bardouille, 18 I&N Dec. 1 14 (BIA 
1981)). The director concluded that the evidence of the success of the team for which the petitioner 
serves as an assistant coach postdates the filing of the petition. 
1 
The petitioner does not claim to meet or submit evidence relating to the criteria not discussed in this 
decision. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to consider the success of athletes coached by the 
petitioner in 2005 through 2007. The petitioner cannot be credited with the success of any Georgia 
Tech player prior to taking her position as an assistant coach for that team. At Florida State 
University, while a volunteerlgraduate assistant coach, the petitioner was primarily a student. The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(h)(3)(i) unambiguously requires evidence of the alien's receipt of a 
qualifying award. On a case-by-case basis, awards won by athletes under the primary tutelage of a 
coach at the time of the award may be considered comparable evidence under this criterion for the 
coach. To credit the volunteerlgraduate assistant coach with an award received by another player, 
however, cannot credibly be considered "comparable" to winning a qualifying award oneself and 
would credit someone so far removed from the achievement as to render this criterion meaningless. 
Regardless, the achievements of Florida State University students referenced by counsel on appeal 
include a sixth place ranking and an "NCAA Tournament bid." These are not nationally recognized 
prizes or awards. 
According to her curriculum vitae, the petitioner spent one year as an assistant coach at East 
Tennessee State. This year of experience is referenced in a press release regarding the petitioner's 
selection for the same position at Georgia Tech but the record contains no evidence regarding the 
success of any players at East Tennessee State during the petitioner's time there. Regardless, the 
accomplishments referenced by counsel2 on appeal include a regional ranking and conference "final 
appearance." Once again, these accomplishments are not nationally or internationally recognized 
prizes or awards. 
A July 3, 2007 press release announces the petitioner's selection as an assistant coach at Georgia 
Tech. As stated above, the petition was filed on January 11, 2008. Thus, we will consider the 
evidence of Georgia Tech players' success between those two dates and whether the record supports 
the proposition that the petitioner is responsible for any success during that period. One month after 
the petition's filing date, Georgia Tech won the ITA National Team Indoor Title. This 
accomplishment, however, postdates the filing of the petition. While the team qualified for the event 
prior to the filing date, the qualifying games do not constitute nationally or internationally recognized 
awards or prizes. On July 5, 2007, three Georgia Tech players were named to the 2007 All-ACC 
Academic Women's Tennis Team based on their academic achievements. The selection of the 
petitioner as assistant coach at Georgia Tech had only been announced and these players were 
selected based on academic rather than athletic ability. Thus, we will not consider these selections. 
A January 9, 2008 article states that the Georgia Tech's women's tennis team earned the top spot in 
the first national poll of the 2008 season as announced by the ITA. The record, however, contains 
little evidence regarding the criteria for this poll. Any consideration of the team's success in the 
previous season cannot be credited to the petitioner. 
2 
 The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 
534 n.2 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 3 n.2 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 
I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
In light of the above, the petitioner has not established that any of the Georgia Tech athletes on the 
team for which she served as assistant coach had won nationally or internationally recognized awards 
or prizes prior to the date of filing. Even if we found that some of the above awards were nationally 
or internationally recognized, we would then need to consider whether these awards can serve as 
comparable evidence of the petitioner's actual receipt of a prize or award. 
"delegated all academic liaison and oversight responsibilities in the Fall 2007 for the Georgia Tech 
Women's tennis team" to the petitioner. While these duties are not tennis-related, we note that= 
attests to other duties. Specifically, asserts that the petitioner was involved in 
scouting and recruitment, conducting individual workouts, designing the off court conditioning 
program and participating in all of the team's critical decisions. Given the emphasis in 8 C.F.R. 
5 204.5(h)(3)(i) on the alien's receipt of a qualifying prize, we are not persuaded that the petitioner's 
workout and off-court conditioning responsibilities are comparable to the type of personal 
recognition garnered by actually receiving an award. Significantly, none of the published material 
about the athletes' success mentions the petitioner as the coach behind the success. Thus, we are not 
persuaded that, at this stage in her coaching career, the petitioner can be fully credited with the 
awards received by athletes on the team for which she serves as an assistant coach. We will revisit 
the petitioner's responsibilities, however, in considering whether the role she was hired to fill is 
either leading or critical pursuant to 8 C.F.R. tj 204,5(h)(3)(viii). 
In summary, while the petitioner meets this criterion as an athlete, she does not meet this criterion as 
a coach. 
Published material about the alien in professional or major trade publications or other major 
media, relating to the alien's work in the field for which classzfication is sought. Such evidence 
shall include the title, date, and author of the material, and any necessary translation. 
On appeal, counsel does not contest the director's conclusions that the published materials submitted, 
much of which postdate the filing of the petition, are not primarily "about" the petitioner relating to her 
work as an athlete or coach and that the petitioner had not established that the source of these materials 
constitute professional or major trade publications or other major media. We affirm the director's 
finding that the materials, which are primarily tennis match results or press releases regarding the 
selection of the petitioner for the position at Georgia Tech, cannot serve to meet this criterion for the 
reasons stated by the director. 
Evidence of the alien's original scientific, scholarly, artistic, athletic, or business-related 
contributions of major signiJicance in the field. 
In response to the director's request for additional evidence, counsel relied on attestations of the 
petitioner's benefit to her employers to meet this criterion. The director concluded that the petitioner 
had not established her contribution to the world of tennis coaching. The director then asserted that 
evidence to meet this criterion might include letters from top officials at national organizations or 
agencies, scholarly articles or heavy independent citation. The director also discussed the relevance of 
patents. On appeal, counsel asserts that scholarly articles and patents are not expected from a tennis 
coach. Counsel reaffirms her previous assertion that letters fiom other coaches serve to meet this 
criterion. 
We withdraw the director's discussion of scholarly articles, citation and patents as irrelevant to the 
petitioner's field. Nevertheless, according to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 204.5(h)(3)(v), an alien's 
contributions must be both "original" and "of major significance." We must presume that the phrases 
"original" and "major significance" are not superfluous and, thus, that they have some meaning. We 
are persuaded that this criterion is readily applicable to the petitioner's field as original contributions, 
such as national or world records, do exist in athletics. 
As stated above, the opinions of experts in the field, while not without weight, cannot form the 
cornerstone of a successful claim of sustained national or international acclaim. USCIS may, in its 
discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. See Matter of Caron 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 795. However, USCIS is ultimately responsible for making the final 
determination regarding an alien's eligibility for the benefit sought. Id. The submission of letters 
from experts supporting the petition is not presumptive evidence of eligibility; USCIS may evaluate 
the content of those letters as to whether they support the alien's eligibility. See id. at 795. USCIS 
may even give less weight to an opinion that is not corroborated, in accord with other information or 
is in any way questionable. Id. at 795; see also Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. at 190). 
In evaluating the reference letters, we note that letters containing mere assertions of widespread 
acclaim and vague claims of contributions are less persuasive than letters that specifically identify 
contributions and provide specific examples of how those contributions have influenced the field. 
Vague, solicited letters fi-om local colleagues or letters that do not specifically identify contributions 
or how those contributions have influenced the field are insufficient. Kazarian, 2009 WL 2836453 
at *5. 
at the University of Nebraska who previously worked 
with the petitioner at Florida State University, asserts that the petitioner "has many intangibles that 
make her a unique and very qualified collegiate coach." He concludes that she is "more than qualified 
to serve as an Assistant coach and that he-expects her to excel, "eventually serving as a Head coach." 
currently Head Coach at the University of North Carolina and the petitioner's former 
coach at Florida State University, asserts that the petitioner is "already one of the best assistant coaches 
in the country, but she has the knowledge, passion and compassion ti be one of the finest head coaches 
in the U.S. in the very near future." These general accolades do not identifl a specific contribution or 
explain how it is original or has impacted the field of tennis coaching as a whole. Moreover, while 
- 
counsel asserts that the director erred in taking specific statements out of context, we cannot ignore that 
these letters stop short of asserting that the petitioner is already one of the small percentage at the top of 
her field, including head coaches. Rather, they conclude that her abilities will allow her to achieve this 
level in the future. That said, we acknowledge that in a subsequent letter asserts that the 
petitioner's knowledge "is far superior to most division 1 head coaches." Still, even in this second 
letter, 
 does not explain how the petitioner has impacted the field. 
of ~thletics at Georgia Tech, asserts that the petitioner's accomplishments as 
a player and coach are an asset to the school and student athletes. 
 Tennis 
coach at Georgia Tech praises the petitioner's recruitment efforts and ability to challenge the players on 
the court. Merely contributing to the team she serves, however, is neither original nor of major 
significance to the field of tennis coaching as a whole. 
a professional tennis player, asserts that the petitioner is a hard worker and brings out the 
best in others. Once again, this general praise does not address the question of how the petitioner's 
work is either original or of major significance. 
tennis player can be utilized to be a successful coach. As stated above, we do not deny the existence of 
a nexus between playing and coaching. does not identify a specific contribution or 
ex~lain how it has impacted the field. He does not claim to have been influenced bv the ~etitioner 
himself. Similarly, 1 ~thletics Director at the ~niversit; of dklahoma, 
discusses the significance of securing the position at Georgia Tech but does not explain how the 
petitioner has impacted his own tennis coaches or the field of tennis coaching as a whole. We will 
consider the nature of the petitioner's position below pursuant to 8 C.F.R. fj 204.5(h)(3)(viii). 
a former tennis player at Florida State University, asserts that the petitioner's 
unique language skills allow foreign students to communicate in their native language and that her 
- - 
 - - 
unique experience as a former professional player sets her apart "from many other collegiate tennis 
coaches." We are not persuaded that speaking multiple languages, while useful in recruiting and 
communicating with foreign students, is an original contribution of major significance to the field of 
tennis coaching. While the petitioner's experience may help her serve her athletes, once again, that is 
not a contribution to the field of tennis coaching as a whole such that it can be considered to be of 
major significance. 
tennis player, asserts that the Tennis Channel visited Geor ia Tech 
and the petitioner providing coaching tips. While 
 asserts 
that this program will be aired to the larger tennis audience, the record does not establish that it had 
aired as of the date of filing. Thus, the recording cannot be considered. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(l), 
(12); Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49. 
The remaining letters provide similar broad accolades. 
 The record does not establish that the 
petitioner's accomplishments as an athlete are either original or of major significance. Every tennis 
match has a winner; it is not an original accomplishment. This conclusion does not suggest that these 
Page 10 
wins are irrelevant; we have already concluded that the petitioner meets the awards criterion at 8 C.F.R. 
8 204.5(h)(3)(i). We simply conclude that success on the court cannot also serve to meet this entirely 
separate criterion. Regarding her coaching accomplishments, the petitioner had only been coaching a 
short time as of the date of filing. While she clearly contributed to her team, already a successful team 
at the time she joined Georgia Tech, none of the references have adequately explained how an ability to 
perform well as an assistant coach is either original or of major significance to the wider field of tennis 
coaching. 
In light of the above, the petitioner has not established that she meets this criterion as an athlete or as a 
coach. 
Evidence that the alien has performed in a leading or critical role for organizations or 
establishments that have a distinguished reputation. 
The record contains no evidence that the petitioner meets this criterion as an athlete.3 Thus, we will 
limit our consideration to the evidence of her role as an assistant coach. As stated above, we withdraw 
the director's concern that letters from the petitioner's employer are not probative evidence for this 
criterion. At issue for this criterion are the nature of the role the petitioner was hired to fill and the 
reputation of the entity that hired her. In other words, the selection of the petitioner for this role, in and 
of itself, must be at least consistent with national or international acclaim. 
The petitioner was bred as an assistant coach for the women's tennis team at Georgia Tech. The record 
adequately establishes the nationally distinguished reputation of this school's women's tennis team. We 
are not persuaded that an assistant coach plays a leading role for the team. At issue, then is whether the 
role is sufficiently critical. We note that the team's brochure indicates that the team has a head coach, 
an assistant coach and a volunteer assistant coach. We are hesitant to find that every member of the 
team's coaching staff plays a sufficiently critical role for the team as contemplated by 8 C.F.R. 
tj 204.5(h)(3)(viii). Such a finding risks rendering this criterion meaningless. 
As the assistant coach, the petitioner is not only responsible for monitoring the team members' 
academic performance, she also participates in recruitment, workouts and conditioning training. Some 
of the letters suggest that the petitioner not only participates in recruiting identified players, but also 
helps scout prospects. Given the evidence in the aggregate, both that discussed above and other 
evidence in the record, we are satisfied that the petitioner minimally meets this criterion as a coach. 
In summary, the petitioner must establish that she either meets three criteria as a coach, or, given her 
recent switch from competing to coaching, that she meets three criteria as an athlete and coaches at the 
national level. The record establishes that the petitioner meets the awards criterion at 8 C.F.R. 
$204.5(h)(3)(i) as an athlete and plays a qualifying critical role as a coach pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
We have already considered the petitioner's athletic awards above pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(h)(3)(i). We 
are not persuaded that these awards are also presumptive to meet this entirely separate criterion at 8 C.F.R. 
5 204.5(h)(3)(viii). 
$204.5(h)(3)(viii). Even if we somehow looked at both her competitive and coaching 
accomplishments as some type of "overall pattern," the petitioner has not established that she meets at 
least three criteria. 
The documentation submitted in support of a claim of extraordinary ability must clearly demonstrate 
that the alien has achieved sustained national or international acclaim and is one of the small percentage 
who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor. 
Review of the record, however, does not establish that the petitioner has distinguished herself as a 
tennis coach to such an extent that she may be said to have achieved sustained national or international 
acclaim or to be within the small percentage at the very top of her field. The evidence indicates that the 
petitioner shows talent as an assistant tennis coach, but is not persuasive that the petitioner's 
achievements set her significantly above almost all others in her field. Therefore, the petitioner has not 
established eligibility pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(A) of the Act and the petition may not be approved. 
The burden of proof in visa petition proceedings remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the petitioner has not sustained that burden. Accordingly, the appeal 
will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.