dismissed EB-1A Case: Biological Science

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: OCT. 4, 2024 In Re: 33942824 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (Extraordinary Ability) 
The Petitioner is a researcher who seeks classification as an alien of extraordinary ability. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(l)(A). This first 
preference classification makes immigrant visas available to those who can demonstrate their 
extraordinary ability through sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have 
been recognized in their field through extensive documentation. 
The Texas Service Center Director denied the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers 
(petition), concluding that the Petitioner did not establish her eligibility. The matter is now before us 
on appeal. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility to U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 291 of the Act; Matter of 
Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. 
Matter of Christa 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will 
dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
To qualify under this immigrant 
classification, the statute requires the filing party demonstrate: 
• The foreign national enjoys extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or 
athletics; 
• They seek to enter the country to continue working in the area of extraordinary ability; and 
• The foreign national's entry into the United States will substantially benefit the country in the 
future. 
Section 203(b)(1 )(A)(i)- (iii) of the Act. The term "extraordinary ability" refers only to those 
individuals in "that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor." 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(2). 
The implementing regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) sets forth a multi-step analysis. In the first 
step, a petitioner can demonstrate international recognition of his or her achievements in the field 
through a one-time achievement (that is, a major, internationally recognized award). If that petitioner 
does not submit this evidence, then he or she must provide sufficient qualifying documentation that 
meets at least three of the ten criteria listed at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x) (including items such as 
awards, published material in certain media, and scholarly articles). 
Where a petitioner meets these initial evidence requirements, we then move to the second step to 
consider the totality of the material provided in a final merits determination and assess whether the 
record shows sustained national or international acclaim and demonstrates that the individual is among 
the small percentage at the very top of the field of endeavor. See Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 
1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing a two-step review where the documentation is first counted and then, 
if fulfilling the required number of criteria, considered in the context of a final merits determination); 
see also Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2022). 
TI. ANALYSIS 
The Petitioner completed her PhD in Biological Science in 2022, and when she filed the petition she 
worked for a clinical-stage biotechnology company. 
Because the Petitioner has not indicated or established that she has received a major, internationally 
recognized award, she must satisfy at least three of the alternate regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). The Director decided that the Petitioner satisfied two of the criteria relating to 
judging and authoring scholarly articles, but she had not satisfied the criteria associated with original 
contributions of major significance. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that she meets the 
contributions criterion as well as performing in a leading or critical role. After reviewing all the 
evidence in the record, we agree with the Director's ultimate determination. 
We begin addressing counsel's argument in the appeal brief that the Director improperly invoked a 
precedent decision: Matter ofKatigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45 (Reg'l Comrn'r 1971). The Director accepted 
the Petitioner's Google Scholar profile printout she filed with the petition, but when she offered an 
updated profile in her request for evidence (RFE) response, the Director cited to Katigbak and noted they 
would only consider evidence that existed on the date she filed the petition. While the Petitioner attempts 
to distinguish this case's facts with those in Katigbak and they view this as an error, we do not. Katigbak, 
14 I&N Dec. at 49 provides: 
If the petition is approved, he has established a priority date for visa number assignment 
as of the date that petition was filed. A petition may not be approved for a profession for 
which the Beneficiary is not qualified at the time of its filing. The Beneficiary cannot 
expect to qualify subsequently by taking additional courses and then still claim a priority 
date as of the date the petition was filed, a date on which he was not qualified. 
Section 204 of the Act requires the filing of a visa petition for classification under section 
203(a)(3). The latter section states, in pertinent part: "Visas shall next be made available 
to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions." (Emphasis added.) It is 
clear that it was the intent of Congress that an alien be a recognized and fully qualified 
member of the professions at the time the petition is filed. Congress did not intend that a 
petition that was properly denied because the Beneficiary was not at that time qualified 
be subsequently approved at a future date when the Beneficiary may become qualified 
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under a new set of facts. To do otherwise would make a farce of the preference system 
and priorities set up by statute and regulation. 
Id. The Regional Commissioner continued this reasoning in Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 T&N Dec. 
158, 160 (Reg'l Cornrn'r 1977). That decision reemphasizes the importance of not obtaining a priority 
date prior to being eligible based on future experience. In fact, despite counsel's assertion to the contrary, 
this principle has been extended beyond the foreign national's eligibility for the classification sought. For 
example, an employer must establish its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the date of filing. Matter 
of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144--45 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). That decision provides that a 
petition should not become approvable under a new set of facts. Recognizing that Matter of Katigbak, 
14 I&N Dec. at 49 was not "foursquare with the instant case" in that it dealt with a beneficiary's eligibility, 
Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. at 145 still applies the reasoning. The decision provides: 
In sixth-preference visa petition proceedings the Service must consider the merits of the 
Petitioner's job offer, so that a determination can be made whether the job offer is realistic 
and whether the wage offer can be met, as well as determine whether the alien meets the 
minimum requirements to perform the offered job satisfactorily. It follows that such 
consideration by the Service would necessarily be focused on the circumstances at the 
time offiling of the petition. The Petitioner in the instant case cannot expect to establish 
a priority date for visa issuance for the Beneficiary when at the time of making the job 
offer and the filing of the petition with this Service he could not, in all reality, pay the 
salary as stated in the job offer. 
(Emphasis in original.) Finally, when evaluating revisions to a partnership agreement the Associate 
Commissioner stated that "a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the Petitioner becomes 
eligible under a new set of facts." Matter oflzummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 175 (Assoc. Comm'r 1998). The 
Izummi decision further provides that USCIS cannot "consider facts that come into being only subsequent 
to the filing of a petition." Id. at 176. "To do otherwise would make a farce of the preference system and 
priorities set up by statute and regulation." Matter ofBardouille, 18 I&N Dec. 114, 117 (BIA 1981 ). 
While citations published after the date of filing may serve as evidence of the continued relevance of a 
foreign national's work that had already been well cited as of the filing date, they cannot be considered 
evidence that they were already influential as of that date. Moreover, a petitioner's articles that were not 
published as of the date of filing and, thus, had not been subject to peer review and disseminated in the 
field as of that date, cannot establish eligibility as of the date of filing. To hold otherwise would have the 
untenable result of a foreign national securing a priority date based on the speculation that their work 
might prove influential while the petition is pending. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12) 
further supports this limitation and requires a filing party to demonstrate eligibility as of the date they 
file the petition. 
A. Evidence of the alien's original scientific, scholarly, artistic, athletic, or business-related contributions 
of major significance in the field. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(v). 
The primary requirements here are that the Petitioner's contributions in their field were original and 
they rise to the level of major significance in the field as a whole, rather than to a project or to an 
organization. See Amin, 24 F.4th at 394 ( citing Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F. Supp. 3d 126, 134 (D.D.C. 
3 
2013)). The regulatory phrase "major significance" is not superfluous and, thus, it has some meaning. 
Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392,415 (2019) (finding that every word and every provision in a statute 
is to be given effect and none should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate 
another provision or to have no consequence). Further, the Petitioner's contributions must have 
already been realized rather than being potential, future improvements. Contributions of major 
significance connotes that the Petitioner's work has significantly impacted the field. The Petitioner 
must submit evidence satisfying all of these elements to meet the plain language requirements of this 
criterion. 
The Director discussed the Petitioner's evidence to include her publication record, the journal rankings 
where her works were published, opinion letters from others in her field, and her judging service. 
While the Director acknowledged the originality of her work, they determined that she did not 
demonstrate that work was already of major significance in her field. Within the appeal, the Petitioner 
divides the brief into two sections. The first section discusses evidence the Director didn't mention in 
the denial, or didn't adequately evaluate. Within the second section, the Petitioner asserts the Director 
did not evaluate the evidence under the preponderance standard. Because there is some evidentiary 
crossover between the two sections, for simplicity, we will follow the same format in this decision that 
the Petitioner used in the appeal brief. 
1. Evidence the Director Ignored or Failed to Evaluate 
On appeal the Petitioner argues the Director either ignored or did not evaluate some of her evidence. 
For instance, regarding to her evidence relating to the citation percentiles, the Petitioner submitted an 
article to the Director from Scientometrics authored by Lutz Bornmann and W emer Marx, entitled 
"How to evaluate individual researchers working in the natural and life sciences meaningfully? A 
proposal of methods based on percentiles of citations." 
This article presented their opinions for "how to evaluate individual researchers in the natural and life 
sciences" for purposes of fonding and promotion or hiring decisions. The authors stated that 
"publications which are among the 10% most cited publications in their subject area are as a rule called 
highly cited or excellent" and that "the top l0% based excellence indicator" should be given "the 
highest weight when comparing the scientific performance of single researchers." But the Petitioner 
did not offer evidence establishing reputable academic or professional organizations have accepted 
and implemented these authors' methodology. Here, the Petitioner has not shown their alleged abuse 
of discretion, nor does this evidence satisfy their burden of persuasion. See Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N 
Dec. 1136, 1142 n.3 (BIA 1998) (finding that a petitioner's burden of proof comprises both the initial 
burden of production, as well as the ultimate burden of persuasion). 
We further note these authors advise against "using Google Scholar (GS) as a basis for bibliometric 
analysis. Several studies have pointed out that GS has numerous deficiencies for research evaluation." 
Yet, the Petitioner has relied on Google Scholar materials throughout these proceedings. 
Furthermore, the Petitioner submitted OpenAlex author metrics she claims compares her citation 
impact to that of other researchers. While this information lists a percentile ranking, we note issues 
that diminish the evidentiary value of the evidence. First, the material is not dated. Second, the 
document simply lists categories and data associated with those categories and it does not reflect that 
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the actual source of the information was OpenAlex as claimed. And third, the Petitioner did not submit 
material revealing the method by which the presented figures were calculated. This collectively means 
we have no method to verify the information the Petitioner presented. Although this does not render 
the evidence to be of no worth, its value is significantly diminished. The Petitioner cannot meet her 
burden of proof relying on this qualitatively deficient material. In evaluating the evidence, the truth 
is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. See Chawathe, 25 I&N 
Dec. at 376 (quoting Matter ofE-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm'r 1989)). 
Other material the Petitioner claims the Director did not consider consists of media articles, but a 
review of that material reveals it is insufficient. The New York Post and New York Daily News articles 
mentioned the university where the Petitioner received her PhD, but they do not mention her. Nor 
does the Business Insider article make any mention of the Petitioner. While we agree with the 
Petitioner that the Director did not analyze these articles, the Petitioner has not shown they are relevant 
to her claims that she has made contributions of major significance in her field, and we do not consider 
this to be a proper basis for the Petitioner's appeal. 
And finally, the Petitioner claims the Director "did not engage with the letters of recommendation" 
from four authors. She asserts the authors of these four letters discussed the influence of the 
Petitioner's findings on the authors' own research work. She further mentions that two other letters 
discussed the impact of her research on the field at large. The appeal brief does not discuss each letter 
and convey how the individual author expressed her achievements in a manner that would help her in 
fulfilling this criterion's requirements. Based on this shortcoming and because the burden rests with 
the Petitioner to demonstrate how the Director erred, we will discuss a sampling of the letters. 
The Petitioner's advisor at the university where she earned her PhD discussed both her and his 
qualifications and indicated that she discovered that a medication the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approved to treat a form of arthritis (auranofin) was highly beneficial in limiting the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2) infection. He further noted that her 
research contributed foundational knowledge needed to develop therapeutic treatments for COVID-19 
and similar viruses. 
However, this merely expresses the originality of her research but is absent of information relating to 
how that original research impacted the field. This is inadequate to show that the Petitioner's 
contributions rose to a level of major significance. 
Next, we discuss a sample of the letters in which the authors discussed the influence of the Petitioner's 
work on their own and on other researchers' work. We will review the letter from _____ 
an assistant professor of microbiology and cell biology in India. Within his letter he described how 
the Petitioner's same research relating to the FDA-approved arthritis drug auranofin was incorporated 
into work ublished in The Lancet Res irato Medicine. But a review of that work titled, 
____ does not reveal that the authors found her work to be an overall benefit to prospective 
patients. Instead, the authors found that auranofin resulted in life-threatening conditions such as low 
5 
blood platelet counts and intra-abdominal sepsis leading to the death oftest subjects. 1 The Petitioner's 
research contribution appears to be the type others in her field might want to avoid in treating 
COVID-19 patients, rather than the effective type of contribution to the field that the Petitioner 
presents it as in the appeal brief. Even though-as we have here-methods and treatment the field 
should avoid can be considered to be a contribution to the field, we conclude the Petitioner has not 
established that the evidence in the form of opinion letters adequately supports her claims under this 
criterion. 
And to close out this section, we note that the lack of a direct discussion of evidence does not mean 
that the Director ignored it; it instead may mean that they considered it and concluded it was 
unpersuasive. See United States v. Teixeira, 62 F.4th 10, 25 (1st Cir. 2023) (concluding a trier of fact 
"need not articulate its conclusions as to every jot and tittle of evidence in making a determination"). 
"Nothing is to be gained by a laundry-list recital of all evidence on the record supporting each view 
on every issue." Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 678 F.2d 327,351 (D.C. Cir. 
1982). 
2. Preponderance of the Evidence Standard of Proof 
The appeal brief couches the Petitioner's claims of the originality of her contributions, as well as that 
those contributions are of major significance, within the broader rubric that the Director did not apply 
the appropriate standard of proof: the preponderance of the evidence standard. Because the originality 
of her work was never in question, we will move to whether her contributions to the field rose to the 
level of major significance. 
Before we address the remainder of the Petitioner's claims, we provide the foundation for the standard 
of proof. As with most administrative proceedings, the standard of proof for this petition is the 
preponderance of the evidence. The preponderance standard of proof is the degree, or level, of proof 
demanded in a specific case. We are ultimately deciding whether a petitioner's claims are sufficiently 
supported by relevant, probative, and credible evidence. Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 369 reiterated the 
longstanding principle for the preponderance standard of proof. Ultimately, the truth is to be 
determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Id. at 376 ( citing E-M-, 20 I&N 
Dec. at 79-80). 
Now to the Petitioner's claims relating to her citation record and other opinion letters. For her citation 
record, the Petitioner identifies her published scholarly works and a book chapter she co-authored, her 
Google Scholar profile, and both the initially provided and the RFE response evidence from Clarivate 
Analytics InCites Essential Science Indicators. As we noted above, any material the Petitioner 
provided with the initially filed petition should factor into ours and the Director's decision but 
documentation submitted after that date that reflects her subsequent achievements will not play a role 
in this petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12); Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49. 
The Petitioner's Google Scholar profile reflected she had published nine works as of the date she filed 
the petition. Only two of those papers received more than 28 citations. In this portion of the Petitioner's 
Robert S Wallis, et al., I 
(2021). 
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1 
appeal brief, she does not explain how her Google Scholar profile individually, or combined with other 
evidence, demonstrates she has made contributions to her field that are of major significance. And within 
the appeal brief' s other portions she does not adequately explain it either other than to state that the 
Director: 
[E]essentially dismissed the evidence of [the Petitioner's] 455 citations" and "USCIS reasoned 
that "[e ]ven highly cited publications alone" [] were not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(v) "absent evidence that they were of 'major significance' as a citation 
number or ranking does not provide sufficient context to determine the impact or importance 
of a given researcher's work in the field" 
She then reengages the argument that the Director misapplied the Katigbak decision, which we 
disposed of as incorrect above. 
Although the Petitioner claims that citations to her work demonstrate a contribution of major 
significance, she has not demonstrated that the number of citations is significant. Nor has she shown 
that a notable number of the citing authors placed unusual reliance on her work, resulting in a 
significant impact within the field. Researchers throughout a given field may cite other published 
works without the cited work being notably influential or serving as a foundational basis for their own 
work. Even though others within the Petitioner's field have relied on her research findings within 
their own work, this is not sufficient to demonstrate that she has made contributions of major 
significance within the field. We agree that such references to her work are a contribution in the field, 
the evidence the Petitioner submitted reflects such reliance is only an incremental contribution. 
This portion of the appeal also identifies two additional opinion letters she claims plainly describe her 
research and explain why it is of major significance. The first letter is the same document we evaluated 
above from the Petitioner's advisor at the university where she attained her PhD, and he discusses the 
same original findings in which she discovered the effectiveness of an FDA-approved arthritis drug to 
treat SARS-COV-2. We reiterate that this treatment was later found to have possibly deadly or 
life-threatening effects in COVID-19 patients. Nevertheless, the Petitioner's advisor explained how 
these were original findings, stated it was significant, but stopped short of describing how those 
findings had any discernible effect in her field of endeavor. 
The second letter the Petitioner identifies is from Dr . _____ in which he discussed the need 
for a vaccine that simultaneously protects against COVID-19 and influenza viruses, and which this 
foreign national addressed through her research. He explained that she created a streamlined approach 
to vaccinations by simplifying the process, the vaccine's success in testing on mice, and indicated it 
provided insights into the development of multivalent vaccines. But he too falls short of delineating 
any impact of the Petitioner's approach within her field. 
And finally, the Petitioner contends that USCIS "fail[ed] to engage with all of the relevant evidence 
submitted in this case." Although we agree with the Petitioner that the Director did not directly discuss 
every piece of evidence that she considers as salient to qualifying under this program, she has not 
established how those omitted elements demonstrated her eligibility. In other words, the Petitioner 
did not explain how the Director's failure to discuss every document in detail changed the outcome of 
the case. And such a showing is the Petitioner's burden, which she fell short of meeting. 
7 
When USCIS provides a reasoned consideration to the petition, and has made adequate findings, it 
will not be required to specifically address each claim the Petitioner makes, nor is it necessary for it 
to address every piece of evidence the foreign national presents. Amin, 24 F.4th at 394; Martinez v. 
INS, 970 F.2d 973, 976 (1st Cir. 1992); ajf'd Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir. 2000); see 
also Pakasi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2009); Kazemzadeh v. US. Atty. Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 
1351 ( I Ith Cir. 2009). It is not enough to demonstrate errors in an agency's decision; the Petitioner 
must also establish that she was prejudiced by the mistakes. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 
(2009); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189,203 (2016); Amin, 24 F.4th at 394. 
As the Petitioner has not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the lack of discussion of any evidence, 
even if we agreed that this was an error, such a lapse appears harmless and is insufficient grounds 
upon which to base this appeal. Errors can be overlooked when they had no bearing on the substance 
of an agency's decision. Aguilar v. Garland, 60 F.4th 401, 407 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Prohibition 
Juice Co. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 45 F.4th 8, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). The party that 
"seeks to have a judgment set aside because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that 
prejudice resulted." Shinseki, 556 U.S. at409 (quotingPalmerv. Hoffinan, 318 U.S. 109,116 (1943)); 
Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 203. 
In summary, the Petitioner has not submitted evidence that meets the plain language requirements of 
this criterion. 
B. Evidence that the alien has performed in a leading or critical role for organizations or establishments 
that have a distinguished reputation. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(viii). 
The Petitioner claimed her eligibility under this criterion in the RFE response, but the Director did not 
offer any analysis relating to her claims or evidence in the denial decision. 
A leading role should be apparent by its position 
in the overall organizational hierarchy and the role's 
matching duties. A critical role should be apparent from the Petitioner's impact on the entity's 
activities. The Petitioner's performance in any role should establish whether it was leading or critical 
for organizations, establishments, divisions, or departments as a whole. Ultimately, the leading or the 
critical role must be performed on behalf of the organization, establishment, division, or department 
that enjoys a distinguished reputation, rather than for a unit subordinate to these listed entities. See 
generally 6 USCIS Policy Manual F.2(B)(l), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual. 
USCIS policy reflects that organizations, establishments, divisions, or departments that enjoy a 
distinguished reputation are "marked by eminence, distinction, or excellence." Id. ( citing to the 
definition of distinguished, Merriam-Webster, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/distinguished). The Petitioner must submit evidence 
satisfying all of these elements to meet the plain language requirements of this criterion. 
The evidence reflects the named organization has a positive reputation and has experienced some 
notable successes. But the Petitioner did not offer probative evidence that, within its industry, this 
entity has a distinguished reputation meaning: 
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• It is in "a position of prominence or superiority" 2; 
• It has "the quality or state of being excellent or superior" 3; or 
• It has "the quality ofbeing excellent" 4 or "very good of its kind : eminently good : first-class" 5. 
The evidence in the record does not adequately reflect this entity enjoys a distinguished reputation and 
we will not presume as much based on its work "closely tied" to a COVID-19 vaccine and therapeutic 
development initiative with the U.S. government. The Petitioner did not explain why government 
grants, contracts, or other forms of financial support illustrate this organization's distinguished 
reputation. Government grants or funding do not necessarily establish that the receiving organization 
or establishment "is 'marked by eminence, distinction, or excellence .... '" Chursov v. Miller, No. 
18-CV-2886 (PKC), 2019 WL 2085199, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019). Additionally, the majority 
of the supporting evidence was either news releases from the company itself, only portions of a 
document, or material that postdated the petition filing date. 
Regarding the news releases from the company itself, this does not amount to independent, objective 
evidence establishing that it has a distinguished reputation pursuant to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(viii). Much like with self-promotion relating to published material under a different 
criterion, USCIS is not required to rely on the self-promotional material of a company and "we may 
require more than the publication's own say-so that it" has a distinguished reputation. Cf Krasniqi v. 
Dibbins, 558 F. Supp. 3d 168, 185 (D.N.J. 2021) (citing Braga v. Poulos, No. CV 06-5105 SJO 
FMOX, 2007 WL 9229758, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2007) aff'd, 317 F. App'x 680 (9th Cir. 2009) 
( concluding that we did not have to rely on a company's self-serving assertions on the cover of a 
magazine as to the magazine's status as major media)); Cuckic v. Jaddou, No. 21-CV-8395 (JPO), 
2023 WL 2586031, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2023). 
And pertaining to the evidence that postdated the petition filing date, a petitioner must establish 
eligibility at the time they file the visa petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12). USCIS may not approve 
a visa petition if the petitioner was not qualified at the priority date but expects to become eligible at 
a subsequent time. See Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. at 175-76; Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49. 
Because the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate the organization enjoys a 
distinguished reputation and that is dispositive of this claim, it is unnecessary for us to evaluate 
whether she performed in a leading or critical role for the entity. In sum, the Petitioner has not 
submitted evidence that meets the plain language requirements of this criterion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not submitted the required initial evidence of either a one-time achievement or 
documents that meet at least three of the ten criteria. As a result, we do not need to provide the type 
of final merits determination referenced in Kazarian, 596 F.3d at 1119-20. Nevertheless, we advise 
2 Eminence, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (Sept. 27, 2024), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eminence. 
3 Distinction (sense 4), Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (Sept. 30, 2024), https://www.merriam­
webster.com/dictionary/distinction. 
4 Excellence, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (Oct. 3, 2024), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/excellence. 
5 Excellent, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (Sept. 17, 2024), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/excellent. 
9 
that we have reviewed the record in the aggregate, concluding it does not support a finding that the 
Petitioner has established the acclaim and recognition required for the classification sought. 
The Petitioner seeks a highly restrictive visa classification, intended for individuals already at the top 
of their respective fields, rather than for individuals progressing toward that goal. USCIS has long 
held that even athletes performing at the major league level do not automatically meet the 
"extraordinary ability" standard. Matter of Price, 20 I&N Dec. 953, 954 (Assoc. Comm'r 1994). 
Here, the Petitioner has not shown the significance of their work is indicative of the required sustained 
national or international acclaim or that it is consistent with a "career of acclaimed work in the field" 
as contemplated by Congress. H.R. Rep. No. l 0 1-723, 59 (Sept. 19, 1990); see also section 
203(b)(1 )(A). Moreover, the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the Petitioner has garnered 
national or international acclaim in the field, and they are one of the small percentage who has risen 
to the very top of the field of endeavor. See section 203(b)(l)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). 
For the reasons discussed above, the Petitioner has not demonstrated her eligibility as an individual of 
extraordinary ability. The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered 
as an independent and alternate basis for the decision. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.