dismissed EB-1A Case: Clinical Chemistry

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 10875587 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : OCT . 5, 2020 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Extraordinary Ability) 
The Petitioner, a clinical chemist, seeks classification as an alien of extraordinary ability. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C . § 1153(b)(l)(A). This first 
preference classification makes immigrant visas available to those who can demonstrate their 
extraordinary ability through sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have 
been recognized in their field through extensive documentation. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish that the Petitioner met the initial evidence requirements of this classification by 
demonstrating her receipt of a major, internationally recognized award or meeting at least three of the 
evidentiary criteria listed under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). The Petitioner then appealed the matter, 
asserting that she met two of the evidentiary criteria in addition to the two that the Director found she 
met. We dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence was not sufficient to show that she met either 
of the additional criteria. 
In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. See 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon review, we will dismiss both motions. 
I. LAW 
The term "extraordinary ability" refers only to those individuals in "that small percentage who have 
risen to the very top of the field of endeavor." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). The implementing regulation 
at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) sets forth a multi-part analysis. First, a petitioner can demonstrate sustained 
acclaim and the recognition of his or her achievements in the field through a one-time achievement 
(that is, a major, internationally recognized award). If that petitioner does not submit this evidence, 
then he or she must provide sufficient qualifying documentation that meets at least three of the ten 
categories listed at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i) - (x) (including items such as awards, published material 
in certain media, and scholarly articles) . Where a petitioner meets these initial evidence requirements, 
we then consider the totality of the material provided in a final merits determination and assess whether 
the record shows sustained national or international acclaim and demonstrates that the individual is 
among the small percentage at the very top of the field of endeavor. See Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 
1115 (9th Cir. 2010). 
A motion to reconsider is based on an incorrect application of law or policy, and a motion to reopen 
is based on documentary evidence of new facts. The requirements of a motion to reconsider are located 
at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3), and the requirements of a motion to reopen are located at 8 C.F.R. § 
103.5(a)(2). We may grant a motion that satisfies these requirements and demonstrates eligibility for 
the requested immigration benefit. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Director determined that the Petitioner met two of the ten evidentiary criteria under 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3); those relating to her authorship of scholarly articles, and her participation as a 
judge of the work of others in her field. On appeal, the Petitioner asserted that she also met two 
additional criteria, relating to her membership in associations requiring outstanding achievements of 
their members, and to her original contributions of major significance to her field. In our previous 
decision, we agreed with the Director that she did not meet those two additional criteria. On motion, 
the Petitioner submits new evidence in support of both criteria, and asserts that our decision regarding 
her membership in at least one of the professional associations was incorrect based upon the evidence 
of record at the time. 
Documentation of the alien 's membership in associations in the field for which 
class[fication is sought, which require outstanding achievements of their members, as 
judged by recognized national or international experts in their disciplines or .fields. 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(ii) 
The Petitioner had previously submitted evidence of her membership in several professional 
associations in her field. However, we determined that the membership requirements of these 
associations, which mainly consists of educational and experience thresholds, did not rise to the level 
of outstanding achievements. On motion, the Petitioner provides new evidence which she asserts 
shows that her Ph.D. degree in clinical and bioanalytical chemistry and her post-doctoral training in 
the same field qualify as outstanding achievements. Regarding her degree, she provides evidence 
from the website of the Commission for Accreditation in Clinical Chemistry (ComACC) showing that 
the doctoral program atl !University l I accredited by the ComACC. 
She also provides a journal article published in 2007 which states that the American Board of Clinical 
Chemistry (ABCC) allows for certification for those for those clinical chemists who received their 
Ph.D. from an accredited program, whereas those who received their degrees from non-accredited 
programs must also have five years of practical experience in order to qualify for certification. 
Although the Petitioner does not articulate how these facts show that obtaining her degree is an 
outstanding achievement, she appears to be relying upon the small number of clinical chemists who 
have graduated from a ComACC accredited program, noting that only 36 students have completed the 
program at Din the past 10 years. However, the fact that only one university in North America has 
chosen to attain an accreditation for its program tailored to clinical chemistry scientists does not prove 
that those who complete such a program have made an outstanding achievement. The Petitioner has 
not established that the clinical and bioanalytical chemistry program at c=Jis highly competitive or 
rigorous in comparison to similar programs at other universities in a way which would make holders 
ofc=]Ph.D.s stand out from their peers. Further, the 2007 article describes earning a Ph.D. as part 
of "the training pathway" for clinical chemistry scientists, meaning that obtaining any such degree is 
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fulfilling a minimum requirement for employment in the career that puts the recipient on an equal 
footing with his or her peers. 
The Petitioner makes a similar assertion about the post-doctoral training she completed at thel I 
College of Medicine and Dchildren's Hospital, noting that the program is 1 of 35 accredited by 
ComACC. By comparing this number with the total number of bachelor's, master's and doctorate 
degrees awarded in the field of biochemistry, the Petitioner concludes that "It is very clear that I am 
in the Top 1 % of my field due to my Ph.D. degree & post doctoral training ... " While it is clear that 
the Petitioner is better qualified to pursue a career as a clinical chemist than those who have not yet 
completed their education and training, she has not shown that the completion of that training is an 
achievement that stands out from those of her peers. 
In addition, the Petitioner asserts that her membership in the American Society of Hematology (ASH) 
is qualifying, and refers to a letter from ASH which states that in addition to a doctoral degree or 
equivalent, a member must "demonstrate a continuous interest in any discipline important to 
hematology, as evidenced by work in the field, original contributions, and attendance at meetings 
concerning hematology." The Petitioner notes that her two articles published in ASH journals can be 
considered to be "original contributions," but does not explain how the publication of these two papers 
is an outstanding achievement. While we agree that papers published in scientific journals should 
present original research findings or data that make some contribution to the pool of knowledge in a 
particular field, the letter indicates that this is one of three ways in which members must "demonstrate 
a continuous interest in any discipline important to hematology." The Petitioner has not shown that 
demonstrating interest in a field by contributing to it rises to the level of an outstanding achievement 
in that field. 
For the reasons stated above, the new evidence submitted on motion does not establish that the 
Petitioner meets this criterion, nor has she shown that our previous decision was based upon an 
incorrect application of law or policy. 
Evidence of the alien's original scient[fic, scholarly, artistic, athletic, or business­
related contributions of major sign[ficance in the field. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(v) 
In our previous decision, we found that the evidence regarding the Petitioner's work on thel.__ ___ __. 
I I in clinical tests was insufficient to show that it had been widely implemented or otherwise 
impacted the field of clinical chemistry. We specifically noted that a reference letter from the director 
of clinical testing at the I I did not indicate that that institution had implemented the 
Petitioner's work, and that the extent of the impact of her work was not apparent. On motion, the 
Petitioner submits additional evidence which she asserts shows how her research helped to form 
guidelines relating td I that were adopted at th~ I and other health care 
organizations. 
Specifically, the Petitioner resubmits a copy of a paper she authored regarding '--------~ which was published in Annals of Clinical & Laboratory Science, as well as two papers which make . 
reference to that paper. The first, titled 'I I I I was published in Clinical Biochemistry in 2019. It cites to the Petitioner's 
paper once, along with a group of seven other papers, in stating that investigations have shownl I 
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I lin several types of assays. The Petitioner asserts that the fact that one of the authors of 
this paper is from the I I and others are from several different healthcare facilities across 
the United States, supports the statement in the letter noted above indicating implementation of her 
work at "many hospitals." Specifically, she asserts that "best practices are only generated when the 
respective healthcare organizations are adhering to those best practices." While we accept the 
argument that those recommending best practices are most likely either already following those 
practices or intend to ( assuming the recommender has the authority to implement the recommended 
practices), this evidence does not overcome our previous finding that the extent of the Petitioner's 
contribution to these recommended best practices has not been established. The paper indicates that 
hers was one of several papers which confirmed the I I issue, and does not show that 
the significance of this contribution towards development of the recommended best practices. 
Similarly, the Petitioner also submits on motion a copy of guidelines developed by the American 
Association of Clinical Chemists (AACC), which she indicates "were generated by contributions on a 
global level." Like the Clinical Biochemistry paper, this document also references the Petitioner's 
paper on one occasion, noting that it was one of three studies which reportedl I for in 
vitro studies o±O immunoassays on equipment from a particular manufacturer. Other studies and 
case reports are also summarized in this document, and it indicates that the United States Food and 
Drug Administration issued guidelines regarding I I in 2017, which "echoed those 
issued previously from manufacturers ... " While this evidence shows that the Petitioner's work 
contributed to the knowledge on this issue, it does not establish that her contribution was of major 
significance, as her work and resulting paper was one of several others which added knowledge on 
this issue and led others to develop best practices and guidance. 
Accordingly, after review of the new evidence submitted on motion, we find that it does not establish 
that the Petitioner meets this criterion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not established that our previous decision was based on an incorrect application of 
law or policy and that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence in the record of proceedings 
at the time of the decision. In addition, after review of the new evidence submitted with her motion 
to reopen, we find that the Petitioner has not established that she meets the individual criteria claimed 
or that she is otherwise eligible for the requested benefit. 
ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
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