dismissed EB-1A Case: Dream Psychology

(b)(6)
MATTER OF A-K-B-
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: FEB.l9 , 2016 
MOTION ON ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, a "dream expert," seeks classification as an individual "of extraordinary ability" in 
the field of dream psychology. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) § 203(b)(l)(A) , 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(A) . The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition. We 
dismissed her appeal, and subsequently reaffirmed that decision on motion. The matter is now 
before us on a second motion to reopen. The motion to reopen will be denied. 
I. MOTION TO REOPEN 
A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be provided and be supported by affidavits or other 
documentary evidence. 8 C.P.R. § 103.5(a)(2). The new facts, however, must demonstrate 
eligibility as of the date of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after a petitioner 
becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See 8 C.F .R. § 103 .2(b )( 1 ), ( 12); Matter of Katigbak , 14 I&N 
Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). If it is the Petitioner's position that she has new accomplishments 
that form the basis of her eligibility, a new petition is the appropriate venue to present those 
achievements. A motion to reconsider must include the reasons for reconsideration and be supported 
by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that our original decision was based on an incorrect 
application of law or United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy. 8 C.P.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(3). A motion to reconsider contests the correctness of the original decision based on the 
previous factual record, as opposed to a motion to reopen which seeks a new hearing based on new 
material. Compare 8 C.P.R. § 103.5(a)(3) and 8 C.P.R. § 103.5(a)(2). 
In part three of her Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, and the accompanying statement, the 
Petitioner indicated that she is filing a motion to reopen. She asserts that a September 2, 2015 , letter 
from 
demonstrates that she now meets the criteria at 8 C.F .R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(iv) and 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(viii) relating to participating as the judge of the work of 
others and performing in a leading or critical role. On motion, the Petitioner also resubmits letters 
from a licensed clinical psychologist; and , a part-time faculty 
member at the We had previously considered both 
letters when we dismissed the Petitioner 's appeal and reaffirmed the dismissal in our motion 
adjudication. 
(b)(6)
Matter of A-K-B-
The Petitioner has not shown that we should grant the instant motion to reopen. Specifically, the 
evidence does not establish the Petitioner's eligibility for the exclusive classification at the time she 
filed the petition in January 2014. As noted in our previous decisions and above, the Petitioner must 
demonstrate eligibility for the visa petition at the time of filing. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12); 
Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49. She cannot secure a priority date based on the anticipation of future 
events that might qualify her for a visa classification. See Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. 
158, 160 (Reg'l Comm'r 1977); Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 175-76 (Assoc. Comm'r 1998) 
(adopting Matter of Bardouille , 18 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981) for the proposition that US CIS cannot 
"consider facts that come into being only subsequent to the filing of a petition.") 
In his September 2015 letter, which the Petitioner submits for the first time on motion, 
provides that she is "a Site Administrator for Course Center," and that she 
"oversees, grades, and judges the work [sic] of students' work." The letter notes that the Petitioner 
"will help to oversee first Online Research Conference in March 2016, where the attendees 
will study the state of the art in contemporary dream research." Neither the letter nor any other 
evidence indicated that the Petitioner had judged others' work at the time of filing the petition in 
January 2014. The Petitioner had not asserted that she met the judging criterion under 8 
C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(iv) when she initially filed her petition, on appeal, or in her first motion to us. 
Moreover, conclusory statement is not supported by any evidence or details on the 
nature of her judging responsibilities, or confirmation that the students are in "the same or an allied 
field of specification for which classification is sought." See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iv). Repeating 
the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy a petitioner 's burden of proof. See Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner , No. 95 Civ. 10729, 1997 WL 188942 at *1 , 5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 
1997). Similarly, we need not accept primarily conclusory assertions. See 1756, Inc. v. United 
States Att'y Gen., 745 F. Supp. 9, 17 (D.C. Dist. 1990). Accordingly, neither letter 
nor any other documents in the record establishes that the Petitioner met this criterion at the time of 
filing in January 2014. 
On motion, the Petitioner also asserts that she meets the critical and leading role criterion under 
8 
C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(viii). affirms that the Petitioner "performs a critical role within 
as a Site Administrator for the online course center, which includes dream research methods, 
lucid dreaming, nightmare treatment, spirituality and dreams, and a variety of other dream-related 
topics based on books, conference presentations , and peer-reviewed journal papers." Although 
notes that the Petitioner's role is "critical," he does not provide specific evidence in support 
of the conclusory statement. The record lacks information showing that the Petitioner's impact on 
is so significant that her role constitutes a critical role for the organization as a whole. As 
noted in our two previous decisions, going on record without supporting documentation is not 
sufficient for the purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Assoc. Comm'r 1998). 
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(b)(6)
Matter of A-K-B-
Furthermore, as discussed in our two previous decisions, the Petitioner has not shown that has 
a distinguished reputation, as required under the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(viii). The 
record lacks evidence relating to this organization reputation or in support of a finding that it has a 
"distinguished reputation." See Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Unsubstantiated statements do not 
establish that the Petitioner meets this criterion. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd., 724 F. Supp. at 1108; 
Avyr Associates, Inc., 1997 WL 188942 at *5. 
In addition, as discussed above, the Petitioner must show her eligibility at the time she filed the 
petition in January 2014. The record does not indicate that she was an site administrator in 
January 2014. As such, even if her role met the criterion under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(viii), which 
as explained above it does not, she would not be eligible for the exclusive classification. The 
Petitioner may not rely on an event that postdates her filing date to establish her eligibility. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12); Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49; Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. at 
160; Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. at 175-76. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that she met 
this criterion at the time of filing in January 2014. 
Finally, on motion, the Petitioner maintains that letters from 
constitute comparable evidence. The record does not support this assertion. The regulation 
provides 
that "[i]fthe above standards [8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x)] do not readily apply to the beneficiary's 
occupation, the petitioner may submit comparable evidence to establish the beneficiary's eligibility." 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)( 4). The Petitioner has not filed any documents indicating that the ten criteria 
listed under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x) do not apply to her occupation as a "dream expert." 
Moreover, the Petitioner has not demonstrated or explained how the three letters are comparable to 
the objective achievements required under any of the ten criteria.' These letters stated in general 
terms that the Petitioner is an expert in her field, who has contributed to the field and "the life of 
many people." We considered letters in our two previous decisions, 
concluding that they were insufficient to show the Petitioner's eligibility. On motion, the Petitioner 
has not specifically challenged our findings relating to these letters. In addition, as discussed above, 
letter similarly does not prove the Petitioner's eligibility. 
General, solicited letters from local colleagues are insufficient to demonstrate a petitioner's 
eligibility. See Kazarian v. USCIS, 580 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2009), aff'd in part, 596 F.3d 
1115 (9th Cir. 201 0). The opinions of experts in the field are not without weight and have been 
considered above. USCIS may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as 
expert testimony. See Matter o.fCaron Int'l, 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Comm'r 1988). However, 
USCIS is ultimately responsible for making the final determination regarding a foreign national's 
eligibility for the benefit sought. !d. Letters from experts supporting the petition is not presumptive 
evidence of eligibility; USCIS may, as our decisions have done, evaluate the content of those letters 
and whether they are corroborated to determine if they support the foreign national's eligibility. See 
1 General assertions that the ten objective criteria described in 8 CFR 204.5(h)(3) do not readily apply to the foreign 
national's occupation are not probative. Similarly, assertions that USCIS should accept witness letters as comparable 
evidence are not persuasive. Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM), ch. 22.2(i)(l )(A) (comparable evidence segment). 
3 
Matter of A-K-B-
id. at 795; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500, n.2 (BIA 2008) (noting that expert opinion 
testimony does not purport to be evidence as to "fact"); Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F. Supp. 3d 126, 134-
35 (D.D.C. 2013) (upholding our decision to give minimal weight to vague, solicited letters from 
colleagues or associates that do not provide details on contributions of major significance in the 
field); AFM, ch. 22.2(i)(1)(D). 
We have considered the materials the Petitioner filed on motion and find that she has not 
documented a one-time achievement (that is a major, internationally recognized award), or offered 
sufficient qualifying items that meet at least three of the ten criteria listed at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x), or comparable evidence confirming her eligibility. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4). The 
Petitioner has not satisfied the initial evidentiary requirements set forth at 8 C.F.R § 204.5(h)(3) and 
(4). Kazarian, 596 F.3d at 1122. Nevertheless, although we need not provide the type of final 
merits determination referenced in Kazarian, a review of the record in the aggregate supports a 
finding that the Petitioner has not demonstrated, through the submission of extensive evidence, the 
level of expertise required for the classification sought. 2 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not shown that the motion to reopen should be granted, because she has not stated the 
new facts to be provided and be supported by affidavits or other documentation. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(2). We have considered the evidence on motion and find that it does not establish the 
Petitioner's eligibility for the exclusive classification. Accordingly, the instant motion to reopen will be 
denied.3 
The burden of proof in visa petition proceedings remains entirely with the Petitioner. Section 291 of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofOtiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden 
has not been met. Accordingly, the motion will be denied. 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is denied. 
Cite as Matter of A-K-B-, ID# 15786 (AAO Feb. 19, 2016) 
2 We maintain de novo review of all questions of fact and law. In any future proceeding, we maintain the jurisdiction to 
conduct a final merits determination as the office that made the last decision in this matter. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(ii); 
see also INA§§ 103(a)(l), 204(b); DHS Delegation Number 0150.1 (effective March 1, 2003); 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2003); 8 
C.F.R. § 103.1 (f)(3)(iii) (2003); Matter of Aurelio, 19 I&N Dec. 458, 460 (BIA 1987) (holding that legacy INS, now 
users, is the sole authority with the jurisdiction to decide visa petitions). 
3 To the extent that the Petitioner is also seeking a motion to reconsider, she has not stated any valid reason for 
reconsideration, nor has she sufficiently supported any valid reason for reconsideration with pertinent legal precedent or 
other legal authority establishing that our August 12, 2015, decision was based on an incorrect application of Jaw or 
USCIS policy. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Accordingly, had the Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, the motion 
would be denied. 
4