dismissed EB-1A Case: Education

(b)(6)
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF A-0-R-D-L-
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: NOV. 6, 2015 
MOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR 
ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, who was a professor at the seeks 
classification as an individual "of extraordinary ability" in education . See Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act) § 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A). The Director, Texas Service 
Center, denied the petition. Previously, we dismissed the Petitioner 's appeal, and reaffirmed that 
decision in two motion adjudications. The matter is now before us on a third motion to reconsider. 
The motion to reconsider will be denied. 
I. Motion to Reconsider 
In Part 3 of his Notice of Appeal or Motion, Form I-290B, the Petitioner indicates that he is filing a 
motion to reconsider. In support of his motion, the Petitioner submits the cover page of a January 
28, 2015, Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) non-precedent decision that the Petitioner asserts 
related to a competitive runner seeking classification as an individual "of extraordinary ability" in 
athletics. 
A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent 
precedent decisions to establish that our original decision was based on an incorrect application of 
law or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). A 
motion to reconsider is based on the existing record and the Petitioner may not introduce new facts 
or new evidence relative to his or her arguments. A motion to reconsider contests the correctness of 
the original decision based on the previous factual record, as opposed to a motion to reopen which 
seeks a new hearing based on new documents . Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.5(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(2). 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated that we should grant his third motion to reconsider, because he 
has not cited to a legal authority or policy showing that we erred in our previous decision, dated May 
8, 2015. First, the Petitioner's submission of the cover page of a non-precedent decision does not 
establish that we erred in our pervious decision. While the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) 
indicates that our precedent decisions are binding on all users employees in the administration of 
the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.5(a)(3) 
requires the Petitioner to support his motion to reconsider with "any pertinent precedent decisions ," 
which do not include non-precedent decisions . Moreover, on motion , the Petitioner has not filed a 
Matter of A-0-R-D-L-
complete copy of the non-precedent decision. Rather, the Petitioner submits the cover page of the 
non-precedent decision that lacked sufficient identifying information relating to the case. 
Furthermore, according to the Petitioner, the non-precedent case involved a competitive runner. The 
Petitioner has not shown that the field in which he claims extraordinary ability, which is education, 
is sufficiently analogous to the field of expertise discussed in the non-precedent case. On motion the 
Petitioner offers a criterion to criterion comparison between the two cases, in which he lists the 
quantity of the accomplishments, and asserts that we erred in our May 8, 2015, decision because 
"[he has] much more evidence and categories than the other petitioner," a competitive runner. As 
we discussed in Matter o[Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010), "truth is to be determined 
not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality" and we examine "each piece of evidence for 
relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of 
the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true." Thus, at issue is the 
quality of the Petitioner's accomplishments rather than a comparison of the number of exhibits with 
an approvable petition. The Petitioner has also not provided sufficient legal authority explaining 
how an approved petition involving a competitive runner demonstrates that his petition should 
similarly be approved. 
Second, the Petitioner's citation of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376, for the standard of proof in 
immigration proceedings does not suggest that our previous decision was based on an incorrect 
application of law or policy. See 8 C.F.R § 1 03.5(a)(3). In each of our previous decisions we 
explained at length why the Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that he 
qualifies for the classification sought. The Petitioner does not explain how our analysis is reflective 
of applying a higher standard of proof. Upon review, we find that we adequately analyzed each 
piece of evidence, and, when concluding it did not meet a given criterion, provided an explanation. 
The Petitioner does not address how Chawathe implicates those specific findings individually. 
Accordingly, the Petitioner's reliance on the very general language in that precedent decision does 
not support a grant of the instant motion. 
Third, on motion, the Petitioner indicates that the Director and we "had confirmed that [he] had 
presented evidence in the following categories: I (Award), IV (Judge) and VI (Publication)." 
Although the Petitioner had filed documents in support of his assertions that he met these and other 
criteria, our decisions found that the Petitioner met only the two relating to participation as a judge 
and authorship of scholarly articles. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iv), (vi). In our previous three 
decisions, dated July 25, 2014; December 15, 2014; and May 8, 2015, we discussed the Petitioner's 
filings relating to six other criteria under the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(viii) pertaining 
to prizes and awards, membership in associations that require outstanding achievements, published 
material about the Petitioner, original contributions of major significance, display at artistic 
exhibitions or showcases, and performance in a leading or critical role. These decisions explained 
why he did not satisfy these remaining six categories. 
On motion, the Petitioner affirms that he meets the criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i), (ii), (iii), 
(v) and (vii). In support of his assertion, the Petitioner points to the same items and makes the same 
legal arguments as those he noted and advanced in his appeal and two previous motions. The 
statement the Petitioner files in support of the instant motion, with respect to satisfying at least three 
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Matter of A-0-R-D-L-
criteria, is substantially the same as the one he submitted in support of his previous motion, which 
we concluded did not warrant reopening the matter. Other than noting that his petition should be 
approved because we approved a competitive runner's petition in a January 28, 2015, non-precedent 
decision, the Petitioner has not identified any error in our May 8, 2015, decision, as relating to the 
criteria under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). As he had requested in his second motion, the 
Petitioner asks us in the instant motion to "review with care [his] entire record for the approval of 
[the] I-140 [petition]." A motion to reconsider is not a process by which a party may submit, in 
essence, the same brief presented on appeal and seek reconsideration by generally alleging error in 
the prior decision. Cf Matter of 0-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006). As we have previously 
reviewed all relevant filings in the record and concluded that the Petitioner did not establish his 
eligibility for the petition, we will not again review the evidence in absence of a showing that our 
previous decision was made in error. 
Fourth, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that we erred in our previous decision for not discussing 
his intent to enter the United States to continue his work as a professor. Having determined that the 
Petitioner did not corroborate his assertions of eligibility as an individual of extraordinary ability, we 
need not expressly address the Petitioner's intent to continue his work in the United States. Our 
finding on this issue would not affect our ultimate conclusion that the Petitioner is not eligible for 
the exclusive classification sought. Similarly, we did not err in not conducting a final merits 
determination. In accordance with the relevant regulation and controlling case law, the Petitioner, as 
initial evidence, must first establish that he meets at least three of the ten criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3); Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 
201 0) (discussing a two-part review where the documentation is first counted and then, if fulfilling 
the required number of criteria, considered in the context of a final merits determination); Rijal v. 
USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (affirming USCIS' proper application of Kazarian), 
aff'd, 683 F.3d. 1030 (9th Cir. 2012); Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(finding that USCIS appropriately applied the two-step review). In this case, as the Petitioner has 
not shown that he meets at least three of the ten criteria, we need not conduct a final merits 
determination. Nevertheless, a review of the record in the aggregate supports a finding that the 
Petitioner has not documented the level of expertise required for the classification sought. 1 
II. Conclusion 
The Petitioner has not shown that the motion to reconsider should be granted, because he has not stated 
any valid reason for reconsideration, nor has he sufficiently supported any valid reason for 
reconsideration with pertinent legal precedent or other legal authority establishing that our May 8, 2015, 
1 
We maintain de novo review of all questions of fact and law. See Soltane v. United States Dep 't of Justice, 381 F.3d 
143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). In any future proceeding, we maintain the jurisdiction to conduct a final merits determination as 
the office that made the last decision in this matter. 8 C.F.R. § I 03 .5(a)(I )(ii); see also INA §§ I 03(a)(I ), 204(b ); DHS 
Delegation Number 0150.1 (effective March I, 2003); 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2003); 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(f)(3)(iii) (2003); Matter of 
Aurelio, 19 I&N Dec. 458, 460 (BIA 1987) (holding that legacy INS, now USCIS, is the sole authority with the 
jurisdiction to decide visa petitions). 
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Matter of A-0-R-D-L-
decision was based on an incorrect application of law or USCIS policy. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). 
Accordingly, the instant motion to reconsider will be denied. 
The burden of proof in visa petition proceedings remains entirely with the Petitioner. Section 291 of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter o.fOtiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden 
has not been met. Accordingly, the motion will be denied. 
ORDER: The motion to reconsider is denied. 
Cite as Matter of A-0-R-D-L-, ID# 14615 (AAO Nov. 6, 2015) 
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