dismissed EB-1A Case: International Law

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re : 13072720 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: APR. 26, 2022 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Extraordinary Ability) 
The Petitioner, an attorney whose practice focuses on international law and policy, seeks classification 
as an alien of extraordinary ability . See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
203(b )(1 )(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b )(1 )(A). This first preference classification makes immigrant visas 
available to those who can demonstrate their extraordinary ability through sustained national or 
international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in their field through extensive 
documentation. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish that the Petitioner had satisfied at least three of ten initial evidentiary criteria, as required. 
We dismissed the Petitioner's appeal from that decision. The Petitioner then filed 14 combined 
motions to reopen and reconsider. Some of these motions were dismissed; others were granted, in 
whole or in part; but each decision affirmed the core determination that the Petitioner did not establish 
eligibility for the benefit sought. The matter is now before us on the 15th combined motion. 
In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon review, we will dismiss the combined motion. 
I. MOTION REQUIREMENTS 
A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved in the reopened proceeding and be supported 
by affidavits or other documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). A motion to reconsider must 
state the reasons for reconsideration and establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence 
of record at the time of the initial decision . 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3) . A motion that does not meet 
applicable requirements shall be dismissed . 8 C.F.R . § 103 .5(a)(4). 
Under the above regulations, a motion to reopen is based on documentary evidence of new facts, and 
a motion to reconsider is based on an incorrect application of law or policy. We may grant a motion 
that satisfies these requirements and demonstrates eligibility for the requested immigration benefit. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R . § 103 .5(a)(l)(i) limits our authority to reopen or reconsider to instances 
where the Petitioner has shown "proper cause" for that action. Thus, to merit reopening or 
reconsideration, a petitioner must not only meet the formal filing requirements ( such as submission of 
a properly completed Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with the correct fee), but also show 
proper cause for granting the motion. Motions for the reopening of immigration proceedings are 
disfavored for the same reasons as petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) ( citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 
94 (1988)); see also Colors oflndiav. Nielsen, No. CV 18-4070-MWF (ASX), 2020 WL 3841042, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2020). 
By regulation, the scope of a motion is limited to "the prior decision." 8 C.F.R. § 103.S(a)(l)(i). 
Therefore, the filing before us is not a motion to reopen and reconsider the denial of the petition or the 
dismissal of the appeal. Instead, the filing is a motion to reopen and reconsider our most recent 
decision. 
II. LAW 
Section 203(b )(l)(A) of the Act makes immigrant visas available to aliens with extraordinary ability 
who have earned sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been 
recognized in the field through extensive documentation; who seek to enter the United States to 
continue work in the area of extraordinary ability, and whose entry into the United States will 
substantially benefit prospectively the United States. 
The tenn "extraordinary ability" refers only to those individuals in "that small percentage who have 
risen to the very top of the field of endeavor." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). The implementing regulation 
at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) sets forth a multi-part analysis. First, a petitioner can demonstrate 
international recognition of his or her achievements in the field through a one-time achievement (that 
is, a major, internationally recognized award). If that petitioner does not submit this evidence, then 
he or she must provide sufficient qualifying documentation that meets at least three of the ten criteria 
listed at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-{x) (including items such as awards, published material in certain 
media, and scholarly articles). 
Where a petitioner meets these initial evidence requirements, we then consider the totality of the 
material provided in a final merits determination and assess whether the record shows sustained 
national or international acclaim and demonstrates that the individual is among the small percentage 
at the very top of the field of endeavor. See Kazarian v. USCJS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) 
( discussing a two-part review where the documentation is first counted and then, if fulfilling the 
required number of criteria, considered in the context of a final merits determination); see also 
Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131-32(D.D.C. 20l3);Rijalv. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 
(W.D. Wash. 2011). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Petitioner filed his 14th motion in November 2019; we dismissed that motion in June 2020. By 
regulation, the scope of the Petitioner's 15th and latest motion to reconsider is limited to errors of fact, 
law, or policy in our June 2020 decision. 
2 
One of the regulatory eligibility criteria concerns performance in a leading or critical role for 
organizations or establishments with a distinguished reputation. See 8 C.F.R. § 204 .5(h)(3 )(viii). In our 
June 2020 decision, we affirmed a prior finding that the Petitioner's vice chairmanship of a committee of 
the ArnericanBar Association (ABA) occurred after the petition's filing date, and therefore couldnot 
establish eligibility at the time of filing. On motion, the Petitioner states that this finding "was 
incomplete," because he had previously served in leading or critical roles for other organizations, 
particularly what he calls "United Nations-centric" roles with the I Bar Association and the 
United Nations Secretariat. 
We have already addressed the Petitioner's core claims about his work with these organizations in prior 
decisions. Our initial appellate decision addressed the issue extensively, as did the first motion decision. 
Those decisions are no longer before us. The Petitioner hasestablishednoerrorin our June 2020decision 
that would compel us to revisit the issue yet again. 
Significantly, in his Novernber2019rnotion, the Petitioner did not mention the United Nations Secretariat 
or thel Bar Association. Because the November 2019 motion was the only matter before 
us in June 2020, we did not err by failing to reach back further into the record and readjudicate claims 
that we had already addressed in prior motions years before (nor are they ripe for review in any future 
motions). 
Fmiherrnore, the Petitioner's submission of evidence that he could have submitted years ago does not 
establish cause for reopening the proceeding. This, too, was explained in multiple p1ior decisions. Some 
of this evidence concerns a short-term, unpaid student internship at the United Nations Secretariat, which 
the Petitioner undertook in 2006-07. We already concluded in prior decisions that this internship was 
neither leading nor critical with respect to the United Nations. The submission of additional 
documentation from that internship does not alter this conclusion. 
Other evidence concerns the Petitioner's ongoing activities with bar associations at various levels. As 
explained previously, we need not consider the Petitioner's current activities unless the Petitioner has first 
established eligibility at the time he filed the petition in May 2010. 
In his 13th motion, the Petitioner claimed that exemption from ABA reimbursement limits satisfies the 
regulatoryrequirernentat8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(ix),relatingto "[e]]videncethatthe alien has commanded 
a high salary or other significantly high remuneration for services, in relation to others in the field." As 
we first observed in our October 2019 decision dismissing the Petitioner's 13th motion, and again in our 
June 2020 decision, the evidence concerns reimbursements that the Petitioner received after the filing 
date, which cannot establish that the Petitioner was eligible at the time of filing as required by 8 C.F.R 
§ 103 .2(b )(1 ). The Petitioner did not overcome this determination in his 14th motion, and it is no longer 
ripe forreview on the 15th motion or in any hypothetical future motion. In his latest motion, the Petitioner 
takes issue with a footnote in our decision concerning taxation ofreimbursements. This question was not 
central to the outcome of our decision. Further discussion of this side issue will not change the 
fundamental issue that the Petitioner received these reimbursements after the filing date. 
3 
The Petitioner contends that we have discretionary authority to waive the application of the regulations 
at 8 C.F.R. § 103 .2(b)(l) and (12), which we have "continuously declin[ed] to exercise." The Petitioner 
has made this claim before, and we rebutted it in our eighth and ninth motion decisions. In raising it yet 
again, the Petitioner cites no statute, regulation, or policy to show that we have that authority. The bare 
assertion that we have such authority does not satisfy the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3), which 
requires the Petitioner to support its legal arguments. The Petitioner maintains that "the unique 
circumstances of this case" warrants such a discretionary waiver, but the Petitioner does not explain what 
those "unique circumstances" are. Therefore, we will not review the entire record in the aggregate, as the 
Petitioner requests, nor will we revisit issues already decided in the appellate decision or earlier decisions 
on motion. 
Having contended that we should waive the requirement that the Petitioner establish eligibility at the time 
of filing, the Petitioner offers new assertions that he was, in fact, eligible at the time of filing. The 
Petitioner establishes that he qualified for immigration benefits inl I (in 2006) and I 
(in 2008) that, he claims, are functionally equivalent to the immigrant classification he seeks in this 
proceeding. The Petitioner does not explain why he waited until his 15th motion to bring this information 
forward, nor does the newly submitted evidence support his claims that the immigration benefits in 
question are comparable to classification as an alien of extraordinary ability under U.S. law.I I 
"Quality Migrant Admission Scheme" refers to "highly skilled or talented persons." The Petitioner 
submits no information regarding the requirements of I "Landed Permanent Residence 
Scheme." The Petitioner has not established the relevance of this newly submitted evidence, regarding 
facts that the Petitioner did not claim in his initial filing or in any subsequent motion over the last ten 
years. 
In his 14th motion, the Petitioner claimed to have suffered violations of his Constitutional right to due 
process. In our June 2020 decision, we explained that we have "no jurisdiction to consider Constitutional 
claims," and that "the Petitioner has not established that any violation of the regulations resulted in 
prejudice." The Petitioner contends that "constitutionality review is not what the Petitioner asse1ied in 
the prior motion," but that is exactly what his due process claim entailed, and in the present motion he 
refers to "constitutional transgressions" and "constitutional Fifth Amendment substantive due process." 
The Petitioner asserts that our "conduct appeared to be egregious and outrageous and shock the 
contemporary conscience," but rather than explain further, the Petitioner cites a number of court cases 
that did not concern immigration appeals. The Petitioner does not explain how the cited cases relate to 
this proceeding, or how the dismissal of an appeal and subsequent motions is comparable to the 
"conscience-shocking" behavior described in those court cases. As we previously observed, "the 
Supreme Court has 'recognize[ d] that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may 
grant or deny itin their discretion."' TownofCastleRockv. Gonzales, 545U.S. 748, 756(2005). 
Quoting from various cited cases, the Petitioner uses words such as "brutal," "offensive," and 
"malicious," without explaining how any of those adjectives applies to the denial of an immigration 
benefit. 
For the above reasons, we find that the Petitioner has not established that our prior decision was incorrect 
at the time of that decision. As such, the motion does not meet all the requirements of a motion to 
reconsider, and therefore we will dismiss that motion. Furthermore, the newly submitted evidence does 
4 
not establish cause for reopening the proceeding, as it does not demonstrate the Petitioner's eligibility at 
the time he filed the petition. Therefore, we will dismiss the motion to reopen. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed, the Petitioner has not shown proper cause for reopening or reconsideration 
and has not overcome the grounds for dismissal of the prior motion. The motion to reopen and motion 
to reconsider will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
5