dismissed EB-1A Case: Law And Economics

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: NOV. 13, 2024 In Re: 34947283 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (Extraordinary Ability) 
Since 2011, the Petitioner - a professor of law and economics - has sought classification under the 
employment-based, frrst-preference (EB-1) immigrant visa category as a noncitizen with 
"extraordinary ability." See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(l)(A) , 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(l)(A). Since affirming his petition's denial by the Director of the Texas Service Center in 
2014, we have dismissed the Petitioner's following 17 motions and combined motions to reopen and 
reconsider. See In Re: 31764796 (AAO July 12, 2024). 
The matter returns to us again on the Petitioner's combined motions. He contends that our latest 
opinion errs by not following the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright 
Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024). 
The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating eligibility for the requested benefit by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matter ofChawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon 
review, we conclude that his motion to reopen does not meet regulatory requirements and that his 
motion to reconsider does not demonstrate Loper's applicability to these proceedings . We will 
therefore dismiss the motions. 
I. LAW 
A motion to reopen must state new facts, supported by documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). 
In contrast, a motion to reconsider must establish that our latest decision misapplies law or policy 
based on the record at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Our review on motion is 
limited to our latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.S(a)(l)(i), (ii) (referencing "the prior decision" and "the 
latest decision"). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and demonstrate eligibility 
for the requested benefit. 
II. MOTION TO REOPEN 
The Petitioner's motion to reopen contains a copy of the Loper decision's first page. He argues that 
this documentary evidence supports "new facts." 
Regulations indicate, however, that petitioners must include relevant precedent decisions in motions 
to reconsider, not in motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3) (stating that a motion to reconsider 
must include "any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect 
application of law or Service policy"). Also, the Loper decision contains new law, not "new facts" 
regarding the Petitioner's case. We therefore find that the copy of Loper's first page applies to the 
Petitioner's motion to reconsider but does not constitute new facts for his motion to reopen. 1 
The Petitioner's motion to reopen omits any other documentary evidence. Contrary to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(2), the motion does not state new facts, supported by documentary evidence. We must 
dismiss "[a] motion that does not meet applicable requirements." 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). Thus, we 
will dismiss the motion to reopen. 
III. MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
A. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo 
The Petitioner contends that, in dismissing his latest motions, we misinterpreted the Act. He argues 
that, under Loper, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) "is no longer allowed its 
expansive interpretation of the statute to dismiss EB- I petitions" and "needs to be held to the strict 
language of the statute." 
Loper overturned Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), ruling 
that federal courts need not defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous federal laws. 
Rather, Loper provides the judiciary with the sole prerogative to "say what the law is," stating: "Courts 
must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory 
authority." Loper, 144 S. Ct. at 2257, 2273. 
The Petitioner misrelies on Loper. First, Loper affects federal courts, not federal agencies. A federal 
court reviewing our interpretation of an ambiguous statute must follow Loper. But Loper does not 
change how we interpret such laws. 
Second, Loper involved an agency's interpretation of a statute. Loper, 144 S.Ct. at 2254-56. In 
dismissing the Petitioner's motions and appeals, we interpreted regulations. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(i-x) (listing ten evidentiary criteria, at least three of which a petitioner seeking to 
immigrate as a noncitizen with extraordinary ability must meet if they did not receive a major 
international award). Even if the regulations are ambiguous, our interpretation of them would merit 
deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 ( 1997), which Loper did not reverse. See, e.g., United 
States v. Boler, 115 F .4th 316, 322 n.4 ( 4th Cir. 2024) ( declining to apply Loper to an issue involving 
an agency's interpretation of its own regulations). 
For the foregoing reasons, Loper did not affect our latest decision. The Petitioner's argument therefore 
does not persuade us. 
1 As discussed below, even ifwe considered the decision page as part of the Petitioner's motion to reopen. Loper would 
not demonstrate the petition's eligibility for reopening. 
2 
B. Factual Errors 
The Petitioner also contends that our latest decision contains factual errors. He states that we 
misdescribed him as a "former professor." He states that he is not only a current professor but also a 
judge, actuary, accountant, and author. He also contends that our decision errs in stating "his 
completion of a handful of introductory courses in a civil engineering curriculum." He maintains that 
he has five years of university studies in that field. He argues that we "created" the misinformation 
"to diminish [his] career." 
Assuming that we erred in our description of the Petitioner and his civil engineering studies, the record 
shows that these errors did not affect our latest decision's outcome. Our description of him as a former 
professor had no bearing on our dismissal of his motions. Also, our latest decision did not seek to 
emphasize the extent of his civil engineering studies. Rather, our point was that he did not demonstrate 
how his civil engineering studies "support his eligibility for this classification as a professor of law 
and economics." 
In sum, our descriptions of the Petitioner and his civil engineering studies were immaterial to our latest 
decision's analysis. See Animal Legal Def Fund v. US Dep't ofAgric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1224 n.13 
(11th Cir. 2015) ("An agency decision is harmless when a mistake of the administrative body is one 
that clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of the decision reached.") 2; see 
generally Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. 330, 350 n.5 (BIA 2021) (citing cases regarding harmless 
or scrivener's errors). The errors therefore do not merit the petition's reconsideration. 
C. The Petitioner's Requests 
The Petitioner's motion to reconsider also contains requests. First, he asks us to tell the Director to 
issue him an employment authorization document (EAD). See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9) 
( allowing noncitizens who have filed applications for adjustment of status to work in the United 
States). 
But we lack authority over applications for, or the issuance of, EADs. See Dep't of Homeland Sec. 
Delegation No. 0150 .1 ( effective Mar. 1, 2003) ( delegating appellate jurisdiction to the Administrative 
Appeals Office over the matters listed in former 8 C.F.R. § 103.l(f)(3)(iii)). We are therefore unable 
to fulfill this request. 
The Petitioner also asks us to reopen and reconsider his petition on our own motion. Under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(5), we can unilaterally decide to reopen or reconsider applications and petitions. See 
l USCIS Policy Manual F., retired Adjudicator's Field Manual, Chapter 10.17(c), 
www.uscis.gov/policymanual (stating that an officer may reopen a petition on USCIS motion if "a 
petition should not have been approved but there are no specifically applicable grounds for revocation 
in the regulations, or ... a petition should not have been denied"). 
2 The Petitioner resides in the eleventh federal judicial circuit. Precedent decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit therefore bind us in this matter. See Matter of Rivens, 25 I&N Dec. 623,629 (BIA 2011). 
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But we decline to reopen or reconsider the petition on our own motion. First, the Petitioner's motions 
already ask us to reopen or reconsider the filing. Second, his arguments do not persuade us that we 
erred in dismissing his latest motions. 
The Petitioner further requests our de novo review of the entire record. He claims that he presented 
"more evidence than needed" to satisfy at least three of the initial evidentiary requirements. 
As we stated in our prior decision, however, the Petitioner has not identified specific errors warranting 
the petition's reconsideration. See, e.g., Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006) ("[A] 
motion to reconsider is not a process by which a party may submit, in essence, the same brief presented 
... and seek reconsideration by generally alleging error in the prior ... decision"). We decline to 
re-adjudicate the petition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The motion to reopen does not meet regulatory requirements. The motion to reconsider does not 
establish that our latest decision misapplies law or policy. 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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