dismissed EB-1A Case: Voice Acting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: NOV. 18, 2024 In Re: 34903412 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (Extraordinary Ability) 
The Petitioner is a voice actor who seeks classification as an individual of extraordinary ability. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(A). This first 
preference classification makes immigrant visas available to those who can demonstrate their 
extraordinary ability through sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have 
been recognized in their field through extensive documentation. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish that he satisfied at least three of the ten initial evidentiary criteria. We dismissed a subsequent 
appeal. The matter is now before us on a combined motion to reopen and reconsider. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, we will dismiss the 
motion. 
First, we will address the Petitioner's motion to reopen, which must state new facts and be supported 
by documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our 
latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and 
demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464,473 (BIA 
1992) (requiring that new evidence have the potential to change the outcome). 
On motion, although the Petitioner disputes our decision to dismiss the appeal, he does not state new 
facts or offer new evidence. As such, the Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of a motion to 
reopen. 
Next, we will address the Petitioner's motion to reconsider, which must establish that our prior 
decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy and that the decision was incorrect 
based on the evidence in the record of proceedings at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). 
Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(ii). We may 
grant motions that satisfy these requirements and demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. 
On motion, the Petitioner contests the correctness of our prior decision, asserting that it "does not align 
with" with the preponderance of the evidence standard set forth in Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 
369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). The Petitioner contends that "fair and proper application" of this standard 
should lead to a favorable outcome regarding his eligibility. 
Except where a different standard is specified by law, the "preponderance of the evidence" is the 
standard of proof governing immigration benefit requests. See id.; see also Matter of Martinez, 21 
I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997); Matter of Sao Hoo, 11 I&N Dec. 151, 152 (BIA 1965). 
Accordingly, "preponderance of the evidence" is the governing standard of proof in this, and in most 
administrative immigration proceedings. See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, E.4(B), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. While the Petitioner asserts that he has provided evidence 
sufficient to demonstrate his eligibility for the extraordinary ability classification, he does not further 
explain or identify a specific instance in which we applied a standard of proof other than the 
preponderance of evidence in dismissing the appeal. 
The Petitioner also reiterates the two-part process for evaluating evidence under this classification, 
arguing that we erred by not conducting a totality of the evidence analysis to determine whether the 
Petitioner achieved sustained national or international acclaim. As the Petitioner himself 
acknowledges, the first step in this two-part process is demonstrating that he meets at least three of the 
initial evidentiary criteria. Our prior decision includes a comprehensive analysis which addresses two 
of the Petitioner's claimed criteria and outlines the evidentiary deficiencies that caused us to conclude 
that he did not meet the requirements of those criteria and therefore did not successfully satisfy the 
initial part of the two-part process. We then explained that because the Petitioner did not establish 
that he satisfied this first step in a two-step process, we need not go forward with the second step, 
which calls for the totality of the evidence analysis the Petitioner references on motion and which is 
part of a final merits determination set forth in Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). 
The Petitioner has offered no cogent legal argument establishing that we incorrectly applied the law 
or USCIS policy by reserving the totality of the evidence analysis in this case. 
The Petitioner also argues that we reached an incorrect conclusion on the criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(h)(3)(iii) and (x), which served as our basis for dismissing the appeal. However, aside from 
disagreeing with our adverse conclusions on these criteria, the Petitioner does not explain how we 
erred in applying the law or USCIS policy. 
For instance, we determined that the Petitioner did not show he meets all elements of the criterion at 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iii), which requires evidence of published material about the Petitioner and his 
work in professional or major trade publications or other major media. Namely, we determined that 
the Petitioner did not establish that the article in question is about him, even though it mentions him 
in his role as dubbing director. We also determined that while the Petitioner submitted online traffic 
and rankings from SimilarWeb for uol.com.br, the internet platform used by the website where the 
Petitioner's article is posted, the Petitioner did not provide evidence establishing the major media 
status of the website itself. 
On motion, the Petitioner merely references "[t]he article from uol.com.br" but he does not provide 
the name of the article in question or address the evidentiary deficiencies we highlighted. Instead, the 
Petitioner focuses on his "significant recognition" and "acknowledgement within the voice acting 
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industry," which are not relevant to a determination of whether he satisfied the specific elements 
comprising the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iii). Thus, the Petitioner has not identified legal error 
in our analysis and determination concerning this criterion. 
The Petitioner also challenges our determination concerning the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(x), 
which requires evidence of the Petitioner's commercial success in the performance arts. We noted 
that this criterion focuses on volume of sales and box office receipts as a measure of commercial 
success and we determined that while the record contains evidence of the Petitioner's performance as 
a voice actor in television and films, it does not demonstrate that the success of the projects the 
Petitioner worked on was attributable to his specific work. 
On motion, the Petitioner disagrees with our determination and argues that we must consider "the 
collective impact of evidence," citing Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, to support this contention. 
However, as previously explained, on appeal we determined that there was no need to conduct a 
totality of the evidence analysis in a final merits determination since the Petitioner did not establish 
that he met the threshold requirement of demonstrating that he satisfied at least three of the initial 
evidentiary criteria. Here, the Petitioner has not established that we erred in foregoing a final merits 
determination under the given circumstances, nor has he identified legal error in our analysis and 
determination concerning the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(x). And although the Petitioner 
asserts that we erred by not "adequately consider[ing] the collective impact" of his contributions, he 
cites no law or USCIS policy to support the contention that collective impact of contributions is a 
factor we must consider to determine whether he satisfied this criterion. 
As stated earlier, the Petitioner has not offered new facts or submitted additional evidence in support 
of the motion to reopen. On motion to reconsider, the Petitioner has not established that our previous 
decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy at the time we issued our decision. 
Therefore, the motion will be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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