dismissed EB-1C Case: Automotive Repair

identifying data deleted to U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
prevent clearly unwarranted dministrativeAppeaisorrice (AAo)
inVaSIOn Of PersOnal privacy 20 MassachusettsAve.N.W., MS 2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
U.S.Citizenship
pVBUC COPY and Immigration
Services
DATE: SEP 1 9 2011 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER FILE:
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionfor Alien Workerasa MultinationalExecutiveor ManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)oftheImmigrationandNationalityAct,8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ON BEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOfficein yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedto this matterhavebeenreturnedto theoffice thatoriginally decidedyour case. Pleasebeadvisedthat
anyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe law wasinappropriatelyappliedby us in reachingour decision,or you haveadditional
informationthatyou wish to haveconsidered,youmayfile a motionto reconsideror a motionto reopen.The
specific requirementsfor filing such a requestcan be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be
submittedto theoffice thatoriginally decidedyour caseby filing a FormI-290B,Notice of Appealor Motion,
with a fee of $630. Pleasebe awarethat 8 C.F,R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresthat any motion must be filed
within 30 daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseeksto reconsideror reopen.
Thankyou,
PerryRhew
Chief, Administrative AppealsOffice
www.uscus.gov
Page2
DISCUSSION: Thepreferencevisapetitionwasdeniedby the Director,TexasServiceCenter. Thematteris
now beforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO) on appeal.Theappealwill bedismissed.
The petitioneris a Floridacorporationthat seeksto employthe beneficiaryasthe "functionalmanager"of an
automotive body repair shop.' Accordingly, the petitioner endeavorsto classify the beneficiary as an
employment-basedimmigrantpursuantto section203(b)(1)(C)of the ImmigrationandNationality Act (the
Act), 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C),asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.
The director deniedthe petition, finding the petitionerineligible basedon three independentgrounds.The
directorconcludedthatthepetitionerfailedto establishthat: 1)thebeneficiarywasemployedabroadin a
qualifying managerialor executivecapacity;2) the beneficiarywould beemployedin the United Statesin a
qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity;and3)thepetitionerhadbeendoingbusinessfor oneyearprior
to filing thepetition.
On appeal,counseldisputesall three groundsfor denial, assertingthat the director failed to considerthe
beneficiary'sposition asa function managerand insteadfocusedon the lack of managerial,professional,or
supervisory subordinatepersonnel. Counsel relies on the Departmentof Labor's O*Net definition of
operationsmanagerto supporttheclaimthatthebeneficiarywasemployedabroadin a qualifying managerial
capacity. Counselassertsthat in theproposedposition,thebeneficiarywould alsomanagea function, which
would involve overseeingthe work of independentcontractors,who carry out various operationaltasks.
Lastly, counselassertsthat the petitioneris the successor-in-interestto a previouslyexisting businessand
thereforemeetstheinitial filing requirementcitedat 8C.F.R.§204.5(j)(3)(i)(D).
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) Priority Workers.- Visas shall first be madeavailable. . . to qualified immigrantswho
arealiensdescribedin anyof thefollowingsubparagraphs(A) through(C):
* * *
(C) CertainMultinational ExecutivesandManagers.-- An alien is described
in this subparagraphif the alien,in the 3 yearsprecedingthe time of the
alien's application for classificationand admissioninto the United States
underthis subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least 1year by a firm or
corporationor otherlegalentity or an affiliate or subsidiarythereofandwho
The AAO notesthat it previouslyreviewedthebeneficiary'sinitial FormI-140 immigrantvisapetition
on appeal. In the originalpetition,the petitionerinitially representeditself as an importerandexporterof
automobileproducts.Thepetitionersubsequentlyindicateda changein its businessoperationsin the UnitedStates,
noting that it would operateasa signpaintingbusinessandwould providemanagementto a purportedlyrelatedauto
bodybusiness.Thepetitionersoughtto employthebeneficiaryasitsmarketingdirector.TheAAOconcludedthatthat
the petitionerfailed to establish:1) that the beneficiarywould be primarily employedin a managerialor executive
position,or 2) theexistenceof therequisitequalifyingrelationshipbetweentheforeignandUnitedStatesentitiesatthe
timeof filing. TheAAO dismissedtheappealonSeptember25,2007.
Page3
seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin orderto continueto renderservicesto the
sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is
managerialor executive.
The languageof the statuteis specificin limiting this provisionto only thoseexecutivesand managerswho
havepreviouslyworkedfor a firm, corporationor otherlegalentity,or anaffiliate or subsidiaryof thatentity,
andwho arecomingto theUnitedStatesto work for thesameentity,or its affiliate or subsidiary.
A United Statesemployermay file a petition on Form I-140 for classificationof an alien under section
203(b)(1)(C)of the Act asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No labor certification is requiredfor this
classification.The prospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnisha job offer in the form of a
statementwhich indicatesthat the alien is to beemployedin the United Statesin a managerialor executive
capacity. Sucha statementmustclearlydescribethedutiesto beperformedby thealien.
The first two issuesin this proceedingcall for an analysisof the beneficiary'sjob duties. Specifically,the
AAO will examinethe recordto determinewhetherthe beneficiarywas employedabroadand whetherhe
would beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
The term "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily-
(i) managesthe organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesand controls the work of other supervisory,professional,or
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the
organization,or a departmentor subdivisionof theorganization;
(iii) if another employee or other employeesare directly supervised,has the
authority to hire and fire or recommendthose as well as other personnel
actions(suchaspromotionandleaveauthorization),or if nootheremployee
is directly supervised,functionsat a seniorlevel within the organizational
hierarchyor with respectto thefunctionmanaged;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionovertheday-to-dayoperationsof theactivity or function
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not
consideredto be acting in a managerialcapacitymerely by virtue of the
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are
professional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
The term "executivecapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
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Additionally, counsel'sclaim that the beneficiarywill assumethe role of a function manageris inconsistent
with his statementson appealwhich indicatethat the beneficiarywould superviseand instructthe contract
labor the petitioner claims to employ. As noted above,the very distinction betweena personneland a
function manageris the fact that the latterdoesnot overseethe work of subordinatepersonnel. Moreover,
even if the recordsupportedthe claim that contractlaborerswereworking for the petitionerat the time the
Form I-140 was filed, any time spent supervising,directing, or overseeingthe work of the petitioner's
contractorswould notbeconsideredasbeingaqualifyingmanagerialor executiveduty. Whetheror not these
specifictaskswouldnormallybedeemedmanagerialorexecutiveif performedin relationtotheinternalstaff
of the petitioner,they would be deemedin this instanceto betasksnecessaryto providea service,albeit a
managementservice,beingprovidedby thepetitionerasa generalcontractingcompanyandthus,would be
non-qualifying. The AAO further notes that counsel'sreferenceto an unpublishedAAO decision is
insufficient,asonly publishedprecedentdecisionsarebindingon USCISemployeesin their administrationof
the Act. See8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c). While unpublisheddecisionsmaybe instructivein certaininstances,they
arenot similarly binding.
Additionally, the AAO finds that the supplementinformation provided on appeal indicates that the
beneficiarywould directly performothernon-qualifyingoperationaltasks,including bookkeeping,doing
estimates,purchasingparts and materials,acceptingcustomerorders,handling deliveries, completing all
refinishing,andrepaintingcars. Theseareall tasksthatfall underoneof two categories,i.e., providing
administrativeoffice tasksor contributingto the overall servicesoffered to the petitioner'scustomers.
Regardless,the enumeratedjob duties are non-qualifying and do not fit the definition of managerialor
executivecapacity.
Similarly, a numberof thejob dutiesthatthe beneficiaryperformedin his positionabroadalsodo not fit the
definition of managerialor executivecapacity. Namely,the petitionerpreviouslystatedthat the beneficiary
performedmarketingtasksand supervisedthe foreign entity'sday laborers. Although the petitionerstated
that 80%of the beneficiary'stime wasspentmanagingtheforeignentity'sdaily operations,thepetitionerdid
notprovideanyindicationastothespecifictasksthatwereentailedinthisoverlygeneralizedcategory.
As previouslynotedan employeewho "primarily" performsthe tasksnecessaryto producea productor to
provide servicesis not consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. See
sections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of theAct. In thepresentmatter,the informationregardingthebeneficiary's
employmentabroadand his proposedemploymentwith the U.S. entity doesnot establishthat either position
involvedor would involvethe performanceof primarily managerialor executivetasks. While the AAO does
not disputethat the beneficiaryhadandcontinuesto havefull discretionaryauthorityover the servicesthat
were provided abroad and the servicesthat are currently provided by the U.S. petitioner, neither the
beneficiary'sdiscretionaryauthoritynor hisplacementat thetop of eitherentity'sorganizationalhierarchyis
sufficientto establishthenatureof thebeneficiary'semployment.Thebeneficiary'sspecificjob dutiesreveal
thetruenatureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd.v.Sava,724F.Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),
affd, 905F.2d41(2d.Cir.1990).
With regardto the beneficiary'sproposedemployment,thejob descriptionandthe petitioner'sstaffing
compositionatthetimeof filing stronglyindicatethattheprimaryportionof thebeneficiary'stimewouldbe
spentactuallycarryingout the servicesthatarebeingofferedto the petitioner'scustomers.TheAAO finds
Page7
that counsel'sreferenceto a Departmentof Laborpublication,which describesthejob dutiesthat fall under
the position of operationsmanager,is irrelevant,as it is the beneficiary'sactualjob duties,ratherthanjob
duties that generally fall within the purview of a given position title, that must be assessedto establish
eligibility. Merely repeatingor paraphrasingthe languageof the statuteor regulationswill not satisfythe
petitioner's burden of proof. Id.; see also Avyr Associates,Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942at *5
(S.D.N.Y.).
Next, althoughtheforeignentity appearsto havebeenmoreadequatelystaffedthanthepetitioningentity, the
job descriptionlacks sufficient informationaboutthetasksthat the beneficiaryactually performed,and the
informationprovidedaboutthe employeeswhosework the beneficiarywas overseeingindicatesthat the
beneficiary manageda staff of skilled workers rather than supervisory, managerial, or professional
employees. Therefore,basedon an analysisof the submittedsupportingevidence,the AAO fmds that the
petitionerhasfailed to establishthatthe beneficiarywasemployedabroadandthat hewould beemployedby
the U.S.entity in a qualifying managerialor executivecapacity.
As a final note, counselcorrectly observesthat a company'ssize alone,without taking into accountthe
reasonableneedsof the organization,maynot bethe determiningfactor in denyinga visa to a multinational
manageror executive.See§ 101(a)(44)(C)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(C).However,it is appropriate
for USCISto considerthesizeof thepetitioningcompanyin conjunctionwith otherrelevantfactors,suchasa
company'ssmall personnelsize,the absenceof employeeswho would performthe non-managerialor non-
executiveoperationsof thecompany,or a "shellcompany"thatdoesnotconductbusinessin a regularand
continuousmanner.See,e.g.Family1nc.v. USCIS,469F.3d1313(9th Cir. 2006); SystronicsCorp.v. INS,
153F. Supp.2d 7, 15(D.D.C.2001). Thesizeof a companymaybeespeciallyrelevantwhenCISnotes
discrepanciesin therecordandfailsto believethatthefactsassertedaretrue.SeeSystronics,153F. Supp.2d
at 15.
Thethird issuethatwill beaddressedin this proceedingis whetherthepetitionermettherequirementcitedat
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(i)(D),which statesthat the petitionermustestablishthat it was doing businessfor at
leastoneyearpriorto filing theFormI-140.
The record showsthat the petitioner filed the Form I-140 on March 13,2007. As such,the petitioner must
establishthatit hasbeendoingbusinessasof March13,2006.However,therecordshowsthatthepetitioner
was establishedas a legal entity on September8, 2006,only six monthsprior to the datethe petition was
filed. The petitioneralsoprovidedevidenceshowingthat anentity that wassimilarly namedandpreviously
locatedat the petitioner'scurrentplaceof businesswasincorporatedon October7, 2003. Counselassertson
appealthatthepetitioneris thesuccessor-in-interestto the latterentity. Counsel'sargument,however,doesnot
overcomethe basisfor denial. The languageof the regulationis clearon its face. The regulationat 8 C.F.R.
§204.5(j)(3)(i)(D)requiresthatthepetitionerestablishthatit,notapredecessor,hadbeendoingbusinessfor one
yearpriorto thefiling oftheFormI-140.
Evenif thepetitionerwereto provideevidencetoestablishthatit purchasedanexistingbusinessthatpredated
thepetitioneritself,whichit didnot,therecordisdevoidof evidenceestablishingthatthepetitionerreplaced
or absorbedtherightsandobligationsof itsallegedpredecessor.Thefactthatthepetitionerwasnotofficially
establishedasof March13,2006,makesit factuallyimpossiblefor it to havebeendoingbusinessasof that
Page8
date,asthe petitionercould not havebeendoingbusinessprior to thedateof its own creation. Thus,evenif
thepetitionerhasability to establishthatit wasengagedin the"theregular,systematic,andcontinuous"course
of businesssincethedateof itsorganization,it couldnothavebeendoingbusinesssinceMarch13,2006,orone
yearpriorto thedatethepetitionerfiled theFormI-140. See8 C.F.R.§204.5(j)(2).
Accordingly, the petitionwill bedeniedfor theabovestatedreasons,with eachconsideredasan independent
andalternativebasisfor denial. In visa petitionproceedings,the burdenof provingeligibility for the benefit
soughtremainsentirelywith the petitioner. Section291of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361. The petitionerhasnot
sustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.