dismissed EB-1C Case: Aviation

pt.JBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: LIN 07 1 17 52964 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Datef~g 1 4 2008 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
Ths is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
[Robert P. Wiemann, Chef 
(Tdrninistrative Appeals Office 
LIN 07 117 52964 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant petition. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed the instant immigrant petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or 
executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
4 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner, an international passengerlfi-eight airline, seeks to employ the beneficiary as 
a station maintenance manager based at the Orlando International Airport. 
The director denied the petition on June 22,2007 on the grounds that the petitioner failed to establish: (1) that 
the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity prior to his 
transfer to the United States as a nonimrnigrant intracomiany transferee; and (2) that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the U.S. entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director observed that the 
petitioner had failed to submit an adequate response to a request for evidence issued on April 20,2007. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary manages the essential aircraft maintenance 
function within the company through subordinate licensed aircraft engineers and supenisors, and states that 
he managed the same function while employed by the foreign entity in the United Kingdom. Counsel 
provides further explanation regarding the beneficiary's duties and the organizational structure of the 
maintenance function within the foreign and United States entities. Counsel submits a brief and additional 
evidence in support of the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) 
 Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding 
the time of the alien's application for classification and admission 
into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed 
for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an 
affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United 
States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or 
to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or 
executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in 1imiting.this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
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A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 204.5(j)(5). 
The first issue to be addressed in this matter is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial capacity. The petitioner does not claim that 
the beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act defines "managerial capacity" as follows: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
 . 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely. by virtue of the supervisor's superv*sory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
The immigrant visa petition was filed on March 14,2007. In a letter dated March 1, 2007, the petitioner stated 
that the beneficiary would continue to serve in his current position of "Station Maintenance Manager" based 
at Orlando International Airport. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary "is responsible for insuring that the 
quality of work performed by his subordinate aircraft maintenance engineers" meets company and 
government-mandated standards. The petitioner further described this position as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has complete day to day discretionary authority to cancel flights, take 
aircraft out of service, establish contractual relationships with maintenance support 
contractors and other airlines to form aircraft part sharing pools as needed on an immediate 
and ad hoc basis. [The beneficiary] also has complete discretionary day to day authority to 
determine which individuals from a total of approximately 25 persons employed directly by 
contract aircraft maintenance companies may or may not perform work on our aircraft. 
LIN 07 117 52964 
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The petitioner indicated that the applicant holds a United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 1' icense 
for Boeing 767 2001300; Boeing 747-10012001400 and Airbus A330-200 and A340 aircraft. The petitioner 
noted that only persons with the proper CAA licenses are authorized to oversee and approve technical work 
on the petitioner's aircraft, which are all registered in the United Kingdom. 
The director issued a request for evidence on April 20, 2007, in which he requested that the petitioner 
describe the duties of the proposed position "in much greater detail." The director instructed the petitioner to 
include the actual, specific, day-to-day tasks involved with the completion of each duty, and to supplement 
these descriptions with an estimate of the percentage of time the beneficiary dedicates to each specific duty. 
The director also requested a detailed organizational chart for the petitioner illustrating its current structure 
and clearly depicting the beneficiary's proposed position. The director noted that the chart should include the 
names of all departments, teams, employees, their titles and descriptions of their job duties. The director 
stated that at a minimum, the chart should name the people above the beneficiary's position and the names of 
the employees he supervises, and identity other departments and teams and the number of employees in each 
department. The director emphasized that the chart must include sufficient detail to adequately illustrate the 
beneficiary's position in relation to others. 
In a response dated June 15, 2007, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary is one of four "Duty Maintenance 
Managers" assigned to the Orlando International Airport, and indicated that these employees perform the 
following duties: 
Assigning independent contractor maintenance staff to perform particular functions on 
each flight for which they are responsible (20% of their time) 
Insuring that U.S. FAA and U.K. CAA required procedures are performed by 
subordinate staff and records of aircraft maintenance are properly prepared by those 
contract maintenance staff (40% of their time) 
Reporting work performed and costs expended to the Orlando Maintenance Manager, 
who reports directly to the Area Maintenance Manager - Americas (South), 
(25% of their time) 
Physical supervision and inspection of actual work performed on each aircraft 
maintained to support legally required maintenance documentation (1 5% of their time) 
The petitioner attached what was described as a "dedicated maintenance organizational chart for the United 
States, North and South." The attached chart for "South Americas" depicts four 
Managers" reporting to the Orlando Station Manager, Phil Serik, who in turn reports to 
Maintenance Manager, South Americas Stations. The chart does not depict any subordinate staff reporting to 
the duty maintenpnce managers, nor does it identify the beneficiary by name. Although the director had 
specifically requested that the petitioner submit position descriptions for the beneficiary's immediate 
supervisor and his subordinate staff, the petitioner did not acknowledge this request. 
The director denied the petition on June 22, 2007, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that the 
applicant would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director noted that 
LIN 07 117 52964 
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although the petitioner initially indicated that the applicant would serve as a "Station Maintenance Manager" 
in Orlando, the organizational chart submitted in response to the request for evidence depicted another 
individual as "station manager," and the petitioner instead indicated that the applicant would be one of four 
"Duty Maintenance Managers." The director observed that it was unclear whether these were the same or 
different positions and noted that there are no subordinate employees listed under the duty maintenance 
manager position. The director emphasized that the petitioner had failed to provide detailed position 
descriptions for all relevant positions on the chart, as specifically requested in the request for evidence. 
The director acknowledged the position description provided in response to the request for evidence, but 
found that the petitioner did not provide the requested detailed explanation of the actual day-to-day tasks 
performed by the beneficiary in his current position. The director noted, for example, that it was not evident 
what duties the beneficiary would perform to "insure that regulatory procedures are followed by contract 
maintenance staff." The director concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that the beneficiary 
would spend the majority of his time supervising professional or supervisory personnel or that he would 
otherwise perform primarily managerial or executive duties. 
On appeal, the petitioner references theodefinition of managerial capacity at 8 C.F.R. tj 204.5(j)(2)(B), noting 
that it includes the management of an essential function within the organization or a department or 
subdivision of the organization. The petitioner states that the beneficiary, as a "Duty Station [Aircraft] 
Maintenance Manager," identifies the most essential and critical function within the company - "prevention 
of aircraft accidents and disasters." The petitioner explains that all of the petitioner's aircraft operating in 
Orlando must be maintained, inspected and repaired according to the requirements of the aircraft 
manufacturer and in accordance with CAA and FAA requirements, and goes on to explain in more detail the 
specific daily, scheduled, and ad hoc inspections required, and the detailed compliance reports that must be 
maintained by the maintenance department. The petitioner further explains the applicant's role as follows: 
[The beneficiary] manages this essential function within [the petitioner] through subordinate 
licensed aircraft engineers employed directly by an independent contractor. This contractor 
supplies to [the beneficiary], on a daily basis, licensed aircraft engineers (the number of 
which is dictated by the amount of work required on a particular aircraft on a particular day 
or the number of scheduled aircraft), and a supervisor of those engineers who is also an 
employee of the independent contractor. 
[The beneficiary] directly manages the independent contractor's supervisor of the items 
scheduled for inspection, replacement andlor repair on our Boeing 747; Boeing 767 and 
Boeing 777 aircraft. The independent contractor's supervisor then assigns specific day-to-day 
tasks and functions to be performed on the aircraft to the subordinate individual aircraft 
engineers. The engineers' supervisor implements the directions of [the beneficiary] in order to 
insure compliance with law, company policy and instructions of the aircraft manufacturer. 
The independent contractor's supervisor also acts as a liaison with cabin crew (pilots and 
flight attendants), to insure required repairs are made inside the aircraft cockpit (aircraft 
LIN 07 117 52964 
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instrumentation, etc.), cabin, i.e. electronic equipment for passenger or crew use, lavatories, 
galleys, etc. 
The petitioner again explains that because its aircraft are registered in the United Kingdom, only an individual 
with a CAA aircraft maintenance license may approve its maintenance records and determine whether an 
aircraft is airworthy. The petitioner states that the beneficiary "does this through a review of the work 
performed and the records prepared." 
The petitioner acknowledges that the applicant does not have the authority to hire and fire the contract 
employees, but states that he "has full discretionary authority to dictate which individual aircraft engineers 
and supervisors employed by the independent contractor may work on [the petitioner's] aircraft and refuse 
those whose performance or work product does not meet with his satisfaction and [the petitioner's] standards 
of excellence and company policy." 
The petitioner further addresses the beneficiary's level of authority as follows: 
[The beneficiary] also has authority to recommend to [the petitioner] which independent 
contractor's services meet with [the petitioner's] high standards of aircraft maintenance and 
safety and also suppliers at Orlando Airport of aircraft parts, lubricants and other essential 
aircraft supplies." 
[The beneficiary] has full and sole day-to-day discretionary authority to take an aircraft out of 
service by determining whether or not an aircraft is airworthy, on a day-to-day basis and such 
action results in the day of hundreds of passengers. This decision is [the beneficiary's] and 
[the beneficiary's] alone. 
The petitioner also acknowledges the director's observations regarding the organizational chart, noting that the 
chart does not depict subordinate staff beneath the beneficiary because these positions are filled by contract 
employees. The petitioner references other airport maintenance departments included on the submitted 
organizational charts, noting that they in fact show up to 20 individuals in "three descending layers of 
hierarchy." As an example, the petitioner notes that its maintenance staff at the JFK International Airport in 
New York includes "nine subordinate representatives (supervisors), eight subordinate aircraft maintenance 
engineers and three aircraft parts store-keepers - supplemented by independent contractor aircraft engineers." 
The petitioner noted that because the Orlando airport has a lower frequency of flights than the JFK airport, the 
use of contracted staff is more cost efficient. 
Finally, the petitioner emphasizes that the beneficiary is presently in the United States and is currently 
working in the proposed position pursuant as an L-1 nonimmigrant visa. 
/ 
bA ya*hJ72 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner 
 established that the beneficiary will 
be employed by the U.S. entity in a primarily managerial capacity. 
As a preliminary matter, the AAO notes that the petitioner has 
 resolved its use of different 
position titles for the beneficiary's proposed position. As noted by the director, the petitioner initially 
LIN 07 117 52964 
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identified the position as that of "Station Maintenance Manager" on the Form 1-140 and supporting letter, but 
subsequently indicated that the beneficiary serves as one of four "Duty Maintenance Managers" assigned to 
the Orlando International Airport. Given that the organizational chart submitted in response to the request for 
evidence identifies the beneficiary's director supervisor as "Station Manager," it is reasonable to assume that 
these are two distinct positions within the petitioner's organizational hierarchy. Absent an explanation from 
the petitioner, the record suggests that the petitioner did not provide an accurate job title for the beneficiary at 
the time of filing the Form 1-140. On appeal, the petitioner does not specifically address the director's 
observations regarding this inconsistency, although it is noted that the petitioner now refers to the position as 
"Duty Station [Aircraft] Maintenance Manager," apparently a hybrid of the two previous job titles. 
The use of inconsistent position titles makes it impossible for CIS to make an accurate assessment of the 
beneficiary's position within the organizational hierarchy. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 59 1-92 (BIA 1988). 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. $ 204.56)(5). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The petitioner's initial description of the beneficiary's duties failed to identify any specific managerial tasks to 
be performed by him in the proposed role. The petitioner stated that he has "complete day to day discretionary 
authority to cancel flights, take aircraft out of service, establish contractual relationships with maintenance 
support contractors and other airlines," as well as "complete day-to-day authority to determine which 
individuals from a total of approximately 25 persons employed directly by contract maintenance companies 
may or may not perform work on our aircraft." These broad statements convey little understanding of what 
specific tasks the beneficiary performs on a day-to-day basis. Making general claims regarding the scope of 
the beneficiary's responsibility is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner's initial description of the proposed position failed to provide 
any detail or explanation of the beneficiary's activities in the course of his daily routine. The actual duties 
themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Furthermore, it is noted that while the petitioner initially indicated that the beneficiary has "complete 
discretionary authority" to establish contractual relationships with maintenance support contractors and other 
airlines, the petitioner states on appeal that his authority extends to recommending which independent 
contractors services meet the petitioner's standards. Again, as with the change in the beneficiary's position 
title, the petitioner offered no explanation for this change in the beneficiary's level of authority with respect to 
the company's contractual relationships. Without such explanation, these conflicting statements further 
support a conclusion that the petitioner did not accurately identify the beneficiary's job title and duties at the 
time of filing. 
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As noted above, the director very clearly articulated in the request for evidence that the petitioner was 
required to describe the beneficiary's actual duties in much greater detail, including clarification regarding the 
"actual specific day-to-day tasks involved with the completion of each duty." The petitioner responded by 
listing four responsibilities and the amount of time devoted to each responsibility. The petitioner indicated 
that 25 percent of the beneficiary's time is devoted to "reporting work performed and costs expended" to his 
supervisor. The petitioner did not explain how this component of the beneficiary's position qualifies as 
managerial in nature. Without clarification regarding the specific tasks performed in regard to monitoring 
costs, for example, this responsibility could involve tasks that are more akin to administrative responsibilities 
that do not rise to the level of managerial capacity. 
Upon review of the remaining three areas of responsibility attributed to the beneficiary, it is noted that the 
petitioner essentially stated that 75 percent of the beneficiary's time is spent assigning tasks to and supervising 
"independent contractor maintenance staff." Specifically, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary spends 
20 percent of his time assigning contract staff to perform particular functions for their assigned flights, 40 
percent of his time ensuring that the staff complete required procedures and properly prepare the associated 
maintenance records, and 15 percent of his time physically supervising and inspecting the actual work 
performed on each aircraft. The petitioner did not indicate what specific tasks are involved in "ensuring" that 
staff complete procedures and properly prepare records, or how this responsibility differs from the 
beneficiary's separate responsibility for supervising and inspecting work performed by the claimed contract 
staff. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or 
managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 
1990). 
While the petitioner has provided a lengthy brief in support of the appeal, the petitioner does not directly 
address the director's finding that the petitioner failed to provide the requested detailed explanation of the 
actual day-to-day tasks performed by the beneficiary. The majority of the petitioner's brief is devoted to 
explaining the importance of the aircraft maintenance function, which was never in question, and to offering 
clarification regarding the staffing and reporting structure within the function. While this information will be 
taken into account, the petitioner still bears the burden of clearly describing the duties to be performed by the 
beneficiary. Here, the position descriptions submitted by the petitioner are insufficient to establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial capacity. Failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. Lj 103.2(b)(14). 
Moreover, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's duties cannot be read or considered in the abstract, 
rather the AAO must determine based on a totality of the record whether the description of the beneficiary's 
duties represents a credible perspective of the beneficiary's role within the organizational hierarchy. When 
examining the managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 
reviews descriptions of a beneficiary's duties and those of his or her subordinate employees, the nature of the 
petitioner's business, and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual 
role in a business. The evidence must substantiate that the duties of the beneficiary and his or her 
subordinates correspond to their placement in an organization's structural hierarchy. 
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The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and "function 
managers." See section 101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). Since the 
petitioner has indicated that the beneficiary primarily supervises subordinate personnel, and has also claimed 
that he manages an essential function of the company, the AAO will consider his eligibility under both 
criteria. 
Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, 
professional, or managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manager," the 
statute plainly states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely 
by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. If a beneficiary directly supervises other employees, the beneficiary must also 
have the authority to hire and fire those employees, or recommend those actions, and take other personnel 
actions. Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iii) of the Act.. 
The petitioner has consistently indicated that the beneficiary would supervise subordinate personnel; however, 
the record is devoid of any evidence of these personnel, such as information regarding the number of 
personnel, their job titles, or their job duties. Clearly, this information is critical to any analysis of whether the 
beneficiary would primarily supervise a staff of professional, managerial or supervisory employees. The 
petitioner initially referred to the beneficiary's authority to determine which individuals from "approximately 
25 persons employed directly by contract aircraft maintenance companies may or may not perform work on 
our aircraft." The director reasonably requested a detailed organizational chart for the petitioner and clearly 
advised that the chart should include the names, job titles and job duties of all employees, or, at a minimum, 
those of the beneficiary's subordinates and immediate supervisor. 
As noted by the director, the organizational chart submitted in response to the director's request did not show 
any staff subordinate to the beneficiary and did not even identify the beneficiary himself by name. 
Nevertheless, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's duties referenced "independent contractor 
maintenance staff' working under the beneficiary's supervision. While the petitioner has provided a 
reasonable explanation as to why the contract staff do not appear on the company's organizational chart, the 
fact that the beneficiary's claimed subordinates are independent contractors rather than direct employees 
should not have prohibited the petitioner from submitting the information requested by the director. The 
director made it clear that he required more information regarding the beneficiary's subordinates, including 
their job titles and job duties. Again, any failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). Based on the evidence in the 
record before the director, he properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary 
would be supervising a subordinate staff of managerial, supervisory or professional personnel, as required by 
section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
On appeal, the petitioner has provided further explanation regarding the organization of its aircraft 
maintenance function in general, but still has not established who the beneficiary actually supervises or what 
their job titles and job duties are. The petitioner indicates that the previously referenced independent 
contractors include both licensed aircraft engineers and "a supervisor of those engineers" who are supplied to 
the beneficiary by an independent contractor on a daily basis. The petitioner states that the beneficiary 
LIN 07 117 52964 
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manages the independent contractor's supervisor and that this employee assigns tasks and functions to the 
engineers and "implements the directions of [the beneficiary]." As discussed above, the petitioner stated in 
its letter dated June 15, 2007 that the beneficiary "assigns independent contractor maintenance staff to 
perform particular functions on each flight for which they are responsible." It appears that the petitioner is 
now attributing this task to previously unidentified supervisors employed by the independent contractors. It is 
incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. 
Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits 
competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
Furthermore, the petitioner does not provide any specific information on appeal regarding the. job titles and 
duties of the "25 persons employed directly by contract aircraft maintenance companies" who are claimed to 
work under the supervision of the beneficiary and the three other duty maintenance managers assigned to the 
Orlando International Airport. Instead, the petitioner indicates that the duty maintenance managers at a 
different airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), supervise nine "subordinate representatives 
(supervisors)," eight aircraft maintenance engineers and three aircraft parts store-keepers, in addition to 
independent contractor aircraft engineers. The petitioner implies that this same three-tier hierarchy exists 
within the independent contractors staff utilized at the Orlando International Airport. However, there are two 
problems with the petitioner's argument. First, it is unclear why the petitioner did not simply provide evidence 
related to the actual contractors it utilizes at the Orlando International Airport and actually supervised by the 
beneficiary, rather than asking that the AAO draw parallels between staffing structures utilized at different 
airports. It would be sufficient for the petitioner to identify the name of the contractor, the names of the 
contract staff avaiIable to work under the beneficiary's supervision, their job titles and a brief description of 
their job duties. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Second, the AAO notes that the petitioner's description of the staffing structure at one of its more fully staffed 
airparts does not comport with the organizational chart it provided. The petitioner refers to nine "subordinate 
representatives (supervisors)," but the petitioner identifies these employees as "Maintenance Repts." on the 
organizational chart and the eight "aircraft maintenance engineers" are identified as "mechs", presumably 
"mechanics." The petitioner did not provide job descriptions or job requirements for any of these positions. 
Even if the AAO were to accept that the claim that the independent contractor staff is similarly organized, it 
could not be determined whether these positions are supervisory or professional in nature. See 8 C.F.R. 8 
204.5 (j)(4)(i). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary primarily manages a 
subordinate staff of managerial, supervisory or professional employees. The petitioner has also acknowledged 
that the beneficiary does not have the authority to hire or fire employees or to recommend these personnel 
decisions because his subordinates are not direct employees. It appears that, at most, the beneficiary and the 
petitioner's other duty maintenance managers have the authority to refuse to accept the services of individual 
employees of the independent contractor if their work is found to not meet the petitioner's standards. The 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial capacity on the basis of 
his supervisory responsibilities. 
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The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. The-term "essential" is commonly defined as "inherent" or 
"indispensable." Webster 's 11 New College Dictionary 3 84 (200 1). Accordingly, based on the plain meaning 
of the word "essential," the petitioner must establish that the function managed by the beneficiary is inherent 
and indispensable to the petitioner's operations rather than a non-essential or superfluous task. 
Based on the statutory definition of managerial capacity, a petitioner must prove the following elements to 
establish that a beneficiary is primarily serving as a function manager within an organization: 
First, the beneficiary must manage an "essential function" within the organization, or a 
department or subdivision of the organization; 
Second, the beneficiary must function at a "senior level" within the organizational hierarchy 
or with respect to the function managed; and 
Third, the beneficiary must control and "exercise discretion" over the day-to-day operations 
of the function. 
See sections 101(a)(44)(A)(ii), (iii), and (iv) of the Act. 
If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a 
written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in maniging the essential function, i.e. 
identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the 
proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attnbuted to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 
204.50)(5). If a petitioner fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial 
functions and what proportion would be non-managerial, the AAO cannot determine whether the beneficiary 
is primarily performing the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. 
Supp. 2d 22'24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
The AAO does not dispute that the aircraft maintenance function is absolutely essential for any commercial 
airline, or that the beneficiary's position is important to the petitioner. However, the evidence submitted falls 
significantly short of establishing that the beneficiary performs primarily managerial duties. As discussed, his 
primary duties involve the supervision of independent contractor aircraft maintenance staff that has not been 
documented by the petitioner. The petitioner has not shown how the beneficiary functions at a senior level 
with respect to the function managed. The record shows that within the Orlando International Airport station, 
there are three other employees with precisely the same level of authority over aircraft maintenance activities 
relative to the beneficiary, and one employee who is senior to the beneficiary. While the beneficiary's is 
noted, the record does not establish that the scope or level of his authority rises to that of a function manager. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in 
the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this reason, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
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The remaining issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary was employed 
by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial capacity. Again, the petitioner has not claimed that the 
beneficiary was employed in an executive capacity. 
The petitioner indicated in its letter dated March 1, 2007 that the beneficiary was employed as a Station 
Maintenance Manager at London Heathrow Airport from 1991 until 2003, at which time he was transferred to 
the United States as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee. The petitioner stated that his duties in that 
position were identical to those he currently performs in the United States. The petitioner further stated: 
In that position, [the beneficiary] managed approximately 100 licensed [company] 
maintenance staff and was responsible for [the petitioner's] aircraft and other airlines under 
contract to [the petitioner]. [The beneficiary] was directly responsible to upper level technical. 
management for the quality of aircraft maintenance performed by those staff to insure it met 
the company standards and adhered to United Kingdom Government regulations. 
In the request for evidence issued on April 20, 2007, the director requested additional evidence including a 
detailed, specific description of the beneficiary's day-to-day duties while employed by the foreign entity, and 
an estimate of the amount of time he devoted to each specific duty. The director also requested a detailed 
organizational chart for the foreign entity that corresponds with the beneficiary's period of qualifying 
employment abroad, noting that it should, at a minimum, clearly identify the beneficiary, his supervisor, his 
subordinates and their names, job titles and job duties. 
As noted above, the petitioner responded to the director's request for evidence in a letter dated June 15, 2007, 
in which it stated: 
With respect to the beneficiary's responsibilities abroad, [the petitioner] is extremely large in 
the United Kingdom. In London, [the petitioner's] maintenance is responsible for 
maintenance of over 350 [company] aircraft, aircraft of Virgin Atlantic, South African 
Airways, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and vie other airlines. Accordingly, [the petitioner] in 
London has over 800 maintenance staff, Duty Managers and maintenance Station Managers. 
The petitioner did not address the director's request for a more detailed description of the beneficiary's duties 
or provide the requested organizational chart. 
The director denied the petition on June 22, 2007, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that the 
beneficiary had been employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. In 
denying the petition, the director observed that the petitioner "failed to comply with the Service's very specific 
request for additional evidence regarding the nature of the duties performed abroad and the beneficiary's 
position relative to others." The director concluded that based on the minimal evidence provided, it could not 
be concluded that the beneficiary's duties with the foreign entity were primarily in a qualifying capacity. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's responsibilities in his prior position with the foreign 
entity were identical to those he performs in the United States. The petitioner notes that while employed 
LIN 07 117 52964 
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abroad, the beneficiary also had the authority to hire or dismiss subordinate aircraft engineers and to 
recommend promotions. The petitioner explained that in London, the subordinate employees were all direct 
employees of the petitioning company and not contractors. The petitioner further clarifies that the 
beneficiary's duties in the United Kingdom also included providing training and recurrent training in aircraft 
maintenance procedures to subordinate maintenance supervisors and aircraft engineers, a responsibility that 
required approximately 15 percent of his time. 
The petitioner further explained the applicant's supervisory duties as follows: 
In London, [the beneficiary] managed maintenance for up to 20 flights each day. The number 
of aircraft engineers assigned to any given flight was dictated solely by the maintenance work 
required on a particular aircraft on any given day. As [the petitioner] operates a 24/7/365 
maintenance operation at London Heathrow (three eight-hour shifts), responsible for over 300 
flights daily, the actual employees subordinate to [the beneficiary] depended upon the 
individual supervisors and subordinate aircraft maintenance engineers on duty on any given 
day or shift and were from an overall pool of nearly 200 subordinate aircraft maintenance 
engineers. 
The petitioner noted that it employs over 2,000 employees in Heathrow airport alone, and that of these 
employees, the beneficiary managed "a large revolving group on individual aircraft maintenance engineers 
and aircraft parts store-keepers . . .through subordinate supervisory aircraft maintenance staff." With respect 
to the beneficiary's supervision of subordinate supervisors, the petitioner states: 
[The beneficiary] managed subordinate aircraft maintenance supervisors - based on the date 
and shift, from a pool of 73 supervises who directly supervised aircraft engineers performing 
actual day-to-day tasks of aircraft maintenance, from a pool of 142 individuals. . . . [The 
petitioner] respectfully submits that, in light of the foregoing, identification of the employees 
[the beneficiary] managed, together with turnover, is a very daunting task. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not fully overcome the grounds stated for denial. As discussed, the petitioner 
failed to respond to the director's request for evidence regarding the beneficiary's duties while employed 
abroad and the organizational structure of the foreign entity. The regulation states that the petitioner shall 
submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion may deem necessary. The purpose of the 
request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has 
been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to 
submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 
C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). The suggestion that it would be difficult for the petitioner to provide the requested 
information because of its large size, even when given 12 weeks to respond to a request for evidence, is not 
persuasive. Therefore, the director's denial of the petition on this basis was proper. 
Further, it is noted that the petitioner has repeatedly stated that the position the beneficiary held in the United 
Kingdom is identical to the position he currently holds in the United States. For that reason, several of the 
deficiencies discussed above would also apply to an analysis of the beneficiary's duties with the foreign 
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Page 14 
entity. 
 The petitioner initially indicated that the beneficiary held the job title of "Station Maintenance 
Manager" with both the U.S. and foreign entities. However, the petitioner subsequently indicated that the 
beneficiary currently holds the position of "Duty Maintenance Manager," which, based on the petitioner's 
evidence submitted, appears to be a distinctly different position from that of "Station Maintenance Manager," 
and less senior within the company's organizational hierarchy. As the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary 
held the same position in the United Kingdom, it is unclear whether his position while employed abroad was 
Station Maintenance Manager or Duty Maintenance Manager. Again, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to 
resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or 
reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. Again, the petitioner has not 
addressed this issue on appeal. 
The AAO acknowledges that the petitioner has consistently stated that the applicant supervised a large staff of 
subordinates who were direct employees of the foreign entity. The petitioner initially stated that the 
beneficiary managed "approximately 100 licensed maintenance staff' and was responsible to upper level 
technical management for the quality of the aircraft maintenance performed by these staff. However, the 
petitioner offered no information regarding the job titles or duties of these staff and did not specifically state 
that the beneficiary managed supervisors or professionals. 
In response to the request for additional evidence regarding the beneficiary's duties, the foreign entity's 
organizational structure, and the job titles and job duties of the beneficiary's subordinates the petitioner stated: 
"[the petitioner] in London has over 800 maintenance staff, Duty Managers and maintenance Station 
Managers." Again, as noted above, it is not clear which position title the beneficiary held or where that 
position was located within the organizational hierarchy. Although it was perhaps not feasible to identify 800 
employees by name on an organizational chart, it was not unreasonable to expect some meaningful response 
from the petitioner, such as the approximate number of employees holding each position title within the 
maintenance department, job descriptions for the positions subordinate to the beneficiary's, andlor a general 
chart clearly showing the reporting structure within the beneficiary's department. 
On appeal, the petitioner clarifies that the beneficiary's subordinates were drawn from "an overall pool of 
nearly 200 subordinate aircraft maintenance engineers," and noted that there were 73 supervisors and 142 
aircraft engineers available to work under his supervision. The petitioner still has not submitted a description 
of the duties performed by the beneficiary's subordinates, nor has it explained why it previously indicated that 
he supervised 100 people. 
Overall, there is insufficient evidence in the record regarding the beneficiary's actual duties while employed 
by the foreign entity. Further, the lack of evidence pertaining to the organizational structure of the foreign 
entity and the beneficiary's place within the hierarchy prohibits a finding that the beneficiary primarily 
supervised subordinate professional, supervisory or managerial staff, and also precludes the AAO from 
determining that he functioned at a senior level with respect to the foreign entity's aircraft maintenance 
function. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
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Page 15 
The AAO acknowledges that the beneficiary is currently employed by the petitioner in L-1 status. In this case, 
it appears that the beneficiary's previous L-1 petition(s) were submitted under the petitioner's blanket L 
petition and were thus adjudicated by U.S. consular .officers. This matter, therefore, presents the first 
opportunity that CIS has had to determine -this beneficiary's eligibility pursuant to the statutory definitions of 
managerial and executive capacity. 
b 
The prior nonimmigrant approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an extension or a separate immigrant 
petition. See e.g. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556,2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The 
AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same 
definitions of managerial and executive capacity and on similar definitions of qualifying 
relationship/organization. See $8 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44) and 8 C.F.R. tj 
204.56)(2) and 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii). Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive 
capacity are the same and the definitions of qualifying relationship/organization are similar, the question of 
overall eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just these definitions. There 
are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the 
United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa petition, which permits an 
alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and; if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization 
as a United States citizen. CJ $8 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $3 1 154 and 1 184; see also 8 3 16 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1427. 
In general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny 
by CIS than nonimmigrant petitions. Accordingly, many Form 1-140 immigrant petitions are denied after CIS 
approves prior nonimmigrant Form 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. 
Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); Fedin 
Brothers Co. Ltd v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
Moreover each nonirnmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. See 8 C.F.R. 8 103.8(d). The 
approval of a nonimmigrant petition does not guarantee that CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on 
behalf of the same beneficiary. The AAO is not required to approve applications or peti,tions where eligibility 
has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter 
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,597 (Cornrn. 1988). 
* 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.