dismissed EB-1C Case: Business

U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)
20MassachusettsAve N.W.,MS2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
8 U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
DATE: DEC 2 8 2012 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionfor AlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveorManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct,8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedto this matterhavebeenreturnedto theofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvised
thatanyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional
informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfBea motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin
accordancewith theinstructionson FormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a feeof $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha motioncanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directlywith theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresanymotiontobefiledwithin
30 daysof the decisionthat themotion seeksto reconsideror reopen.
Thankyou,
RonRosenberg
ActingChief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscis.gov
Page2
DISCUSSION: The director of the Texas ServiceCenter revokedthe previously approved
preferencevisapetition. The petitionerappealedthe matterto the AdministrativeAppealsOffice
(AAO), wherethe appealwasdismissed.TheAAO dismisseda subsequentmotionto reconsider.
Thematteris nowbeforethe AAO on a motionto reopenanda motionto reconsider.Themotion
will bedismissedandthedirector'sandtheAAO's decisionswill beundisturbed.
Thepetitioneris a Floridacorporationthatseeksto employthebeneficiaryasits generalmanager.
Accordingly, the petitioner endeavorsto classify the beneficiary as an employment-based
immigrant pursuantto section203(b)(1)(C)of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act),
8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C),asamultinationalexecutiveor manager.
The director revokedthe previously approvedpetition becausethe director determinedthat the
petitionerfailedto respondto theNoticeof Intentto Revoke(NOIR).
Thepetitionersubsequentlyfiled anappealwhich theAAO dismissedon December8, 2009. The
petitioner filed a motion to reconsider,which the AAO dismissedon December9, 2011. On
January5, 2012,counselfor thepetitionerfiled FormI-290Bandstatedthatthepetitioneris filing a
motionto reopenandreconsider.
On motion, counselcontendsthat the beneficiaryhired a new attorneyto representhim and his
family ataninterview"thatwasconductedby theINS." Thenewattorneypresenteda G-28for the
I-485,but not for the I-140; however,counselstatesthat the "recordis repletewith evidencethat
TampaUSCISwasawarethat washandlingthe wholecase,asevidencedby
the myriadcorrespondencebetweenTampaUSCISandthe Firm." Counselalsoadmitsthat
neverfiled a G-28,Noticeof Entryof Appearance,on behalfof thepetitionerfor theFormI-
140. Counselstatesthatthepetitionerdid not receivetheNOIR, andinsteadit wentto theattorney
of record that was subsequentlydisbarred. Counselexplainedthat the petitioner has filed a
complaintwith disciplinarycounselagainst in regardto hisactions.
As a preliminary matter,the AAO notesthat while an appealand a motion are both remedial
actions, the legal purpose of an appeal is entirely distinct from that of a motion to
reopen/reconsider. The AAO reviews appealson a de novo basis, allowing the petitioner to
supplementthe recordwith any evidenceor documentationthat the filing party feelsmay overcome
the groundsfor theunderlyingadversedecision. SeeSoltanev. DOJ, 381F.3d 143,145(3d Cir.
2004). However,theAAO's reviewof a motionto reopenor a motionto reconsideris limited to
evidencethatfitsthespecificcriteriadiscussedat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(2)and8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(3),
respectively. Submittingevidencethat doesnot fit the regulatorycriteria specifiedat 8 C.F.R.§
103.5(a)(2)or 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(3),dependingonthetypeof motionthepetitionerhasfiled,will
not suffice even if such evidencemay have overcomethe groundsfor denial if it have been
submittedon appeal.
Theregulationsat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(2)states,in pertinentpart:"A motionto reopenmuststatethe
new facts to be providedin the reopenedproceedingand be supportedby affidavits or other
documentaryevidence."
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Basedon theplainmeaningof "new,"a newfactis foundto beevidencethatwasnot availableand
couldnothavebeendiscoveredor presentedin thepreviousproceeding.1
Onmotion,counselfor the etitionerexplainedthatthepetitionerfiled a complaintwith "disciplinary
counselagainstAttorne with regardto hisactions." Onmotion,thepetitionerprovideda letter
anda complaintform from thepetitionerto the FloridaBarregardingthe actionsof The
letterandcomplaintformaredatedJanuary3,2012.
Any appealor motionbasedupona claimof ineffectiveassistanceof counselrequires:(1) thatthe
claimbe supportedby anaffidavit of the allegedlyaggrievedrespondentsettingforth in detailthe
agreementthat was enteredinto with counselwith respectto the actionsto be taken andwhat
representationscounseldid or did not maketo therespondentin this regard,(2) thatcounselwhose
integrityor competenceis beingimpugnedbe informedof the allegationsleveledagainsthim and
be given anopportunityto respond,and(3) that the appealor motionreflectwhethera complaint
hasbeenfiled with appropriatedisciplinaryauthoritieswith respectto anyviolation of counsel's
ethicalor legalresponsibilities,and if not, why not. Matter of Lozada,19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA
1988),affd, 857F.2d10(1stCir. 1988).
Thepetitionerdid not submitevidencethat wasinformedof theallegationsleveledagainst
him andwasnotgivenanopportunityto respon. n addition,thepetitionerdid notprovidesufficient
evidenceto establishthatthecomplaintmadeby thepetitionerto theFloridaBarwasin factfiled and
receivedbytheFloridaBar.
Furthermore,the documentationsubmittedon motion includeddocumentsthat could havebeen
previouslysubmitted.It is not clearwhy thepetitionerdid not file a complaintagainsttheprevious
attorneyearlier. A reviewof the evidencethatthepetitionersubmitson motionrevealsno factthat
couldbeconsiderednewunder8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(2).Theevidencesubmittedwaseitherpreviously
availableandcouldhavebeendiscoveredor presentedin thepreviousproceeding,or it post-datesthe
petition.
In addition,the motion doesnot satisfythe requirementsof a motion to reconsider. 8 C.F.R.§
103.5(a)(2)states,inpertinentpart:
A motionto reconsidermuststatethereasonsfor reconsiderationandbesupportedby
any pertinentprecedentdecisionsto establishthat the decisionwas basedon an
incorrectapplicationof law or Servicepolicy. A motionto reconsidera decisionon
an applicationor petition must,when filed, also establishthat the decisionwas
incorrectbasedontheevidenceof recordatthetimeof theinitialdecision.
Onmotion,counseldoesnot submitanydocumentthatwouldmeettherequirementsof amotionto
reconsider.A reviewof therecordandtheadversedecisionindicatesthatthedirectorandtheAAO
1 Theword"new"is definedas"1.havingexistedor beenmadefor onlya shorttime. . . 3.Justdiscovered,
found, or learned <new evidence> . . . ." WEBSTER'SII NEW RIVERSIDEUNIVERSITYDICTIONARY792
(1984)(emphasisin original).
Page4
properly appliedthe statuteand regulationsto the petitioner'scase. The petitioner'sprimary
complaintisthatit receivedineffectiveassistanceof prior counsel.
Uponreviewof thedenialandtheAAO's decisions,boththeDirectorandAAO provideddetailed
statementsof the groundsfor denial and dismissaland cited to the specificprovisionsof the
regulationsasa basisfor the decisions.A reviewof the recordandthe adversedecisionindicates
thatthe directorandtheAAO properlyappliedthe statuteandregulationsto the petitioner'scase.
Both the director and the AAO's decisionshave clearly outlined the missing information or
inconsistentinformationanddocumentation,andexplainedthattherecordhasinsufficientevidence
to establisheligibility for thebenefitsought.
On motion,the petitionerdoesnot establishthat the AAO's decisionwasbasedon an incorrect
applicationof lawor Servicepolicy. Thebrief doesnot provideinformationor evidencethatwould
supporta motionto reconsider.Goingon recordwithout supportingdocumentaryevidenceis not
sufficientfor purposesof meetingthe burdenof proof in theseproceedings.Matter of Soffici,22
I&N Dec. 158, 165(Comm'r 1998)(citing Matter of TreasureCraft of California, 14I&N Dec.
190(Reg.Comm'r1972)).
In visa petitionproceedings,the burdenis on the petitionerto establisheligibility for the benefit
sought. SeeMatter of Brantigan,11I&N Dec.493 (BIA 1966). Thepetitionermustproveby a
preponderanceof evidencethat thebeneficiaryis fully qualifiedfor the benefitsought. Matter of
Martinez,21 I&N Dec. 1035,1036(BIA 1997);Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec.77, 79-80(Comm.
1989);MatterofSooHoo,11I&N Dec.151(BIA 1965).
The "preponderanceof the evidence"standardrequiresthat the evidencedemonstratethat the
applicant'sclaimis "probablytrue," wherethedeterminationof "truth" is madebasedonthe factual
circumstancesof eachindividualcase.Matterof E-M-, 20 I&N Dec.77,79-80(Comm.1989). In
evaluatingthe evidence,Matter of E-M- alsostatedthat "[t]ruth is to be determinednot by the
quantityof evidencealonebut by its quality."Id. Thus,in adjudicatingtheapplicationpursuantto
thepreponderanceof the evidencestandard,the directormustexamineeachpieceof evidencefor
relevance,probativevalue,andcredibility,bothindividuallyandwithin thecontextof thetotality of
theevidence,to determinewhetherthefactto beprovenisprobablytrue.
Evenif thedirectorhassomedoubtasto thetruth,if thepetitionersubmitsrelevant,probative,and
credibleevidencethatleadsthedirectorto believethattheclaimis "probablytrue" or "morelikely
than not," the applicantor petitionerhassatisfiedthe standardof proof. SeeUS. v. Cardozo-
Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greaterthan 50 percent
probabilityof somethingoccurring). If thedirectorcanarticulatea materialdoubt,it is appropriate
for the directorto eitherrequestadditionalevidenceor, if that doubt leadsthe directorto believe
thattheclaimisprobablynottrue,denytheapplicationor petition.
Here,the submittedevidencedoesnot meetthepreponderanceof the evidencestandard.As noted
in thedirector'sdecisionandtheAAO's decisions,thepetitionerdid not providesufficientevidence
to establishthat the petitionermeetsthe regulatoryrequirementsto establisheligibility for the
benefitsought.
Page5
Motionsfor the reopeningof immigrationproceedingsaredisfavoredfor the samereasonsas are
petitionsfor rehearingandmotionsfor a newtrial on thebasisof newly discoveredevidence.INS v.
Doherty,502U.S.314,323(1992)(citingINSv. Abudu,485U.S.94 (1988)). A partyseekingto
reopenaproceedingbearsa"heavyburden."INSv. Abudu,485U.S.at110.With thecurrentmotion,
themovanthasnot metthatburden.
Theburdenof proof in theseproceedingsrestssolelywith thepetitioner. Section291of theAct, 8
U.S.C. 1361. Thepetitionerhasnot sustainedthat burden. 8 CFR § 103.5(a)(4)statesthat "[a]
motionthat doesnot meetapplicablerequirementsshallbe dismissed." Accordingly,the motion
will be dismissed,the proceedingswill not be reconsidered,and the previousdecisionsof the
directorandtheAAO will notbedisturbed.
ORDER: Themotionisdismissed.Thedirector'sandAAO's decisionswill beundisturbed.