dismissed EB-1C Case: Business Management

identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyunwarranted
invasionofpersonalprivacy
PUBLICCOPY
U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)
20MassachusettsAve.N.W.,MS2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
U.S.Citizenship
andImmigration
Services
DATE: OCT 0 6 2011
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionfor Alien WorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveor ManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)oftheImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOfficein yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedtothismatterhavebeenreturnedtotheofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvisedthat
anyfurtherinquiry thatyou might haveconcerningyour casemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe law was inappropriatelyappliedby us in reachingour decision,or you haveadditional
informationthatyouwishtohaveconsidered,youmayfile amotiontoreconsideroramotiontoreopen.The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha requestcanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.All motionsmustbe
submittedto theoffice thatoriginally decidedyour caseby filing aFormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,
with a fee of $630. Pleasebe awarethat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresthat anymotionmustbe filed
within 30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseeksto reconsideror reopen.
Thankyou,
PerryRhew
Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscis.gov
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DISCUSSION:Thepreferencevisapetitionwasdeniedby theDirector,TexasServiceCenter.Thematteris
nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)onappeal.Theappealwill bedismissed.
Thepetitioneris a Florida corporationthat seeksto employthe beneficiaryasits manager.Accordingly,the
petitioner endeavorsto classify the beneficiary as an employment-basedimmigrant pursuantto section
203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct (theAct), 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C),asa multinational
executiveor manager.
The director deniedthe petition basedon five independentgroundsof ineligibility. Namely, the director
concludedthat the petitionerfailed to establishthat 1) it hasthe ability to pay the beneficiary'sproffered
wage;2) thebeneficiarywasemployedabroadby aqualifyingorganizationfor therequisitetimeperiodand
thatsuchemploymentwaswithin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity;3) thebeneficiarywouldbe
employedin the United Statesin a managerialor executivecapacity;and 4) that the petitioner and the
beneficiary'semployerabroadhavea qualifyingrelationship.
On appeal,thepetitionersubmitsabrief disputingthedirector'sfindings.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) Priority Workers.-- Visasshallfirst bemadeavailable. . . to qualifiedimmigrantswho
arealiensdescribedin anyof thefollowingsubparagraphs(A) through(C):
* * *
(C) CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.-- An alienis described
in this subparagraphif the alien, in the 3 yearsprecedingthe time of the
alien's application for classificationand admissioninto the United States
underthis subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least1 yearby a firm or
corporationor otherlegalentity or anaffiliate or subsidiarythereofandwho
seeksto enter the United Statesin order to continue to render servicesto the
sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor affiliate thereof in a capacitythat is
managerialor executive.
The languageof the statuteis specificin limiting this provisionto only thoseexecutivesandmanagerswho
havepreviouslyworkedfor a firm, corporationor otherlegalentity,or anaffiliate or subsidiaryof thatentity,
andwho arecomingto theUnited Statesto work for thesameentity,or its affiliate or subsidiary.
A UnitedStatesemployermayfile a petitionon FormI-140for classificationof an alienundersection
203(b)(1)(C)of the Act asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis requiredfor this
classification. The prospectiveemployerin the United Statesmust furnish a job offer in the form of a
statementwhich indicatesthatthealienis to beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive
capacity.Suchastatementmustclearlydescribethedutiesto beperformedby thealien.
First,theAAO will addressthebeneficiary'semploymentcapacityin herrespectivepositionswith theforeign
and U.S. entities. In order to properly addressthesetwo issues,the AAO will examinethe record to
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determinewhetherthe beneficiarywas employedabroadandwould be employedin the United Statesin a
qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)oftheAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
The term "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesand controls the work of other supervisory,professional,or
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the
organization,or a departmentor subdivisionof theorganization;
(iii) if anotheremployeeor other employeesare directly supervised,has the
authority to hire and fire or recommendthose as well as other personnel
actions(suchaspromotionandleaveauthorization),or if no otheremployee
is directly supervised,functionsat a seniorlevel within the organizational
hierarchyor with respectto thefunctionmanaged;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionovertheday-to-dayoperationsof theactivity or function
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not
consideredto be acting in a managerialcapacitymerely by virtue of the
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are
professional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)oftheAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
The term "executive capacity" meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) directsthemanagementof theorganizationor a majorcomponentor function
of theorganization;
(ii) establishesthe goals and policies of the organization, component,or
function;
(iii) exerciseswide latitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly generalsupervisionor directionfrom higherlevel executives,
theboardof directors,or stockholdersof theorganization.
In oneof two supportingstatementsdatedOctober10,2008,thebeneficiary'sprospectiveemploymentwas
describedasfollows:
Thispositionrequiresthebeneficiaryto establishtheoperationof thecompany,organizeand
overseeall administrativemattersexercisefull responsibilityfor recruiting,hiring, training
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anddismissingemployees.Shewill ensurethecoordinationof thedepartmentsandworkers,
implementspoliciesandadoptstrategiesto improve[the] businessholdingfull authorityover
all executivedecisionsaimingto achievethe profitability goalssetby the [c]orporation.. . .
Shewill handleall policy andbusinessdecisionssuchasnegotiationof contractsto provide
for services,purchases,salespricing,bankinginsuranceandcredittermsandits employees[.]
Sheis also,responsiblefor insuringthatsalesandprofit goalsaremeteachquarter,hasthe
discretionaryauthorityto reducecostsassheseesfit. Her seniorlevel is establishedsinceher
functionwithin theorganizationincludesthedecisionmakingauthorityoversalaryincreases,
hiring andfiring, training of staff, budgetaryconcerns,andcapitalexpenditures[.] Shewill
haveauthorityto bindthecompanycontractuallyin anymatters.. . .
* * *
Thebeneficiaryandhervastexperiencewill makeherthe oneto beresponsiblefor directing
the projectsandoperationsof our company,developingandexecutingthe necessarypolicies
to effectively direct the company'smanagement,hiring, dismissingand supervisinglower
level employees.. . . Shewill direct and supervisetheir activities which will be geared
towardsthe salesof productsandservicesrelatedto [thepetitioner.] In addition,shewill be
responsiblefor the analysis of the company'srevenues,sales techniquesand overall
operations.Shewill observethedailyprogressof employees,andwill includedevelopment
of marketingstrategiesin orderto determinethe potentialemergingmarketsfor our services
andcreatematerialsfor marketing,salestraining,andpresentations.Shewill assist[the
petitioner]with businessexpansion,productivity andprofit. [Shew]ill developsolutionsto
anyproblemsthat[s]heperceivesbasedonpreviousmanagerialexperience.
In the secondOctober10,2010supportstatement,the petitionerindicatedthat 30%of the beneficiary'stime
would be allocatedto overseeingand coordinatingcommercialoperations,30% to establishingbusiness
relationshipswith customersand distributors and reviewing and negotiating deals, 30% to monitoring
consumerpreferencesand marketing opportunitiesand promoting products and services,and 10% to
assigningsales,setting goals, and analyzing sales statisticsto determinesalespotential and inventory
requirements. Neither supporting statementincluded a description of the beneficiary's employment abroad.
Accordingly,on April 20, 2009,U.S. CitizenshipandImmigrationServices(USCIS)issueda requestfor
additionalevidence(RFE) instructingthe petitionerto provide a list of the beneficiary'sjob dutiesin her
foreign positionaswell asher proposedpositionwith the U.S. entity. The petitionerwas askedto assigna
percentageto eachof the listedjob dutiesto indicatehow the beneficiaryallocatedhertime in eachposition.
Thepetitionerwasalsoaskedto list thebeneficiary'ssubordinateemployeesandto providetheirjob titles,job
duties,andeducationallevels. Additionally, the directorrequestedthat the petitionerprovideorganizational
chartsfor eachentity in orderto illustratethebeneficiary'spositionwithin therespectivehierarchies.
In response,thepetitionerprovideda statementdatedMay 20,2009. Thepetitionerstatedthatthebeneficiary
gainedexperiencein the field of interior designby working in a managerialposition for "severalBrazilian
enterprises."The petitionerdid not complywith the director'srequestfor a specificlist of the beneficiary's
job dutieswith a qualifying entity abroad. Rather,the petitioner'sdiscussionof the beneficiary'sforeign
employmentwaslimitedto generalreferencesto thebeneficiary'sskills andmanagerialexperienceanda
single paragraphcontaininga paraphrasedlist of the elementsthat comprisethe statutorydefinition of
managerialcapacity. Additionally, the petitionerfailed to clarify the dateanddurationof the beneficiary's
Page5
employmentabroadwith aqualifyingentity. Thepetitionerclaimedthatthebeneficiaryworkedin asimilar
occupationeventhoughshewasnot directlytransferredfrom thepetitioner'sforeignaffiliate.
The petitioner also failed to provide the requestedadditional information concerningthe beneficiary's
proposedemploymentwith the U.S. entity. Although the petitionerreferredto "a detailedstatementof job
duties" in the record,it is unclearwhetherthejob descriptionreferencedwas the one that was originally
submittedin supportof the FormI-140. Thereis no indicationthat the petitioneractuallycompliedwith the
director'sRFE requestfor a detailed list of the beneficiary'sspecificjob duties and correspondingtime
allocations.It is notedthatfailureto submitrequestedevidencethatprecludesa materialline of inquiry shall
begroundsfor denyingthepetition.8C.F.R.§ 103.2(b)(14).
After reviewingthepetitioner'sresponseto theRFEaswell asthedocumentationthatwassubmittedinitially
in supportof theFormI-140,thedirectordeterminedthatthepetitionerfailedto establishthatthebeneficiary
waseitheremployedabroadin a qualifying capacityor that shewould be employedin sucha capacitywith
the petitioningU.S. entity. Accordingly, in a decisiondatedJuly 8, 2009 the director deniedthe petition
listing thesedeficienciesastwo basesfor denial.
On appeal,the petitioner challengesthe director'sdecision,claiming that the director failed to allow an
adequatetime periodin whichto respondto theRFEpursuantto regulatoryprovisions.
Contraryto the petitioner'sassertion,the regulatoryprovisionsat 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)do not mandatea
specifictime allowancefor the submissionof a responseto an RFE or a notice of intentto deny (NOID).
Much like the discretionaryauthorityUSCIShasin determiningwhetherto issuean RFE,USCIShasthe
sameauthorityto determinehow muchtime to allow the petitionerto respondto an RFE or NOID. Thus,
while it is commonto seean RFE with a responsetime of twelve weeks,the director has the ultimate
discretionin choosinga shorterresponsetime, as was the casein the presentmatter. The provisionsat
8C.F.R.§§103.2(b)(8)(ii)and (iii) expresslystatethat the petitionermustprovideany missinginitial
evidenceor anyotherevidence"within a specifiedperiodof time asdeterminedby USCIS."
Although the appellatebrief indicatesthat the beneficiaryhadqualifying employmentabroadandwould have
qualifying employmentwith the petitioning entity, the requestedevidencethat would have enabledthe
director to better assessthe validity of this claim was not provided. When examiningthe executiveor
managerialcapacityof the beneficiary,the AAO will look first to the descriptionof the beneficiary'sjob
duties.See8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5). TheAAO will thenconsiderthis informationin light of the employing
entity'sorganizationalhierarchy,the beneficiary'spositiontherein,andthe entity'soverall ability to relieve
thebeneficiaryfrom havingto primarily performthedaily operationaltasks.
In thepresentmatter,therecordlacksa comprehensivedescriptionof thebeneficiary'sday-to-daytaskseither
with her foreign employeror with the prospectiveU.S. employer. Althoughthe petitionerprovided
considerablymoreinformationaboutthe beneficiary'sprospectiveemployment,thejob descriptionandthe
supplementalpercentagebreakdown,bothof whichwereprovidedinitially in supportof theFormI-140,are
overlyvagueasthefail to specifytheactualtasksthebeneficiarywould performon a daily basis. Moreover,
the descriptionof the prospectiveemploymentindicatedthatthe beneficiarywould performcertainnon-
qualifying duties,suchasnegotiatingcontracts,dealingdirectly with actualandprospectivecustomers,and
promotingthe petitioner'sproductsand services. While the AAO acknowledgesthat no beneficiaryis
requiredto allocate100%of histimeto managerial-or executive-leveltasks,thepetitionermustestablishthat
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thenon-qualifyingtasksthe beneficiaryperformedin the foreignemploymentandthosetasksshewould
performin thecourseof theU.S.employmentareonly incidentalto herproposedposition.An employeewho
"primarily" performsthe tasksnecessaryto producea productor to provide servicesis not consideredto be
"primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of the Act
(requiringthat one"primarily" performthe enumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatter of
Church ScientologyInternational, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Here, the petitioner failed to
provide a definitive statementof the beneficiary'sactualdaily tasksin either of her positions. The actual
dutiesthemselvesrevealthetruenatureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.1103,
1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41(2d.Cir. 1990). Furthermore,thepetitionerfailedto providethe
requestedorganizationalchartsillustratingthe beneficiary'sallegedmanagerialpositionabroadandwith the
petitioningU.S. employer. The petitioner'sfailure to providethis essentialrequestedevidenceprecludesthe
AAO from beingableto affirmatively concludethatthebeneficiarywasemployedabroadandthat shewould
be employedin the United Statesin a qualifying managerialor executivecapacityand basedon thesetwo
initial findings,theinstantpetitioncannotbeapproved.
Thenext issueto be addressedin this proceedingis whetherthe petitionerhasa qualifying relationshipwith
thebeneficiary'sforeignemployer. To establisha "qualifyingrelationship"undertheAct andtheregulations,
thepetitionermustshowthatthebeneficiary'sforeignemployerandtheproposedU.S.employerarethesame
employer(i.e. a U.S.entitywith a foreignoffice) or relatedasa "parentandsubsidiary"or as"affiliates." See
generally§203(b)(1)(C)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C);seealso8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(2)(providing
definitionsof theterms"affiliate" and"subsidiary").
Theregulationat 8 C.F.R.§204.5(j)(2)statesin pertinentpart:
Affiliate means:
(A) Oneof two subsidiariesboth of which areownedandcontrolledby the sameparentor
individual;
(B) Oneof two legalentitiesownedandcontrolledby the samegroupof individuals,each
individual owningandcontrolling approximatelythe sameshareor proportionof each
entity;
* * *
Multinational meansthat the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary,conducts
businessin two or morecountries,oneof which is theUnited States.
Subsidiarymeansafirm, corporation,or otherlegalentityof whichaparentowns,directlyor
indirectly,morethanhalf of theentityandcontrolstheentity;or owns,directlyor indirectly,
halfof theentityandcontrolstheentity;orowns,directlyor indirectly,50percentof a50-50
joint ventureandhasequalcontrol andveto powerover the entity; or owns,directly or
indirectly,lessthanhalf of theentity,but in fact controlstheentity.
In the present matter, the petitioner did not addressthe beneficiary's employment abroad in the initial
supportingstatements.As such,the directorwasunableto determinewhetherthe petitionermaintainedthe
requisitequalifying relationshipwith the entity that employedthe beneficiaryabroadprior to herU.S. entry.
Accordingly,thisdeficiencywasdulyaddressedin theRFEthatwasissuedonApril 20,2009. Specifically,
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the petitionerwasinstructedto provideevidenceestablishingcommonownershipbetweenthe beneficiary's
prospectiveU.S.employerandherforeignemployer.
In response,thepetitionerprovidedatranslatedcorporatedocumentpertainingto Living DesignDecoracoes
Ltda.,showingthat ownershipof that entitywasequallydividedinto thirds amongthreeindividuals. The
responsedid not,however,establishthatthebeneficiarywasemployedby thatforeignentity. Furthermore,
the only evidencethat addressesthe issueof the U.S. entity'sownershipis containedwithin the petitioner's
2006and2007corporatetax returns,whichshowthat hoownsonethird of the
foreignentity, is 100%ownerof theU.S. entity. To confusemattersfurther,the petitionerdid not nameany
of the beneficiary'sforeign employersor assertthat the beneficiarywaseveremployedby the foreignentity
that is claimedto be the petitioner'saffiliate. The petitionerstatedonly that the beneficiarywas employed
abroadin a similar occupationandfurtherclaimedthatthebeneficiarywasnot employedwith thepetitioner's
affiliate foreignentity directlyprior to herarrival in theUnited States.
In the decisiondatedJuly 8, 2009,the directorconcludedthatthe petitionerfailed to establishthat it hasthe
requisitequalifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'semployerabroad.
The regulationand caselaw confirm that ownershipand control are the factorsthat must be examinedin
determiningwhethera qualifying relationshipexistsbetweenUnited Statesandforeign entitiesfor purposes
of this visa classification.Matter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19I&N Dec. 593;seealsoMatter of
SiemensMedicalSystems,Inc., 19I&N Dec.362(BIA 1986);Matterof Hughes,18I&N Dec.289(Comm.
1982). In thecontextof this visapetition,ownershiprefersto thedirector indirectlegalright of possessionof
the assetsof anentity with full powerandauthorityto control;controlmeansthedirector indirectlegalright
and authority to direct the establishment,management,and operationsof an entity. Matter of Church
ScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.at 595.
Althoughthepetitioner'sappellatebrief restatestherelevantstatutorydefinitionsandregulatoryrequirements,
it fails to explainhowthepetitionermeetsthoserequirements.
As the record currently stands, it appears that the petitioner and Living Design Decoracoes Ltda. have one
commonowner. However,the commonalitydoesnot rise to the level of an affiliate or parent-subsidiary
relationship. While the foreignentity is equallyownedby threedifferentindividuals,noneof whomhas
majority ownership,the U.S. entity appearsto be entirely ownedby oneof thosethreeindividuals. Despite
the petitioner'sclaim on appealthat the two entities are family-owned, the AAO notes that a familial
relationshipdoesnot constitutea qualifying relationshipunderthe regulations. Furthermore,evenif the
petitionerwere ableto establishthat the petitionerhaseitheran affiliate or a parent-subsidiaryrelationship
with Living DesignDecoracoesLtda.,thepetitionerneitherclaimednor providedevidenceto establishthat
the latterentity employedthe beneficiaryabroadfor therequisiteoneyeardurationwithin therelevantthree-
yeartime period. As such,theAAO finds thatthepetitionerhasfailed to establishthat thepetitionerhasthe
requisitequalifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'sforeignemployer.
As a sidenote,theAAO pointsout that the abovedefinition of thetermmultinationalrequiresthepetitioner
to establishthatit conductsbusinessabroadthroughanaffiliate,parent,or subsidiaryentity. As thedegreeof
commonownershipbetweenthepetitionerandLiving DesignDecoracoesLtda.doesnotriseto thelevelof
anaffiliate, parent,or subsidiary,theAAO cannotconcludethatthepetitioneris amultinationalentity.
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Thefinal issueto be addressedin the presentmatteris whetherthe petitionerhasthe ability to paythe
beneficiary'sprofferedwage.
Theregulationat8 C.F.R.§204.5(g)(2)statesthefollowing,in pertinentpart:
Any petitionfiled by or for an employment-basedimmigrantwhich requiresan offer of
employmentmustbeaccompaniedby evidencethattheprospectiveUnitedStatesemployerhas
theabilityto paytheprofferedwage. Thepetitionermustdemonstratethisabilityatthetime
the priority dateis establishedandcontinuinguntil the beneficiaryobtainslawful permanent
residence.Evidenceof thisability shallbeeitherin theformof copiesof annualreports,federal
taxreturns,orauditedfinancialstatements.
In determiningthepetitioner'sability to paytheprofferedwage,USCISwill first examinewhetherthepetitioner
employedthe beneficiaryat the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishesby
documentaryevidencethatit employedthebeneficiaryata salaryequalto or greaterthantheprofferedwage,this
evidencewill beconsideredprimafacie proofof thepetitioner'sabilityto paythebeneficiary'ssalary.In the
presentmatter,whilethepetitionerclaimsthatit hasemployedthebeneficiarysincepriorto thefiling of theForm
I-140andhastheability to paythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage,no evidencehasbeensubmittedto substantiate
thisassertion.Goingon recordwithoutsupportingdocumentaryevidenceis not sufficientfor purposesof
meetingtheburdenof proofin theseproceedings.Matterof Soffici,22 I&N Dec.158,165(Comm.1998)
(citingMatterof TreasureCraftofCalifornia,14I&N Dec.190(Reg.Comm.1972)).
As an alternatemeansof determiningthe petitioner'sability to pay,the petitioner'snet incomefigure as
reflectedonthefederalincometax returnmayalsobeexamined.TheAAO notes,however,thattheonly tax
documentsthepetitionerhasprovidedreflectincomethatwasearnedin 2006and2007. However,theinstant
Form I-140 was filed in 2008. As the petitioner'sability to pay mustbe establishedasof the dateof filing
pursuantto regulation,the lack of documentationaddressingthe petitioner'sfinancial statusas of that date
precludestheAAO from beingableto determinethatthepetitionerhastheability to paythebeneficiary's
profferedwage.
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons,with each consideredas an independentand
alternativebasisfor denial. In visapetitionproceedings,the burdenof provingeligibility for thebenefit
soughtremainsentirelywith the petitioner. Section291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361. Thepetitionerhasnot
sustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealis dismissed.