dismissed EB-1C Case: Business Management

identifving data' deleted to 
prevent clearly unw ananted 
hvasion of persoad ~~VWY 
U.S. Department of Ilomeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
PUBLlC COPY 
5 FILE: a -+p 
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: AUG ; d ~3% 
SRC 05 260 50950 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based visa petition. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (MO) on appeal. The MO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant immigrant visa petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager 
or executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
8 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida that is 
operating an air conditioning business and a Subway fast food sandwich and salad shop. The petitioner seeks 
to employ the beneficiary as its president. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Counsel for the petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion 
and forwarded it to the MO for review. In his appended appellate brief, counsel contends that the director 
incorrectly concluded that the beneficiary would not be employed in the United States company as a manager 
or executive, and claims that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) overlooked the concept of function 
manager in its denial of the immigrant visa petition. Counsel also claims that CIS' denial violates the 
petitioner's right to due process. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time 
of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United 
States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a 
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof 
and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render 
services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement, which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
The issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function withn the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level withn the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the hnction managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-malung; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-140 on September 26,2005, noting that the beneficiary would be employed as 
its president. In an appended letter from the beneficiary's foreign employer, the company's proprietor 
discussed the following job responsibilities related to the beneficiary's proposed position: 
In his capacity as [plresident of [the petitioning entity], [the beneficiary] is responsible for 
directing the overall management and administration of the company, including decisions 
Page 4 
regarding investment of capital. [The beneficiary] is charged with ensuring the company's 
successful operation, which consists of establishing goals and policies and implementing 
strategies relating to the acquisition and operation of our holdings. He has also been 
delegated with the exclusive authority to negotiate and enter into contracts on behalf of the 
company, as well as the hiring and firing employees, independent contractors, and other 
related personnel. [The beneficiary] has played - and will continue to play - an integral role 
in investigating further business investments and ventures in the United States. In fact, since 
undertalung the position of [plresident, [the beneficiary] attended numerous meetings to 
review and consider alternative investment opportunities and made several proposals to 
purchase businesses on behalf of the company. In short, [the beneficiary's] services are 
essential for [the petitioning entity's] continued growth and hture success. 
On October 6, 2005, the director issued a notice of intent to deny requesting that the petitioner provide the 
following documentary evidence: (1) "an analysis of the day-to-day responsibilities of the beneficiary" 
explaining how the beneficiary's job duties would be primarily managerial or executive in nature, as well as 
the amount of time the beneficiary would devote to each; (2) a list of the employees directly supervised by the 
beneficiary, their titles, and job duties; (3) a description of the beneficiary's supervisory duties; (4) an 
organizational chart reflecting the names, titles, job duties and educational levels of the employees 
subordinate to the beneficiary; and (5) copies of the petitioner's quarterly reports for 2005. 
Counsel responded in a letter dated November 2, 2005. In his letter, counsel claimed that the beneficiary 
would be employed as a function manager, as he is authorized to manage the following functions: 
(1) [Elstablishing and negotiating contracts and other related matters; (2) hirindfiring of 
employees and independent contractors; (3) establishing goals and policies and implementing 
marketing strategies and plans; (4) investing capital; and (5) investigating and undertaking 
investment opportunities. 
In an attached letter bearing the same date, the foreign entity's proprietor provided the following outline of the 
beneficiary's proposed job duties: 
[The beneficiary] is responsible for directing the management and administration of our 
subsidiary to ensure its successful operation, which includes designing and researching 
investment opportunities and investing company funds in new or existing business ventures 
(15-20%); designing and executing strateges to improve efficiency, productivity and to 
reduce expenses and costs, which includes attending office meetings, reviewing 
financial/expense/operating reports, and resolvinghandling miscellaneous corporate activities 
(15%); establishing objectives and guidelines related to investments, structure organization, 
and business development (10-15%); identifying financial goals and devising financial 
strategies to reach targets. (10%); hiring and firing employees and independent contractors 
(5-10%); reporting to our office in Pakistan (5-10%). 
Supervisory duties: [The beneficiary] supervises all of our U.S. subsidiary's employees. He 
holds the highest position within our U.S. subsidiary and has been delegated with complete 
authority over our subsidiary's business operations, direction, policies and expansion. 
The proprietor further provided a list of the nine employees to be supervised by the beneficiary, noting that 
two are employed as the manager and secretary of the air conditioning company, while the remaining seven 
employees would occupy the positions of manager, assistant manager and sandwich artist in Subwayhe. He 
also included a brief description of the job duties to be performed by each. An attached organizational chart 
reflected the beneficiary's position of president over the above-noted subordinate positions. 
Counsel also submitted the requested quarterly wage reports for the petitioning entity and ~ubwa~0ne.l The 
petitioner's quarterly report ending on September 30, 2005 identified a staff of two, while Subwayhe's 
quarterly report for the same period reflected the employment of seven workers during this time. 
The director subsequently issued a second notice of intent to deny; however, as the director did not address 
the issue of the beneficiary's employment capacity in the United States entity, it will not be discussed herein. 
The director issued a decision on January 25, 2006, concluding that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
In her decision, the director outlined the job duties to be performed by the beneficiary and stated that it lacked 
specificity as to the beneficiary's employment in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director 
recognized the employment of two individuals subordinate to the beneficiary who were purportedly employed 
in managerial positions, but stated that "[tlhe record has not established that the two managers are 
professionals or supervisors." The director concluded that instead the beneficiary would be primarily 
employed as a first-line supervisor. The director further stated that the beneficiary's title alone is not 
sufficient to establish eligibility for the requested immigrant visa petition, and instructed that "it must be 
shown the beneficiary is primarily engaged in [the] performance of qualifying duties." Consequently, the 
director denied the petition. 
Counsel for the petitioner filed an appeal on February 24, 2006. In an appended appellate brief, counsel 
contends that the petitioner has demonstrated that the beneficiary's employment would comport with the 
criteria outlined in the statutory definitions of "managerial capacity" or "executive capacity." Counsel restates 
the beneficiary's job duties previously provided for the record by the foreign entity's proprietor, and states that 
as the company's president, the beneficiary "has been instrumental in initiating and implementing the 
petitioner's operations as well as overseeing the petitioner's acquisition of the [air conditioning business and 
SubwayOne] within the past three years." Counsel further provides: 
The beneficiary holds the senior most position in the petitioning entity and has been 
delegated with the absolute authority to exercise a wide range of discretion over company 
policy and decision-making, including investments, expansion, planning, staffing and budget. 
The beneficiary has played a key and vital role in the growth of the petitioner and has created 
a solid foundation from which the petitioner can further expand and continue to succeed. 
Under the beneficiary's leadership and direction, the petitioner acquired a controlling interest 
in two businesses, an air conditioning sales, repair and installation business located in 
Hollywood, Florida and a Subway Sandwich and Salad restaurant located in Ft. Lauderdale, 
- - 
I 
Counsel explained in his November 2, 2005 response to the director's notice of intent to deny that the 
petitioner elected to file a separate income tax return for SubwayOne rather than reporting income generated 
from the business on the petitioner's corporate income tax return. 
Page 6 
Florida. 
 The beneficiary also actively continues to seek out additional investment and 
business opportunities. 
Counsel challenges the director's "factual conclusions regarding the scope and nature of the beneficiary's 
duties," claiming that the beneficiary would not be employed as a first-line supervisor, but rather, would 
manage the "entire" petitioning organization, which counsel stresses consists of the two businesses and a 
combined subordinate staff of nine workers. Counsel contends that the director's finding that the beneficiary 
would be employed as a first-line supervisor overlooks the concept of function manager and the evidence 
offered in the record. Counsel states that the director ignored "the fact that the beneficiary manages the entire 
organization, manages an essential function within the organization, and functions at a senior level with the 
organizational hierarchy and with respect to the function managed." Counsel also states that even if the 
beneficiary does not qualify as a manager, CIS failed to consider his classification as an executive of the 
United States company. 
Counsel also contends that the beneficiary's employment capacity may not be based on the size of the 
petitioning entity. Counsel states that the petitioning entity, which operates two businesses, maintains a firm 
corporate hierarchy "with the beneficiary clearly acting in a managerial or executive capacity by overseeing 
all business activities and essential functions of the petitioner." Counsel questions that if not for the 
beneficiary, who would have managed the petitioning entity and led the company in the acquisition of two 
separate businesses. Counsel also raises the question of how the petitioning entity can continue to operate if 
not for the beneficiary's employment and "leadership" as a manager or executive. Counsel claims that the 
beneficiary's "most senior position in the petitioner," in conjunction with "the totality of the circumstances," 
demonstrate the beneficiary's eligibility for the requested classification. 
Counsel further claims that the director's decision violates the petitioner's due process rights as she did not 
"adequately provide a specific explanation regarding the basis for denial" and ultimately based the denial on 
issues raised only in the first notice of intent to revoke. Counsel states that the petitioner provided the 
documentary evidence requested by the director in her first notice of intent to deny, which addressed the issue 
of the beneficiary's employment capacity. Counsel notes that the director's subsequent notice did not address 
the beneficiary's employment capacity, therefore leading the petitioner to conclude that "[CIS] was satisfied 
with the petitioner's response to the first [notice of intent to deny], and that the issues raised in the second 
[notice of intent to deny] were the only remaining issues to be resolved." Counsel contends that if the 
petitioner's response to the first notice of intent were "insufficient or failed to satisfactorily address the issues" 
CIS should have either denied the petition or addressed the unresolved issues in the second notice of intent to 
deny. Counsel also contends that the director's decision violates the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 103.3(a)(l)(i) in 
that the director did not explain the specific reasons for the denial of the 1-140 petition. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the United 
States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner does not clarify whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily engaged in managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. A petitioner must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether 
such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. See 8 C.F.R. $ 204.5(j)(5). 
Page 7 
Here, when describing the job duties to be performed by the beneficiary the petitioner references portions of 
both statutes defining "managerial capacity" and "executive capacity." Specifically, the petitioner stated that 
the beneficiary would direct the management of the United States company, establish goals and policies, 
implement strategies, devise investment and organizational objectives, and report to the Pakistani office - 
responsibilities which are typically deemed to be executive in nature. See section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
Alternatively, the petitioner also represented that the beneficiary would exercise such managerial 
responsibilities as hiring and firing employees and possessing authority over the petitioner's business 
operations, direction, policies and expansion. See section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. Counsel also asserts that 
the beneficiary would qualify as a function manager as he "manages the entire organization, manages an 
essential function within the organization, and functions at a senior level with the organizational hierarchy 
and with respect to the function managed." A petitioner may not claim to employ a beneficiary as a hybrid 
"executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. 
Similarly, counsel's claim on appeal that CIS, in rejecting the proposition that the beneficiary would be 
employed as a manager, "failed to address or even mention the possibility" of the beneficiary employment as 
an executive is misplaced. If the petitioner chooses to represent the beneficiary as both an executive and a 
manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth in the statutory 
definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager. CIS should not be expected to interpret the 
record so as to determine the proposed employment capacity of the beneficiary. In visa petition proceedings, 
the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. See Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N 
Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). As discussed below, the petitioner has not satisfied this requirement. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(5). 
The limited job descriptions offered by the petitioner fail to document the beneficiary's proposed employment 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For example, the petitioner identified such broad job 
responsibilities as "directing the overall management and administration of the company," "ensuring the 
company's successful operation," "establishing goals and policies and implementing strateges," negotiating 
contracts, "hiring and firing employees," "designing and implementing financial and marketing plans," 
"researching investment opportunities," and "identifymg financial goals." The AAO notes, in particular, that 
the petitioner offered similar job descriptions both in its November 2, 2005 response to the director's notice of 
intent to deny and its appellate brief, even after the director requested "an analysis of the day-to-day 
responsibilities" held by the beneficiary. The job descriptions offered by the petitioner do not identify the 
specific managerial or executive job duties to be performed by the beneficiary in his position as president. In 
fact, many of the noted job duties essentially restate the criteria outlined in the statutory definitions of 
"managerial capacity" and "executive capacity" without specifically addressing his day-to-day job duties. The 
petitioner's recitation of the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not 
sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner 
has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? 
The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 
724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Additionally, specifics are 
clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in 
nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Id. at 1108. 
Page 8 
Also, counsel's blanket assertion on appeal as to the beneficiary's employment as a function manager is not 
sufficient to establish such classification. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary 
does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing 
an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
9 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner 
claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer 
that clearly describes the duties to be performed, i.e. identifjr the function with specificity, articulate the 
essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. 
 8 C.F.R. 9 204.5(j)(5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the 
duties related to the function. 
Here, counsel contends that CIS overlooked the concept of function manager. Yet, in support of the claim 
that the beneficiary would be employed as a function manager counsel provided a limited statement that the 
beneficiary would perform such vague job duties as negotiating contracts, hiring and firing employees, 
developing and implementing marketing strategies, and determining investment opportunities for the 
petitioner. Counsel has not identified a specific function of the business to be managed by the beneficiary; 
rather, he merely notes broad job responsibilities held by the beneficiary. Counsel's assertion is not sufficient 
to establish the beneficiary's classification as a function manager. Without documentary evidence to support 
the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported 
assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 1&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); 
Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 
1980). 
Counsel correctly observes that a company's size alone, without talung into account the reasonable needs of 
the organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a multinational manager or executive. 
See 5 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(C). However, it is appropriate for CIS to consider the 
size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small 
personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations 
of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, 
e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size of a company may be especially 
relevant when CIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. 
At the time of filing the instant 1-140 petition, the petitioner claimed to operate an air conditioning business 
through its wholly-owned subsidiary and a Subway restaurant, through its 5 1 
percent-owned subsidiary, SubwayOne, Inc. The petitioner represented the employment of two individuals 
on its September 30, 2005 quarterly report. Alternatively, a staff of seven was identified on the September 
30,2005 quarterly report for SubwayOne. The beneficiary's 2004 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form W-2, 
Wage and Tax Statement, and state quarterly reports indicate that the beneficiary is being compensated by 
SubwayOne. Such an arrangement raises uncertainty as to the true position held by the beneficiary in the 
United States and doubt that the beneficiary is performing primarily managerial or executive tasks for the 
petitioning entity. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of 
the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 
19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988). 
Page 9 
In any event, the financial documentation associated with the two businesses does not support the proposition 
that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Specifically, the 
wages reported on SubwayOne's June 30,2005 state quarterly wage report and its September 30,2005 federal 
quarterly wage report, each of which included the beneficiary's salary, suggest that several of SubwayOne's 
employees are employed on a limited or part-time basis. In particular, the June 30, 2005 quarterly wage 
report indicates that two of SubwayOne's workers, including its assistant manager, worked approximately 
eight of the thirteen weeks in the second quarter. As the petitioner has not provided its state quarterly report 
for the third quarter of 2005, which is the period during which the instant petition was filed, the AAO cannot 
determine the full or part-time status of each of its employees. However, as the wages paid in the second and 
third quarters are relatively the same, it is reasonable to assume that at least a portion of its workers is 
employed part-time. As the petitioner has not addressed the full or part-time status of its employees with 
respect to its day-to-day operations, the AAO cannot determine whether the reasonable needs of the sandwich 
shop might plausibly be met without the services of the beneficiary in a non-managerial or non-executive 
manner. 
Likewise, it is questionable whether the petitioner employs a staff sufficient to perform the non-qualifying 
tasks related to its air conditioning business. The petitioner represented that it employed a manager and a 
secretary. The AAO notes, however, that the petitioner did not submit evidence that it employed any 
subordinate staff members who would perform the actual day-to-day, non-managerial operations of the 
company, such as its sales, marketing and inventory, as well as the repair and installation services offered by 
the business. Moreover, the limited amount in wages reported on the petitioner's September 30, 2005 
quarterly report also raises the question of whether the petitioner's two workers work less than a full-time 
forty-hour workweek. Regardless, based on the petitioner's representations with respect to its two businesses, 
the record does not support a finding that the reasonable needs of either might plausibly be met by the 
services of the beneficiary and the remaining eight employees. 
Consequently, counsel's assertion on appeal that the combination of the beneficiary's position as president and 
"the totality of the circumstances" represent the beneficiary's eligibility for the immigrant visa classification 
remains unsubstantiated. The AAO stresses that a managerial or executive title alone is not sufficient to 
demonstrate the beneficiary's employment in a primarily qualifying capacity. See 8 C.F.R. $ 204.5('j)(5) 
(requiring that the petitioner submit with the Form 1-140 a clear description of the managerial or executive 
duties to be performed by the beneficiary). Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the 
assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel 
do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 
I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
Counsel further claims on appeal that CIS violated the petitioner's due process rights. Counsel, however, has 
not shown that any violation of the regulations resulted in "substantial prejudice" to the petitioner. See De 
Zavala v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that an alien "must make an initial showing of 
substantial prejudice" to prevail on a due process challenge). The petitioner has fallen short of meeting this 
standard. A review of the record and the adverse decision indicates that the director properly applied the 
statute and regulations to the petitioner's case. In particular, the director referenced the beneficiary's job 
responsibilities and noted that the record was devoid of the specific managerial or executive job duties to be 
performed by the beneficiary. Additionally, the director correctly concluded that, by itself, a managerial or 
executive title is not sufficient to demonstrate the beneficiary's employment in a primarily qualifying 
capacity. As a result, the director satisfied her affirmative duty to explain the reasons for the denial of the 
Page 10 
immigrant visa petition. See 8 C.F.R. 9 103.3(a)(l )(i) (stating that when denying a petition, a director has an 
affirmative duty to explain the specific reasons for the denial). The petitioner's primary complaint is that the 
director denied the petition. As previously discussed, the petitioner has not met its burden of proof and the 
denial was the proper result under the regulation. Accordingly, the petitioner's claim is without merit. 
Counsel's additional claim that the director's denial of the petition on grounds not addressed in her second 
notice of intent to deny violated the petitioner's due process rights is also without merit. In the instant case, 
the petitioner is granted an automatic right to appeal the decision of the service center. See 8 C.F.R. $ 103.3. 
Therefore, the petitioner is given an opportunity to establish eligibility in the appropriate forum, that being the 
AAO. The fact that the director did not indicate in the second notice of intent to deny that she would later 
address the issue of the beneficiary's qualifying employment in the denial in no way precludes the petitioner 
from establishing eligibility for the desired immigration benefit. In fact, the petitioner had already been given 
an opportunity to address the beneficiary's employment capacity in its response to the director's first notice of 
intent to deny. Consequently, the petitioner has not demonstrated a violation of its due process rights. 
Counsel also notes that CIS previously approved three L-1A nonimmigrant petitions filed by the petitioner on 
behalf of the beneficiary. It should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, 
immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by CIS than nonirnrnigrant petitions. The AAO 
acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of 
managerial and executive capacity. See $$ 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44). 
Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall 
eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and 
executive capacity. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which 
allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa 
petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, 
ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. Cf: $9 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $8 1154 
and 1184; see also 9 3 16 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. @ 1427. 
In addition, unless a petition seeks extension of a "new office" petition, the regulations allow for the approval 
of an L-1 extension without any supporting evidence and CIS normally accords the petitions a less substantial 
review. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an 
L-1A petition's validity). Because CIS spends less time reviewing L-1 petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant 
petitions, some nonimrnigrant L-1 petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 
F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003). 
Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of prooc each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimmigrant approvals do 
not preclude CIS from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texas AM Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 
556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that 
CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. CIS denies many 1-140 
petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 
293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Suva, 
724 F. Supp. at 1 103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported and 
contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and 
gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, 
e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to 
suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. 
Montgomeiy, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Due to the lack of 
required evidence in the present record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the 
previous nonimmigrant approvals by denying the present immigrant petition. 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 5 1 (2001). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the beneficiary was employed by the 
foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner 
must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a 
majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 
199 1 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary had been employed as the foreign entity's finance manager during 
which he "prepar[ed] financial analyses, reports and budgets," "[made] administrative plans and policies," 
"[dealt] with governmental departments and organizations [to ensure] compliance with local and federal laws 
and regulations," "review[ed] firm policies with respect to workforce, human resources and labor," and 
"maintain[ed] relationships with financial institutions." Based on the current record, the AAO is unable to 
determine whether the claimed managerial duties constitute the majority of the beneficiary's duties, or 
whether the beneficiary primarily performs non-managerial administrative or operational duties. The 
petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties does not establish what proportion of the beneficiary's 
duties is managerial in nature, and what proportion is actually non-managerial. See Republic of Transkei v. 
INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1991). This omission is particularly relevant because several of the 
beneficiary's responsibilities, such as preparing financial reports and personally working with governmental 
departments and financial institutions do not fall directly under traditional managerial or executive duties as 
defined in the statute. See §§101(a)(44)(A) and (B). The AAO notes that an employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Cornm. 1988). 
Page 12 
The remaining job description for the beneficiary's former position as finance manager is particularly vague 
and does not identify his specific day-to-day managerial or executive tasks. For example, the petitioner stated 
that the beneficiary directed the foreign entity's financial affairs "to ensure that our operations remained 
efficient and profitable," and "was responsible for overall financial planning, implementation and follow-up." 
As noted in the previous discussion, reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast 
business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job 
duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily 
do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). As a result, 
the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An additional issue not addressed by the director is whether the petitioner demonstrated its ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proffered annual salary of $35,100. 
In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner 
employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by 
documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, 
this evidence will be consideredprima facie proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the beneficiary's salary. In 
the present matter, the petitioner did not establish that it had previously employed the beneficiary. The 
beneficiary's 2004 IRS Form W-2 indicates that the beneficiary was compensated by Subwayone, rather than 
by the petitioning entity. 
As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay, the AAO will next examine the 
petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the federal income tax return, without consideration of 
depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a 
petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. Elatos Restaurant 
Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. 
Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. 
Texas 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F. 
Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), agd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, the court 
held the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now CIS) had properly relied on the petitioner's net income 
figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than on the petitioner's gross income. 
623 F. Supp. at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered 
income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the 
petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." Chi-Feng Chang v. 
Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. at 537; see also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. 
As the petition's priority date falls on September 26, 2005, the AAO must examine the petitioner's tax return 
for 2005. The record does not contain the petitioner's 2005 income tax return. Regardless, Subwayone's 
2005 quarterly wage reports identify the beneficiary as an employee. As a result, there is no evidence that the 
beneficiary was being compensated by the petitioning entity at the time of filing. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
8 204.5(g)(2) states: 
Any petition filed by or for any employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of 
employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer 
has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the 
time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful 
permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual 
reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. 
(Emphasis added). In the instant matter, the prospective United States employer is the petitioning entity, not 
Subwayone. The record does not contain documentary evidence related to the petitioner's ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proposed annual salary. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Cornrn. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Consequently, the petition will be denied for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.