dismissed EB-1C Case: Business Management
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. The director determined the beneficiary would primarily perform the tasks of a first-line supervisor over non-professional employees. While the AAO found the director's specific analysis flawed and withdrew a separate ground for denial concerning the qualifying corporate relationship, it ultimately agreed that a denial was warranted on the grounds of the beneficiary's proposed duties.
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identifyingdatadeletedto d preventclearlyunwarrante invasionofpersona1privacy PUBLICCOPY U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity U. S.CitizenshipandlmmigrationServices AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO) 20 MassachusettsAve. N.W., MS 2090 Washington,DC 20529-2090 U.S.Citizenship andImmigration Services DATE: OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER FILE: OCT282011 IN RE: Petitioner: Beneficiary: PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionforAlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveor ManagerPursuantto Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct,8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C) ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER: INSTRUCTIONS: Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments relatedto thismatterhavebeenreturnedtotheofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvisedthat anyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadetothatoffice. If you believethe law wasinappropriatelyappliedby us in reachingour decision,or you haveadditional informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfile amotiontoreconsideroramotionto reopen.The specificrequirementsfor filing sucha requestcan be foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5. All motionsmustbe submittedto theofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcaseby filing aFormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion, with a feeof $630. Pleasebeawarethat8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresthat anymotionmustbefiled within 30 daysof the decisionthat the motion seeksto reconsideror reopen. Thankyou, erryRhew Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice www.uscis.gov Page2 DISCUSSION:ThepreferencevisapetitionwasdeniedbytheDirector,TexasServiceCenter.Thematteris nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)onappeal.Theappealwill bedismissed. Thepetitioneris a Texascorporationthatseeksto employthebeneficiaryasits generalmanagerandvice president. Accordingly,the petitionerendeavorsto classifythe beneficiaryas an employment-based immigrantpursuantto section203(b)(1)(C)of the Immigrationand NationalityAct (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C),asamultinationalexecutiveormanager. The directordeniedthe petitionbasedon two groundsof ineligibility. The directorconcludedthat the petitionerfailedto establish(1) that it hasa qualifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'sforeignemployer and(2)thatthebeneficiarywouldbeemployedintheUnitedStatesin amanagerialorexecutivecapacity. On appeal,counseldisputesthedirector'sdecisionandsubmitsanappellatebriefto supporthisarguments. After carefulconsiderationof thepetitioner'ssubmissionstheAAO findsthattherecordcontainssufficient evidenceto establishthataqualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenthepetitionerandthebeneficiary'sforeign employer. As such,the director'sfirst groundfor denialis herebywithdrawnandthe remainderof this decisionwill focusonthedirector'ssecondfinding,whichconcernsthebeneficiary'semploymentcapacityin hisproposedU.S.position. Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart: (1) Priority Workers.-- Visasshallfirst bemadeavailable. . . to qualifiedimmigrantswho arealiensdescribedin anyof thefollowingsubparagraphs(A) through(C): * * * (C) CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.-- An alienis described in this subparagraphif the alien,in the 3 yearsprecedingthe time of the alien'sapplicationfor classificationandadmissioninto the United States underthis subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least1yearby a firm or corporationor otherlegalentityor anaffiliateor subsidiarythereofandwho seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin orderto continueto renderservicesto the sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is managerialorexecutive. Thelanguageof thestatuteis specificin limiting thisprovisionto onlythoseexecutivesandmanagerswho havepreviouslyworkedfor afirm, corporationor otherlegalentity,oranaffiliateor subsidiaryof thatentity, andwhoarecomingto theUnitedStatesto workforthesameentity,oritsaffiliateor subsidiary. A UnitedStatesemployermay file a petitionon FormI-140for classificationof an alien undersection 203(b)(1)(C)of theAct asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis requiredfor this classification.The prospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnisha job offer in the form of a statementwhich indicatesthatthealienis to beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive capacity.Suchastatementmustclearlydescribethedutiesto beperformedbythealien. Page3 Theprimaryissuein thisproceedingis whetherthepetitionersubmittedsufficientevidenceto establishthat thebeneficiarywouldbeemployedin theUnitedStatesin aqualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity. Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides: The term "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the employeeprimarily-- (i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function, or componentoftheorganization; (ii) supervisesand controisthe work of other supervisory,professionai,or managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunction within the organization,oradepartmentorsubdivisionof theorganization; (iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesare directly supervised,hasthe authorityto hire andfire or recommendthoseas well as otherpersonnel actions(suchaspromotionandleaveauthorization),or if nootheremployee is directlysupervised,functionsat a seniorlevelwithin the organizational hierarchyor withrespectto thefunctionmanaged;and (iv) exercisesdiscretionovertheday-to-dayoperationsof theactivityor function for which the employeehas authority. A first-line supervisoris not consideredto be actingin a managerialcapacitymerelyby virtue of the supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unless the employeessupervisedare professional. Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides: The term "executivecapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the employeeprimarily- (i) directsthemanagementof theorganizationoramajorcomponentorfunction of theorganization; (ii) establishesthe goals and policies of the organization,component,or function; (iii) exerciseswidelatitudein discretionarydecision-making;and (iv) receivesonly generalsupervisionor directionfromhigherlevelexecutives, theboardof directors,orstockholdersof theorganization. In supportof theFormI-140,thepetitionersubmittedaletterdatedJune12,2009,whichincludedalist of the beneficiary'sproposedjob responsibilities.Thepetitionerindicatedthatthebeneficiarywouldberesponsible for investments,increasingefficiency,overseeingU.S.operations,makingdecisionsregardingcontractswith suppliersanddistributors,directingmanagersin thecompany'saccountingandfooddepartments,establishing salesgoals,meetingwith dealersanddistributors,overseeingcontactswith businesspartners,andexpanding Page4 theU.S.work force. Thepetitionerstatedthatthebeneficiary'sexperiencewith theoverseasentitymakes himqualifiedto negotiatecontractsonthepetitioner'sbehalf. The petitioneralso providedtwo organizationalchartseachpertainingto oneof the petitioner'stwo gas station/conveniencestorebusinesses.Thefirst store'schartdepictsthebeneficiaryin thepositionof general managerwith aseparateindividualoccupyingthepositionof vicepresident.Thepresidentis depictedasthe beneficiary'ssuperiorandanaccountingmanager/cashierandafoodmanager/cashierareeachdepictedasthe beneficiary'sdirectsubordinates.The remainderof the staff is comprisedof a shift manager/cashier,the directsubordinateof the accountingmanager/cashier,andtwo cooks,bothdirectlysubordinateto thefood manager/cashier.Thesecondstore'sorganizationalchartalsodepictsthepresidentatthetopof thehierarchy. However,unlike the prior store'schart,the beneficiaryis depictedin the combinedpositionof general managerand vice presidentwith the food manageras his direct subordinate,who overseesthree cook/cashiers. On July 28, 2009,the directorissueda requestfor additionalevidence(RFE)instructingthe petitionerto submitevidenceof the U.S.entity'sstaffing,includingthe numberof employeesthe petitionerhas,each employee'sjob dutiesandeducationalcredentials,andthecompany'smanagementandpersonnelstructure. In response,thepetitionerprovidedastatementfromcounseldatedAugust27,2009. Counselstatedthatthe beneficiarywouldbeemployedin a managerialcapacityin thathewouldoverseetheworkof anaccounting manager,whomcounseldescribedasa professionalemployeepossessinga baccalaureatedegree,andtwo managerialemployees,includinga food servicemanageranda food manager/headchef. The petitioner providedan updatedorganizationalchartand explainedthat one of the employeeswas promotedto a managerialpositionsincethepetitionwasfiled. Counselalsostatedthatthebeneficiarywouldbeemployedin anexecutivecapacityin thathewoulddirect the financesandmarketing,establishthe petitioner'sgoalsandpolicies,makediscretionarydecisions,and receiveonlygeneralsupervisionfromthecompanypresident.Thepetitionerprovideda supplementallist of 20job responsibilities.Of the20itemslistedin theresponse,18of thoseitemswereincludedin thedirector's decisionandthereforeneednot berestatedin this decision.Itemno.6-being in chargeof expandingthe company'swork force-and item no. 7-directing andcoordinatingmarketingandbusinessdevelopment activities-werethetwo itemsthatwereinadvertentlyleftoutof thedirector'sdecision. OnOctober5, 2009,thedirectordeniedthepetitionconcludingthatthepetitionerfailedto establishthatthe beneficiarywouldbeemployedin the UnitedStatesin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.The directorobservedthe changein the accountmanager'spositiontitle from accountingmanager/cashierto simplyaccountingmanageranddeterminedthatthispositionwasnota full-timeposition. Thedirectoralso determinedthat the beneficiarywould primarily performthe tasks of a first-line supervisor,as the beneficiary'ssubordinatesaremainlynon-professionalemployees. WhiletheAAO findsthata denialof thepetitionwaswarranted,thedirector'sunderlyinganalysisis flawed andneedsfurtherclarification.First,theAAO notesthatachangein positiontitlesdoesnotindicatewhether an employeeis employedon a part-or full-timebasis. As such,the AAO findsthatthereis no basisfor affirmatively concluding that the accountingmanager/cashierwas employed on a part-time basisat the time of filing. While it is possiblethathewasonly a part-timeemployee,sucha determinationwouldrequire documentationof thewagespaidto thatindividualatthetimeof filing. See8C.F.R.§ 103.2(b)(1).Here,the Page5 AAO finds that the recordis devoid of the documentationthat is necessaryto establishwhetherthe accountingmanager/cashierwasemployedonapart-timebasisin2009whenthepetitionwasfiled. Second,theAAO findsthattherecordlackssufficientinformationto allowforthefindingthatthebeneficiary primarilyperformsthetasksof a first-linesupervisor.In orderto makethis determination,therecordmust containdocumentationshowingthatthebeneficiary'ssubordinatesarenon-supervisory,non-managerial,and non-professionalemployeesandthat the primaryportionof the beneficiary'stime is spentoverseeingthe workof theseemployees.Sucha findingalsoimpliesthatthepetitionerprovideda sufficientlydetailedjob descriptionto conveyameaningfulunderstandingof theactualtasksthebeneficiarywouldperformonadaily basis. Here,again,the AAO finds thatthe recordlackssufficientevidenceto allow the directorto have reacheda conclusion. Contraryto thedirector'sobservation,theAAO findsthatthepetitioner'sdescription of thebeneficiary'sproposedemploymentlackssufficientdetailaboutthebeneficiary'sjob duties.Rather,the list of itemsprovidedin responseto theRFEis primarilycomprisedof generaljob responsibilitiesthatfocus on the beneficiary'sdiscretionarydecision-makingand supervisoryauthority. The vagueinformation precludesa trueunderstandingof thebeneficiary'sactualdaily tasks,whicharenecessaryto determinethe employmentcapacityof the proposedposition. For instance,while the petitionerindicatedthat the beneficiarywoulddirectandcoordinatethepetitioner'sfinances,nospecifictaskswerelistedto explainhow theseresponsibilitiestranslateintoactualdailytasks.Thesameis trueof thebeneficiary'srolein overseeing theestablishmentof operations,directingthemanagementof accounting,formulatingandexpandingpolicies, planningbusinessobjectives,directingtradeactivities,andoverseeingcontactwith businesspartners.These statementsaresogeneralthattheycanbeappliedto a varietyof managers,includingthosewho primarily performdaily operationaltasksandthusdo not meetthecriteriaspecifiedfor a multinationalmanageror executive. Specificsareclearly an importantindicationof whethera beneficiary'sdutiesare primarily executiveor managerialin nature;otherwisemeetingthedefinitionswouldsimplybea matterof reiterating theregulations.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v. Sava,724F. Supp.1103(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41 (2d. Cir. 1990). WhiletheAAO acknowledgesthatno beneficiaryis requiredto allocate100%of histimeto managerial-or executive-leveltasks,the petitionermust establishthat the non-qualifyingtasksthe beneficiarywould performareonly incidentalto his/herproposedposition. An employeewho "primarily"performsthetasks necessaryto producea productor to provideservicesis not consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. Seesections10l(a)(44)(A)and (B) of the Act (requiringthat one "primarily"performtheenumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatterof ChurchScientologv International,19I&N Dec.593,604(Comm.1988).TheAAO notesthatwithoutadetailedjob description, establishingspecificallywhattasksthebeneficiarywouldperformon a daily basis,it cannotbeconcluded thatthebeneficiarywouldbeemployedin aqualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity. Additionally,theevidenceof recordmustshowthatthepetitioneriscapableof relievingthebeneficiaryfrom havingto primarily performnon-qualifyingtasks. This oftencallsfor an examinationof the petitioner's staffing structure,as merelyclaiming that the petitioneris capableof employingthe beneficiaryin a qualifying capacityis not sufficient without actual evidenceestablishingwho within the petitioner's organizationalhierarchyis availableto performthosedaily operationaltasksthat areoutsidethe realmof what is deemedas qualifying within a managerialor executivecapacity. In reviewingthe relevanceof the numberof employeesa petitionerhas,federalcourtshavegenerallyagreedthat USCIS"may properly consideranorganization'ssmallsizeasonefactorin assessingwhetherits operationsaresubstantialenough to supporta manager."Family,Inc. v. U.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices,469F.3d1313,1316(9th Page6 Cir. 2006)(citingwith approvalRepublicof Transkeiv.INS,923F.2d175,178(D.C.Cir. 1991);FedinBros. Co.v.Sava,905F.2d41,42(2dCir. 1990)(percuriam);QDataConsulting,Inc.v.INS,293F. Supp.2d25, 29(D.D.C.2003).Furthermore,it is appropriatefor USCISto considerthesizeof thepetitioningcompanyin conjunctionwith otherrelevantfactors,suchasa company'ssmallpersonnelsize,theabsenceof employees whowouldperformthenon-managerialor non-executiveoperationsof thecompany,or a "shellcompany" thatdoesnotconductbusinessin aregularandcontinuousmanner.See,e.g. SystronicsCorp.v.INS,153F. Supp.2d7, 15(D.D.C.2001). In the presentmatter,the wagedocumentationfor 2008indicatesthat a largenumberof the petitioner's employeeswerecompensatedwith wagesthatwouldnotbecommensuratewiththoseof full-timeemployees. If this wasstill thecaseat thetimethepetitionwasfiled in 2009,it is likely thatthebeneficiarywouldbe calleduponto performnumerousdaily operationaltasksto ensurethatthepetitionercontinuesto function successfully.It isnotedthatapetitioner'sneedswill notsupersedethestatutoryrequirement,whichexpressly statesthatthebeneficiarymustprimarilyperformtaskswithin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity in orderto merittheimmigrantclassificationsought. On appeal,counselsupplementsthepreviouslyprovidedlist of the beneficiary'sjob responsibilitieswith a percentagebreakdownwhich allocatestime to the itemson the list. Thetime allocationsarenot useful, however,whenthejob descriptionlistsonly broadjob responsibilitiesratherthanspecificjob duties,which theregulationsrequirein orderto establisheligibility. See8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5).TheAAO furthernotes that counsel'sreferenceto the petitioner'supdatedorganizationalstructureis irrelevantfor the purposeof establishingthepetitioner'seligibility atthetimeof filing. A petitionermustestablisheligibility atthetime of Elingthepetition;apetitioncannotbeapprovedatafuturedateafterthepetitionerorbeneficiarybecomes eligibleundera newsetof facts. MatterofKatigbak, 14I&N Dec.45, 49 (Comm.1971). Furthermore, despitecounsel'sreferencesto the"departments"withinthepetitioningorganization,therecordcontainslittle evidenceto supporttheneedfor or existenceof departmentsandmultiplemanagerialtierswithin thecontext of a gasstation/conveniencestoreoperation.Goingon recordwithoutsupportingdocumentaryevidenceis not sufficientfor purposesof meetingtheburdenof proofin theseproceedings.Matterof Soffici,22 I&N Dec.158,165(Comm.1998)(citingMatterof TreasureCraftof California,14I&N Dec.190(Reg.Comm. 1972)). The unsupportedassertionsof counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec.533,534(BIA 1988);Matterof Laureano,19I&N Dec.1(BIA 1983);Matterof Ramirez-Sanchez,17 I&N Dec.503,506(BIA 1980). In summary,the recorddoesnot establishthat the petitionerhasthe needor the ability to employthe beneficiaryin apositionthatisprimarilywithinaqualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity.Therefore,on thebasisof thisconclusion,theAAO findsthatthepetitioncannotbeapproved. Additionally,whilenotaddressedin thedirector'sdecision,therecordshowsthatthepetitionerdoesnotmeet the criteriacited in 8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(3)(i)(A),which statesthat the petitionermustestablishthat the beneficiarywasemployedabroadin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacityfor at leastoneoutof the threeyearsprior to filing theFormI-140. Similarto thedescriptionthatwasprovidedwith regardto the proposedemployment,the descriptionof the beneficiary'sforeignemploymentwas lackingin a detailed descriptionof job duties. As indicatedabove,the actualdutiesthemselvesrevealthe true natureof the employment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd v.Sava,724F.Supp.at 1108.Astherecordlacksthisinformation,which is necessaryto determinethe beneficiary'semploymentcapacitywith the petitioner'sforeignaffiliate,the instantpetitioncannotbeapprovedonthebasisof thisadditionalfinding. Page7 An applicationor petitionthatfailsto complywith thetechnicalrequirementsof thelaw maybedeniedby theAAO evenif theServiceCenterdoesnotidentifyall of thegroundsfor denialin theinitial decision.See SpencerEnterprises,Inc.v. UnitedStates,229F.Supp.2d 1025,1043(E.D.Cal.2001),affd, 345F.3d683 (9th Cir. 2003);seealsoSoltanev. DOJ, 381F.3d143,145(3d Cir. 2004)(notingthatthe AAO reviews appealsonadenovobasis).Therefore,basedontheadditionalgroundof ineligibilitydiscussedabove,this petitioncannotbeapproved. The petition will be deniedfor the abovestatedreasons,with eachconsideredas an independentand alternativebasisfor denial. In visa petitionproceedings,the burdenof provingeligibility for the benefit soughtremainsentirelywith thepetitioner.Section291of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361.Thepetitionerhasnot metthat burden. ORDER: Theappealis dismissed.
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