dismissed EB-1C Case: Business Management

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office of Administrative Appeals 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
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FILE Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: APR 0 3 2009 
LIN 07 136 51466 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. !ij 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. !ij 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks toreconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. 
The petitioner filed a motion to reopen and reconsider seeking to overcome the director's findings. 
The director granted the motion, but affirmed the denial of the petition. The matter is now before the 
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a Florida corporation seeking to employ the beneficiary as its president. 
Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant 
pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
3 1 15 3 (b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The director's initial denial of the petition was based on two independent grounds of ineligibility: 
1) the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a qualifying 
managerial or executive capacity; and 2) the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ the 
beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. In support of his conclusion, the director provided 
a discussion of the findings that resulted in the denial of the petition, focusing heavily on the 
petitioner's failure to provide a detailed description of the beneficiary's job duties. 
On motion, counsel addressed the director's findings, providing an overview of the foreign entity's 
staffing and each staff member's responsibilities. Counsel also disputed the director's findings with 
regard to the beneficiary's employment capacity in his proposed position with the U.S. entity, 
asserting that the evidence and information previously submitted established that the petitioner had 
and would continue to employ the beneficiary in an executive capacity. 
The director granted the motion and reviewed the record a second time. Although the language of 
the decision is somewhat ambiguous, it appears that the director's most recent adverse decision was 
based solely on the finding concerning the beneficiary's proposed position within the U.S. entity. It 
appears that the director withdrew the earlier finding that the beneficiary was not employed abroad 
in a qualifying capacity. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the AAO affirms the most recent 
decision, which cited the beneficiary's proposed employment and excluded his foreign employment 
as a basis for denial. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to give proper consideration to the two prior 
nonimmigrant petition approvals for the same beneficiary. Counsel also provides the Department of 
Labor's descriptions for each of the positions listed within the petitioner's organizational hierarchy, 
contending that the petitioner is a professional organization that is in need of the beneficiary's 
leadership and direction in all business matters. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 
1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. 
The primary issue in this proceeding calls for an analysis of the beneficiary's job duties. 
Specifically, the AAO will examine the record to determine whether the beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
Page 4 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In support of the Form 1-140, the petitioner provided a letter dated April 5, 2007, which contained 
the following percentage breakdown describing the beneficiary's proposed employment: 
Plan, develop, and establish policies and objectives of [the] U[.]S[.] business. (10%) 
Plan business objectives[,] develop organizational policies to coordinate function 
and operation, and establish responsibilities and procedures for attaining objectives. 
(1 0%) 
Review activity reports and financial statements to determine progress and status in 
attaining objectives. (1 5%) 
Revise objectives and plans in accordance with current conditions. (1 0%) 
Direct and coordinate formulation of financial programs to provide funding for new 
or continuing operations to maximize return on investment[s], and to increase 
productivity. (1 0%) 
Determine and implement marketing and sales strategies. (1 5%) 
Plan and develop policies designed to improve [the] company's image and relations 
with customers, employees, and [the] public. (10%) 
Hire personnel and evaluate performance for compliance with established policies 
and objectives of [the] firm and contributions in attaining objectives. (10%) 
Ensure smooth delivery of [the] product to clients and client satisfaction. (1 0%) 
In response to the director's May 10,2007 request for additional evidence (WE), counsel provided a 
letter dated July 6, 2007 in which she listed the four employees and the five subcontractors that the 
beneficiary currently supervises. The petitioner also provided its organizational chart, showing each 
employee's and subcontractor's position within the U.S. entity's hierarchy and illustrating each 
individual's position with respect to the beneficiary. The chart shows that the beneficiary's two 
direct subordinates include the secretarylcompany accounts and director of sales and marketing. The 
chart also shows that the director of sales and marketing oversees the property managerJsales 
associate and interior designerlinstallation manager and that the secretarylcompany accounts position 
oversees the firm contracted to perform the petitioner's accounting services. Lastly, the chart shows 
that the company's property managerlsales associate oversees a subcontracted cleaning company, 
while the interior designerlinstallation manager oversees subcontracted soft furnishings installers, 
tile and carpet installers, and subcontracted carpentry and installation services. 
In the initial denial, dated July 25, 2007, the director found that the description of the beneficiary's 
proposed position lacked sufficient detail and in general provided little insight into the beneficiary's 
day-to-day job duties. 
On motion, counsel reiterated the beneficiary's position description and listed the position titles 
within the petitioner's organizational chart, disputing the director's finding that the previously 
provided description of the beneficiary's proposed employment was deficient. In an effort to 
overcome this finding, the petitioner provided a log of tasks the beneficiary carried out during the 
one-week period from July 30, 2007 through August 3, 2007. The AAO notes, however, that a 
petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date 
after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Katigbak, 14 
I&N Dec. 45,49 (Comm. 1971). In the present matter, the Form 1-140 was filed in April 2007. It is 
not clear that the task log is an accurate portrayal of the job duties the beneficiary would have 
performed at the time of filing. 
Additionally, even if the task log is an accurate representation of the duties performed at the time of 
filing, it does not establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a qualifying capacity under an 
approved petition. The task log provides only a general overview of the proposed employment. In 
fact, with the exception of the Thursday task log, each day is divided into a morning and afternoon 
portion with each morning entailing a meeting between the beneficiary and either a company 
employee, a subcontractor, or a company client. The afternoon portion of the beneficiary's day 
appears to include similar meetings with other company employees or subcontractors. For instance, 
Monday's morning activity consisted of meeting with the managing director of Lifestyle Magic 
Incorporated to discuss the petitioner's association with properties managed by the latter entity. In 
light of the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's morning tasks, it appears that the meeting was 
arranged for the purpose of soliciting further business for the petitioner. It is therefore unclear how 
the business meeting can be classified as a qualifying task as it was meant to sell the petitioner's 
services. As the beneficiary's afternoon was entirely consumed with making plans to address the 
morning meeting, it is equally unclear how those tasks could have been qualifying. Similarly, the 
beneficiary's time spent meeting with the petitioner's new clients, which accounted for the 
beneficiary's Friday morning activity, also cannot readily be identified as a qualifying task(s) 
without further explanation. 
Further, the task log for Tuesday and Wednesday of that week indicates that at least a portion of the 
beneficiary's time was spent meeting with the interior designer, despite the fact that the petitioner's 
organizational chart clearly shows another employee, i.e., the real estate brokerlsales and marketing 
manager, as the interior designer's direct supervisor. It is unclear how the time spent meeting with 
the interior designer can be deemed as a qualifying task, nor has the petitioner provided sufficient 
information to indicate just how much of the beneficiary's time is allotted specifically to non- 
qualifying job duties. While the AAO acknowledges that a multinational manager or executive may 
have a mix of job duties, including those that are non-qualifying, the petitioner must establish that a 
majority of the beneficiary's time is allotted to qualifying tasks. It is noted that an employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
10 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 
(Comm. 1988). The task log that has been provided by the petitioner does not establish that the 
beneficiary's time would be primarily devoted to tasks within a qualifying capacity. 
On appeal from the director's most recent decision, counsel asserts that the director erroneously 
applied the statutory definition of managerial capacity, despite the fact that the petitioner's claim is 
that the beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity. After reviewing the director's 
latest decision, the AAO finds that counsel's objection is without merit. Contrary to counsel's 
argument, the director cited portions of the statutory definition of managerial capacity as well as 
portions of the definition of executive capacity, thereby indicating that both statutory definitions 
were applied to the description of the beneficiary's proposed employment. The AAO notes that this 
is the general practice of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Despite counsel's 
objection, the purpose of this practice is to allow the petitioner the added benefit of qualifying under 
either statutory definition, even if the beneficiary's employment falls under a statutory definition 
other than the one initially claimed. There is no indication, as suggested by counsel, that the director 
ignored the petitioner's initial claim, as the director clearly concluded that "[tlhe record does not 
establish that a majority of the beneficiary's duties have been or will be primarily directing the 
management of the organization. " 
Counsel also continues to express her dismay at the fact that the petitioner's Form 1-140 was denied 
despite the two prior approvals of the petitioner's L-1A nonimmigrant petitions for the same 
beneficiary. Although counsel acknowledges the explanations provided by the AAO in other 
decisions dealing with the same issue, she nevertheless finds these explanations inadequate. First, 
counsel questions the likelihood that service centers give less scrutiny to nonimmigrant L-1A 
petitions than they do to immigrant petitions. Counsel refers to a report from the Inspector General 
cautioning of abuses of the L-1 visa program, suggesting that the report would cause service centers 
to scrutinize nonimmigrant petitions more, rather than less, closely than their immigrant 
counterparts. Next, counsel argues that the AAO's distinction of the immigrant Form 1-140 petitions 
from the nonimmigrant Form I-129L petitions suggests that the former are held to a higher standard 
than the latter petitions. These suspicions, however, are unfounded and merely represent counsel's 
subjective interpretation, which is not supported by independent objective evidence. See Matter of 
Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); 
Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
Furthermore, with regard to the critique of the AAO and the suggestion that a higher standard is 
applied when reviewing immigrant petitions, counsel's comments indicate that she has taken the 
AAO's statements out of context. Contrary to counsel's assertions, the AAO does not suggest that 
the less permanent nature of the nonimmigrant petition causes less scrutiny of those petitions, which 
ultimately leads to erroneous approvals. Rather, the AAO makes two independent statements in its 
explanation. First, the AAO distinguishes the immigrant versus the nonimmigrant petitions, citing 
the permanent nature of the former versus the temporary nature of the latter as one of those 
distinctions. Second, the AAO notes that certain types of L-1A petitions, particularly extension 
petitions for petitioners that do not fall under the definition of "new office," may be approved 
without any supporting documentation, which may account for many of the erroneous approvals. 
See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an 
L-1A petition's validity). There is no indication in the explanation offered by the AAO that less 
scrutiny is given to L-1A petitions as a result of their temporary nature. Thus, the AAO finds 
counsel's criticisms to be entirely without merit. 
As properly determined by the director in his prior decisions, the petitioner has provided a deficient 
description of the beneficiary's job duties, failing to convey a meaningful understanding of the 
specific tasks the beneficiary would perform on a day-to-day basis and without a foundation upon 
which to conclude that the primary portion of the beneficiary's time would be spent performing tasks 
within a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5). Specifics are 
clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or 
managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 4 1 
(2d. Cir. 1990). Here, the record is devoid of these necessary specifics. 
Furthermore, while the director made no specific request for evidence of the personnel employed by 
the petitioner at the time the Form 1-140 was filed, the AAO notes that the petitioner is nevertheless 
obligated to provide documentary evidence to support its assertions, including the assertions 
regarding the personnel composition as conveyed in the petitioner's organizational chart. As 
previously stated, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofjci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
It is further noted that in reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, 
federal courts have generally agreed that USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size 
as one factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." 
Family, Inc. v. US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13, 13 16 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. 
Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. 
Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003). 
Accordingly, due to the petitioner's failure to meet the requirement set out in 8 C.F.R. 5 204,5Cj)(5) 
and its failure to establish that it had sufficient personnel at the time of filing to relieve the 
beneficiary from primarily performing non-qualifying tasks, the AAO cannot conclude that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity under an approved 
petition. For this reason, the petition cannot be approved. 
Furthermore, the record does not support a finding of eligibility based on additional grounds that 
were not previously addressed in the director's decision. 
First, 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(3)(i)(C) states that the petitioner must establish that it has a qualifying 
relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) states 
in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same 
share or proportion of each entity; 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign 
entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593; see also Matter ofsiemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of 
Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to 
the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority 
to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
at 595. 
In the present matter, the petitioner claims and provides evidence to show that it is owned 50150 by 
the beneficiary and his wife. Although the petitioner claims to have an affiliate relationship with the 
foreign entity by virtue of being partly owned by the beneficiary and his wife, there is no evidence 
establishing the degree of common ownership. The above definition of affiliate sets out specific 
criteria for meeting the definition of an affiliate. Merely having some degree of common ownership 
does not necessarily mean that the regulatory criteria have been met. In the present matter, these 
criteria can only be met if the foreign entity is owned 50150 by the beneficiary and his wife, as they 
are the two individuals who own and control the U.S. petitioner. Here, there is no evidence 
establishing such an ownership scheme of the foreign entity. As previously stated, the petitioner 
must provide independent evidence to corroborate its claims. See Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 
165. As such, the AAO cannot conclude that a qualifying relationship exists between the petitioner 
and the beneficiary's employer abroad. 
Lastly, by virtue of the beneficiary's claimed ownership of the U.S. petitioner, it appears more likely 
than not that the beneficiary will not be an "employee" of the United States operation. As explained 
in 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5), the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary will be "employed" in an 
executive or managerial capacity. It is noted that "employer," "employee," and "employed" are not 
specifically defined for purposes of the Act even though these terms are used repeatedly in the context 
of addressing the multinational executive and managerial immigrant classification. Section 
203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C), requires beneficiaries to have been "employed" abroad and to 
render services to the same "employer" in the United States. Further, section 101(a)(44), 8 U.S.C. 5 
1 101 (a)(44), defines both managerial and executive capacity as an assignment within an organization in 
which an "employee" performs certain enumerated qualifying duties. Finally, the specific definition of 
"managerial capacity" in section 10 1 (a)(44)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), refers repeatedly to the 
supervision and control of other "employees." Neither the legacy Immigration and Naturalization 
Service nor USCIS has defined the terms "employee," "employer," or "employed" by regulation for 
purposes of the multinational executive and managerial immigration classification. See, e.g., 8 
C.F.R. 5 204.5 and 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1). Therefore, for purposes of this immigrant classification, these 
terms are undefined. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that where a federal statute fails to clearly 
define the term "employee," courts should conclude "that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "Darden") 
(quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). That definition is as 
follows: 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law 
of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324; see also Restatement (Second) ofAgency 5 220(2) (1958); Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (hereinafter "Clackamas"). As the 
common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the 
answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor 
being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 
254,258 (1968). 
Within the context of immigrant petitions seeking to classify the beneficiary as a multinational 
manager or executive, when a worker is also a partner, officer, member of a board of directors, or a 
major shareholder, the worker may only be defined as an "employee" if he or she is subject to the 
organization's "control." See Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 
449-450 (2003); see also New Compliance Manual at 4 2-III(A)(l)(d). Factors to be addressed in 
determining whether a worker, who is also an owner of the organization, is an employee include: 
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and 
regulations of the individual's work. 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual's 
work. 
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization. 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the 
organization. 
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed 
in written agreements or contracts. 
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the 
organization. 
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-450 (citing New Compliance Manual). 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be an "employee" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. As explained 
above, the petitioner is a corporation, which the petitioner claims is ultimately owned and controlled 
by the beneficiary, who purports to assume a role as the petitioner's principal. There is no evidence 
that beneficiary's work will be subject control. Therefore, the AAO cannot conclude that the 
beneficiary will be an employee of the petitioning entity as required by 8 C.F.R. tj 204.5(j)(5). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a 
challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 
(E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. The 
petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.