dismissed EB-1C Case: Coffee Trading

U.S.DepartmeBÉOfHomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO)
20 MassachusettsAve.N.w., MS 2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
DATE: [lK '¿'l 2012 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER FILE:
IN RE:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionforAlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveorManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedto this matterhavebeenreturnedto theofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvised
thatanyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe AAO inappropriatelyappliedthe law in reachingits decision,or you haveadditional
informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfile a motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin
accordancewith theinstructionson FormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a feeof $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha motioncanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directlywith theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresanymotionto befiledwithin
30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseekstoreconsiderorreopen.
Thankyou,
onRosenberg
ActingChief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscus.gov
Page2
DISCUSSION: The director of the Texas Service Center revoked the previously approved
preferencevisa petition. The matteris now beforethe AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO) on
appeal.Theappealwill bedismissedandthepetitionwill berevoked.
Thepetitioneris aFloridacompanyengagedin coffeetradingandsales,andit seeksto employthe
beneficiaryasits President/Directorof MarketingandSales.Accordingly,thepetitionerendeavors
to classifythe beneficiaryasan employment-basedimmigrantpursuantto section203(b)(1)(C)of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § ll53(b)(1)(C), as a multinational
executiveor manager.
On August4, 2011,the directorrevokedthe petitionconcludingthat the petitionerdid not submit
sufficient evidencein rebuttal to the United StatesCitizenship and Immigration Services'
("USCIS") Noticeof Intentto Revoke("NOIR") andhadnotovercomethegroundsfor revocation.
Specifically,the director determinedthat the petitionerfailed to establishthat the beneficiary's
proposedemploymentwith the U.S. entity would be within a qualifying managerialor executive
capacity.TheAAO reviewedtherecordin its entiretybeforeissuingits decision.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified
immigrantswho are aliensdescribedin any of the following subparagraphs(A)
through(C):
* * *
(C) CertainMultinational Executivesand Managers.-- An alien is
describedin this subparagraphif the alien, in the 3 yearspreceding
thetimeof thealien'sapplicationfor classificationandadmissioninto
the UnitedStatesunderthis subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at
least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate
or subsidiarythereofandwho seeksto entertheUnited Statesin order
to continueto renderservicesto the sameemployeror to a subsidiary
or affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is managerialor executive.
The languageof the statuteis specific in limiting this provisionto only thoseexecutivesand
managerswhohavepreviouslyworkedfor a firm, corporationor otherlegalentity,or anaffiliate or
subsidiaryof thatentity,andwho arecomingto theUnitedStatesto work for thesameentity,or its
affiliateor subsidiary.
A United Statesemployermay file a petitionon FormI-140 for classificationof an alien under
section203(b)(1)(C)of the Act asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis
requiredfor this classification.Theprospectiveemployerin the United Statesmustfurnisha job
offer in theform of a statementwhichindicatesthatthealienis to beemployedin theUnitedStates
in a managerialor executivecapacity. Sucha statementmust clearly describethe dutiesto be
performedby thealien.
Page3
The issuethat will be addressedin this proceedingcalls for an analysisof the beneficiary'sjob
duties. Specifically,the AAO will examinethe record to determinewhetherthe petitioner
submittedsufficient evidenceto establishthat the beneficiarywould be employedin the United
Statesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
Theterm "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which
theemployeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function,or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesandcontrolsthework of othersupervisory,professional,or
managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunction within the
organization,or adepartmentor subdivisionof theorganization;
(iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesaredirectly supervised,has
the authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseas well as other
personnelactions(suchaspromotionand leaveauthorization),or if
no otheremployeeis directly supervised,functionsat a seniorlevel
within the organizationalhierarchyor with respectto the function
managed;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionover the day-to-dayoperationsof the activity or
functionfor whichtheemployeehasauthority. A first-linesupervisor
is not consideredto be acting in a managerialcapacitymerely by
virtue of the supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unlessthe employees
supervisedareprofessional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
Theterm"executivecapacity"meansanassignmentwithin anorganizationin whichthe
employeeprimarily--
(i) directsthe managementof the organizationor a majorcomponentor
functionof theorganization;
(ii) establishesthe goalsandpoliciesof the organization,component,or
function;
(iii) exerciseswide latitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly general supervisionor direction from higher level
executives,theboardof directors,or stockholdersof theorganization.
Page4
In examiningthe executiveor managerialcapacityof the beneficiary,USCISwill look first to the
petitioner'sdescriptionof thejob duties. See8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5). Publishedcaselaw clearly
supportsthe pivotalrole of a clearlydefinedjob description,asthe actualdutiesthemselvesreveal
the true natureof the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava,724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108
(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41(2d.Cir. 1990);seealso8C.F.R.§204.5(j)(5).USCISreviews
the totality of the record,which includesnot only thebeneficiary'sjob description,but alsotakes
into accountthenatureof thepetitioner'sbusiness,theemploymentandremunerationof employees,
as well as the job descriptionsof the beneficiary'ssubordinates,if any, and any other facts
contributingto a completeunderstandingof abeneficiary'sactualrolewithin agivenentity.
The definitionsof executiveand managerialcapacityhavetwo parts. First, the petitionermust
show that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilitiesthat are specified in the
definitions. Second,the petitioner must prove that the beneficiaryprimarily performs these
specifiedresponsibilitiesanddoesnot spenda majorityof his or hertime on day-to-dayfunctions.
ChampionWorld,Inc. v.INS,940F.2d1533(Table),1991WL 144470(9thCir. July30, 1991).
An analysisof the record doesnot lead to an affirmative conclusionthat the beneficiarywas
employedabroador wouldbeemployedintheUnitedStatesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executive
capacity.
With regardto theprofferedpositionofferedto thebeneficiary,thepetitionerprovideda vagueand
generaljob descriptionsuchasthe beneficiary"overseesdesign,marketing,promotion,delivery
and quality of programs, products and services," "oversees fundraising planning and
implementation,""managing[the petitioner],on a dayto daybasis,""settingup a strategyfor the
futureof [the petitioner],"and"offers consultingservicesto its currentcustomers."It is unclear
which specifictasksactuallyfall within thesebroadcategoriesandwhetherthe supervisorytasks
the beneficiarywill perform are of a qualifying nature. The petitionerfailed to establishwhat
specifictasksthebeneficiarywouldperformin supervisingbusinessaffairsor whatpolicydecisions
thebeneficiarywould make. Therecordis similarly lackingin specificinformationaboutthejob
duties involved in securingthe growth of the petitioning entity. Furthermore,the petitioner states
thatthebeneficiarywill arrangesupplyof coffeeandcoffeerelatedservicesto its customersbut the
petitioner did not provideany evidencethat it hasa contractwith the customers.In responseto the
notice of intent to revoke, the petitioner provided a list of customersbut failed to provide any
evidence of these relationships such as contracts. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job
responsibilitiesor broadly-castbusinessobjectivesis not sufficient; the regulationsrequire a
detaileddescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily job duties. Thepetitionerhasfailedto provideany
detailor explanationof the beneficiary'sactivitiesin the courseof his daily routine. The actual
dutiesthemselveswill revealthetruenatureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co Ltd.v.Sava,724
F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41 (2d.Cir. 1990). Thepetitioner'svague
andgeneraldescriptionof thebeneficiary'spositiondoesnot identifythe actualdutiesperformed,
suchthattheycouldbeclassifiedasmanagerialor executivein nature.
In addition,thejob descriptionincludesseveralnon-qualifyingdutiessuchasthebeneficiarywill be
responsiblefor "enteringandexecutingcontractswith new and existingcustomers,""increasing
salesto existingcustomers,""increasingexisting customerbase,""conductingnegotiationswith
Page5
sellers,""supervisesdocumentationfor a properexecutionof the contract(shippingdocuments,
exportandimport documents)beforeforwardingthemto customagent,""arrangesshippingwith
shipping lines and forwarding agents,"and "price fixing of hedgedpositions." Developing
marketingstrategy,runningthe salesprogramsandnegotiatingdealsareall operationaldutiesthat
cannotbe classifiedasmanagerialor executivetasks. It appearsthat the beneficiarywill be the
only personin chargeof all of the businessoperationssuchas negotiatingcontracts,marketing,
sales,preparingthebudget,developingprocedures,andhandlingtheshippinganddeliveryprocess,
ratherthanmanagingotherindividualsto performthenon-qualifyingtasks.
Neitherthejob descriptionscounselhasprovidednor the organizationalstructureof the petitioner
establishthatthebeneficiarywould beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a qualifyingmanagerialor
executivecapacity.As indicatedby thepetitioner,it employsthebeneficiaryonly. Thepetitioner
doesnot provideevidencethat the petitioneremployedindividualsto assistwith the finances,
budgeting,bookkeeping,marketresearch,marketing,salesand negotiationof contracts,thus, it
appearsthat the beneficiary is performing the duties inherent in operating a businesssuch as
finances,customerservice,negotiations,contracts,and shipping services. An employeewho
"primarily" performsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor providea serviceis not considered
to be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and
(B) of the Act (requiringthat one "primarily" perform the enumeratedmanagerialor executive
duties);seealso Matter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19 I & N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm.
1988).
Althoughcounselstatesonappealthatthe"businessmodelfor [thepetitioner)reliesonoutsourcing
for the 'vastmajorityof operationsrelatedto traffic management,logistics,legalandfiscalmatters
of the corporation,'"the petitionerhasneitherpresentedevidenceto documentthe existenceof
theseemployeesnor identifiedthe servicestheseindividualsprovide. Additionally,the petitioner
hasnot explainedhowtheservicesof thecontractedemployeesobviatetheneedfor thebeneficiary
to primarily conductthe petitioner'sbusiness. Without documentaryevidenceto supportits
statements,thepetitionerdoesnot meetits burdenof proof in theseproceedings.Matterof Soffici,
22 I&N Dec.158,165(Comm'r 1998).
While the AAO acknowledgesthat no beneficiaryis requiredto allocate100%of his time to
managerial-or executive-leveltasks,the petitioner must establishthat the non-qualifying tasksthe
beneficiarywould perform are only incidental to his proposedposition. An employeewho
"primarily" performsthe tasks necessaryto producea product or to provide servicesis not
consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. See sections
101(a)(44)(A)and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated
managerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatterof ChurchScientologyInternational,191&N Dec.
593, 604 (Comm. 1988). The petitionerhas failed to establishthat the beneficiarywould be
employedin aqualifyingcapacity.
As requiredby section101(a)(44)(C)of theAct, if statYmglevelsareusedasa factorin determining
whetheranindividualis actingin a managerialor executivecapacity,USCISmusttakeinto account
thereasonableneedsof theorganization,in light of theoverallpurposeandstageof developmentof
theorganization.To establishthatthereasonableneedsof theorganizationjustify thebeneficiary's
Page6
job duties,the petitionermustspecificallyarticulatewhy thoseneedsarereasonablein light of its
overall purposeandstageof development.The petitionerhasnot explainedhow the reasonable
needsof the petitioningenterprisejustify thebeneficiary'sperformanceof non-managerialor non-
executiveduties. Goingon recordwithout supportingdocumentaryevidenceis not sufficientfor
purposesof meetingtheburdenof proof in theseproceedings.Matter of Soffici,22 I&N Dec. 158,
165(Comm'rI998).
Furthermore,the reasonableneedsof the petitionerwill not supersedethe requirementthat the
beneficiarybe "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacityas requiredby the
statute.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44).The reasonable
needsof thepetitionermayjustify abeneficiarywhoallocates51percentofhis dutiesto managerial
or executivetasksas opposedto 90 percent,but thoseneedswill not excusea beneficiarywho
spendsthemajorityof histimeonnon-qualifyingduties.
Although counselsuggeststhat the beneficiary'sposition may be deemedas that of a function
managerwhich doesnot focuson the beneficiary'sdutiesasa personnelmanager,counselcannot
merelyraisethesealternateclaimsto avoid addressingthe non-qualifyingtasksthe beneficiary
would haveto perform. Without documentaryevidenceto supportthe claim, the assertionsof
counselwill not satisfythe petitioner'sburdenof proof. Theunsupportedassertionsof counseldo
not constituteevidence.Matter of Obaigbena,19 I&N Dec.533,534 (BIA 1988);Matter of
Laureano,19I&N Dec.1 (BIA 1983);Matterof Ramirez-Sanchez,171&NDec.503,506(BIA
1980).
TheAAO acknowledgescounsel'scontentionthatthebeneficiary'spositionis anessentialfunction
within the petitioner's organization.The term "function manager"applies generallywhen a
beneficiarydoesnot superviseor controlthe work of a subordinatestaff but insteadis primarily
responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section
101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii).Theterm"essentialfunction"is not
definedby statuteor regulation.If a petitionerclaimsthatthebeneficiaryis managinganessential
function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describesthe duties to be
performedin managingthe essentialfunction,i.e. identify the functionwith specificity,articulate
the essentialnatureof the function,andestablishthe proportionof the beneficiary'sdaily duties
attributedto managingthe essentialfunction. See8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). In addition, the
petitioner'sdescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily duties must demonstratethat the beneficiary
managesthe functionratherthanperformsthe dutiesrelatedto the function. An employeewho
primarilyperformsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor to provideservicesis not considered
to beemployedin a managerialor executivecapacity.Boyang,Ltd. v.LN.S.,67F.3d305(Table),
1995WL 576839(9thCir, 1995)(citingMatterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.
at 604. Thepetitionerhasnotprovidedevidencethatthebeneficiarymanagesanessentialfunction.
As notedabove,the petitionerprovideda brief andvaguejob descriptionthatdid not discusshow
the beneficiaryis managingan essentialfunction. Only on appealdid counselfor the petitioner
claim that the beneficiaryis a functionmanager.However,asnotedabove,the beneficiary'sjob
descriptiondoesnot establishthatthebeneficiaryisprimarilyperformingin amanagerialcapacity.
Page7
Beyondthe requireddescriptionof thejob duties,USCISreviewsthe totality of the recordwhen
examiningthe claimedmanagerialor executivecapacityof a beneficiary,includingthe petitioner's
organizationalstructure,thedutiesof thebeneficiary'ssubordinateemployees,thepresenceof other
employeesto relieve the beneficiary from performing operationalduties, the nature of the
petitioner'sbusiness,andany other factorsthat will contributeto a completeunderstandingof a
beneficiary'sactualdutiesandrole in a business. In the caseof a functionmanager,whereno
subordinatesare directly supervised,theseother factorsmay include the beneficiary'sposition
within theorganizationalhierarchy,thedepthof the petitioner'soperations,the indirectsupervision
of employeeswithin the scopeof the functionmanaged,andthe valueof thebudgets,products,or
servicesthatthebeneficiarymanages.
As discussedabove,thepetitionerhasnot identifiedemployeeswithin thepetitioner'sorganization,
subordinateto the beneficiary,who would relievethe beneficiaryfrom performingroutineduties
inherentto operatingthe businesssincethe subordinates'dutiesareto executetheprojectandnot
look for new engagementsandleadthe projects. The fact that the beneficiaryhasbeengiven a
managerialjob title andgeneraloversightauthorityover the businessis insufficientto elevatehis
positionto thatof a "functionmanager"ascontemplatedby the governingstatuteandregulations.
As discussedabove,the petitionerhasnot establishedthat the beneficiary'sdutiesare primarily
managerialin nature,andthushecannotbeconsidereda "functionmanager."
Other than statingthat the proposedposition will be responsiblefor managingan unidentified
essentialfunction,counselprovidesno explanationor evidencein supportof his claim that the
beneficiarywould qualify asa functionmanagerpursuantto section101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of the Act.
Theunsupportedstatementsof counselon appealor in a motionarenot evidenceandthusarenot
entitledto anyevidentiaryweight.SeeINSv.Phinpathya,464U.S.183,188-89n.6(1984);Matter
ofRamirez-Sanchez,17I&N Dec.503(BIA 1980).
On appeal,counselcontendsthat it is relevantinformationto considerthat the beneficiarywas
previouslygrantedL-1 nonimmigrantstatus. TheAAO notesthat, regardlessof the fact that the
petitioner hadan L-1 petition approvedon behalfof the samebeneficiary,the fact remainsthat each
nonimmigrantandimmigrantpetitionis a separaterecordof proceedingwith a separateburdenof
proof andassuch,eachpetitionmuststandon its own individualmerits. USCISisnot requiredto
assumetheburdenof searchingthroughpreviouslyprovidedevidencesubmittedin supportof other
petitionsto determinetheapprovabilityof this petition. Theapprovalof anonimmigrantpetitionin
no way guaranteesthat USCIS will approvean immigrantpetition filed on behalfof the same
beneficiary. USCISdeniesmanyI-140 immigrantpetitionsafterapprovingprior nonimmigrantI-
129L-1 petitions. See,e.g.,Q Data Consulting,Inc. v.INS, 293F. Supp.2d at25;IKEA USv. US
Dept.of Justice,48F. Supp.2d22(D.D.C.1999);FedinBrothersCo.Ltd v. Sava,724F. Supp.
1103(E.D.N.Y.1989).
If thepreviousnonimmigrantpetitionwasapprovedbasedon the sameunsupportedassertionsthat
arecontainedin the currentrecord,the approvalwould constitutematerialandgrosserroron the
partof thedirector. TheAAO is not requiredto approveapplicationsor petitionswhereeligibility
hasnot beendemonstrated,merelybecauseof prior approvalsthat mayhavebeenerroneous.See,
e.g.Matter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19I&N Dec. 593,597 (Comm. 1988). It would be
Page8
absurdto suggestthat USCISor anyagencymusttreatacknowledgederrorsasbindingprecedent.
SussexEngg.Ltd. v.Montgomery,825F.2d1084,1090(6thCir. 1987),cert.denied,485U.S. 1008
(1988).
Beyondthedecisionof thedirector,therecordlackssubstantivejob descriptionsestablishingwhat
job duties the beneficiaryperformedduring his employmentabroad. Conclusoryassertions
regardingthebeneficiary'semploymentcapacityarenot sufficient. Merelyrepeatingthe language
of the statuteor regulationsdoesnot satisfythepetitioner'sburdenof proof. FedinBros.Co..Ltd.
v. Sava,724F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990);Ávyr
Associates,Inc. v.Meissner,1997WL 188942at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). Theactualdutiesthemselveswill
revealthetruenatureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.at 1108.
An applicationor petitionthat fails to complywith the technicalrequirementsof the law may be
deniedby the AAO evenif the ServiceCenterdoesnot identify all of thegroundsfor denialin the
initial decision. SeeSpencerEnterprises.Inc. v. UnitedStates,229 F. Supp.2d 1025,1043(E.D.
Cal.2001),affd, 345F.3d683(9thCir.2003);seealsoSoltanev.DOJ,381F.3d143,145(3dCir.
2004)(notingthattheAAO reviewsappealson adenovobasis).Basedon theadditionalgroundsof
ineligibility notedabove,thispetitioncannotbeapproved.
Theappealwill bedismissedfor the abovestatedreasons,with eachconsideredasan independent
andalternativebasisfor denial. In visapetitionproceedings,theburdenof provingeligibility for
the benefitsoughtremainsentirelywith the petitioner. Section291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361.
Thepetitionerhasnot sustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.Thepetitionisrevoked.