dismissed EB-1C Case: Computer Technology

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
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PUBLIC COPY 
Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: JUN 0 1 2006 
WAC 00 167 50734 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
A, Robe fl% . Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was approved by the Director, California Service Center. Upon 
further review, the director determined that the petitioner may have been ineligible for the benefit sought and 
issued a notice of intent to revoke (NOIR) the approval of the petition. The approval was subsequently 
revoked on December 8, 2005. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on 
appeal. The appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
The petitioner was established in 1996 in the state of California. The petitioner claims to be engaged in 
domestic and international trading of computer technology and initially sought to employ the beneficiary as 
its vice president.' Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based 
immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
$ 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The director revoked approval of the petition based 
on two independent grounds of ineligibility: 1) the petitioner failed to establish that it has been doing 
business in the United States on a regular, systematic, and continuous basis; and 2) the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary has been and would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Although counsel provided a brief on appeal, the entire statement, with the exception of the reference to the 
director's latest notice: was a duplicate of counsel's response to the NOR. With regard to counsel's 
reference to Firstland Int'l, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2004), the AAO wishes to expand on the 
director's response, as it does not clearly explain counsel's faulty reasoning. In that opinion, the court in 
Firstland interpreted the third and fourth sentence of section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1155 (2003), to render 
the revocation of an approved immigrant petition ineffective where the beneficiary of the petition did not 
receive notice of the revocation before beginning his journey to the United States. Firstland, 377 F.3d at 130. 
Counsel asserts that the reasoning of this opinion must be applied to the present matter and accordingly, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) may not revoke the approval because the beneficiary did not 
receive notice of the revocation before departing for the United States, since she was already in the United 
States when the director issued the revocation. 
According to the Fom G-28 submitted on appeal, the petitioner and beneficiary are located in California; 
thus, this case did not arise in the Second Circuit. In fact, even if this case did arise in the Second Circuit, 
Firstland is no longer a binding precedent. 
On December 17, 2004, the President signed the Intelligence Refom and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(S. 2845). See Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). Specifically relating to this matter, section 
5304(c) of Public Law 108-458 amends section 205 of the Act by striking "Attorney General" and inserting 
"Secretary of Homeland Security" and by striking the final two sentences. Section 205 of the Act now reads: 
The Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and 
sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 204. 
Such revocation shall be effective as of the date of approval of any such petition. 
' In a letter dated February 25, 2002, the petitioner's then president stated that he would be retiring from his position 
effective March 1, 2002 and that the beneficiary would assume the new position of president as of that date. 
Counsel referred to the director's latest notice as the "notice of Denial." That reference is incorrect, as the subject of the 
instant matter is a notice of revocation. While counsel's error is duly noted, it has no legal effect on the outcome of this 
proceeding. 
Furthermore, section 5304(d) of Public Law 108-458 provides that the amendment made by section 5304(c) 
took effect on the date of enactment and that the amended version of section 205 applies to revocations under 
section 205 of the Act made before, on, or after such date. Accordingly, the amended statute specifically 
applies to the present matter and counsel's Firstland argument no longer has merit. 
Again, section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155, states: "The Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any 
time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him 
under section 204." Regarding the revocation on notice of an immigrant petition under section 205 of the Act, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals has stated: 
In Matter of Estime, . . . this Board stated that a notice of intention to revoke a visa petition is 
properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" where the evidence of record at the time the 
notice is issued, if unexplained and unrebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa petition 
based upon the petitioner's failure to meet his burden of proof. The decision to revoke will be 
sustained where the evidence of record at the time the decision is rendered, including any 
evidence or explanation submitted by the petitioner in rebuttal to the notice of intention to 
revoke, would warrant such denial. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 590 (BIA 1988)(citing Matter ofEstime, 19 I&N 450 (BIA 1987)). 
By itself, the director's realization that a petition was incorrectly approved is good and sufficient cause for the 
issuance of a notice of intent to revoke an immigrant petition. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. at 590. 
In the instant matter, the director raised valid concerns over the petitioner's diminished organizational 
structure since the date of the approval, implying that the petitioner cannot claim to employ the beneficiary in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity if it lacks the necessary support personnel to relieve the 
beneficiary from having to primarily engage in nonqualifying operational tasks. Regardless of any economic 
hardships the petitioner may have experienced since approval of the Form 1-140, the petitioner has the burden 
of maintaining eligibility to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or executive until the 
beneficiary obtains status as a lawful permanent resident. Counsel failed to address the issues cited in the 
director's revocation and which are germane to establishing the petitioner's eligibility. 
Counsel's arguments rested almost entirely on equitable relief theories such as equitable estoppel, laches, and 
detrimental reliance. However, counsel fails to acknowledge the powers statutorily bestowed upon the 
director by virtue of section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1155. There is no question that the director 
established good and sufficient cause for his decision to revoke the approval of the petition in the instant 
matter. Counsel's prior arguments have not adequately addressed the grounds for ineligibility. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(v) states, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact 
for the appeal. 
Page 4 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Inasmuch as counsel has failed to identify specifically an 
erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of fact in this proceeding, the petitioner has not sustained that 
burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed.