dismissed EB-1C Case: Corporate Uniforms

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF U-C-I-, LLC 
APPEAL OF TEXAS SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: JUNE 29,2017 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, an importer and seller of corporate uniforms, seeks to permanently employ the 
Beneficiary as its president under the first preference immigrant classification for multinational 
executives or managers. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b )(I )(C), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(l)(C). This classification allows a U.S. employer to permanently transfer a qualified foreign 
employee to the United States to work in an executive or managerial capacity. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish, as required, that the Beneficiary would be employed in the United States in an executive 
capacity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits a brief asserting that the Director used an incorrect standard of 
proof in denying the petition and maintains that the Beneficiary's position requires him to perform 
primarily executive duties. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 203(b )(1 )(C) of the Act makes an immigrant visa available to a beneficiary who, in the three 
years preceding the filing of the petition, has been employed outside the United States for at least one 
year in a managerial or executive capacity, and seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to 
render managerial or executive services to the same employer or to its subsidiary or affiliate. 
A United States employer may file Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, to classify a 
beneficiary under section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. A labor 
certification is not required for this classification. The Form 1-140 must be accompanied by a 
statement from an authorized official of the petitioning United States employer which demonstrates that 
the beneficiary has been employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity for at least one year in 
the three years preceding the filing of the petition, that the beneficiary is coming to work in the United 
States for the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate of the foreign employer, and that the 
prospective U.S. employer has been doing business for at least one year. 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(3). 
Matter of U-C-1-. LLC 
II. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAP A CITY 
The Director determined that the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary would be employed 
in the United States in an executive capacity. 1 
The term "executive capacity" is defined as "an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily": 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of 
the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, the 
board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B). If staffing levels are used as a factor in 
determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, 
in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(C) ofthe Act. 
A. Duties 
When examining whether a beneficiary will be employed in an executive capacity, we will look first 
to the submitted description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). 
Based on the statutory definition of executive capacity, the petitioner must first show that the 
beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World. Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 
1533 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary will be primarily engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational 
activities alongside the petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 
1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
In its letter of support, the Petitioner explained that it was established for the purpose of importing, 
warehousing, selling, shipping, and delivering uniforms in the United States. The Petitioner stated 
that the Beneficiary would be responsible for overseeing personnel, developing the company's 
internal structure and operating processes and procedures, and overseeing business development. 
The Petitioner also provided a list of the Beneficiary's proposed job duties, which would include 
1 The Petitioner does not claim that it will employ the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity. 
2 
Matter of U-C-1-, LLC 
directing business operations through management of profit and loss as well as "facilitating 
management, safety and security, loss prevention, and banking." The Petitioner did not clarify what 
tasks are involved in "facilitating management," state how the Beneficiary would protect the 
company from loss, or specify his actual role with respect to banking activities. 
The Petitioner also stated that the Beneficiary would supervise, set goals for, and oversee the scope 
of work of the export sales department, which was not included in the Petitioner's corresponding 
organizational chart. In fact, in a separate statement, the Petitioner explained that it viewed export 
activity as a future undertaking. Likewise, while the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would 
oversee the training of sales teams, the corresponding organizational chart shows one sales team 
with four existing employees and five vacant spots for sales representatives that are projected as 
future hires. The chart does not show that the Petitioner had multiple "sales teams" at the time of 
filing. With regard to any job duties that are contingent on future developments, such as proposed 
departments or projected employees, we note that the Petitioner must establish that all eligibility 
requirements for the immigration benefit have been satisfied from the time of the filing and 
continuing through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). Our analysis ofthis issue is based on the 
organizational hierarchy that existed when the petition was filed. 
The Petitioner also broadly stated that the Beneficiary would be responsible for: directing the 
implementation of the "Institutionalization Program" with the goal of developing new products and 
finding business opportunities in the surrounding areas; directing and coordinating finances and 
budget activities and activities associated with production, pricing, sales, and product distribution; 
directing and implementing policies and objectives: and directing human resource activities, such as 
approving human resources plans, selecting "high-level staff," and establishing "major 
departments." The Petitioner did not describe the components of the "Institutionalization Program" 
or specify the actual tasks involved in setting goals and policies or coordinating various company 
activities. Other duties listed included approving proposed budgets, overseeing client negotiations 
and development of new client business, evaluating the company's finances with respect to business 
development, ensuring implementation of the foreign entity's business model, and conferring with 
management and staff to address issues or problems, coordinate activities, and analyze ~ompany 
performance. 
After reviewing the record, the Director issued a request for evidence (RFE), instructing the 
Petitioner to list the Beneficiary's specific daily job duties and the percentage of time the 
Beneficiary would allocate to each individual task. The Director advised the Petitioner against 
grouping tasks into categories and stated that the job description should explain how the 
Beneficiary's proposed position meets the four-prong definition of managerial capacity. 
In response, the Petitioner provided a statement containing a supplemental job description, which 
restates certain job duties that were part of the original job description and assigns a percentage of 
time to those duties. The additional job description provided little new information and instead 
continued discussing the Beneficiary's proposed position in a general manner without conveying a 
meaningful understanding of the Beneficiary's actual daily tasks. For instance, the Petitioner 
3 
Matter of U-C-1-, LLC 
claimed that 15% of the Beneficiary's time would be allocated to "[p]lanning, developing, and 
coordinating all business operations at the highest level of management with the help of subordinate 
executives and staff members, including managing profit and loss, facilitating management, safety 
and security, loss prevention, and banking." While the references to "business operations" and 
"highest level of management" are both new, neither addition enhances our understanding of the 
specific daily tasks involved in managing profit and loss or "facilitating management." The 
Petitioner also added that the Beneficiary will develop and implement "the company's management, 
sales and marketing, logistics, human resources, and infrastructure," and exercise discretionary 
decision-making without oversight. However this additional language only conveys a sense of the 
Beneficiary's level of authority, yet adds no practical understanding of the specific actions the 
Beneficiary would undertake to meet these broadly stated job responsibilities. 
Next, the Petitioner stated that 15% of the Beneficiary's time would be allocated to reviewing 
budgets; 15% to directing and coordinating finances that are associated with business development 
activities, such as budgets, expenditures, research, marketing, return-on-investment, and profit-loss 
projections; and 10% to reviewing financial documents and working with managers and other staff 
to address issues, coordinate activities, resolve problems, and analyze operations. The Petitioner did 
not specify any issues, activities, or problems or explain the repeated references to the Beneficiary's 
responsibility to "[a]nalyze operations." Again, while all three sets of duties denote the 
Beneficiary's heightened degree of discretionary authority over business activities, the Petitioner did 
not provide sufficient information about his actual daily tasks. Further, the Petitioner's reference to 
"installation'' and "technical service offered to clients" when discussing the Beneficiary's 
operational analysis responsibility is unclear and appears to have little to do with the Petitioner's 
clothing distribution business. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the 
definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 
724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The actual duties 
themselves reveal the true nature ofthe employment. !d. 
The Petitioner went on to restate two elements of the original job description regarding the 
Beneficiary's role in directing and implementing the "Institutionalization Program" and supervising 
and overseeing "the scope of work of the export sales department," allocating a combined 15% of 
the Beneficiary's time to these duties. However, the Petitioner did not disclose any specific actions 
that would be involved in directing and implementing the stated program, other than to vaguely state 
that the goal of the program would be to ''assur[ e] that the business process matches the best 
practices" to allow for company growth and development; nor did the Petitioner provide further 
information to explain why the Beneficiary would be tasked with overseeing a department that does 
not appear to have existed within the organization at the time the petition was filed. Although the 
Petitioner claimed that the Beneficiary would "be responsible for establishing the necessary 
mechanisms to effectively evaluate the company's performance," it is unclear how this responsibility 
would translate to his daily activities. 
4 
Matter of U-C-1-, LLC 
Next, Petitioner stated that 23% of the Beneficiary's time would be allocated to various 
responsibilities associated with managing subordinates, including overseeing the training of sales 
teams, meeting with the sales team to conduct progress reviews and improve performance, and 
directing human resource (HR) activities, including approving HR plans and activities, selecting 
directors and other high-level staff, and establishing departments. The lack of information about the 
specific type of oversight the Beneficiary would be required to provide in sales training gives rise to 
the question of whether conducting such oversight would realistically be a routine daily or weekly 
task. Furthermore, while the Petitioner stated that it "envisions the hiring of additional sales 
representatives" to ensure client satisfaction, the Petitioner's organizational chart indicates that at the 
time of filing, the Petitioner had a sales director, a customer service adviser, and two sales managers 
comprising its entire sales force. There is insufficient evidence that the Petitioner had multiple sales 
teams whose training the Beneficiary would have to regularly oversee. Likewise, while it is likely 
that the Beneficiary would approve HR plans or activities, hire high-level staff~ and establish new 
departments within the organization intermittently based on the needs of the organization, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the Beneficiary would perform any of these duties in the routine course 
of his daily business. 
Finally, the Petitioner stated that the remaining 7% of the Beneficiary's time would be allocated to 
overseeing client negotiations and developing business relationships. However, it is not clear that 
these tasks, which are part of the overall process of selling the Petitioner's product and finding more 
clients to sell those products to, can be deemed as being executive in nature, despite the level of 
discretionary authority that may be inherent to the negotiation process itself. 
In the denial decision, the Director determined that the record is not persuasive in demonstrating that 
the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the Director's RFE erroneously focused on the statutory 
definition of managerial capacity, thereby overlooking the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary 
would be employed in an executive capacity. While we agree that the Director's focus on 
managerial capacity was incorrect given the Petitioner's claim, we find that the oversight was 
harmless and did not contribute to the findings in the denial decision, which expressly referenced 
both managerial and executive capacity, thereby indicating that the Petitioner was given the full 
benefit of having its eligibility assessed under both statutory definitions. 
The Petitioner also restates the job description it provided in response to the RFE, classifying each 
job duty into one of four subject headings - financial directive, operational objective, sales directive, 
or overall directive goal. As with the prior job description, the Petitioner's argument on appeal 
focuses on the Beneficiary's authority to analyze and oversee all aspects of the company's daily 
operations and make discretionary decisions regarding the company's business and financial goals 
based on data compiled by subordinate staff. The Petitioner also points to the Beneficiary's 
knowledge of "all aspects of the product industry" based on his experience in his former 
employment abroad. 
5 
Matter of U-C-1-, LLC 
We find that the record properly documents the Beneficiary's knowledge and experience and we do 
not dispute the Beneficiary's authority over personnel and all business matters based on his top-most 
placement within the Petitioner's organizational hierarchy. Rather, the issue in contention is 
whether the job duties the Beneficiary would carry out in the process of running the U.S. operation 
would be primarily of an executive nature. As stated above, we find that the Petitioner has not 
submitted sufficient information about the Beneficiary's actual daily tasks and therefore we cannot 
determine whether such tasks would be primarily executive in nature. Therefore, while we do not 
question the Beneficiary's qualifications for the proposed employment, based on the above 
discussion highlighting the various deficiencies in the job descriptions on record, we disagree with 
the Petitioner and find that the record lacks a sufficient job description which "clearly describe[ s] the 
duties to be performed" by the Beneficiary. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). 
B. Staffing 
Beyond the required description of the job duties, USC IS reviews the totality of the evidence when 
examining the claimed executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the company's organizational 
structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to 
relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, and any other 
factors that will contribute to an understanding of a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position 
within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish 
the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a 
subordinate level of managerial employees for a beneficiary to direct and a beneficiary must 
primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day 
operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply 
because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as an owner or sole 
managerial employee. A beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision 
making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization." !d. 
We note that a company's size alone, without taking into account the reasonable needs of the 
organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa petition for classification as a 
multinational executive. See section 10l(a)(44)(C) ofthe Act. However, it is appropriate for USCIS 
to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as the 
absence of employees who would perform the non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell 
company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See e.g. Family Inc., 
469 F.3d 1313; Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
The Petitioner claimed to have seven employees at the time of filing and submitted an organizational 
chart depicting the Beneficiary at the top of the hierarchy as its president with a sales director and a 
.
Matter of U-C-1-, LLC 
financial manager as his direct subordinates. As noted above, the organizational chart goes on to 
depict the rest of the staffing structure showing an accounting clerk as the financial manager's 
subordinate, a customer service adviser as the sales director's subordinate, and two sales managers 
subordinate to the customer service adviser. Although the chart shows a fifth hierarchical tier 
consisting of five sales representatives, all tive positions were vacant at the time of filing and will 
not be considered. The Petitioner provided evidence of wages paid to employees in 2014, but did 
not provide recent payroll evidence from 2015. The individual identified on the chm1 as the 
financial manager ( . did not receive wages in 2014.2 
In the RFE, the Director instructed the Petitioner to provide an organizational chart accompanied by 
job titles and job descriptions for subordinate employees along with their IRS Form W-2 wage 
statements for the relevant time periods, their educational levels, and information disclosing their 
full- or part-time status with the U.S. entity. The Petitioner was also instructed to provide evidence 
documenting the number of contractors used, if any, and the job duties they performed. 
In response, the Petitioner resubmitted a copy of the original organizational chart and provided its 
quarterly federal tax return for the third quarter of 2015, during which the instant petition was filed. 
The Petitioner also provided job descriptions for the Beneficiary's direct subordinates - the sales 
director and financial manager- as well as nine Form W-2s it issued in 2015. A Form W-2 showing 
earnings of $23,063 was issued to As noted in the Director's denial, this evidence 
does not resolve the discrepancy between the Petitioner's documented workers and the 
organizational chart, which shows rather than in the position of 
financial manager. We further note that Form W-2 for 2015 shows that her earnings 
were approximately $7,500 less than those of the accounting clerk, a position that is directly 
subordinate to the financial manager. Even if we were to disregard the name anomaly for the 
position of financial manager, it is unclear why the financial manager 's subordinate received a salary 
that is approximately 23% higher than that of the financial manager herself Further, despite the 
Director's discussion of the lack of wage evidence for the Petitioner did not 
acknowledge or provide evidence to resolve the inconsistency. The Petitioner must resolve these 
incongruities in the record with independent , objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
We also agree with the Director's decision to question the full- or part-time status of at least one 
employee- the Petitioner 's sales director. Namely , we note that while 
was identified as one of the Beneficiary's two direct subordinates, projected to assist the Beneficiary 
in managing the organization, his salary for 2015 was only $7,500 as compared to his 2014 Form W-
2, which was originally submitted in support of the petition and which showed a salary of $150,000. 
While it is possible that the 2015 W -2 only reflects partial earnings, this gives rise to 
2 The Petitioner provided a resume for a who indicated that she is the Petitioner's financial 
manager . The Petitioner 's organizational chart indicates its financial manager is and the Petitioner did 
not provide evidence that she is also known as The Petition er did not pay wages to 
orto in2014 . 
.
Matter of U-C-1-, LLC 
question whether was actually employed by the Petitioner at the time of filing. Given 
that $7,500 represents only 5% of 2014 earnings, it appears that he was employed for 
only a short time period in 2015 and thus may not have been employed at the time of filing or the 
time going forward. This anomaly causes us to question whether the Petitioner had a sales director 
at the time of filing and if not, who, other than the Beneficiary, would have been available to carry 
out the sales director's job duties. 
Another employee identified on the Petitioner's organizational chart, a sales manager, earned less 
than half of his 2014 salary in 2015, raising similar questions as to whether he was still employed by 
the Petitioner at the time of filing in the third quarter of 2015. While the Petitioner claims on appeal 
that the Form W-2s it submitted in the RFE response were only reflective of employee base salaries, 
it provided little evidence to show that it paid its employees commissions or other earnings in 2015 
beyond those included in the Form W-2s. A petitioner's unsupported statements are of very limited 
weight and normally will be insufficient to carry its burden of proof. The Petitioner must support its 
assertions with relevant, probative, and credible evidence. See Malter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 
369, 376 (AAO 2010). 
Further, the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary "will be in charge of the overall sales procedures 
of the company'' is not supported by evidence showing that the Petitioner had a sales director to 
carry out the sales procedures put forth by the Beneficiary. This leads us to question the true nature 
of the Beneficiary's job duties, which would undoubtedly be affected by the lack of a support staff to 
carry out his sales directives and relieve him from various sales-related duties. While no beneficiary 
is required to allocate 100% of his time to executive-level tasks, the petitioner must establish that the 
non-qualifying tasks the beneficiary would perform are only incidental to the proposed position. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services 
is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int '!, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 
1988). 
In denying the petition, the Director questioned whether the Petitioner's statl at the time of filing 
was sufficient to relieve the Beneficiary from having to primarily carry out the nonexecutive 
operational tasks of the organization. The Director declined to consider "artificial staffing tiers'' or 
inflated employee job titles. 
On appeal, the Petitioner objects to the Director's reference to artificial tiers and inflated job titles, 
referring to its organizational hierarchy, which shows seven positions reporting to the Beneficiary 
and relieving him from having to carry out the organization's nonexecutive functions. 
We find that the various unresolved discrepancies and anomalies pertaining to the Beneficiary's 
subordinate staff preclude us from gaining a full understanding of who the Petitioner employed at 
the time of filing and the job duties they performed. Without this critical information we cannot 
conclude that the Beneficiary had adequate staff to support him in a position that would entail job 
.
Matter of U-C-1-, LL C 
duties that are primarily of an executive nature. The Petitioner's reliance on its organizational cha11 
and employee resumes is insufficient given the above-cited inconsistencies between the 
organizational chart and the employee wage evidence. See Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 591-92. While we 
agree with the Petitioner's assertion that no adverse finding should result merely from the fact that 
the organization experienced staffing changes between 2014 and the date the petition was filed, the 
Petitioner must provide evidence to show who it employed at the time of tiling and establish that the 
staffing structure at that time was sufficient to support the Beneticiary in an executive capacity. As 
stated above , the Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant , probative , and credible 
evidence. See Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
Further, we note that the Petitioner did not claim to have employees or contractors to provide the 
logistics services that involve receiving the imported merchandise, shipping it to its tina! 
destinations, or any other operational tasks that would go along with the Petitioner's import and 
distribution operations. The Petitioner claims to have a warehouse in Texas, but did not 
further elaborate regarding its staffing or operations. Without further evidence or explanation , we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the Beneficiary would be directly involved in carrying out or 
overseeing the logistical tasks pertaining to the shipping and receiving of the Petitioner ' s 
merchandise, which would not be deemed as tasks of an executive nature. 
We have considered the Petitioner's stafting needs within the scope of its sales-driven operation; 
however, the various unexplained and unresolved anomalies catalogued above detract from the 
Petitioner's claim and lead us to question whether it was adequately staffed at the time of filing such 
that it was ready and able to relieve the Beneficiary from having to allocate a significant portion of 
his time to non-executive duties. 
Based on the deficiencies and inconsistencies addressed above, the Petitioner has not established that 
it will employ the Beneficiary in an executive capacity. 
III. PRIOR APPROVALS 
As a final note, we acknowledge that USCIS previously approved an L-1 A nonimmigrant petition 
filed on behalf of the Beneficiary . We are not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been 
erroneous. See Church Scientology lnt '!, 19 I&N Dec. at 597); see also Sussex Eng 'g. Lid. v. 
Montgomery, 825 F.2d I 084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987). Furthermore , we are not be bound to follow a 
contradictory decision of a service center. La. Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, No. 98-2855 , 2000 
WL 282785, at *2 (E.D. La. 2000). 
The Petitioner's nonimmigrant petition filing was a separate proceeding with a separate record. In 
making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in that 
individual record of proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l6)(ii). In the present matter, the Director 
reviewed the record of proceedings and concluded that the Petitioner was ineligible to classify the 
Beneficiary as a multinational executive based on its failure to establish eligibility . In both the RFE 
9 
Matter of U-C-1-, LLC 
and the final denial, the Director clearly articulated the objective statutory and regulatory 
requirements and applied them to the case at hand. If the previous petition was approved based on 
the same insufficient evidence of the Beneficiary's eligibility, the approval would constitute error on 
the part of the Director. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of the analysis provided above, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary would 
be employed in the United States in an executive capacity. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofU-C-1-. LLC, ID# 454669 (AAO June 29, 2017) 
10