dismissed EB-1C Case: Electronics

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
, 
 U.S. Citizenship 
mm data- m and Immigration 
( -rly uerr~rran:, + 
PF 
 Services 
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Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: JUN 2 8 2006 
WAC 04 249 53379 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
^Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the employment-based visa petition. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant immigrant petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or 
executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
5 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California that is 
operating as a supplier of portable digital video disc players. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary 
as its vice-president. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated the existence of a 
qualifying relationship between the foreign and United States entities. In his analysis of the instant matter, 
the director focused on whether the beneficiary's foreign employer furnished consideration in exchange for its 
purported interest in the petitioning entity. 
On appeal, the petitioner's present counsel contends that the beneficiary's foreign employer is the parent of 
the petitioning organization. Counsel submits a brief and documentary evidence in support of the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time 
of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United 
States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a 
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof 
and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render 
services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement, which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
The issue in this proceeding is whether a qualifying relationship exists between the United States company 
and the beneficiary's foreign employer. 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 204.56)(2) states in pertinent part: 
AfJiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity; 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 
joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
The petitioner filed the instant petition on September 14, 2004. In an appended letter, dated August 30, 2004, 
the petitioner explained that the beneficiary's foreign employer is the parent of the United States company as 
a result of its ownership of 51 percent of the petitioner's issued stock. As supporting evidence, the 
petitioner's former counsel submitted a chart identifying three shareholders of the petitioning entity - the 
beneficiary's foreign employer, as well as a Chinese corporation and a corporation based in California. Their 
respective ownerships interests were identified as 5 1 percent, 39 percent and 10 percent. Counsel provided 
three stock certificates, numbered one through three, and the petitioner's stock transfer ledger, both of which 
reflected the issuance of stock in the above-named amounts to the three companies on June 12, 2001. 
Counsel further submitted the petitioner's California Notice of Transaction Pursuant to Corporations Code 
Section 25102(f), filed on January 30, 2002, which identified the petitioner's total value of securities as 
$500,000. 
On July 23, 2005, the director issued a request for evidence, asking that the petitioner submit the following 
evidence establishing a qualifying relationship between the foreign and United States entities: (1) original 
wire transfers, canceled checks, deposit receipts, and bank statements reflecting monies transferred by the 
beneficiary's foreign employer in exchange for its purported ownership of 510 shares of the petitioner's 
stock; (2) Security and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, Annual Report, identifying the petitioner's 
subsidiaries and the percentage of ownership; (3) copies of the petitioner's board of director's meetings 
addressing its shareholders and the interests held by each; (4) the petitioner's articles of incorporation; and (5) 
a list of the petitioner's stockholders and the percentages of ownership. The director instructed that the 
petitioner should demonstrate that the foreign entity paid for the petitioner's stock, particularly if the monies 
were transferred from a source other than the beneficiary's foreign employer. The director stated that the 
petitioner should "explain the source and reason for receiving such funds and provide the names of all account 
holders depositing these funds and their affiliation to the foreign or U.S. company." 
The petitioner's former counsel responded in a letter dated October 11, 2005. In an attached letter bearing the 
same date, the petitioner addressed the funding of the United States organization by the beneficiary's foreign 
employer. The petitioner explained that in order for the beneficiary's foreign employer, a Chinese 
Page 4 
corporation, to transfer monies within the allotted time period', the Chinese corporation "borrowed $100,000 
from one of its Hong Kong customers," , which 
transferred the funds to the petitioner through a United States agent. The petitioner submitted "declarations" 
- - 
from the president of the beneficiary's foreign employer and from- 
the transfer of funds on behalf of the bene 
petitioning entity. The petitioner stated that 
 "loan" to the foreign entity "was later 
- 
offset [by] a [transfer] of goods from [the foreign entity] to 
 As evidence of the 
transaction, the petitioner submitted: 1 bank statements for the reflecting two 
separate deposits made by and resident in the amounts of $50,000 
each into the United States agents savings account and subsequent withdrawals for the same amount; (2) 
copies of two $50,000 cashier's checks issued to the petitioning entity; (3) copies of the petitioner's June and 
July 2001 bank statements reflecting the cumulative deposit of $100,000 in its checking account; and (4) an 
August 7, 2001 commercial invoice for goods in the amount of $130,000 shipped from the beneficiary's 
foreign employer to Shinco International. 
The petitioner further explained in its October 11, 2005 letter that following the initial transfer of $100,000, 
"[the beneficiary's foreign employer] still owed $155,000 of stock capitals to [the petitioner]." As a result, the 
petitioner explained, the petitioning entity agreed to accept a shipment of goods in the amount of $177,500 
from the foreign entity. The petitioner stated "[tlhe $155,000 stock capitals were offset from the purchasing 
price of the goods." The petitioner submitted an August 27,2001 invoice reflecting $177,500 worth of goods 
shipped from the foreign entity to the petitioner. The petitioner also provided an October 3, 2005 resolution 
in which the petitioner's current board of directors acknowledged that the previous board of director's had 
determined that it was in the petitioner's best interest to accept the goods from the foreign entity "in lieu of the 
remaining consideration of the 510 shares that [the foreign entity] promised to pay." The resolution 
referenced a copy of the written consent approved by the prior Board, but noted that the resolution had not 
been signed. The petitioner submitted a copy of the August 27, 2001 unsigned resolution, stating that "there 
is no doubt that the Board of Directors has previously adopted the above resolutions." The petitioner again 
provided for the record its California notice of transaction and articles of incorporation. 
In a decision dated December 14, 2005, the director concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated the 
existence of a qualifying relationship between the foreign and United States entities.* Specifically, the 
director stated that "it has not been shown that the foreign entity owns the U.S. entity." The director 
referenced the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner, but concluded that there is insufficient 
evidence to establish that the foreign entity "actually contributed funds to purchase the petitioner's stock." 
The director focused on the anticipated amount of consideration to be received by the petitioner for its issued 
stock, which, according to the stock transfer ledger and June 12, 2001 minutes amounted to $500,000. The 
I 
 The petitioner stated that "[dlue to strict foreign currency policies in Mainland China, it was impractical for 
[the beneficiary's foreign employer] to directly wire such payment to the petitioner" by the end of July 2001, 
the date for fulfilling "the petitioner's initial capital needs." 
2 
 In addition to other findings made by the director, the director concluded that the information contained on 
Schedule E of the petitioner's 2001 through 2003 tax returns conflicted with the shareholders identified on the 
petitioner's issued stock certificates. The director, however, misread the tax returns, which in fact identified 
an officer of the petitioning entity as devoting 100 percent of his time to the business, rather than as owning 
100 percent of the petitioner's stock. The AAO acknowledges counsel's discussion on appeal regarding the 
director's misinterpretation of the petitioner's tax returns. 
director noted that, in contrast, the petitioner reported common stock in the amount of $200,000 in its 2001 
through 2003 tax returns. The director noted that the inconsistencies had not been clarified for the record. 
The director also addressed the use of an intermediary to circumvent Chinese currency laws and transfer 
monies to the petitioner, and questioned "the integrity of the submitted evidence." The director stated that the 
petitioner had not shown through sufficient evidence the purported difficulty in directly transferring funds 
from China to a United States company, and noted that the declaration from the foreign entity's president was 
not sufficient. Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
The petitioner's present counsel filed a timely appeal on January 13, 2006. In an attached appellate brief, 
counsel addresses the discrepancy between the amount of common stock initially identified by the petitioner 
on such corporate documents as its stock transfer ledger, and the value reported on its income tax returns. 
Counsel states: 
At the time of the [pletitioner's incorporation, the total capital amount committed by the three 
shareholders was $500,000. 
 However, the initial paid-in capital was $200,000. 
 The 
[pletitioner's bank statements also showed $200,000 as its seed capital. That is why the 
equity of common stock on the Petitioner's tax returns showed $200,000. The shareholders 
intended to contribute additional $300,000 when the business necessitated additional capital 
contribution. Fortunately, after active operation for a period of time, the initial $200,000 
paid-in capital proved to be sufficient to run the business due to one shareholder's, [the 
foreign entity's], liberal payment terms for supply of goods to the [pletitioner. There were no 
business reasons for the shareholders to contribute additional capital. As a result of [the 
foreign entity's] willingness to finance the [pletitioner's purchase of goods, [the foreign 
entity] kept its initial capitalization at $100,000, which constituted 50% of the [pletitioner's 
total capital and 50% of the outstanding securities of the [pletitioner. 
Counsel contends that as a result of the foreign entity's ownership of 50 percent of the petitioning entity, the 
foreign corporation owns and controls the petitioner, thereby establishing the necessary qualifying 
relationship. 
Counsel also addresses the director's reference to the credibility of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. 
Counsel notes that "China is notorious for having a stringent foreign exchange control policy," and claims that 
the process to approve transfers from the beneficiary's foreign employer to the petitioner would have taken 
several months. Counsel explains that the funds were instead transferred through the foreign entity's Hong 
Kong affiliate3 in order "[tlo avoid delay and commence business operation in the United States." 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated the existence of a qualifying relationship between the 
foreign and United States entities. 
3 
 Counsel's reference to the transferor as the foreign entity's "affiliate" conflicts with the prior claim by the 
petitioner that the transferred money originated from the foreign entity's "customer" in Hong Kong. It is 
incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. 
Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits 
competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 
1988). 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also 
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of 
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or 
indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter 
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient 
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The 
corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant 
annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact 
number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate 
control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the 
distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual 
control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. at 364-365. Without full 
disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
The regulations specifically allow the director to request additional evidence in appropriate cases. See 8 
C.F.R. fj 204.56)(3)(ii). As ownership is a critical element of this visa classification, the director may 
reasonably inquire beyond the issuance of paper stock certificates into the means by which stock ownership 
was acquired. As requested by the director, evidence of this nature should include documentation of monies, 
property, or other consideration furnished to the entity in exchange for stock ownership. Additional 
supporting evidence would include stock purchase agreements, subscription agreements, corporate by-laws, 
minutes of relevant shareholder meetings, or other legal documents governing the acquisition of the 
ownership interest. 
In the instant matter, the record as presently constituted contains several discrepancies that prevent a finding 
that the foreign entity furnished consideration in exchange for its purported ownership of 51 percent of the 
petitioning entity. As addressed above, an important factor in establishing stock ownership is demonstrating 
the means by which the stock was acquired.4 While the petitioner submitted several documents that are 
probative of the consideration furnished by the foreign entity, the record does not contain original wire 
transfer receipts, which were requested by the director, and are critical to establishing the foreign entity as the 
transferor of the $100,000. The petitioner's failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line 
of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(14). The petitioner represents that 
the foreign entity transferred goods to Shinco International in exchange for furnishing $100,000 to the United 
The AAO acknowledges the restrictive laws instituted by the Chinese government in transfemng funds from 
a Chinese corporation directly to a United States entity. The AAO may recognize a qualifying relationship in 
cases where a third party is used to facilitate the transfer of monies from the Chinese corporation to the United 
States entity. The petitioner, however, is obligated to provide clear and comprehensive documentation of 
each stage of the transfer, specifically demonstrating the relationship between the foreign entity and company 
from where the funds were transferred. As discussed, the record in the present matter is not sufficient to 
demonstrate the purported parent-subsidiary relationship. 
Page 7 
States company. Therefore, in order to establish the foreign enti 
 as the true transferor, the petitioner must 
show that the transferred monies actually originated with 
 The AAO notes that the 
agent's June through September 2001 bank statement names 
 resident individual1 , as 
the originator of the transferred funds, not Shinco International. lij While it is possible 
president transferred the funds in his corporate capacity and on behalf of the organization, the absence of the 
original wire transfer receipts prevents such a finding. The record lacks evidence sufficient to demonstrate 
that the $100,000 was actually transferred from Shinco International's bank account, and not an individually- 
held account. Again, this is particularly relevant to establishing the pertinent link between the foreign entity 
and the petitioning entity.' 
Regardless of the above-discussed discrepancy, which incidentally focuses on only $100,000 of the $255,000 
worth of common stock purportedly issued to the foreign entity, the record fails to answer several issues with 
regard to the remaining $155,000 due to the petitioner. For example, the petitioner's former counsel claimed 
that the foreign entity furnished goods in the amount of $177,000 in exchange for the remaining $155,000 
worth of stock yet unpaid by the foreign entity. On appeal, however, counsel suggests that the petitioner 
purchased the $177,000 worth of goods from the foreign entity through a finance agreement with "liberal 
payment terms." Based on counsel's representations, it would seem that the foreign entity did not in fact 
render goods in exchange for the remaining $155,000 due to the petitioner. The petitioner has not clarified 
this contradiction in the evidence presented, which is critical to determining whether, in fact, the foreign 
entity furnished consideration for the balance of its purported stock purchase. It is incumbent upon the 
petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to 
explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective 
evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Counsel's 
additional statement on appeal that the foreign entity's purported $100,000 deposit in the petitioning entity 
"constituted 50% of the [p]etitionerls total capital and 50% of the outstanding securities of the [pletitioner'' 
also suggests that the foreign entity's did not furnish consideration for the $1 55,000 due to the petitioner. 
The information contained on the petitioner's California notice of transaction also conflicts with the 
representations made by the petitioner. On the California Notice of Transaction Pursuant to Corporations 
Code Section 25102(f), which although dated June 12, 2001 was not filed with the state until January 30, 
2002, the petitioner identified the total offering for its common stock as $500,000. Of particular importance 
is the fact that the petitioner reported $500,000 in "money," and did not account for any amount of 
"consideration other than money." Additionally, the petitioner represented that the purported transfer of 
goods was completed on August 27, 2001, approximately five months before the notice of transaction was 
filed. As a result, it would seem that the notice of transaction would reflect the $155,000 in goods claimed by 
the petitioner to have been given in consideration for the foreign entity's stock interest. Doubt cast on any 
aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the 
remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591. 
The AAO also notes, in particular, that the statements made by counsel on appeal are not consistent with the 
evidence already provided, and further complicate the record. For example, counsel addresses Shinco 
Because the foreign entity is represented as reimbursing 
petitioner must demonstrate that funds were actually 
foreign entity. 
International as the foreign entity's affiliate as opposed to being a customer of the foreign company, as 
previously referenced by the petitioner. Counsel also notes that the foreign entity's ownership interest in the 
petitioning entity is 50 percent rather than 5 1 percent. These inconsistencies, in addition to the above-noted 
discrepancies, cast doubt on the petitioner's representations and the veracity of the evidence presented. Again, 
doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and 
sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established the existence of a qualifying relationship 
between the foreign and United States entities. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary was employed by 
the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function withn the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-malung; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction fiom higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In its August 30, 2004 letter, the petitioner identified the beneficiary as the foreign entity's export department 
manager and translator, stating that in this position, the beneficiary "had been responsible for directing and 
coordinating activities with overseas markets for exporting consumer electronic products, as well as been in 
charge of export business of [the petitioning entity]." In an attached "certificate of employment," the 
petitioner further stated that while employed in the positions of export department manager and translator, the 
beneficiary "[translated] DVD specifications, technical information, advertising materials, and product 
instruction sheets," and was "[iln charge of export business for overseas customers" in Thailand, Europe and 
the United States. The limited job description offered by the petitioner fails to identify any managerial or 
executive job duties performed by the beneficiary while employed by the foreign entity. Reciting the 
beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations 
require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a 
critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties 
themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), agd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). In fact, it appears that the beneficiary was 
responsible for personally performing the non-qualifying tasks of the export department, as he "coordinat[ed]" 
the export functions with overseas markets. The foreign entity's organizational chart further suggests that the 
beneficiary was employed in a non-managerial and non-executive capacity, as the beneficiary did not have a 
subordinate staff to perform the operational and administrative tasks of the department. Additionally, based 
on the brief job description of the beneficiary's role as the foreign entity's translator, the beneficiary was 
personally responsible for the "translation of DVD specifications." An employee who "primarily" performs 
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed 
in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one 
"primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). The record as presently constituted fails to establish that the 
beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this 
additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An additional issue not addressed by the director, is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the 
United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. In its August 30, 2004 letter, the 
petitioner provided the following limited list of job duties to be performed by the beneficiary in his position as 
vicelpresident: (1) assist the president in the operation of the petitioning corporation, the formation of its 
policies and its development; (2) communicate with the parent company to implement its policies in the 
petitioning entity; (3) "directly supervise and manage" the sales and marketing departments; and (4) supervise 
the operation director. Despite the director's request for a "detailed description" of the beneficiary's position 
in the United States, the petitioner submitted an equally vague outline, in which it restated the beneficiary's 
responsibilities of assisting the company's president and establishing policies for future development, and 
added that the beneficiary would spend forty percent of his time directing "overall sales, marketing and public 
relations," while supervising the marketing and sales mangers. The petitioner's response to the director's 
request for evidence did not expand upon the role to be held by the beneficiary in the United States. Nor did 
it clarify or identify the specific managerial or executive job duties to be performed by the beneficiary in his 
position as vice-president. Again, reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business 
objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. 
The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a 
Page 10 
daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. 
The AAO notes that simply assigning a managerial or executive title to the beneficiary is not sufficient to 
establish employment in a primarily qualifying capacity. The beneficiary's true position within the United 
States entity is questionable, particularly in light of the fact that the beneficiary's proposed salary is 
significantly lower than several of his subordinate employees.6 Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's 
proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence 
offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591. Based on the present record, the 
petitioner had not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The AAO recognizes that CIS previously approved an L-1A nonimmigrant petition filed by the petitioner on 
behalf of the beneficiary. It should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, 
immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by CIS than nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO 
acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of 
managerial and executive capacity. See $8 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(44). 
Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall 
eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and 
executive capacity. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which 
allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa 
petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, 
ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. CJ: $8204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $9 1154 
and 1184; see also 9 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1427. 
In addition, unless a petition seeks extension of a "new office" petition, the regulations allow for the approval 
of an L-1 extension without any supporting evidence and CIS normally accords the petitions a less substantial 
review. See 8 C.F.R. 9 2 14.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an 
L-1A petition's validity). Because CIS spends less time reviewing L-1 petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant 
petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1 petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 
F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003). 
Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimmigrant approval 
does not preclude CIS from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. 
Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way 
Based on the petitioner's state quarterly wage report for the quarter ending June 30, 2004, the marketing 
manager, director of operations, logistics manager, accounting manager, and accounts receivable employee, 
all employees subordinate to the beneficiary, are receiving compensation greater than the beneficiary. 
guarantees that CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. CIS denies 
many 1-140 petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, 
Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. 
Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. at 1 103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petition was approved based on the same unsupported and 
contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and 
gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, 
e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to 
suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. 
Montgomely, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Due to the lack of 
required evidence in the present record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the 
previous nonimmigrant approval by denying the present immigrant petition. 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a distnct court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.