dismissed EB-1C Case: Film Production

U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO)
20 MassachusettsAve.N.W., MS 2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
8 U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
DATE: DEC 2 0 2012 OFFICE:NEBRASKASERVICECENTER FILE:
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionforAlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveorManagerPursuant
toSection203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct,8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind the decisionof the AdministrativeAppealsOffice in your case. All of the
documentsrelatedto thismatterhavebeenreturnedto theofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Please
beadvisedthatanyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If youbelievetheAAO inappropriatelyappliedthelaw in reachingits decision,or youhaveadditional
informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfile a motionto reconsideror amotionto reopen
in accordancewith theinstructionsonFormI-290B,Noticeof AppealorMotion,with a feeof $630.The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha motioncanbefoundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file anymotion
directly with the AAO. Pleasebeawarethat8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresanymotionto befiled
within30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseekstoreconsiderorreopen.
Thankyou,
RonRosenberg
ActingChief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscas.gov
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DISCUSSION: The preferencevisa petition was deniedby the Director, NebraskaService
Center. The matteris now beforethe AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO) on appeal. The
appealwill bedismissed.
Thepetitioneris a Californialimited liability companyengagedin film production,andit seeks
to employ the beneficiary as its OperationsManager/CEO. Accordingly, the petitioner
endeavorsto classifythe beneficiaryas an employment-basedimmigrantpursuantto section
203(b)(1)(C)of the ImmigrationandNationalityAct (the Act), 8 U.S.C.§ ll53(b)(1)(C), asa
multinationalexecutiveor manager.
The director deniedthe petition on June23, 2011, concludingthat the petitioner failed to
establishthat the beneficiary'sproposedemploymentwith the U.S. entity would be within a
qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.
Onappeal,counseldisputesthedirector'sfindingsandprovidesanappellatebrief layingout the
groundsfor challengingthedenial.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be madeavailable. . . to qualified
immigrantswho arealiensdescribedin anyof the following subparagraphs(A)
through(C):
* * *
(C) CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.-- An alienis
describedin this subparagraphif thealien,in the3 yearspreceding
the time of the alien'sapplicationfor classificationandadmission
into theUnitedStatesunderthis subparagraph,hasbeenemployed
for at least 1 year by a firm or corporationor other legal entity or
anaffiliate or subsidiarythereof andwho seeksto enterthe United
Statesin order to continueto renderservicesto the sameemployer
or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is
managerialor executive.
The languageof the statuteis specificin limiting this provisionto only thoseexecutivesand
managerswhohavepreviouslyworkedfor a firm, corporationor otherlegalentity,or anaffiliate
or subsidiaryof thatentity,andwho arecomingto theUnitedStatesto work for thesameentity,
or its affiliateor subsidiary.
A United Statesemployermay file a petitionon FormI-140 for classificationof analienunder
section203(b)(1)(C)of theAct asamultinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis
requiredfor this classification.Theprospectiveemployerin theUnitedStatesmustfurnishajob
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offer in the form of a statementwhich indicatesthat the alien is to be employedin the United
Statesin a managerialor executivecapacity.Suchastatementmustclearlydescribethedutiesto
beperformedby thealien.
Theissuethat will be addressedin this proceedingcalls for ananalysisof thebeneficiary'sjob
duties. Specifically,the AAO will examinethe recordto determinewhetherthe petitioner
submittedsufficientevidenceto establishthatthebeneficiarywouldbe employedin the United
Statesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
Theterm"managerialcapacity"meansanassignmentwithin anorganizationin which
theemployeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function,
or componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory,
professional,or managerialemployees,or managesan essential
functionwithin theorganization,or adepartmentor subdivisionof
theorganization;
(iii) if anotheremployeeor other employeesare directly supervised,
hasthe authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseaswell as
other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave
authorization),or if no other employeeis directly supervised,
functionsat a seniorlevel within the organizationalhierarchyor
with respectto thefunctionmanaged;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretion over the day-to-dayoperationsof the activity
or function for which the employeehas authority. A first-line
supervisoris not consideredto be actingin a managerialcapacity
merely by virtue of the supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unlessthe
employeessupervisedareprofessional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 110l(a)(44)(B),provides:
Theterm "executivecapacity"meansanassignmentwithin anorganizationin which
theemployeeprimarily-
(i) directsthe managementof the organizationor a major component
or functionof theorganization;
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(ii) establishesthegoalsandpoliciesof the organization,component,
or function;
(iii) exerciseswidelatitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly generalsupervisionor direction from higher level
executives, the board of directors, or stockholdersof the
organization.
In examiningthe executiveor managerialcapacityof the beneficiary,USCISwill look first to
the petitioner'sdescriptionof thejob duties. See8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). Publishedcaselaw
clearly supportsthe pivotal role of a clearly definedjob description,as the actual duties
themselvesrevealthetruenatureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.
1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41(2d.Cir. 1990);seealso8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5).
Thatbeingsaid,however,USCISreviewsthetotality of therecord,whichincludesnot only the
beneficiary'sjob description,but alsotakesinto accountthenatureof the petitioner'sbusiness,
the employmentand remunerationof employees,as well as the job descriptionsof the
beneficiary'ssubordinates,if any,andanyotherfactscontributingto a completeunderstanding
of abeneficiary'sactualrolewithin agivenentity.
Thedefinitionsof executiveandmanagerialcapacityhavetwo parts. First,the petitionermust
show that the beneficiaryperforms the high-level responsibilitiesthat are specifiedin the
definitions. Second,the petitionermustprove that the beneficiaryprimarily performsthese
specifiedresponsibilitiesand does not spenda majority of his or her time on day-to-day
functions. ChampionWorld,Inc. v.INS,940F.2d1533(Table),1991WL 144470(9thCir. July
30,1991).
An analysisof the recorddoesnot leadto an affirmativeconclusionthat the beneficiarywas
employedabroador would be employedin the United Statesin a qualifying managerialor
executivecapacity.
With regardto theprofferedpositionofferedto thebeneficiary,thepetitionerprovideda vague
andgeneraljob descriptionsuchasthebeneficiarywill "plan,develop,andestablishthepolicies
and objectives of the company in accordancewith board directors"; and "makes revisions in
corporateplansin accordancewith conditions." Thepetitioneralsostatedthatthebeneficiary's
"primaryresponsibilityhasbeen/isto overseefilm projectsandmakethe businessandfinancial
decisionfor theprojectsto proceed."It is unclearwhichspecifictasksactuallyfall within these
broad categoriesand whether the supervisorytasksthe beneficiarywill perform are of a
qualifying nature. Thepetitionerfailed to establishwhat specifictasksthe beneficiarywould
performin supervisingbusinessaffairs or what policy decisionsthe beneficiarywould make.
Therecordis similarly lackingin specificinformationaboutthejob dutiesinvolvedin securing
the growth of the petitioning entity. That being said, developingmarketingstrategyand
negotiatingdealsarebothoperationaldutiesthatcannotbeclassifiedasmanagerialor executive
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tasks. Recitingthebeneficiary'svaguejob responsibilitiesor broadly-castbusinessobjectivesis
not sufficient;theregulationsrequirea detaileddescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily job duties.
Thepetitionerhasfailedto provideanydetailor explanationof thebeneficiary'sactivitiesin the
courseof his daily routine. The actualdutiesthemselveswill revealthe true natureof the
employment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd.v.Sava,724F.Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The petitioner'svagueandgeneraldescriptionof the beneficiary's
position doesnot identify the actualdutiesperformed,suchthat they could be classifiedas
managerialor executivein nature.
In addition, the job descriptionincludes severalnon-qualifying duties. For instance,in
describingthe beneficiary'semploymentwith the petitioner,the petitioner indicatedthat 50
percentof thebeneficiary'stime will beallocatedto the"actualplanningandcoordinatingof the
productions,"suchas"coordinatingthe activitiesof writers,directors,managers,andtechnical
personnelthroughoutthe productionprocess;resolvingpersonnelproblems;determiningthe
productionsize,contentandbudget;establishingproductionschedulesandmanagementpolicies
for the particularproduction;andoverseeingproductionprogressandattainmentof production
objectives,includingpayroll supervision."However,thepetitioneremploysthebeneficiaryand
doesnot have any additionalemployeeswho actually assistin coordinatingthe production
processandhandlingof all the financialoperations,indicatingthat thebeneficiarymustbethe
oneto carryout theseoperationalfunctions,which areclearly outsidethe parametersof what
would be deemedas being within a managerialor executivecapacity. An employeewho
"primarily" performsthe tasksnecessaryto producea productor to provide servicesis not
consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity.Seesections
101(a)(44)(A)and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated
managerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatterof ChurchScientologyIntn 'l., 19I&N Dec.593,
604(Comm'r 1988). A managerialor executiveemployeemusthaveauthorityoverday-to-day
operationsbeyondthe level normally vestedin a first-line supervisor,unlessthe supervised
employeesareprofessionals.SeeMatter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19I&N Dec. 593,
604(Comm'r 1988).
The petitioner also indicatedthat the beneficiarywill spend30 percentof his time in pre-
productionactivity suchas"directing marketingandpublic relationsactivities of the production
company,""developingideasfor projects,""selectingscripts," "supervisingthe writing and
submissionof proposalsfor project contracts,""arrangingfor financialthe productions,"and
"hiring writers, actors, directors, production staff members and contractors." Finding
engagementsand developingthe market research,marketing,and promotionprograms,and
handlingpublic relationsandperformingall the activitiesrequiredto createa productionare
operationalfunctionsthat areclearlyoutsidethe parametersof whatwould bedeemedasbeing
within a managerialor executivecapacity. Again,anemployeewho "primarily" performsthe
tasksnecessaryto producea productor to provideservicesis not consideredto be "primarily"
employedin a managerialor executivecapacity.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of the Act
(requiringthatone"primarily" performtheenumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealso
Matter of ChurchScientologyIntn 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593 at 604. A managerialor executive
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employeemusthaveauthorityoverday-to-dayoperationsbeyondthe levelnormallyvestedin a
first-linesupervisor,unlessthesupervisedemployeesareprofessionals.Id.
Thepetitioneralsoindicatedthatanother20percentof thebeneficiary'stimewill be allocatedto
post-productionandadministrationwhich includes"reviewingthe films to ensureconformance
to productionstandards,""overseeingfilm distribution(if necessary),""supervisingbookkeeping
andaccounting,""directingmaintenanceof companyfacilitiesandequipment,"and"billing." It
appearsthat the beneficiarywill be in chargeof preparingthe budget, negotiations,and
developingproceduresratherthanmanagingother individualsto performthesenon-qualifying
tasks.Runningthefinancialoperations,bookkeeping,andbilling areresponsibilitiesthatarenot
deemedasbeingwithin amanagerialor executivecapacity.
Thejob descriptionthe petitionerhasprovideddoesnot establishthat thebeneficiarywouldbe
employedin theUnitedStatesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.As indicatedby
the petitioner,the beneficiaryis the soleemployee. The petitionerdoesnot provideevidence
that the petitioneremployedindividualsto assistwith the finances,budgeting,bookkeeping,
marketing,public relationsand businessdevelopment;thus, it appearsthat the beneficiaryis
performingthe duties inherentin operatinga businesssuch as finances,customerservice,
negotiations,contracts,and marketing. An employeewho "primarily" performsthe tasks
necessaryto produceaproductor providea serviceisnot consideredto be"primarily" employed
in a managerialor executivecapacity. Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of theAct (requiring
thatone"primarily" performthe enumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatter of
ChurchScientologyInternational, 19I & N Dec.593,604(Comm. 1988).
While the AAO acknowledgesthat no beneficiaryis requiredto allocate100%of his time to
managerial-or executive-leveltasks,the petitionermustestablishthat the non-qualifyingtasks
the beneficiarywould performareonly incidentalto his proposedposition. An employeewho
"primarily" performsthe tasksnecessaryto producea productor to provide servicesis not
consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. Seesections
101(a)(44)(A)and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated
managerialor executiveduties); seealso Matter of Church ScientologyInternational, 19 I&N
Dec. 593, 604(Comm. 1988). Thepetitionerhasfailed to establishthat thebeneficiarywould be
employedin aqualifyingcapacity.
The AAO acknowledgescounsel'scontentionthat the beneficiary'sposition is an essential
function within the petitioner'sorganization. The term "function manager"appliesgenerally
whena beneficiarydoesnot superviseor controlthe work of a subordinatestaff but insteadis
primarily responsiblefor managingan "essentialfunction"within theorganization.Seesection
101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii).Theterm"essentialfunction"is not
definedby statuteor regulation. If a petitionerclaimsthat the beneficiaryis managingan
essentialfunction,thepetitionermustfurnisha writtenjob offer that clearlydescribestheduties
to be performedin managingthe essentialfunction,i.e. identify the functionwith specificity,
articulatethe essentialnatureof the function,and establishthe proportionof the beneficiary's
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daily dutiesattributedto managingthe essentialfunction. See8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii).In
addition,the petitioner'sdescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily dutiesmustdemonstratethat the
beneficiarymanagesthe functionratherthan performsthe dutiesrelatedto the function. An
employeewhoprimarilyperformsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor to provideservices
is not consideredto be employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. Boyang,Ltd. v.1.N.S.,
67 F.3d305 (Table),1995WL 576839(9th Cir, 1995)(citingMatter of ChurchScientology
International,19I&N Dec.at 604. In this matter,thepetitionerhasnot providedevidencethat
the beneficiarymanagesan essentialfunction. As notedabove,the petitionerprovideda brief
and vaguejob descriptionthat did not discusshow the beneficiaryis managingan essential
function. Thebeneficiary'sjob descriptiondoesnot establishthat the beneficiaryis primarily
performingin a managerialcapacity.
Beyondtherequireddescriptionof thejob duties,USCISreviewsthetotality of therecordwhen
examining the claimed managerialor executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the
petitioner'sorganizationalstructure,the dutiesof the beneficiary'ssubordinateemployees,the
presenceof otheremployeesto relievethe beneficiaryfrom performingoperationalduties,the
natureof the petitioner'sbusiness,and any other factorsthat will contributeto a complete
understandingof a beneficiary'sactualdutiesandrole in a business.In the caseof a function
manager,whereno subordinatesare directly supervised,theseother factorsmay includethe
beneficiary's position within the organizationalhierarchy, the depth of the petitioner's
organization,the indirect supervisionof employeeswithin the scopeof the functionmanaged,
andthevalueof thebudgets,products,or servicesthatthebeneficiarymanages.
As discussedabove, the petitioner has not identified employeeswithin the petitioner's
organization,subordinateto thebeneficiary,who wouldrelievethebeneficiaryfromperforming
routinedutiesinherentto operatingthebusiness.Thefactthatthebeneficiaryhasbeengiven a
managerialjob title andgeneraloversightauthorityoverthebusinessis insufficientto elevatehis
position to that of a "function manager"as contemplatedby the governing statute and
regulations.As discussedabove,the petitionerhasnot establishedthat the beneficiary'sduties
areprimarily managerialin nature,andthushe cannotbeconsidereda "function manager."
Other than stating that the beneficiary will be responsiblefor managingan essentialfunction,
counselprovides no explanationor evidencein supportof his claim that the beneficiary would
qualify asa functionmanagerpursuantto section101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of theAct. Theunsupported
statementsof counselon appealor in a motionarenot evidenceandthusarenot entitledto any
evidentiaryweight.SeeINSv.Phinpathya,464U.S. 183,188-89n.6 (1984);Matterof Ramirez-
Sanchez,17I&N Dec.503(BIA 1980).
Thepetitionerhasfailedto providesufficientevidenceto establishthatthebeneficiarywouldbe
employedin the United Statesin a qualifying managerialor executivecapacity. Accordingly,
theinstantpetitioncannotbeapproved.
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Beyondthe decisionof the director,the recordlackssubstantivejob descriptionsestablishing
whatjob dutiesthebeneficiaryperformedduringhisemploymentabroad.Conclusoryassertions
regarding the beneficiary'semploymentcapacity are not sufficient. Merely repeatingthe
languageof the statuteor regulationsdoesnot satisfythe petitioner'sburdenof proof Fedin
Bros.Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F. 2d41(2d.Cir.
1990);AvyrAssociates,Inc. v.Meissner,1997WL 188942at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). Theactualduties
themselveswill revealthe truenatureof the employment.FedinBros. Co.,Ltd. v. Sava,724F.
Supp.at 1108.
An applicationor petitionthat failsto complywith thetechnicalrequirementsof thelaw maybe
deniedby the AAO evenif the ServiceCenterdoesnot identify all of the groundsfor denialin
the initial decision. SeeSpencerEnterprises,Inc. v. United States,229 F. Supp.2d 1025,1043
(E.D.Cal.2001),affd, 345F.3d683(9thCir.2003);seealsoSoltanev.DOJ,381F.3d143,145
(3dCir. 2004)(notingthattheAAO reviewsappealson adenovobasis),
Thepetitionwill bedeniedfor theabovestatedreasons,with eachconsideredasanindependent
andalternativebasisfor denial. In visapetitionproceedings,theburdenof provingeligibility for
thebenefitsoughtremainsentirelywith thepetitioner. Section291of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361.
Thepetitionerhasnot sustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.