dismissed EB-1C Case: Florist

I 
' identifying data deleted to 
prevent cleariy unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Ofice of Adminisfrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
SRC 08 014 53640 MAR 2 9 2010 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(I)(C) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 I 153(b)(I)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. $ 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant 
petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal 
will be dismissed. 
The petitioner, a retail and wholesale florist, seeks to employ the beneficiary as a store manager and 
flower designer at its San Juan, Puerto Rico location. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to 
classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or 
manager. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary was employed overseas, or would be employed by the United States entity, in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the 
beneficiary manages an essential function of the U.S. company and therefore qualifies for the benefit 
sought. Counsel submits a brief but no additional evidence in support of these assertions. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(I) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years 
preceding the time of the alien's application for classification 
and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, 
has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation 
or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and 
who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to 
render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate 
or subsidiary of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
Page 3 
offer in the form of a statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in 
a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. tj 204.5Cj)(5). 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity by the United States entity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
Page 4 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, on October 17, 2007. The 
Form 1-140 lists the beneficiary's proposed position as "store manager and flower designer." In a 
letter dated August 2, 2007 filed with the Form 1-140, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary 
entered the United States in November 2002 on an L-1B visa, as a floral designer for the U.S. 
company. He was later converted to L-1A status as his position within the company was changed to 
that of store manager. The petitioner stated that, for purposes of this petition, it seeks to employ the 
beneficiary in the position of store manager of its principal store in Puerto Rico. The petitioner 
stated that the beneficiary's duties and responsibilities in that position would include: 
[Slupervision of day-to-day operations, preparation of store's operational budget 
including purchase of flowers, accessories, salaries, utilities, rent, etc.; approval of 
design of floral arrangements for special events such as conventions, conferences, 
receptions and weddings and cost estimate; supervision of training of employees in 
showcasing and combining the different flowers according to [the petitioner's] 
standards; hiring and firing of employees; relations with customers and trouble 
shooting. 
The petitioner further indicated that in the proffered position, the beneficiary would receive an 
annual salary of $34,932.99 plus other benefits. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's resume, in which the beneficiary described his 
job ris onsibilities in the ~ni;ed States "from ~ebruar~ 2002 - present," as the manager for 
the store located in San Juan, Puerto Rico, as follows: 
I am responsible of supervising the store's personnel, including hiring and 
dismissing employees, making sure the employees comply with the store's 
conduct rules and supervising the quality of the work employees work and the 
drivers performance [sic]. 
I am responsible for making decisions at times of emergency, following the store's 
established criteria. 
I manage the store's cash flow by managing the register's daily balance and 
depositing at the bank. 
I purchase flowers at the fields of Colombia, Costa Rica and from other suppliers, 
needed for the daily sales of the store as well as for special activities. 
I make decisions on when to scrap materials which do not possess the quality 
grade which would guarantee freshness and duration. 
I am responsible to revise the quality of the arrangements to make sure they 
comply with the customers' expectations and with the store's exclusive designs, 
with the design team under my supervision, currently five flower designers. 
I am responsible for opening and closing the store on a daily basis. 
I organize the week's work schedule, authorize overtime and coordinate lunch 
time and recess periods. 
I organize the weekly work hours report for the employee's payroll. 
I am responsible for the on-time delivery of flower arrangements, within the 
customer's specifications. 
I purchase all additional materials used for the proper operation of the store. 
I am responsible to provide customers with orientation, price quotes and samples 
for the personal decorations and the joint decorations such as weddings, birthdays, 
baptisms, first communions, inaugurations. 
I manage weekly decorations, alongside the time of year: Christmas, Autumn, 
Valentines Day, and Thanksgiving for [certain companies.] 
On October 22, 2008, the director issued a request for further evidence (RFE). The petitioner was 
instructed to "provide evidence that clearly establishes that the beneficiary manages or directs the 
management of a function of the petitioning entity and that the function managed is not directly 
performed by the beneficiary." The director also requested a detailed organizational chart for the 
U.S. company illustrating the current structure with the beneficiary's proposed position. The 
petitioner was also asked to provide the names of all departments, teams, and employees with their 
titles and a description of their job duties. 
In a letter dated December 5, 2008 responding to the RFE, counsel for the petitioner supplied the 
following description of the beneficiary's job responsibilities: 
Hire, fire and enforce among the store employees and the assigned drivers, the 
disciplinary regulations and quality control standards. 
Meet with client who requests decorations for special personal or corporate events 
such as weddings, galas, conventions, seminars, family celebrations, etc.; discuss 
with client the proposed activity, visit sites, prepare design for decoration of 
facilities, recommend flower selection and color combinations, and negotiate fee 
for services 
In the event of an emergency, such as flowers do not arrive on time for a special 
event or are not of an acceptable quality or are of a different color, uses discretion 
to undertake whatever action is deemed necessary, taking into account the 
Company's standards and responsibility to its clients. 
Handle the store's cash, preparing the register's tally and the corresponding 
deposits in the banks assigned by the Company. 
Purchase the necessary flowers from the farms in Colombia, Costa Rica, and the 
different businesses, for the daily sales and for special events and arrange for the 
appropriate delivery dates. 
Use discretion to decide when to dispose of the flowers in order to maintain the 
quality standard of the [company.] 
Be responsible for the quality control of the flower arrangements prepared by our 
flower designers and that they comply with the exclusive designs of [the 
company]. 
Open and close the store; use discretion to open or close earlyllate for safety 
reasons or to complete pending orders. 
Organize the employees work schedule on a weekly basis and authorize daily over 
time, lunch time, and breaks. 
Prepare the weekly report of hours worked to prepare the payroll. 
Manage the delivery of the flowers by the store drivers within the time-frame 
requested by the clients. 
Resolve in the best possible terms any complaint that may arise from an 
unsatisfied customer. 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the U.S. company, which lists the CEO at the 
top, followed by the director of flower shops, who directs three managers, including the beneficiary, 
at three different locations. Below the managers, although not directly placed under any one 
manager, the staff consists of one person in inventory control, three flower designers and four 
drivers. The petitioner did not submit job descriptions for any employee other than the beneficiary. 
On February 26, 2009, the director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not 
established that the beneficiary will be employed by the U.S. entity in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. The director observed that the petitioner's response to the RFE "omits any 
mention of the beneficiary's job duties" and that, given the company's limited staffing, "it can only 
be concluded that the bulk or primary part of the beneficiary's proposed job assignment in the United 
States will be outside the scope of the 'executive' or 'managerial' capacities as defined." The director 
also noted that the majority of the beneficiary's duties appear to involve "business marketing, 
recruitment and supervision, and other duties comprising the daily productive tasks of the company, 
including the first-line supervision of nonmanagerial, nonsupervisory, nonprofessional personnel." 
Therefore, the director concluded that it cannot be found that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that, contrary to the director's finding, the petitioner in fact did provide a 
description of the beneficiary's duties in response to the WE. Counsel restates the description in the 
December 5,2008 letter. Counsel agrees that the beneficiary "will devote a major part of his time to 
the business marketing, staff recruitment, and supervision," but submits that "business marketing" is 
an essential function of the company. Counsel further contends that the beneficiary has "complete 
discretion in making decisions that could have a very detrimental impact on the business if handled 
incorrectly." Counsel claims that "marketing the business and managing the shop leaves little time 
for non-managerial activities." Counsel claims that other personnel -- namely the flower designers, 
drivers, and maintenance staff -- are the ones who perform the non-managerial tasks involved in 
producing the flower arrangements that make up the company's essential products. The petitioner 
does not submit additional evidence on appeal. 
Upon review, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 8 204.56)(5). The petitioner's description 
of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. Beyond the required 
description of the job duties, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) reviews the 
totality of the record when examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, 
including the petitioner's organizational structure, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate 
employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the beneficiary from performing operational 
duties, the nature of the petitioner's business, and any other factors that will contribute to a complete 
understanding of a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
First, the AAO acknowledges that, as counsel asserts on appeal, the petitioner in fact did provide a 
description of the beneficiary's job duties through counsel, in response to the RFE. However, upon 
review, the AAO finds that the beneficiary's job duties as described include a significant number of 
day-to-day operational tasks of the company. For example, according to the beneficiary's resume, he 
purchases flowers and other materials; is "responsible for opening and closing the store on a daily 
basis"; is "responsible for the on-time delivery of flower arrangements"; and provides "orientation, 
price quotes and samples" to customers. According to counsel's response to the RFE, the beneficiary 
also "[handles] the store's cash, preparing the register's tally and the corresponding deposits in the 
banks"; and, with respect to personal or corporate events for clients, the beneficiary would "discuss 
with client the proposed activity, visit sites, prepare design for decoration of facilities, recommend 
flower selection and color combinations, and negotiate fee for services." Based on these 
descriptions, the beneficiary is performing tasks necessary to provide the store's services or products, 
and as such, these duties will not be considered managerial or executive in nature. An employee 
who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
10 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int'Z., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comrn. 
1988). 
Whether the beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on whether the petitioner has 
sustained its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial or executive. See sections 
lOl(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Here, although the descriptions of the beneficiary's job duties 
include both duties that may be considered managerial and duties that do not fall directly under 
traditional managerial duties as defined in the statute, as discussed above, the petitioner failed to 
document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial in nature and what 
proportion would be non-managerial. See Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). For this reason, the AAO cannot determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing 
the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
Page 8 
Counsel claims on appeal that there are other personnel who perform the day-to-day tasks of the 
company. However, counsel's claim does not find support in the record. Without documentary 
evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of 
proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 
I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of 
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Although the director requested a description 
of the job duties of all employees, the petitioner failed to provide job descriptions for any employee 
other than the beneficiary. Without any information regarding the functions or duties of the other 
employees, it is not possible to determine to what extent the non-managerial duties relating to the 
operations of the company are actually performed by personnel other than the beneficiary. Further, 
the purpose of the RFE was to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the 
benefit sought has been established. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(8). The failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.2(b)(14). 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and 
"function managers." See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 101(a)(44)(A)(i) 
and (ii). Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. See 5 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. Contrary to 
the common understanding of the word "manager," the statute plainly states that a "first line 
supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. 
Here, the petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to show who actually makes up the 
beneficiary's subordinate staff. The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the U.S. 
company, which shows eight employees below the three store managers at three different locations, 
including designers, drivers, and an inventory control staff. The petitioner also submitted sample 
weekly work schedules for the weeks of July 14-20 and November 17-23,2008, which list the names 
of the beneficiary and all but one of the persons below the manager level on the organizational chart. 
However, this evidence at best confirms that these employees worked for the beneficiary during the 
weeks noted on the schedules. The record remains insufficient to demonstrate that the 
organizational structure of the U.S. company at the time the petition was filed was as represented by 
the chart. A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at 
a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of 
Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). Furthermore, even assuming that these employees 
were the beneficiary's subordinates at the time of filing, the petitioner did not provide any 
information regarding their job requirements or responsibilities. Without that information, the AAO 
cannot determine whether any of these employees function in a managerial or supervisory capacity, 
nor can it be determined whether any of their positions require a baccalaureate (or bachelor's) 
degree, such that they may be considered "professionals" under the statute. As such, the evidence is 
insufficient to demonstrate that the beneficiary primarily supervises and controls the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees and therefore would qualify as a "personnel 
manager." Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
Page 9 
Counsel also asserts on appeal that the beneficiary qualifies as a function manager. The term 
"function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii). The term 
"essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly 
describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function 
with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. tj 204.5(j)(5). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. 
As previously discussed, although counsel claims that the beneficiary manages the business 
marketing function, which should be considered an essential function of the company, counsel has 
not provided sufficient details of the beneficiary's job responsibilities to establish that the 
beneficiary's daily duties are in fact primarily attributable to managing that function rather than 
performing the duties related to the function. Further, given the lack of evidence regarding the 
beneficiary's subordinate staff, it is unclear that the beneficiary actually has an adequate staff that 
would relieve him from performing non-qualifying duties. Again, an employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be 
"primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of 
the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see 
also Matter of Church Scientology Int 1, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Accordingly, the AAO cannot 
conclude that the petitioner has established that the beneficiary manages an essential function, such 
that he could be considered a function manager. 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the petitioner has 
failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily executive or managerial 
capacity in the United States. For that reason, the petition will be denied. 
The second issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was 
employed by the foreign entity in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. 
In the August 2, 2007 letter submitted with the Form 1-140, the petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary was employed by, a wholesaler and retailer of flowers and 
ornamental plants located in Bogota, Colombia, from November 1996 to October 2002. The 
petitioner claimed that this entity holds 100% of the stock of the U.S. company. The petitioner did 
not state which position the beneficiary held in the foreign company or provide any description of 
his job duties. In the resume submitted with the Form 1-140, the beneficiary described his position 
in Bogota, from December 17, 1996 to November 10, 2001, as including responsibility for "training 
the staff [of the company] in the creation of floral arrangements, bows, and flower combinations and 
in client service," and "prepare the store windows for our different locations according to the 
seasons." The beneficiary also listed a number of projects involving floral arrangements and 
Page 10 
decorations that he was involved in or completed in the city of Bogota. No information was 
provided with respect to the staff of the foreign company. 
In the RFE, the petitioner was asked to provide a more detailed description of the beneficiary's duties 
abroad, stating what actual specific, day-to-day tasks are involved with the completion of each duty, 
and supplementing these descriptions with an estimate of the percentage of time the beneficiary 
dedicated to each duty. The director also requested a detailed organizational chart for the 
beneficiary's employer abroad, with the names of all departments and teams, and the names and 
detailed descriptions of the job duties for the beneficiary's immediate supervisors and subordinate 
employees. 
In the letter res onding the WE, counsel indicated that the beneficiary "was of 
- and referred to the beneficiary's resume, the same resume that was previously 
submitted, for a description of his responsibilities. Counsel also submitted an organizational chart 
which shows the beneficiary as at the fourth level of authority, below the 
president, vice president, and several directors. The chart shows a number of employees at the two 
levels below the beneficiary's rank. However, there is no line indicating which, if any, of these 
employees reported to the beneficiary. The petitioner did not provide any further descriptions of the 
job responsibilities of the beneficiary or any other employee in the foreign company. 
In his decision, the director found that based on the information provided, the beneficiary's "duties 
abroad were composed primarily of the daily productive tasks and first-line supervision of 
nonmanagerial, nonprofessional employees." Absent other information, the director concluded that 
the beneficiary's position overseas did not fall within the definition of managerial or executive 
capacity. 
On appeal, counsel did not address the issue of the beneficiary's qualifying employment overseas. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director that the petitioner has failed to establish that the 
beneficiary was employed overseas in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. 
Again, when examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look 
first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 8 204.5(j)(5). The petitioner's 
description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and 
indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. Here, the 
petitioner has failed to provide adequate information regarding the job responsibilities of the 
beneficiary abroad. Initially, the petitioner did not provide any description of the beneficiary's 
position or responsibilities in the foreign entity, other than what was set forth in the beneficiary's 
resume. The information in that resume is vague and nonspecific and fails to demonstrate what the 
beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For example, the beneficiary claimed that he was 
responsible for "training the staff' in flower arrangement and customer service, "prepare[d] the store 
windows," "prepared decorations for ... businesses," and apparently prepared decorations and 
arrangements for a number of major projects. However, there is no further detail as to what specific 
tasks the beneficiary performed in any of the projects listed, or how and to what extent he was 
Page 11 
involved in the training of the staff. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is 
not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 
I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 
(Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties 
are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a 
matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
More significantly, if the beneficiary himself prepared store window displays and decorations and 
arrangements for clients, then he was performing tasks necessary to provide the store's services or 
products, and these duties will not be considered managerial or executive in nature. There is no 
information in the record as to how the beneficiary's time was apportioned among his duties 
overseas. Again, an employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or 
to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N 
Dec. at 604. 
It is also noted that while counsel indicated in response to the WE that the beneficiary was the 
indicated on his Form G-325A, Biographic ' the beneficia- 
Information, that his last position abroad was that of' " rather than manager. It 
is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless 
the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 
19 I&N Dec. 582,591 -92 (BIA 1988). 
In addition, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the foreign entity that, like the U.S. 
chart, fails to clearly show the composition of the beneficiary's subordinate staff. Further, despite 
the director's request, the petitioner failed to provide any information regarding the job duties of any 
employee of the foreign entity other than the beneficiary. The purpose of the RFE was to elicit 
further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established. 8 
C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(8). Again, the failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line 
of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). Moreover, without any 
information regarding the functions or duties of the other employees, it is not possible to determine 
to whether the beneficiary had sufficient support staff to relieve him from having to spend his time 
primarily engaged in the non-qualifying day-to-day tasks of the company. 
Further, although the organizational chart of the foreign entity indicates that there are two layers of 
employees under the beneficiary, some of whom bear the title of "supervisor," an employee will not 
be considered to be a supervisor simply because of a job title, because he or she is arbitrarily placed 
on an organizational chart in a position superior to another employee, or even because he or she 
supervises daily work activities and assignments. Without further information regarding his 
subordinate employees, it cannot be determined whether the beneficiary in fact directed supervisory, 
managerial or professional employees, such that he would have qualified as a personnel manager in 
his position abroad. See 5 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary 
primarily functioned in an executive or managerial capacity in his overseas employment. For this 
additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds the evidence is insufficient to establish that the 
petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. In order to qualify 
for this visa classification, the petitioner must establish that a qualiqing relationship exists between the 
United States and foreign entities in that the petitioning company is the same employer or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of the foreign entity. See section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same 
share or proportion of each entity. 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power over 
the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls 
the entity. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between U.S. and foreign entities 
for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
593 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); 
Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership 
refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and 
authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the 
establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
Page 13 
In the letter dated August 2, 2007 accompanying the initial petition, the petitioner claimed that the 
foreign entity holds 100% of the common stock of the U.S. corporation. The petitioner submitted a 
translated copy of a "Certificate of Existence," dated January 30, 1996, issued by the Bogota 
Chamber of Commerce, as evidence of the existence of the foreign entity. The petitioner also 
submitted an undated document from the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
certifying the organization of the U.S. company under the laws of Puerto Rico. However, these 
documents provide no information with respect to the ownership of the entities, and the petitioner 
did not submit any other documentation relating to the ownership of either entity. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
In the absence of further evidence definitively establishing the ownership of both the U.S. and 
foreign entities, the AAO finds the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there exists a qualifying 
relationship between the U.S. company and the beneficiary's foreign employer. For this additional 
reason, the petition will be denied. 
In addition, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that it has the ability to pay the 
beneficiary the proffered wages for his position in the United States as required by the regulations. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R 5 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an 
employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be 
accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to 
pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the 
priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lahl permanent 
residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, 
federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. 
In this instance, the petitioner stated initially that the beneficiary would be paid an annual salary of 
$34,932.99 plus benefits in his proffered position. In the RFE, the director requested further 
information regarding the salary being offered to the beneficiary and evidence that the employer has 
the ability to pay the proffered salary from the date of filing to the present. 
In response to the RFE, the petitioner submitted a copy of the U.S. company's financial statements 
for the years ended April 30, 2008 and 2007, in Spanish, along with an English translation. 
However, the English translation of the document is incomplete, with most of the numerical values 
left blank. Based on the incomplete translation, the AAO is unable to apply any of the information 
in the financial statements to the analysis of whether the petitioner has the ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proffered wages. The petitioner has failed to provide any other evidence of relevance 
on this issue, such as the company's tax returns, or any other proof that the beneficiary has received a 
salary at least equal to the amount of the proffered wages. Failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 
Page 14 
103.2(b)(14). Further, without relevant evidence, the AAO cannot determine whether the petitioner 
has the ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R 5 
204.5(g)(2). For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
Finally, the AAO acknowledges that USCIS previously granted an L-1A petition filed by the 
petitioner on behalf of the instant beneficiary. It must be noted that many 1-140 immigrant petitions 
are denied after USCIS or a U.S. Consular officer abroad approves prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 
petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); IKEA US v. 
US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103. 
Examining the consequences of an approved petition, there is a significant difference between a 
nonimmigrant L-1A visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily, 
and an immigrant E-13 visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the 
United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. CJ: 9s 
204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5s 1154 and 1184; see also § 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1427. 
Because USCIS spends less time reviewing I- 129 nonimmigrant petitions than I- 140 immigrant 
petitions, some nonimmigrant L- IA petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. 
v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; see also 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting 
documentation to file a petition to extend an L-1A petition's validity). Despite the previously 
approved petition, USCIS does not have any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the 
petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act. 
Based on the lack of required evidence of eligibility in the current record, the AAO finds that the 
director was justified in departing from the previous nonimmigrant petition approval by denying the 
instant petition. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). When the AAO denies a petition 
on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the 
AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer 
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, 
that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.