dismissed EB-1C Case: Gas Station/Convenience Store

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
fddfyfng data deleted m 
OfJe ofAdministrative Appeals MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
prevent clearly unwarranted U.S. citizenship 
invasion of personal pdvacy 
 and Immigration 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
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.. 
John F. Grissom 
+w 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner is a Texas corporation operating as a gas station/convenience store. The petitioner 
seeks to employ the beneficiary as its presidentlchief executive officer. Accordingly, the petitioner 
endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C), as a 
multinational executive or manager. The director denied the petition based on the determination that 
the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a managerial or executive 
capacity. 
On appeal, counsel submits an appellate brief disputing the specific findings that led to the director's 
decision to deny the petition on the stated ground. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 
1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must fimish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. 
The primary issue in this proceeding calls for an analysis of the beneficiary's job duties. 
Specifically, the AAO will examine the record to determine whether the beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States in a qualifyrng managerial or executive capacity. 
Page 3 
Section 1 01 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 1 01 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
hction for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
hction of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In support of the Form 1-140, the petitioner submitted a letter dated March 6, 2007, discussing the 
business operations of the beneficiary's foreign employer and the beneficiary's U.S. businesses, 
which includes the petitioning entity. Although the petitioner discussed the beneficiary's ownership 
interests in the foreign and U.S. entities as well as the beneficiary's position titles with respect to 
Page 4 
each entity, a discussion of the beneficiary's job duties was not included in the letter. The petitioner 
did, however, provide its organizational chart, depicting the beneficiary at the top of the 
organizational hierarchy with a manager as his immediate subordinate. The bottom tier of the 
organization was shown to include three cashiers and three service providers whom the petitioner 
claimed as its independent contractors. 
On August 8, 2007, the director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE) instructing the 
petitioner to provide information about its hours of operation and a weekly schedule, showing the 
employees working for the petitioner and their respective hours of employment. The director also 
asked the petitioner to provide a detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed employment, 
enumerating the specific job duties that would be performed and the precise actions that would be 
taken in order to carry out those duties. Lastly, the director requested an organizational chart of the 
petitioner's corporate structure accompanied by job descriptions for the employees included therein. 
In response, the petitioner provided a letter dated October 26, 2007, which included an explanation 
of the beneficiary's investment in two U.S. businesses. Specifically, the petitioner stated that the 
beneficiarv is the sole owner of the petitioning entity. which became the successor-in-interest of- 
- . , 
. another U.S. eniity that was previously established by the beneficiary. The 
petitioner further explained that the beneficiary is the majority owner of another U.S. entity, = 
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In addition to the letter, the petitioner submitted a number of supporting documents. The AAO notes 
that only those documents that are relevant to the beneficiary's employment capacity in the proposed 
position with the U.S. entity will be discussed. Specifically, the supporting documents included the 
petitioner's 2007 second quarterly tax return, which showed that the petitioner employed three, or 
possible fewer, employees at the time the Form 1-140 was filed.' The AAO notes that the quarterly 
tax return for the second quarter of 2007 does not corroborate the information provided in Part 5, 
No. 2 of the Form 1-140, where the petitioner claimed to have nine employees. 
The petitioner also provided another organizational chart, which named the same employees as were 
named in the chart provided earlier in support of the Form 1-140, but depicted a different hierarchical 
structure. More specifically, while the initial chart illustrated a three-tiered staffing hierarchy where 
all three of the store's cashiers were depicted at the same level, the newer chart shows two cashiers at 
the second organizational level and the third cashier, who appears to be at the lowest, or fourth, level 
within the hierarchy assuming the additional title of store manager and senior cashier. It is unclear 
why a managerial staff member has been depicted at a lower level in the petitioner's organization 
than the employees he would purportedly supervise, nor is there any explanation as to why this 
employee's placement within the organization has been altered. It is incumbent upon the petitioner 
to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to 
' Part 1, No. 1 of the Form 941 for the second quarter of 2007 asked the petitioner to disclose the total number of 
employees who received compensation during that quarter. It is noted that while the petitioner indicated that it 
compensated three employees during the second quarter of 2007, the AAO cannot determine whether all three employees 
were working for the petitioner in May 2007 when the petition was filed, as the form does not ask the petitioner to 
disclose the specific number of employees compensated during any specific month within the second quarter. As such, it 
cannot even be concluded that the petitioner had three employees at the time of filing. 
explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent 
objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 
1988). 
Lastly, the petitioner provided a list of the beneficiary's proposed job duties and the percentage of 
time allotted to each one. As the director has restated the description, verbatim, in his decision, the 
AAO need no repeat this information in the current decision. 
In a decision dated March 20, 2008, the director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner 
failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a qualifllng managerial or executive 
capacity. The director conveyed a sense of doubt regarding the beneficiary's specific role and the 
job duties performed to ensure business expansion in the United States and further observed that the 
second, sixth, and eighth duties as provided in response to the WE contained ambiguous wording of 
the beneficiary's job description, thereby precluding U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) from being able to determine specific tasks performed in the execution of certain duties. 
In reviewing the time allotted to the duties specifically referenced by the director, the AAO observes 
that these account for only 35% of the beneficiary's time. As pointed out by counsel in his brief, the 
petitioner only needs to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform tasks of a qualifylng 
nature. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 
I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Therefore, if only 35% of the beneficiary's time would be spent 
performing non-qualifying tasks, this alone would not render the beneficiary ineligible for 
classification as a multinational manager or executive. 
Regardless, the AAO finds that the director's conclusion was warranted and need not be disturbed. 
Pursuant to a thorough and comprehensive review of the petitioner's submissions, the AAO finds 
that the beneficiary's description of duties is problematic for reasons other than those discussed by 
the director. Namely, the job description provided by the petitioner is so generic and generally 
lacking in specific tasks that the AAO is unable to ascertain what specific tasks would be performed 
and whether the beneficiary's time would be primarily spent in a qualifylng capacity. For instance, 
the petitioner allotted 15% of the beneficiary's time to making executive decisions, implanting 
initiatives, and developing plans to ensure maximum efficiency and minimize financial loss. 
However, these duties must be considered in light of the petitioner's specific business purpose, 
which involves the operation of a gas station~convenience store. It is unclear what executive 
decisions, initiatives, and plans would involve the efforts of someone in a primarily managerial or 
executive position on a daily basis. Similarly problematic is the petitioner's claim that 15% of the 
beneficiary's time would be allotted to directing and coordinating reviews of activity, operating, and 
sales reports. The petitioner provides no discussion as to how the beneficiary would coordinate the 
review of reports and why 15% of the beneficiary's time on a daily basis would be spent reviewing 
such reports. This job duty is not only ambiguous, but also makes no sense in the context of a gas 
stationlconvenience store petitioning to employ the beneficiary. 
The petitioner allotted another 10% of the beneficiary's time to analyzing and evaluating overall staff 
performance. This portion of the description is problematic, as the majority of the petitioner's staff 
as identified in the organizational chart is comprised of non-supervisory, non-professional, and non- 
managerial employees. 
 Despite the claim that the beneficiary's immediate subordinate is a 
managerial employee, the petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish its employment 
of the claimed individual at the time of filing, nor does a single managerial employee comprise the 
petitioner's staff, which appears to be comprised primarily of cashiers. Despite the petitioner's 
attempt to attach a managerial position title to one of the cashiers, as previously noted, the petitioner 
did not initially identify this employee as a manager and provided no explanation as to the change in 
the position title other than for the purpose of establishing that the beneficiary would be employed in 
a qualifying capacity. 
Furthermore, the petitioner's Form 941 for the second quarter of 2007 indicates that the petitioner 
employed no more than three employees at the time the Form 1-140 was filed. Aside &om the fact 
that this information is inconsistent with the claim made in the Form 1-140 itself, the petitioner has 
not established which positions were filled at the time of filing and whether the petitioning gas 
station~convenience store required and was capable of supporting an employee in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 
I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 
(Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Thus, given the director's adverse findings regarding duties that would consume 35% of the 
beneficiary's time coupled with the problems noted above, the AAO finds that: 1) the petitioner has 
failed to justifL employing the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; and 
2) the petitioner has not provided sufficient information as to specific tasks the beneficiary would 
perform during at least 75% of his work week. It is noted that the actual duties themselves reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director imposed a heavier burden of proof than the applicable 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Counsel's assertion is based on an erroneous interpretation 
of the director's analysis, which addressed only certain job duties that would have only accounted for 
35% of the beneficiary's time. According to counsel's understanding, the fact that the director's 
specific comments were only directed at three job duties indicates that the director did not deem the 
remainder of the job duties as problematic. However, a closer reading of the director's observations 
indicates that the director focused on the second, sixth, and eighth job duties, because he found them 
to be non-qualifllng. The fact that specific findings were not issued with regard to the remaining job 
duties is not an implication that only the three cited job duties were problematic. Rather, the director 
generally found that the beneficiary's job description used "somewhat ambiguous wording," thereby 
indicating an overall lack of sufficient details regarding specific tasks and activities to be carried out 
on a daily basis. 
While counsel finds the director's reference to the "somewhat ambiguous wording" in itself 
ambiguous, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 204.5(j)(5) is instructive and adequately conveys the 
importance of a detailed description of the beneficiary's job duties. In the present matter, the job 
description is wordy, consisting of lengthy statements that primarily use terminology that would 
generally be associated with an employee in a managerial or executive capacity. However, the 
description is so generic that it can be applied to management in any number of retail operations in a 
variety of different industries. There is no indication that the general statements used to describe the 
beneficiary's job duties take into account the petitioner's staffing or the specific nature of the 
petitioner's business. Thus, counsel's objection to the director's use of the term "ambiguous" in 
reference to the beneficiary's job description is unfounded. 
Next, counsel refers to an unpublished decision issued by the AAO in which the AAO reproached 
the director for employing an additional criterion that was undefined and not part of the regulatory 
framework. Counsel's argument fails on two grounds. First, counsel has furnished no evidence to 
establish that the facts of the instant petition are analogous to those in the unpublished decision. 
Unlike the "undefined and unsupported view" of the director in the unpublished case, there is no 
evidence that the director in the present matter used the same or similar terminology in reaching his 
conclusion. Contrary to the counsel's assertions, there is no evidence that the director strayed from 
the statutory provision, requiring the beneficiary to primarily perform job duties in a qualifying 
managerial or executive capacity. Second, while 8 C.F.R. 5 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent 
decisions are binding on all USCIS employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished 
decisions are not similarly binding. 
Lastly, counsel reiterates his contention that the beneficiary primarily performs job duties in a 
qualifylng capacity. However, the AAO has provided a detailed analysis of the beneficiary's job 
description, specifically denoting the flaws that preclude withdrawal of the director's legally sound 
decision. While USCIS acknowledges the petitioner's compliance with the request for additional 
documentation and information, the mere compliance does not indicate that eligibility has been 
established. To the contrary, the AAO has provided a detailed discussion of the various ways in 
which the petitioner has fallen far short of establishing its eligibility for the immigration benefit 
sought. In light of the above, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that the 
beneficiary would primarily perform job duties in a qualifying capacity. 
Furthermore, the record does not support a finding of eligibility based on additional grounds that 
were not previously addressed in the director's decision. 
First, 8 C.F.R. 8 204.5(j)(3)(i)(B) states that the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a qualifylng managerial or executive position for at least one out of the three 
years prior to his entry to the United States as a nonirnrnigrant to work for the same employer. In the 
instant matter, record lacks an adequate description of the beneficiary's job duties abroad such that 
any determination can be made as to his employment capacity with the claimed foreign employer. 
Therefore, the AAO cannot conclude, based on the record as it currently stands, that the beneficiary 
was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Second, by virtue of the beneficiary's claimed ownership of the U.S. petitioner, it appears more 
likely than not that the beneficiary will not be an "employee" of the United States operation. As 
explained in 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5), the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary will be 
"employed" in an executive or managerial capacity. It is noted that "employer," "employee," and 
"employed" are not specifically defined for purposes of the Act even though these terms are used 
repeatedly in the context of addressing the multinational executive and managerial immigrant 
classification. Section 203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C), requires beneficiaries to have been 
"employed" abroad and to render services to the same "employer" in the United States. Further, section 
101 (a)(44), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44), defines both managerial and executive capacity as an assignment 
within an organization in which an "employee" performs certain enumerated qualifying duties. Finally, 
the specific definition of "managerial capacity" in section 101 (a)(44)(A), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), 
refers repeatedly to the supervision and control of other "employees." Neither the legacy Immigration 
and Naturalization Service nor CIS has defined the terms "employee," "employer," or "employed" by 
regulation for purposes of the multinational executive and managerial immigration classification. 
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 
 204.5 and 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1). Therefore, for purposes of this immigrant 
classification, these terms are undefined. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that where a federal statute fails to clearly 
define the term "employee," courts should conclude "that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "Darden") 
(quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). That definition is as 
follows: 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law 
of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324; see also Restatement (Second) ofAgency 220(2) (1958); Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (hereinafter "Clackamas"). As the 
common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the 
answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor 
being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 
254,258 (1968). 
Within the context of immigrant petitions seeking to classify the beneficiary as a multinational 
manager or executive, when a worker is also a partner, officer, member of a board of directors, or a 
major shareholder, the worker may only be defined as an "employee" if he or she is subject to the 
organization's "control." See Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 
449-450 (2003); see also New Compliance Manual at 5 2-III(A)(l)(d). Factors to be addressed in 
determining whether a worker, who is also an owner of the organization, is an employee include: 
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and 
regulations of the individual's work. 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual's 
work. 
a 
 Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization. 
a 
 Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the 
organization. 
a 
 Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed 
in written agreements or contracts. 
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the 
organization. 
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-450 (citing New Compliance Manual). 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be an "employee" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. As explained 
above, the petitioner is a corporation, which the petitioner claims is ultimately owned and controlled 
by the beneficiary, who purports to assume a role as the petitioner's principal. There is no evidence 
that anyone other than the beneficiary himself is in a position to exercise any control over the work 
to be performed by the beneficiary. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identifl all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the additional 
ground of ineligibility discussed above, this petition cannot be approved. 
As a final note. service records show that a new office ~etition (receiwt no. SRC 04 141 52356). filed 
previously approved for one year. However, the first L-1A petition (receipt no. SRC 05 230 52740) 
for this petitioner was denied and the appeal was dismissed. Thus, counsel's brief reference to a 
previously approved L-1 employment of the beneficiary is irrelevant, as it does not apply to the same 
petitioner as the one whose Form 1-140 is being reviewed in the present matter. Regardless, with 
regard to the beneficiary's approved L-1 nonirnmigrant classification, it should be noted that, in 
general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater 
scrutiny by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) than nonimmigrant petitions. 
In addition, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a 
separate burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. USCIS is not 
required to assume the burden of searching through previously provided evidence submitted in 
support of other petitions to determine the approvability of the petition at hand in the present matter. 
USCIS denies many 1-140 immigrant petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 
petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. NS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of 
Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
Page 10 
approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are contained in the current record, the 
approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not 
required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely 
because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Cornrn. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that USCIS or 
any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 
825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a 
court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the 
nonirnrnigrant petitions on behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the 
contradictory decision of a service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 
282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a 
challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, afd, 
345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. The 
petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.