dismissed EB-1C Case: Home Decor

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF C-U-G- CORP. 
APPEAL OF TEXAS SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: MAY 26, 2017 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, an importer and seller of cabinets and home decor, 1 seeks to permanently employ the 
Beneficiary as a manager under the first preference immigrant classification for multinational 
executives or managers. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(I)(C), 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(I)(C). This classification allows a U.S. employer to permanently transfer a 
qualified foreign employee to the United States to work in an executive or managerial capacity. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish, as required, that: (I) in the three years preceding the filing of the petition or the 
Beneficiary's entry into the United States to work for the Petitioner, the Beneficiary has been 
employed by a qualifying entity abroad for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity; 
and (2) the Beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence and asserts that the Director erred in denying 
the petition. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act makes an immigrant visa available to a beneficiary who, in the three 
years preceding the filing of the petition, has been employed outside the United States for at least one 
year in a managerial or executive capacity, and seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to 
render managerial or executive services to the same employer or to its subsidiary or affiliate. 
A United States employer may tile Fom1 I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, to classify a 
beneficiary under section 203(b)(I)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. This 
classification does not require a labor certification. 
1 
On several documents, including the Form 1-140 petition and its own company letterhead, the Petitioner places the 
suffix ·'LLC" after its name, indicating that the Petitioner is a limited liability company. The record shO\VS, hovvever. 
that the Petitioner is a corporation, not a limited liability company. 
Maller ofC-U-G- Corp. 
The pe!Illon must include a statement from an authorized official of the petitioning United States 
employer which demonstrates that the beneficiary has been employed abroad in a managerial or 
executive capacity for at least one year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, that the 
beneficiary is coming to work in the United States for the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate of 
the foreign employer, and that the prospective U.S. employer· has been doing business for at least one 
year. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3). 
II. FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT 
The Director denied the petition based, in part, on a finding that the Petitioner did not establish that 
the Beneficiary was employed abroad by its foreign affiliate for at least one year during the relevant 
three-year period. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(i) addresses two possible scenarios regarding this "one-in­
three" requirement. If the beneficiary is outside the United States at the time of filing, then the 
beneficiary must have held qualifying employment for at least one year in the three years 
immediately preceding the filing of the petition. If the beneficiary is in the United States working 
for the petitioner or a related employer, then the year of qualifying employment must have occurred 
in the three years preceding the beneficiary's entry as a nonimmigrant. The latter subsection of the 
regulation accommodates beneficiaries who have been working for the respective petitioners, or 
related entities, in nonimmigrant status, and who for that reason alone were not employed abroad for 
at least one year of the three years immediately preceding the filing of the immigrant petition. 
Employment with the petitioner or a related entity in the United States maintains continuity of 
employment within the multinational organization, but employment with an unrelated entity, either 
abroad or in the United States, interrupts a beneficiary's qualifying employment. Both the statute 
and regulations establish that a beneficiary cannot qualify for the classification if there has been an 
interruption of more than two years following the beneficiary's year of qualifying employment 
abroad. 
For these reasons, we must examine the Beneficiary's employment history both abroad and in the 
United States, to determine if he meets the foreign employment requirement. 
We must tirst determine whether the Petitioner has demonstrated that the foreign employment took 
place. If the Petitioner does not meet this first threshold, then it serves no purpose to analyze 
whether the claimed foreign position was in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Beneficiary entered the United States in June 2011 as a B-2 nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. 
The Petitioner filed the Form 1-140 petition in September 2014, more than three years later. The 
Petitioner noted that the Beneficiary had changed status to an L-1 A nonimmigrant intracompany 
transferee, but did not initially say who had employed the Beneficiary in the United States. A 
translated letter indicated that, from March 2009 to June 2011, the Beneficiary "was the manager of 
2 
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Matter ofC-U-G- Corp. 
the company 
which is the Petitio ner' s affil iate. 
Concurrent with the Petitioner's filin g of Form I-140, the Bene fic iary filed Form 1-485, Application 
to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. That application included form G-325A , 
Biographic Information. On Form G-325A, where asked to identify his e mployment over the past 
five years, the Beneficiary stated that he \VOrked for from May 2009 to June 2011, 
and thereafter for the Peti ~ioner in the Un ited States. The form had space for t hree more emp loyers, 
but the Benefic iary listed no other U.S. or foreign emplo yment. 
Durin g routine verification efforts, the Direc tor consulted U .S. Citizen ship and Immigration Services 
(USClS) records, which showed that the Benefic iary changed from B-2 to L-1 A nonimm igrant sta tus 
through a petiti on filed by in December 20 11. ln February 2013, 
filed another petit ion, t he approva l of wh ich extended the Ben eficiary's L-1 A status. 
fn May 20 13, filed a Form l- I 40 immigran t pet ition on the Beneficiary' s beha1f, 
seeking to clas sify him as a multin ational manager or executive based on his continu ous employment 
with and its foreign parent company, That petit ion, which is 
part of the insta nt record of proceedin g, included pay receipts that issued to the 
Benet1ciary in late 2010 and early 2011 , and a letter signed by the Ben efic iary, indicat ing that h e 
''had been wor king for . . . in Brazil for more than 23 years ." This evidence 
confl icts with the Petitioner 's claim that the Bene fici ary worked for from May 
2009 to June 20 11 . 
In a 
request for evidence (RFE) , the Director stated that the two Form I-140 pet itions included 
confli cti ng e mployme nt histor ies for the Benefic iary. T he Director asked for clarification and fo r 
doc umentary evidence to suppo rt the Petitioner's claims a bout the Benefi cia ry's past and present 
employm ent. The Director specifica lly requested copies of the Bene ficiary's 20 15 pay receipts and 
his 20 14 IRS Form W-2 , Wage and Tax S tatement, to show that t he Beneficiary worked for the 
Petition er in the United Stat es at the time of fil ing. 
In respo nse, the Beneficiary stated: 
In 2011 ' in \Vhich I was a share hold er, dec ided to m ake 
inve stments in a distribution of kitchen cabin ets called ' For that 
reason req uested the L 1 A nonimmi grant visa .. . . However , in 
20 13 the shareh older s of ' dec ided to go out of business and in 
2014 l started to \Vork for [the Petit ioner). . . . [F) rom 2009 to 20 II I have also 
wor ked for 
The em ploym ent history that the Benefic iary desc ribed above i s disqualifying on irs face. The 
Bene ficiary e ntered the United States in June 20 11 and did not wor k for any entity related to 
during the nex t two and one half years. Assuming that the Beneficiary actual ly 
work ed for the Petitio ner begin nin g in 2014, he would need to establ ish t hat he worke d abroad for 
3 
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Matter ofC-U-G- Corp. 
during the three year period immediately preceding that first day of employment 
in 2014. The Beneficiary does not state that he had one year of employment with 
during that period. He could not have had the required year of foreign employment, because he was 
outside the United States for less than one year during the period in question. Therefore, the 
Beneficiary is currently ineligible for the classification sought; he did not work abroad for a 
qualifying employer for at least one year during the relevant three-year period. 
Furthermore, we cannot ignore conflicting and unsubstantiated claims regarding the Beneficiary's 
past employment. In the RFE response, the Beneficiary stated that he "started to work for" the 
Petitioner "in 2014." On Form G-325A, however, the Beneficiary stated that he had worked for the 
Petitioner since June 2011 - which cannot be correct, 
because the Petitioner filed its articles of 
incorporation in March 2013. 
The Beneficiary did not mention or on the Form 
G-325A filed concurrently with the present petition. However, the Petitioner has not identified pay 
receipts or comparable contemporaneous documentation from 2009-20 ll in the record to support its 
claim that he worked for at that time. Given that the record does contain pay 
receipts that issued to the Beneficiary during this time period, the record tends 
to support a conclusion that and not was the Beneficiary's actual 
foreign employer in the period preceding his initial entry to the United States. The Petitioner claims 
no qualifying relationship with 
In the denial notice, the Director found that the Petitioner had not corroborated the claim that the 
Beneficiary worked for in 2009-2011, or that he now works for the Petitioner. 
The Director noted that the Petitioner did not submit the requested pay receipts and IRS Form W-2. 
The Director concluded that the Petitioner had not shown that the Beneficiary worked abroad in a 
managerial or executive capacity for a qualifying organization for at least one year during the three 
years preceding his admission to the United States. 
On appeal, the Petitioner states that the Beneficiary "is already ... working for [the Petitioner] on 
a[n] L1 Visa." 2 The Petitioner submits copies of pay receipts and an IRS Form W-2 issued to the 
Beneficiary, but these documents all show compensation paid to the Beneficiary in 2015, not in 
2014. The Petitioner also submits a letter from the president of who stated that 
the Beneficiary worked for that company "as a manager from July/2009 to October 20 11." The 
Petitioner did not submit pay records from the foreign company, stating that it would need additional 
time to obtain that evidence. 
The Director had requested evidence of salary payments to the Beneficiary from the foreign 
company in the RFE, issued in May 2015. The Petitioner did not submit that evidence in response to 
2 The Beneficiary held L-1 A status in 2014, but it only permitted him to work for If the 
Petitioner did employ the Beneficiary under an L-1 A nonimmigrant visa issued for a different employer, then the 
Beneficiary violated his nonimmigrant status by accepting that employment. See 8 C. F. R. §§ 274a.l2(b)( 12), 214.1 (e). 
4 
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;\!alt er ofC-U-G - Co17J. 
the RFE. Th e Petitioner filed the appeal m ore than a year l ater , in October 20 16. The Petitione r 
clai ms that it requi res still mo re tim e to obtain the payroll recor ds, but provides no evidence that 
those records ex ist. As note d b efore, earlier petition on the Beneficia ry' s behalf 
did n ot incl ude any indication that the Benef:i ciary had ever worked for 
There have been conflicting claims rega rding the Beneficiar y's em ployment history. The Petiti oner 
mu st resolve these inconsistenci es with indepe ndent, objecti ve evidence pointi ng to where the truth 
lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582 , 59 1-92 (BIA 1988). The Petitioner has not submitt ed 
contemporaneous corroboratin g docume ntation from Unresolved mate rial 
inco nsistencies may lead us to reeval uate the re liability and sufficiency o f other evid ence subm itted 
in support of the requested immi gratio n bene fit. !d. The refore, the Petitioner has not established 
that its claims are credible. Under the circumstances , we will not grant the Petitione r additional time 
to submit payro ll records that it sho uld h ave submitted i n respo nse to the RFE when t he Director 
specifica lly requested them. The D irec tor allowed the Peti tioner a fair opportunity to p erfec t the 
record, and we consider the reco rd to be complete as it now stands. 
The preponderance of the available e vidence indicates that the Benefic iary w orked for 
not in t he yea rs immedi ately preced ing his 20 11 entry into the 
United States. Therefor e, the Petitioner has not credibly establi shed that the Ben eficiary worked for 
before he e ntered the U nited States. Because the Petitioner has not shown that 
this e mployment took place, it necessa rily fo llows that the Petitioner has not sho wn that the 
emp loyme nt was in a managerial or exec utive capac ity_ and we will not further address the 
Beneficiary's claimed emp loyment with 
Ill. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL OR EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
The Directo r f ound that the Petitioner did not establ ish t hat the Benefici ary will be e mployed in t he 
United State s in 
a m anagerial capacity with the Peti tioner or a related entity. The Petitioner 
specifica lly claims that it will employ the Beneficiary as a function mana ger. Therefore, we n eed 
not discuss the requir eme nts to qualify as a n exec utive, or as a pers onnel manager (whose 
managerial duties rel ate primarily to s upervisio n of managerial, s upervisory, or profess ional 
subordin ates). 
3 On app ea l, rhe Petitioner state s that the Director denied the petition , in part , beca use the Petitioner had not estab lished a 
qual ifying relatio nship with the Benefic iary's fore ign empl oyer. The Petitio ner, ho wever, has neither d emonstrated nor 
claimed that it has a qual ify ing relationship with Instead, the Pet itioner' s claims of a quali fyin g 
re lationship rely on the sha red o wnership of and the petition ing U.S. com pany . The record 
esta blishes a q ualifying relationship between and but th is evidence is not 
re levan t h ere because is not t he petitioner in this proceed ing. The D irecto r d enied the petit ion not 
because of the lack of a qualify ing re lationship, but b ecause of the apparently fictitious nature o f the Petitio ner's claim 
that the Benefic iary worke d for from 2009 to 20 II . 
5 
Matter ofC-U-G- Corp. 
The definition of the term "managerial capacity" is "an assignment within an organization in which 
the employee primarily": 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization: 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is 
directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed: and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A tirst-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A). Further_ "[a] first-line supervisor is 
not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are pmfessional'' !d. 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial 
or executive capacity, USCIS must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in 
light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the organization. See section 101 (a)( 44)(C) 
of the Act. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5) requires the Petitioner to submit a statement which indicates 
that the Beneficiary is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the Beneficiary. 
On his Form G-325A the Benellciary claimed to have begun working for the Petitioner in June 
2011. This claim cannot be correct, because the Petitioner liled its articles of incorporation in March 
2013. The record does not suppmi the Petitioner's initial claim that it first employed the Beneficiary 
in 2011, or the Petitioner's revised claim that it hired the Beneficiary in 2014. This issue is not a 
prima facie bar to consideration as it is with the Beneficiary's claimed foreign employment, because 
there is no requirement that the Petitioner already employ the Beneficiary at the time of filing. 
6 
Matter ofC-U-G- Corp. 
A. Duties 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of a given beneficiary, we will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. The Petitioner's description of the job duties must 
clearly describe the duties to be performed by the Beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in 
a managerial or executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). 
The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary qualities as a function manager. The term "function 
manager" applies generally when a beneficiary's managerial role arises not from supervising or 
controlling the work of a subordinate staff but instead from responsibility for managing an "essential 
function" within the organization. See section 101 (a)( 44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The statute and 
regulations do not define the term "essential function." If a petitioner claims that a beneficiary will 
manage an essential function, that petitioner must clearly describe the duties to be perfom1ed in 
managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function with speciJicity, articulate the essential 
nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties dedicated to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). In addition, a petitioner's description of 
a beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage the function rather 
than perform the duties related to the function. 
The Petitioner stated: 
This position requires the beneficiary to establish the operations of the company. 
Organize and oversee[] all administrative matters, exercise full responsibility for 
recruiting, hiring, training and dismissing employees. He will ensure the coordination 
of the departments and workers, implement policies and adopt strategies to improve 
[the] business holding full authority over all executive decisions aiming to achieve the 
profitability goals set by the company .... He will handle all policies and business 
decisions such as negotiation of contracts to provide for services, purchases, sales 
pricing, banking insurance and credit terms. He is also responsible for insuring that 
sales and profit goals are met each quarter, has discretionary authority to reduce costs 
as he sees fit. His position will be fully managerial in nature since responsibilities 
and duties were limited to managerial level activities. 
The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would divide his time as follows: 
• Directing the ongoing development of new projects, 30% 
• Establishing appropriate contact and business relationships with customers, 
distributors and others, reviewing terms and negotiating most favorable deals for 
the corporation, 40% 
• Managing and directing marketing efforts in emerging markets, 10% 
• Assigning sales, setting goals, and analyzing sales statistics to determine sales 
potential and inventory requirements[,] 20% 
7 
Mauer ofC-U-G- Corp. 
In the RFE, the Director asked the Petitioner to list the Beneficiary's duties, rather than broad 
categories or areas of responsibility. In response, the Petitioner stated that it had "previously 
submitted ... a very detailed statement" establishing the Beneticiary's managerial role. 
In denying the petition, the Director concluded that "the beneficiary will be performing the daily 
duties associated with the business activity of the petitioner." On appeal, the Petitioner repeats the 
narrative job description quoted above, and adds the following passage (note: errors in the original 
have not been changed): 
Directs and coordinates promotion of products or services performed to develop new 
markets, increase share of markets, and obtain competitive position in industry. 
Analyzes division or department budget requests to identify areas in which reductions 
can be made, and allocates operating budget. Confers with administrative personnel 
and reviews activity, operating, and sales reports to determine changes in programs or 
operations required. Presides over all company wide employees meeting and formal 
meeting of directors and managers. Maintains full and final signature authority for 
the corporation and its bank accounts plans and develops industriaL labor and public 
relations policies designed to improve company and relations with customers, 
employees, and public. 
The first three sentences in the above passage are copied almost verbatim from the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles. The generic language, such as "products or services" and "division or 
department," is consistent with a general template rather than a specific description of the particular 
position that the Petitioner wishes the Beneficiary to tilL The remaining sentences are equally 
generic. There is a reference to "directors" although the record does not show that the petitioning 
company has directors. The Petitioner manufactures no products, and therefore the reference to 
"industrial ... relations policies" is unexplained. Therefore, it appears that the Petitioner derived the 
last sentences in the above passage from a different, unidentified template. 
Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily 
executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of 
reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co .. Lid. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
ajf'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the 
employment. !d. The regulations require a detailed description of the Beneficiary's intended duties 
with the Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5G)(5). This requirement is meaningless if the Petitioner can 
satisfy it simply by quoting templates or generic detinitions from the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles, the Occupational Outlook Handbook, or other publicly available sources such as job 
announcements posted by other employers. The question is not what a manager does, but what this 
particular job entails. 
The Petitioner repeats the four-part list of duties with time percentages on appeal, with one 
significant substitution. The Petitioner initially stated that the Beneficiary would spend 10% of his 
time "[ m ]anaging and directing marketing efforts in emerging markets." The new list indicates that 
8 
Maller of C- U-G- Corp. 
the Beneficiary would be "[m]onitoring consumer preference and possible marketing opportunities. 
assuring a correct positioning within the market promotion of the product or service offered." The 
narrative description contains no reference to development of new projects, yet this activity would 
supposedly occupy 30% of the Beneficiary's time. 
The Beneficiary's job description lacks verifiable, reliable details. The Petitioner has not shown that 
the Beneficiary's duties would be primarily those of a function manager. 
B. Staffing 
Beyond the required description of the job duties, USCIS reviews the totality of the record when 
examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the company's 
organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees. the presence of other 
employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, 
and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a 
business. 
The fact that the Beneficiary manages or directs a business does not necessarily establish eligibility 
for classification as an intracompany transferee in a managerial capacity within the meaning of 
section 10l(a)(44) of the Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of 
a position be "primarily" of a managerial nature. Section 101(A)(44)(A) of the Act. While the 
Beneficiary may exercise discretion over the Petitioner's day-to-day operations and possesses the 
requisite level of authority with respect to discretionary decision-making, the position description 
alone is insufficient to establish that his actual duties, as of the date of filing, would be primarily 
managerial in nature. 
We also consider the proposed posttton in light of the nature of the Petitioner's business, its 
organizational structure, and the availability of staff to carry out the Petitioner's daily operational 
tasks. Federal courts have generally agreed that, in reviewing the relevance of the number of 
employees a Petitioner has, USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor 
in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to supp011 a manager.''
4 
Furthermore, it is 
appropriate for USCJS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other 
relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would 
perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that 
does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See. e.g., Syslronics Corp. v. INS, 
!53 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
The Petitioner provided three similar, but not identical, accountings of the company's staffing. The 
"Executive Summary" of the Petitioner's business plan staled that the company "has a showroom 
4 Family, Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval 
Republic ofTrunskei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Suva, 905 F.2d at 42; Q Data 
Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D. D.C. 2003). 
9 
Matter ofC-U-G- Corp. 
with 2 sales people, 01 designer, 01 Accountant, 01 Financial Manager and 01 Operational manager, 
who is the officer for the corporation, and will help [the Beneficiary] in the expansion of the 
company." Elsewhere in the same document, the "Personnel Plan" listed the above workers plus 
two more sales workers, a second designer, and a marketing manager. The Petitioner's 
organizational chart showed some of the above listed employees, but it did not show a financial 
manager or a marketing manager. Therefore, the Petitioner's statements have been inconsistent 
regarding, for instance, the presence of a subordinate marketing staff 
In the RFE, the Director asked the Petitioner to conoborate its staffing by submitting copies of tax 
documents and evidence of contract labor. The Director specifically asked for IRS Forms 941, 
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Returns, for late 2014 and early 2015, and IRS Forms W-2, Wage 
and Tax Statements, for 2014. 
The Petitioner's response included a copy of its 2014 IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax 
Return, showing $104,490 in salaries, $44,454 in commissions, $35,085 in consulting fees, and a 
$49,312 design fee. The Petitioner did not submit the requested IRS Forms W-2 and 941, which 
would have shown how many employees the Petitioner employed during 2014. or documentation 
relating to contract labor to show the number of workers and the type of work performed. 
In the denial notice, the Director stated that the Petitioner had not submitted the necessary evidence 
to show that other employees are relieving the Beneficiary from performing the company's 
operational and administrative functions. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director has been 
unfair in assessing the Petitioner's evidence, but the Petitioner does not address the specific points 
that the Director raised in the denial notice. 
The Petitioner submits copies of!RS Forms W-2, showing payments to six employees in 2015. This 
evidence does not establish the Petitioner's personnel structure as of September 2014, when the 
Petitioner filed the petition. Only two of the names on the Forms W -2 correspond to names on the 
Petitioner's initial organizational chart- those of the Beneficiary and the designer. Only four of the 
six employees earned amounts commensurate with year-round, full-time employment; the other two 
earned $3000 and $6000 respectively. The six employees earned a total of$187,975 in 2015. The 
2015 amount is almost twice the salary figure reported on the Petitioner's 2014 income tax return, 
which suggests that the Petitioner paid fewer than four full-time salaries during the earlier year. 
We further note that the Petitioner paid the Beneficiary $36,400 in 2015. Three other employees 
each earned between $39,000 and $62,770. These figures do not readily support the Petitioner's 
claim that the Beneficiary is the highest-ranking employee at the petitioning company. 
The evidence submitted on appeal undermines, rather than supports, the Petitioner's unsubstantiated 
claim that the company had sufficient staff at the time of filing to relieve the Beneficiary from 
having to perform non-qualifying operational and administrative tasks. 
The Petitioner has not shown that it seeks to employ the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity. 
10 
Matter ofC-U-G- Corp. 
IV. DOING BUSINESS 
Beyond the Director's decision, the record does not establish that the Petitioner has been doing 
business for at least one year prior to the date of tiling the petition as required by 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(j)(3)(i)(D). The regulations define "doing business" as the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods or services by a firm, corporation, or other entity. The term does not 
include the mere presence of an agent or office. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2). 
On Form 1-140, the Petitioner stated that it was established in March 2013. Copies of business 
permits in the record are dated December 2013, less than a year before the September 2014 filing 
date. The earliest invoices and bank statements in the record date from February 2014. The 
Petitioner has not shown that it was regularly, continuously, and systematically providing goods, 
services, or both in September 2013, a year before the filing date. 
In the RFE, the Director asked for evidence that the Petitioner had been doing business for at least 
one year. In response, the Petitioner submitted a copy of its 2014 income tax return. The Petitioner 
had previously submitted a copy of its 2013 tax retum. These documents do not show when in 2013 
the Petitioner began providing goods or services. 
Because the Petitioner has not established the extent of its business activity in 2013, it has not met its 
burden to show that it has been doing business since no later than September 2013. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because a prior immigrant petition tiling conflicts with the Petitioner's claims, the Petitioner has not 
established that a qualifying entity employed the Beneficiary abroad for at least one year during the 
three years prior to the filing of the petition. Also, the Petitioner has not submitted enough evidence 
to show that it will employ the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity, or that it has been doing 
business for at least a year prior to the l1l ing date. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofC-U-G- Corp., ID# 452427 (AAO May 26, 2017) 
II