dismissed EB-1C Case: Hospitality
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. The provided job description was found to be overly general and vague, making it impossible to determine if the beneficiary would primarily perform high-level managerial duties rather than the day-to-day, non-qualifying tasks necessary to provide the company's services.
Criteria Discussed
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(b)(6)
,.
DATE:
INRE :
PETITION:
MAR 1 9 2013
Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., MS 2090
Washington , DC 20529-2090
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER FILE: :...::::=:===~
Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant
to Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C)
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
Enclosed please fmd the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the
documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please
be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office .
• J
If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional
information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen
in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. The
specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.P.R. § 103.5. Do not file any motion
directly with the AAO. Please be aware that 8 C.P.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i) requires any motion to be filed
within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.
Thank you,
Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
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Page2
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center.
The record indicates that the petitioner filed a motion to reopen. In a decision dated September
4, 2012, the director stated that the requirements of a motion have been met and the petitioner's
appeal filed on January 30, 2012, is reopened and forwarded to the Administrative Appeals
Office (AAO) for a final decision. The matter is now before the AAO on appeal. The appeal
will be dismissed.
The petitioner is a hotel chain that seeks to employ the beneficiary as its Guest
Services/Reservations Manager. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the
beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational
executive or manager.
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the
beneficiary's proposed employment with the U.S. entity would be within a qualifying managerial
or executive capacity.
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings and provides an appellate brieflaying out the
grounds for challenging the denial.
Section 203(b) ofthe Act states in pertinent part:
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified
immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A)
through (C):
* * *
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. --An alien is
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding
the time of the alien's application for classification and admission
into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed
for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or
an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United
States in order to continue to render services to the same employer
or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is
managerial or executive.
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate
, or subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity,
or its affiliate or subsidiary.
(b)(6)
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A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United
States in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to
be performed by the alien.
The issue that will be addressed in this proceeding calls for an analysis of the beneficiary's job
duties. Specifically, the AAO will examine the record to determine whether the petitioner
.submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United
States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity.
Section 101(a)(44)(A) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides:
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which
the employee primarily--
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivisi<;m, function,
or component of the organization; ·
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory,
professional, or managerial employees, or manages an essential
function ~ithin the organization, or a department or subdivision of
the organization;
(iii) if another employee or other employees are drrectly supervised,
has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as
other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave
authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised,
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or
with respect to the function managed; and
(iv) · exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity
or function for which the employee has authority. A first-line
supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity
merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the
employees supervised are professional.
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S. C.§ 110l(a)(44)(B), provides:
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which
the employee primarily--
(b)(6)
Page4
. (i) directs the management of the organization or a major component
or function of the organization;
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component,
or function;
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the
organization.
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, USCIS will look first to
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). Published case law
clearly supports the pivotal role of a clearly defined job description, as the actual duties
themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp.
1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5).
USCIS reviews the totality of the record, which includes not only the beneficiary's job
description, but also takes into account the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment
and remuneration of employees, as well as the job descriptions of the beneficiary's subordinates,
if any, and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role
within a given entity.
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have tw9 parts. First, the petitioner must
show that the beneficiary performs the high-level responSibilities that are specified in the
definitions. Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these
specified responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day
functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July
30, 1991). .
An analysis of the record does not lead to an affirmative conclusion that the beneficiary would be
employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity.
When examining the executive or managerial capacity ofthe beneficiary, the AAO will look first
to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's
description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary
and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive. or managerial capacity. !d.
The petitioner provided a list of job. duties. Due to the overly general and vague list of job
duties, the AAO is unable to gain a meaningful understanding of how much time the beneficiary
spent performing qualifying tasks versus those that would be deemed non-:qualifying. For
instance, in describing the beneficiary's position in the United States, the petitioner stated that
the beneficiary has "overall responsibility for the overall operation of the Guest Services
(b)(6)
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Page5
Department," "responsible for all hiring and firing. decisions," and "monitor and supervise all
aspects of her manager's duties and training protocols." It is unclear what specific tasks actually
fall within these broad ·. categories. Merely using the term "manage" to describe the beneficiary's
~nction does not establish that the supervisory tasks the beneficiary will perform are of . a
qualifying nature. Without further information, it is impossible to determine whether the
beneficiary will be providing the services of the business rather than directing such activities
through subordinate employees. An employee who "primarily;~ performs the tasks necessary to
produce a product or provide a service is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a
managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of
· Church Scientology International, 19 I & N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988).
In response to the request for evidence, the petitioner explained that the beneficiary will spend 25
percent of her day "coordinating the receiving updates on reservations from rooms and banquet
facilities," 50 percent ofher day ''requires oversight ofher front desk operations," and 15 percent
of her day will "involve review and quality control of the valet services and the shuttle services
to historic Annapolis." In addition, the petitioner explained that the ''balance ofthe day is spent
in coordination with other senior management staff" The petitioner did not provide a clear
description of the day to day duties to be performed by the beneficiary. Going on record without
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in
these proceedings. Matter of So.ffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter of
Treasure Craft ofCalifornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).
The petitioner submitted a list of front office staff with job descriptions. According to the list,
the front office staff includes the assistant reservation manager, reservations, front desk manager,
front desk staff: night audit and valet/porter. The petitioner did not explain how many
individuals are actually employed in these positions and are supervised by the beneficiary. In
addition, the petitioner did not provide any evidence to corroborate the employment of the entire
front office staff Again, going on record with<?ut supporting documentary evidence is not
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden ofproofin these proceedings. Matter ofSoffici, 22
I&N Dec. 158 at 165.
In summary, the petitioner has failed_ to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the
beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive
capacity. Based on this finding, the instant petition cannot be approved.
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence to establish
that it has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. To establish a
"qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. a
U.S. entity with a foreign office) or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See
generally § 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153{b)(1)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2)
(providing definitions of the terms "affiliate" and "subsidiary").
(b)(6)
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Page6
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, the articles of incorporation
alone are not sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and
control of a corporate entity. The stock certificates, corporate stock certificate ledger, stock
certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant .annual shareholder meetings
m~t also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to
the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control.
Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares,
the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor
affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra.
Without full disclosure of all relevant docuJ,nents, USCIS is unable to determine the elements of
ownership and control. In the instant petition, the petitioner did not submit any documentation to
establish a qualifying relationship between the beneficiary's foreign employer and the petitioner.
In addition, the record· lacks substantive job descriptions establishing what job duties the
beneficiary performed during her employment abroad. Conclusory assertions regarding the
beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the
statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v.
Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Aryr
Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). The actual duties themselves
will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at
1108.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in
the initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043
(E.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Soltane v. DOJ, 381 F.3d 143,' 145
(3d Cir. 2004)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the
additional grounds of ineligibility discussed above, this petition cannot be approved.
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent
and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for
the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
The petitioner has not sustained that burden.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Avoid the mistakes that led to this denial
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