dismissed EB-1C Case: Import/Export

identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyunwarranted
invasionof personalprivacy
PUBLICCOPY
U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigmtionServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)
20 MassachusettsAve., N.W., MS 2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
DATE: AUG 1 5 2012 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionforAlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveor ManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
SELF-REPRESENTED
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOfficein yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedto this matterhavebeenreturnedto theofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvised
thatanyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe AAO inappropriatelyappliedthe law in reachingits decision,or you haveadditional
information that you wish to have considered,you may file a motion to reconsideror a motion to reopenin
accordancewith theinstructionson FormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a feeof $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha motioncanbe foundat.8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directlywith theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresanymotionto befiledwithin
30 daysof the decisionthat the motion seeksto reconsideror reopen.
Thankyou,
PerryRhew
Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscus.gov
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DISCUSSION: Thepreferencevisapetitionwasdeniedby the Director,TexasServiceCenter.
Thepetitionerfiled FormI-290Bon June1,2010. ThedirectorwroteadecisiondatedOctober15,
2010statingthattheappealwasuntimelyfiled. Thedirectorreviewedthe appealasa motion,and
rejectedthe motionbecauseit failedto meettherequirementsof a motionto reopenor a motionto
reconsider.As theappealwasin fact timely filed, the AAO will withdrawthe director'sdecision
datedOctober15,2010andenteradecisionontheappeal.Theappealwill bedismissed.
Thepetitioneris a Floridacompanyengagedin "import/export." It seeksto employthebeneficiary
as its President. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavorsto classify the beneficiary as an
employment-basedimmigrantpursuantto section203(b)(1)(C)of the ImmigrationandNationality
Act (theAct), 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C),asamultinationalexecutiveor manager.
OnApril 26,2010,thedirectordeniedthepetitionconcludingthat:(1)thepetitionerfailedto establish
thatit wouldemploythebeneficiaryin amanagerialor executivecapacity;(2) thepetitionerfailedto
establishthatit hastheabilityto paythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage;and(3) thepetitionerfailedto
establishthatit hadbeendoingbusinessintheUnitedStatesforoneyearwhenthepetitionwasfiled.
The petitioner subsequentlyfiled an appeal. On appeal,the petitionerdisputesthe director's
findingsandsubmitsabrief andadditionalevidencein supportof theappeal.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) Priority Workers.-- Visas shall first be madeavailable. . . to qualified
immigrantswho arealiensdescribedin anyof the following subparagraphs(A)
through(C):
* * *
(C) CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.-- An alienis
described in this subparagraphif the alien, in the 3 years
precedingthe time of the alien's application for classification
andadmissioninto theUnitedStatesunderthis subparagraph,
hasbeenemployedfor at least1yearby a firm or corporation
or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiarythereof and
who seeksto enterthe United Statesin orderto continueto
renderservicesto the sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor
affiliatethereofin a capacitythatis managerialor executive.
The languageof the statuteis specific in limiting this provision to only thoseexecutivesand
managerswhohavepreviouslyworkedfor thefirm,corporationor otherlegalentity,or anaffiliate
or subsidiaryof thatentity,andarecomingto the UnitedStatesto work for the sameentity,or its
affiliateor subsidiary.
A United Statesemployermay file a petition on FormI-140 for classificationof an alienunder
section203(b)(1)(C)of the Act asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis
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requiredfor this classification.Theprospectiveemployerin the United Statesmustfurnishajob
offer in the formof a statementthatindicatesthatthealienisto beemployedin theUnitedStatesin
a managerialor executivecapacity. Sucha statementmust clearly describethe duties to be
performedby thealien. See8 C.F.R.§204.5(j)(5).
Thefirst issuein thisproceedingis whetherthepetitionersubmittedsufficientevidenceto establish
that it would employthe beneficiaryin the United Statesin a qualifying managerialor executive
capacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
Theterm "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which
theemployeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function,or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesandcontrolsthework of othersupervisory,professional,or
managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunctionwithin the
organization,or adepartmentor subdivisionof theorganization;
(iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesaredirectly supervised,has
the authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseas well as other
personnelactions(suchaspromotionand leaveauthorization),or if
no other employeeis directly supervised,functions at a senior level
within the organizationalhierarchyor with respectto the function
managed;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionoverthe day-to-dayoperationsof the activity or
function for which the employeehasauthority. A first-line supervisor
is not consideredto be acting in a managerialcapacitymerelyby
virtue of the supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unlessthe employees
supervisedareprofessional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
Theterm "executivecapacity"meansan assignmentwithin anorganizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) directsthe managementof theorganizationor a majorcomponentor
functionof theorganization;
(ii) establishesthe goalsandpoliciesof the organization,component,or
function;
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(iii) exerciseswidelatitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly generalsupervisionor direction from higher level
executives,theboardof directors,or stockholdersof theorganization.
In a letterof supportdatedJuly2, 2009,thepetitionerexplainedthedutiesto beperformedby the
beneficiaryasfollows:
As noted above,[the petitioner] initially operatedas a laundry servicebusiness.
Howeverin, in 2007,it decidedto "switchgears"andoperateinternationalbusiness.
It hasbeen[thebeneficiary's]directionandhardwork thathasallowedthecompany
to makethistransition.
Sincethat time, [thebeneficiary]hasconductedall necessaryresearchinto foreign
marketsandproducts,aswell as local products,to determinethe bestapproachto
developingthis business. Shehas completediscretionto negotiateand execute
contracts.[Thebeneficiary]haslocated,contactedandnegotiatedthe contractsfor
our localinvestors,aswell asthenumerouscontractsfor saleof goods.Without[the
beneficiary's] involvement,[the petitioner] would be unableto grow and offer
additionalemploymentto UnitedStatescitizens.
Thepetitionersubmittedanorganizationalchartof theU.S.company.Thechartindicatedthatthe
beneficiarywill supervisea tradeagentin Venezuela,a businessspecialist,anda webmaster.The
organizationalchartalsoindicatesthatthebeneficiarywill supervisea "universalaccountservices
administrativespecialistoutsource,"anda lawyerthat alsoappearsto be outsourced.In addition,
the petitioner provided a brief descriptionof the job duties performedby the beneficiary's
subordinates.
Upon review of the petition and evidence,the petitionerhasnot establishedthat the beneficiary
would be employed in a managerialor executive capacity. When examining the executive or
managerialcapacityof thebeneficiary,theAAO will look first to thepetitioner'sdescriptionof the
job duties. See8 C.F.R.§ 214.2(l)(3)(ii). Thepetitioner'sdescriptionof thejob dutiesmust clearly
describethe dutiesto beperformedby the beneficiaryandindicatewhethersuchdutiesareeitherin
anexecutiveor managerialcapacity. Id.
Thepetitionerprovideda vagueandnonspecificdescriptionof thebeneficiary'sdutiesthat fails to
demonstratewhatthe beneficiarywill do on a day-to-daybasis. The petitionerprovideda very
brief descriptionof thedutiesto beperformedby thebeneficiarythat fails to provideabreakdown
of the dutiesto determinethe percentageof time spenton eachduty and whetherthe duty is
managerialor executivein nature. Recitingthebeneficiary'svaguejob responsibilitiesor broadly-
castbusinessobjectivesis not sufficient; the regulationsrequire a detaileddescriptionof the
beneficiary'sdailyjob duties. Thepetitionerhasfailedto provideanydetailor explanationof the
beneficiary'sactivitiesin the courseof herdaily routine. Theactualdutiesthemselveswill reveal
the true natureof the employment. Fedin Bros. Co.,Ltd. v. Sava,724 F. Supp.at 1108. The
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petitioner's descriptionsof the beneficiary'sposition do not identify the actual duties to be
performed,suchthattheycouldbeclassifiedasmanagerialor executivein nature.
Thejob descriptionalso includesseveralnon-qualifyingdutiessuchas "conductedall necessary
researchinto foreignmarketsandproducts,aswell aslocalproducts,to determinethebestapproach
to developingthisbusiness";"completediscretionto negotiateandexecutecontracts";and"located,
contactedandnegotiatedthecontractsfor our localinvestors,aswell asthenumerouscontractsfor
saleof goods." It appearsthatthebeneficiarywill beresponsiblefor marketresearch,developing
andmarketingtheservicesof thebusiness,finding newclientsandmeetingwith them,negotiating
contracts,andsalesoperationsratherthandirectingsuchactivitiesthroughsubordinateemployees.
An employeewho "primarily" performsthe tasksnecessaryto producea productor to provide
servicesis not consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity.See
sections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of the Act (requiringthat one"primarily" performthe enumerated
managerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatterof ChurchScientologyIntn 'l., 19I&N Dec.at604.
Thepetitioner'sorganizationalchartindicatedthatthebeneficiarywill supervisea vicepresident,a
businessspecialist,anda web master,andwill outsourcethe accountservicesandlegalservices.
The petitioner submittedForms W-2 for 2008 that indicated the petitioner employed four
individuals. The salariesreceivedby the threeemployeessupervisedby the beneficiaryindicate
thattheyarepart-timeemployees.Thewebmasterreceived$13,318.55;thevicepresidentreceived
$12,645.00andtheBusinessSpecialistreceived$6,400.00.It doesnot appearthatthebeneficiary
supervisesfull-time employeesthat performthe tasksnecessaryto provideservicesso that the
beneficiarycan primarily perform managerialor executiveduties. Thereis no evidencein the
recordthatthepetitioneroutsourcestheaccountservicesor thelegalservicessuchascontracts,pay
statements,or tax documents.It also appearsthat the beneficiarywill be responsiblefor the
financialoperations,bookkeeping,andcontracts.Goingonrecordwithoutsupportingdocumentary
evidenceis not sufficientfor purposesof meetingtheburdenof proof in theseproceedings.Matter
of Soffici,22 I&N Dec.158,165(Comm'r 1998)(citingMatterof TreasureCraft of California, 14
I&N Dec.190(Reg.Comm'r1972)).
The record indicatesthat at the time of filing the petition, a preponderanceof the beneficiary's
dutieswould havebeento directly provide the servicesof the business,regardlessof whethersuch
serviceswerequalifyingor not. While the AAO acknowledgesthat no beneficiaryis requiredto
allocate 100%of his or her time to managerial-or executive-leveltasks,the petitioner must
establishthat the non-qualifyingtasksthe beneficiarywould perform are only incidentalto her
proposedposition. An employeewho "primarily" performsthe tasksnecessaryto producea
productor to provideservicesis not consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor
executivecapacity.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of theAct (requiringthatone"primarily"
performthe enumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatter of ChurchScientology
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm.1988). The evidencefurnishedstronglyindicates
that the beneficiarywould not be employedprimarily in a qualifying managerialor executive
capacity.Forthisreason,thepetitionmaynotbeapproved.
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Basedon the vaguejob descriptionsubmittedwith thepetition,the directorreasonablyconcluded
that the petitionerhas failed to demonstratethat the beneficiarywould be primarily performing
managerialor executivedutiesin his proposedposition.
Thesecondissuein this proceedingis whetherthepetitionerhastheability to paythebeneficiary's
profferedwage.
Theregulationat 8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(g)(2)states,in pertinentpart:
Anypetitionfiledby or for anemployment-basedimmigrantwhichrequiresanoffer
of employmentmustbeaccompaniedby evidencethattheprospectiveUnitedStates
employerhastheability to paytheprofferedwage. Thepetitionermustdemonstrate
this ability at the time the priority date is establishedand continuing until the
beneficiaryobtainslawful permanentresidence.Evidenceof this ability shallbe in
the form of copies of annualreports, federal tax returns, or auditedfinancial
statements.
(Emphasisadded.)
On the Form I-140, the petitioner indicateda salary of $769.23per week or approximately
$40,000.00peryear. In determiningthepetitioner'sability to paytheprofferedwage,USCISwill
first examinewhetherthe petitioneremployedthe beneficiaryat the time the priority datewas
established.If thepetitionerestablishesby documentaryevidencethat it employedthebeneficiary
at a salaryequalto or greaterthantheprofferedwage,this evidencewill beconsideredprimafacie
proofof thepetitioner'sabilityto paythebeneficiary'ssalary.
The petitionersubmittedForm W-2 for 2008that indicatedthe beneficiaryreceiveda salaryof
$26,775.00for 2008. On appeal,the petitionersubmittedFormW-2 for 2009that indicatedthe
beneficiaryreceivedanannualsalaryof $43,204.00.Thus,the beneficiarydid receivemorethan
theproposedannualsalaryof approximately$40,000.00. Thus,the AAO will withdraw this portion
of thedirector's decision.
Finally,the directordeniedthe petitionconcludingthat the petitionerdid not establishthat it had
beendoingbusinessin theUnitedStatesfor oneyear. Theregulationat8C.F.R.§204.5(j)(2)states
thatdoingbusinessmeans"theregular,systematic,andcontinuousprovisionof goodsand/orservices
by afirm, corporation,or otherentityanddoesnotincludethemerepresenceof anagentor oflice." In
the presentmatter,the petitionersubmittedForm 1120,U.S.CorporationIncomeTax Return,for
2009thatindicatedgrossreceiptson salesof $326,475.00for thatyearandpaymentof salariesand
wagesof $168,959.00.Thepetitionerhadfour employeesandconductedbusinessfor at leastone
yearprior to the filing dateof thepetition. Accordingto thetaxdocumentsandotherevidencein
therecord,it appearsthatthepetitionerwasandis doingbusinessin theUnited States.TheAAO
will withdrawthisportionof thedirector'sdecision.
TheAAO acknowledgesthatUSCIShaspreviouslyapprovedanL-1A petitionandextensionsfiled
by the petitioneron behalfof the beneficiary. Many I-140 immigrantpetitionsaredeniedafter
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USCISapprovesprior nonimmigrantI-129L-1 petitions.See,e.g.,QData Consulting,Inc. v.INS,
293 F. Supp.2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003);IKEA US v. USDept. of Justice,48 F. Supp.2d 22; Fedin
Brothers Co.Ltd. v. Sava,724F. Supp.1103. Examiningthe consequencesof anapprovedpetition,
thereis a significantdifferencebetweena nonimmigrantL-1A visaclassification,which allowsan
aliento entertheUnitedStatestemporarily,andanimmigrantE-13visapetition,whichpermitsan
aliento apply for permanentresidencein the United Statesand,if granted,ultimatelyapply for
naturalizationasaUnitedStatescitizen. Cf §§204and214of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§§ 1154and1184;
seealso § 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. BecauseUSCISspendslesstime reviewingI-129
nonimmigrantpetitionsthan I-140 immigrantpetitions,somenonimmigrantL-1A petitionsare
simply approvedin error. Q Data Consulting,Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp.2d at 29-30; seealso 8
C.F.R.§ 214.2(1)(14)(i)(requiringno supportingdocumentationto file apetitionto extendanL-1A
petition'svalidity).
Despitethe previously approvedpetitions, USCIS does not have any authority to confer an
immigrationbenefitwhenthepetitionerfails to meetits burdenof proof in a subsequentpetition.
Seesection291of theAct. Eachpetitionfiling is a separateproceedingwith a separaterecord. See
8 C.F.R.§ 103.8(d). In makinga determinationof statutoryeligibility, USCIS is limited to the
information containedin that individual record of proceeding.See8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii).
Basedon the lackof requiredevidenceof eligibility in the currentrecord,the AAO findsthatthe
directorwasjustified in departingfrom the previousnonimmigrantpetitionapprovalsby denying
theinstantpetition.
In visapetitionproceedings,theburdenof provingeligibility for thebenefitsoughtremainsentirely
with thepetitioner. Section291of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361. Thepetitionerhasnot sustainedthat
burden.
ORDER: Theappealis dismissed.