dismissed EB-1C Case: Import/Sales

U.S. Department of IIomeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
' 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
64 
FILE: Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: DEC 0 8 2006 
WAC 05 207 52604 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to- 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C) 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the employment-based visa petition. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant immigrant visa petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager 
or executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
fj 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California that is 
engaged in the import and sale of porcelain products and home furniture. The petitioner seeks to employ the 
beneficiary as its president and general manager. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
would be employed by the United States entityin a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the director erred in concluding that the beneficiary's job 
duties would not be primarily managerial or executive in nature. Counsel challenges the director's findings 
that the job description offered by the petitioner is vague, and that the record demonstrates that the beneficiary 
would primarily perform non-qualifying tasks related to the petitioner's business functions. Counsel submits 
a brief in support of the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants.who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time 
of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United 
States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a 
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof 
and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render 
services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
The issue in the instant matter is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section I0 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj I 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
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(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion ind leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, hnctions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 1 01 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 1 0 l(a)(44)(B), provides: 
 k 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- d 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockhblders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the instant visa petition on July 13, 2005 noting the beneficiary's proposed employment as 
president and general manager of the seven-person United States company. In an attached letter, dated June 
17, 2005, the petitioner noted the beneficiary's employment in "dual roles" as both an executive and a 
manager, and outlined the following job duties associated with the position of president: 
1. Plans and directs all aspects of [the] organization's business development, sales and 
marketing, accounting and financial policies, planning, objectives, and initiatives; 
2. Establishes internal policies, including but not limited to, reward and punishment 
policies, performance evaluation standards, employee benefits, etc.; 
3. Determines the budgetary and personnel needs to achieve objectives; 
C Page 4 
4. Be responsible for developing new market initiatives, assessing new markets, and 
analyzing business opportunities; 
5. Represents the company's interest in dealing with government agencies, customers, 
employees, business service providers, etc.; 
6. Consults with CPA and legal counsel to familiarize with federal, state, and local 
government policies governing business practice in the U.S., including but not limited to, 
business registration, tax reporting, labor relations, etc.; 
7. Liaises with the parent company and the productions facilities to coordinate the U.S. 
operation with that of the parent company and the production facilities; 
8. Reports to the parent company regarding U.S. subsidiary's business progress, financial 
situation, and new market trends in the U.S., and seeks financial support from the parent 
company to fund the expansion program; 
The petitioner noted that as the company's general manager, the beneficiary would perform the following 
managerial job duties: 
1. Implements financial programs and hiring plans to support business and employee needs; 
2. ,Establishes responsibilities and procedures of essential functions, and directs and 
coordinates overall operation through subordinate managers or supervisors; 
3. Provides training to subordinates and specifies job assignments; 
4. 
 Supervises and controls the work of the sales manager, warehouse manager, and office 
manager; 
5. Exercises total control over financial issues such as budget control, funding, fund 
allocation, cash flow, extension of credit, and personnel actions such as hiring and firing, 
promotion, leave authorization; 
6. Implements reward and punishment policies based on performance evaluation; 
7. Reviews sales reports to determine business progress and takes necessary actions to 
obtain business objectives; 
8. Listens to reports froin subordinates managers or supervisors regarding issues arising 
from.day-to-day operation and gives instructions as to how to deal with the problems. 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary would supervise a sales manager, warehouse manager, and office 
manager, who would "submit budgetary request[s] for [the] [plresident's approval, supervise and manage the 
company's import, sales, marketing, shipping, and accounting operations, and prepares [sic] operations reports 
for [the] [plresident's review." 
In an appended organizational chart of the United States company, the beneficiary was depicted as 
supervising the company's six employees that consisted of a porcelain division sales manager, a home 
furniture division sales manager, an office manager, a warehouse manager, an administrative-import assistant, 
and a warehouse worker. The petitioner noted its use of two outside sales representatives, as well as two 
stores within which it purportedly sold its porcelain products and furnishings. The petitioner also attached a 
list of its seven employees, briefly noting the job responsibilities held by each. 
The petitioner also submitted its employee records for the months of April through June 2005, and state and 
federal quarterly wage reports for the period ending June 30,2005. 
The director issued a request for evidence on December 16, 2005 directing the petitioner to submit the 
following documentary evidence of the beneficiary's employment in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity: (1) an organizational chart describing the job duties and educational levels of all employees 
supervised by the beneficiary and how the workers are compensated; (2) a "detailed description" of the job 
duties performed by the beneficiary, as well as a description of the beneficiary's "typical day"; and (3) 
certified state quarterly wage reports filed by the petitioner for the third and fourth quarters in 2005. 
Counsel for the petitioner responded in a letter dated March 6, 2006, noting that the petitioner employed 
seven full-time workers and three commissioned sales representatives. The AAO notes that according to the 
petitioner's attached list, each of its sales representatives, of which two are businesses, were contracted for 
work with the petitioning entity approximately two months after the present filing. 
In his letter, counsel explained that the petitioner operated with four departments - porcelain sales, furniture 
sales, shipping-receiving-warehousing, and importing-administration - each of which is supervised by a 
manager who reports to the beneficiary. Counsel stated that under each manager are employees who perform 
the "routine operational duties" of the department. Counsel also noted the petitioner's use of an outside 
accountant to complete its monthly payroll, tax reporting, and financial statements. 
Additionally, counsel provided the following outline of the beneficiary's "typical day": 
(2 hr. or 21%) 
Check all e-mail incoming from Japan headquarter, China factories; Hong Kong and 
Paris [blranches and reply [to] all e-mail. The contents of the e-mails included 
oversights over issues regarding product development and design, production, 
regional sales, etc. 
10:30 - 11 :30 AM 
(1 hr. or 11%) 
Brief meeting with sales managers and make monthly planning[.] 
11.30 AM- 1:30 PM 
(2 hr. or 21%) 
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accounting contracts for tax reporting, financial statements, payroll, and consulting 
about updated tax issues. 
2:OO- 4:00 PM 
(2 hr. or 21%) 
king meeting appointment with Disney Buyers on 01/18/06, called 
who is the Sourcing Manager for Disney and discussed about 2006 
Christmas production increases. 
4:00 - 4145 PM 
(45 min. or 8%) 
Telephone conversation with (president of Japan parent company 
President [sic], discussing development schedule and speed for all new projects 
including new pet products and Disney products 2006[.] 
4.45-5115 PM 
(30 min. or 5%) 
Telephone conversation with 
 (China Factory Manager), requesting an 
increase of employees from 1,000 to 1,300 due to new projects coming for 2006[.] 
5.15 - 6100 PM 
(45 min. or 8%) 
Check in coming and out going &mail[.] 
6.00 PM , Left office[.] 
8:00 - 8:30 PM 
(30 min. or 5%) 
Telephone conversation with Hong Kong [algent, 
 ] to source other 
vendors in China, Vietnam, and Thailand[.] 
Counsel claimed that the outline of the beneficiary's "typical" job duties demonstrated that the beneficiary 
was "mainly concerned with and occupied with issues related to the organization's direction, supervision, 
development, and coordination of various aspects of the operation," and would occupy a primarily managerial 
or executive position within the petitioning entity. 
Counsel submitted the petitioner's state quarterly wage report for the third quarter of 2005. The AAO notes 
,that according to the amount in wages reflected on the quarterly wage report, the petitioner's office manager 
appears.to have been employed on a part-time basis during the period this petition was filed. 
The director issued a decision, dated April 1 1, 2006, concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated that 
the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. The director restated the job duties associated with the beneficiary's positions of president and 
general manager, and specifically noted that a portion of the job duties are not typically deemed to be 
managerial or executive in nature. The director concluded that the beneficiary's job duties of developing and 
assessing new markets, interacting with government agencies and customers, and supervising the company's 
three managers are more suggestive of those tasks necessary "to provide a service or to produce a product." 
The director further stated that the job description presented by the petitioner was "vague and nonspecific," 
and failed explain what tasks the beneficiary would perform on a daily basis. The director specifically noted 
that the petitioner did not "define [its] goals, policies, [or] strategies, or clarify who actually performs the 
marketing, budgeting, finance and accounting, advertising, and personnel functions." 
The director also noted that the petitioner appeared to employ only five full-time workers on the date of filing, 
while the remaining two were employed on a part-time basis. As mentioned previously, the AAO notes that 
the petitioner's September 30, 2005 state quarterly wage report suggests that the petitioner employed at least 
one part-time worker, its office manager, on the filing date. According to the quarterly wage report, a second 
worker, the manager of the porcelain department, received wages that suggest employment in a part-time 
status. It appears, however; that at some time during the third quarter this employee replaced the previous 
porcelain department manager, and therefore had only begun to receive compensation. 
The director ultimately determined that the beneficiary would assist with the day-to-day non-qualifying tasks 
related to the petitioner's business functions and would not occupy a primarily managerial or executive 
position. The director further concluded that the beneficiary would not be employed as a function manager as 
the petitioner had not demonstrated that "the beneficiary manages or directs the management of a department, 
subdivision, function, or component of the petitioning organization." Consequently, the director denied the 
petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends in an April 21, 2006 brief that Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS) erred in determining that the beneficiary did not qualify for the requested immigrant visa 
classification. Counsel challenges the director's classification of some of the beneficiary's job duties as non- 
managerial and non-executive, stating that his finding was "arbitrary" and not supported by "any convincing 
arguments." Counsel instructs that even if a portion of the beneficiary's job duties are considered non- 
qualifying, the relevant statute "does not require that the beneficiary's duties in the U.S. have been or will be 
exclusively executive or managerial in nature." (Emphasis in original). 
Counsel further disputes the director's finding that the description of the beneficiary's "typical day" is vague 
and nonspecific. Counsel contends that the director failed to discuss why the job description was insufficient 
to establish the beneficiary's performance of primarily managerial or executive job duties. 
Counsel also claims that the petitioner sufficiently accounted for the performance of its non-qualifying 
functions, such as marketing, budgeting, finance, accounting, advertising, and personnel, in the job 
descriptions offered for its managers and lower-level employees. Counsel states that each of the petitioner's 
four departments has a manager who is "responsible for the management of daily operations of the department 
and supervision of the work of department e_mployee(s)." Counsel contends that the petitioner's managers, 
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lower-level employees, and contracted sales representatives and accountant relieve the beneficiary from 
personally performing the daily operational tasks of the business. 
Lastly, counsel contends that the director erred in deeming the beneficiary to be employed as a first-line 
supervisor. Counsel states that the beneficiary meets the statutory criteria of a manager, as he supervises 
managerial employees and exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making. Counsel notes that the 
employees subordinate to the'beneficiary are either managers or first-line supervisors. Counsel contends that 
 . 
the beneficiary's additional "supervisory duties" such as making decisions and establishing goals for the 
corporation, exercising discretion over the company's operations, determining its budget and line of products, 
and assigning tasks demonstrate that the beneficiary would not occupy the position of first-line supervisor. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the United 
States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
/ 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(')(5). 
As mentioned by the director, the job descriptions offered by the petitioner are not sufficiently detailed so as 
to clarify the managerial or executive job duties performed by the beneficiary on a daily basis. Specifically, 
the beneficiary was identified as being responsible for ."developing new market initiatives," "assessing new 
markets," representing the petitioner in its contacts with government agencies, customers, and business 
service providers, and liaising with foreign production facilities. The petitioner does not explain what 
specific managerial or executive job duties are associated with these job responsibilities. For example, 
without an explanation of the beneficiary's role in developing and assessing new markets, it is unclear 
whether the beneficiary is personally responsible for performing the company's marketing functions and 
expanding its customer base, which may reasonably be assumed from the petitioner's representations. 
Additionally, based on the petitioner's brief statement, it appears that the beneficiary's role in the production 
of the petitioner's products overseas, in which he "coordinate[s] the U.S. operation with that of the parent 
company and the production facilities" falls short of being managerial or executive. Again, the petitioner 
failed to explain how the beneficiary's responsibility as a liaison with the foreign company and production 
facility would incorporate primarily managerial or executive tasks. 
Similarly, the petitioner did not.define the managerial or executive responsibilities associated with directing 
the company's "objectives," "initiatives," "essential functions," "financial programs," or "overall operation." 
Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the 
regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to 
answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual 
duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 
I 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The outline of the beneficiary's "typical day" supports the suggestion that the beneficiary would be personally 
responsible for performing several of the petitioner's non-qualifying day-to-day functions. Based on the 
beneficiary's "typical" daily tasks, the beneficiary is responsible for addressing issues related to the 
development, design and production of the petitioner's products, as well as determining production levels and 
staffing of the foreign facilities, and locating overseas vendors. Cumulatively, these non-managerial and non- 
executive responsibilities occupy sixty percent of the beneficiary's time. Moreover, copies of the petitioner's 
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invoices and bills of lading, one of which bears a date subsequent to the present filing, reference the 
beneficiary as the contact for the petitioning entity, thereby suggesting that the beneficiary is personally 
selling the petitioner's products. Contrary to counsel's claim on appeal, the beneficiary's job duties do not 
appear to be primarily managerial or executive in nature. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks 
necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one 
"primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
Int 'I., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Cornm. 1988). 
The AAO notes that the petitioner has not identified any subordinate workers who would relieve the 
beneficiary from performing these tasks. Nor has the petitioner documented why these responsibilities should 
be considered managerial or executive in nature. See $5 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Moreover, it does not appear that the petitioner employs a staff sufficient- to support the beineficiary in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. As required by section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, if staffing levels 
are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, CIS 
must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of 
development of the organization. 
Here, at the time of filing, the petitioner employed the beneficiary as its president-general manager, two sales 
managers, a warehouse manager, a warehouse worker, and an administrative-import assistant. As discussed 
above, the petitioner's staff also included a part-time office manager. Despite the petitioner's claims, there is 
no evidence that it utilized outside sales representatives at the time the immigrant visa petition was filed. 
According to a list submitted by the petitioner in response to the director's request for evidence, its three sales 
representatives began selling the petitioner's products in September and October 2005, at least two months 
after the present filing date. Also, each of the three Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms 1099 issued by the 
petitioner in 2005 reflected compensation paid only to those three representatives obtained after the filing. 
There is no evidence that on the date of filing the petitioner contracted with "Roselinde Porcelain," "Calendar 
Club," "Oriental ~radin~'," or "Kashu Sales," the companies identified on its initial organizational chart, for 
sales services. 
The petitioner has not established who would be responsible for performing its sales functions, which, 
according to the petitioner, includes the use of such avenues as direct mail, exhibitions, catalogs, and the 
company website. The AAO notes that the petitioner maintains separate sales departments for its porcelain 
items and home furnishings, thereby suggesting the need for multiple sales employees or representatives. As 
discussed above, the petitioner also failed to account for the performance of its marketing and production 
functions. Based on the petitioner's representations, the beneficiary appears to be personally responsible for 
the performance of any related non-managerial and non-executive tasks. The record as presently constituted 
' The AAO recognizes that the petitioner is 'doing business as Oriental Trading through its home furniture 
department. However, the date on which it commenced operations is not clear as the petitioner noted on its 
list of commissioned sales representatives that Oriental Trading was "hired" in September 2005. 
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does not support a finding that the petitioner's reasonable needs might plausibly be met by the services of the 
beneficiary and his support staff. 
Counsel claims on appeal that the beneficiary would supervise managerial ana supervisory employees and 
would exercise wide latitude in discretionary decision-making, thereby satisfying the statutory criteria of 
"managerial capacity." The AAO notes that the petitioner's obligation in establishing the beneficiary's 
classification as a manager or executive goes beyond merely restating the statutory definitions. See Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108 (stating that conclusory assertions or restatements of the 
language of the statute or regulations do not satisfy the petitioner's burden of establishing the beneficiary as a 
manager or executive). In order to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity, the petitioner must first show that the beneficiary performs the high-level 
responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. The petitioner holds the additional responsibility of 
demonstrating that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a 
majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 
1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). As discussed above, the petitioner has not satisfied this obligation. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
The AAO recognizes that CIS previously approved three L-IA nonimmigrant visa petitions filed by the 
petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary. It should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the 
benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by CIS than nonimmigrant petitions. The 
AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same 
definitions of managerial and executive capacity. See $$ 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
$ 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the 
question of overall eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions 
of managerial and executive capacity.. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa 
classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and 
an immigrant visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, 
if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. CJ: $$ 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. $5 1154 and 1184; see also $ 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1427. 
-. 
In addition, unless a petition seeks extension of a "new office" petition, the regulations allow for the approval 
of an L-1 extension without any supporting evidence and CIS normally accords the petitions a less substantial 
review. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an 
L-IA petition's validity). Because CIS spends less time reviewing L-1 petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant 
petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1 petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 
F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003). 
Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record,of proceeding with a separate 
burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The pripr nonimmigrant approvals do 
not preclude CIS from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texas ABM Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 
556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that 
CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. CIS denies many 1-140 
petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 
Page 11 
293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 
724 F. Supp. at 1 103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported and 
contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and 
gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, 
e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to 
suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. 
Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Due to the lack of 
required evidence in the present record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the 
previous nonimmigrant approvals by denying the present immigrant petition. 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.