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PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: 
 OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: gp 0 8 2M6 
SRC 06 072 50536 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
.--- -J& 
~orbert P. Wemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. The matter is 
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
The petitioner is a Texas corporation engaged in the business of international and domestic sales of chemical, 
decorative, and health supplement products. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as its president. Accordingly, 
the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational 
executive or manager. 
On June 6, 2006, the director determined that the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proffered wage and denied the petition. More specifically, the director cited the provisions of 
8 C.F.R. 3 204.5(g)(2), which specifically requires that the prospective United States employer, i.e., the 
petitioner, establish its own ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage. In the instant matter, Part 6, Item 
9 of the Form 1-140 indicates that the beneficiary's proffered wage is $60,000 per year. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's conclusion on the basis that the foreign entity, which is the claimed 
owner of the petitioner, has established its ability to pay. Counsel further admits (and the documentation in 
the record supports counsel's admission) that the petitioner itself lacks the ability to pay the beneficiary's 
proffered wage. Numerous financial documents belonging to the foreign entity were submitted in order to 
establish that entity's ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 103.3(a)(l)(v) states, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact 
for the appeal. 
Inasmuch as the petitioner has failed to identify specifically an erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of 
fact in this proceeding and based on counsel's own interpretation of the law, which is entirely contrary to the 
relevant and unambiguous regulatory provision, this petition cannot be approved. 
Furthermore, the record supports a finding of ineligibility based on additional grounds that were not 
previously addressed in the director's decision. 
First, 8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(3)(i)(B) states that the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was employed 
abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive position for at least one out of the three years prior to entry as 
a nonimmigrant. In the instant matter, the petitioner provided a letter dated November 18, 2005 from the 
foreign entity describing the beneficiary's position abroad. However, the description is comprised of a brief 
account of the beneficiary's broad job responsibilities, which was devoid of any the duties actually performed 
by the beneficiary on a daily basis. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's 
duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a 
matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 
905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). As the record lacks a detailed description of the actual duties performed by the 
beneficiary during his employment abroad, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary's foreign 
employment was within a qualifying capacity. 
Second, 8 C.F.R. $ 204.56)(3)(i)(C) states that the petitioner must establish that it has a qualifying 
relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. In the instant matter, the petitioner claims to be a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer. However, the evidence of record does not support 
this claim. Namely, the petitioner has submitted two of its corporate tax returns-one tax return for 2004 and 
another for 2005. However, neither tax return includes a completed Schedule L, which accounts for 
shareholder equity, i.e., shareholder capital contribution in exchange for shares purchased. 
Furthermore, while Article Four of the petitioner's Articles of Incorporation states that the par value of the 
petitioner's stock would be $1 per share, the Minutes of Organizational Meeting that took place on October 
12, 2003 indicate that the claimed parent entity bought 3 10 shares of the petitioner's stock at $100 per share 
and note that "[tlhis price per share shall not be less than the par value stated in the Articles of Incorporation." 
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective 
evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner 
submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591- 
92 (BIA 1988). Although the petitioner provided a "Certified Shareholder List," this document is a mere 
attestation of the petitioner's vice president, which can only be deemed a third party claim, not the 
independent objective evidence required to resolve this inconsistency. The petitioner also provided a stock 
certificate indicating that 310 of its shares were issued to the beneficiary's foreign employer. However, as 
general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient 
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft 
of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). As the petitioner failed to provide sufficient, credible 
evidence documenting its ownership and control, the AAO cannot conclude that it properly established a 
qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer at the time of filing the Form 1-140. 
Third, 8 C.F.R. tj 204.5(j)(3)(i)(D) states that the petitioner must establish that it has been doing business for 
at least one year prior to filing the Form 1-140. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 204.5(j)(2) states that doing 
business means "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andlor services by a firm, 
corporation, or other entity and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office." As the petition was 
filed on January 3, 2006, the petitioner must establish that it had been doing business as of January 3, 2005 in 
order to meet the provisions in 8 C.F.R. fj 204.56)(3)(i)(D). In the instant matter, the petitioner provided 
numerous shipping documents dated April, May, October, and November of 2005.' No additional 
documentation was provided to establish that the petitioner was doing business on a "regular, systematic, and 
continuous" manner during the remaining eight months of the relevant 12-month period. 
Lastly, 8 C.F.R. $ 204.5Cj)(5) requires that the petitioner submit an offer of employment with a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States. In the instant matter, the petitioner did 
not submit such a letter. Rather, the only letter discussing the beneficiary's proposed position in the United 
States is dated April 17, 2006 and was written by an official of the beneficiary's foreign employer, not his 
prospective employer. The only other discussion of the beneficiary's proposed employment can be found in 
the petitioner's organizational chart. However, neither job description consists of specific duties the 
beneficiary would actually perform on a daily basis. It is noted that reciting the beneficiary's vague job 
I 
 The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's submission of other shipping documentation. However, only documentation 
that directly applies to the relevant 12-month period will be discussed. 
Page 4 
responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this 
case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. As the record lacks an 
adequate account of the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States, the AAO cannot conclude that the 
beneficiary would primarily perform duties of a qualifying managerial or executive nature. 
As a final note, service records show the petitioner's previously approved L-1 employment of the beneficiary. 
With regard to the beneficiary's L-1 nonimmigrant classification, it should be noted that, in general, given the 
permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by CIS than 
nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa 
classifications rely on the same definitions of managerial and executive capacity. See $8 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive 
capacity are the same, the question of overall eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the 
provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and executive capacity. There are significant differences 
between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for 
no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent 
residence in the United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. 
CJ: $8 204 and 2'14 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $5 1154 and 1184; see also $ 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1427. 
In addition, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of prooc each petition must stand on its own individual merits. CIS denies many 1-140 immigrant 
petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 
293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 
724 F. Supp. at 1 103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions 
that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of 
the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or 
any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 
1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afyd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the additional grounds of ineligibility discussed above, this 
petition cannot be approved. 
Page 5 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, afyd, 345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. The petitioner has not 
sustained that burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed.