dismissed EB-1C Case: Jewelry

identifying data deleted to 
preve dearly unwarranted 
of personal privacy 
US. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W ., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
EAC 06 023 50 1 92 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a New York corporation claiming to be a jewelry wholesaler and distributor. It seeks to 
employ the beneficiary as its president. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an 
employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203 (b)( 1 )(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1 153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The director determined that the 
beneficiary would not be employed in a managerial or executive capacity and denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's conclusions and submits a brief in support of her arguments. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described 
in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the 
alien's application for classification and admission into the United States 
under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firrn or 
corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who 
seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the 
same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for a firrn, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, 
and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
The primary issue addressed by the director in this proceeding is whether the petitioner would employ the 
beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
Page 3 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 10 1 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-malung; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In support of the Form 1-140, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 29, 2005 containing the 
following description of the beneficiary's proposed employment, which the petitioner claimed would be 
within an executive capacity: 
1. 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function: 
As [plresident, [the beneficiary] will has [sic] full executive and managerial control for 
[sic] all operations and activities of the United States company. The [plresident controls all 
day-to-day operations of the entity and makes day-to-day decisions about the goals and 
management of the U.S. company. He approves contract negotiations for sales, directs the 
profession activities of the [vlice [plresident who supervises a sales person and accountant, 
formulates all business plans, short and long term, for the New York entity in coordination 
with the activities of the parent company, and communicates with the parent company 
regarding the current financial status of the U.S. entity. 
[The beneficiary] also possesses the sole responsibility for the selection of full-time staff. 
Additionally, he has sole discretion over all ancillary personnel decisions, including 
compensation, leave, discharge, vacation and training as well as the management and 
supervision of work performed. . . . 
2. 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function: 
[The beneficiary] establishes all goals and policies for the U.S. entity. 
 He makes 
fundamental decisions regarding the types of customers which the company should target 
for sales and distnbution and has full and ultimate responsibility for overall U.S. 
operations. This includes establishing all company policies regarding business strategies, 
personnel and operating policies. He is the sole individual in the U.S. entity qualified and 
authorized to make these critical [and] fundamental decisions. 
3. 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making: 
As previously stated, [the beneficiary] possesses nearly unbridled discretion in rendering 
important and key decisions for the U.S. entity. He makes key decisions in terms of 
company policies (both internal and external), business strategies, policies and procedures. 
Additionally, he possesses sole responsibility for the selection of staff and sole discretion 
over all ancillary personnel decisions, including compensation, leave, discharge, vacation 
and training. 
4. 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives: 
Since [the beneficiary] possesses 
 central, highest level position in the U.S. entity, he 
receives no supervision or direction from any other person in the U.S. as stated above, he 
consults with the parent company to advise them of current business strategies and the 
financial status of the U.S. entity. He receives only minimal supervision and direction by 
the parent company. 
On March 22, 2006, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) issued a request for additional evidence 
(RFE) instructing the petitioner to provide the following documentation regarding the beneficiary's proposed 
employment capacity in the United States: 1) a detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed day-to-day 
duties with an hourly breakdown of time assigned to each duty on a weekly basis; 2) evidence of the 
petitioner's management and personnel structures identifying the beneficiary's subordinates, and their 
respective position titles and job duties; and 3) the Form W-2s and W-3s issued by the petitioner in 2004 and 
2005, as well as the petitioner's quarterly tax returns for the first three quarters of 2005. 
The petitioner's response included a letter from counsel dated June 15, 2006 asserting that the beneficiary's 
proposed employment fits the definition of a function manager whose role does not include overseeing the 
work of other employees. Counsel also listed and described the exhibits that addressed issues raised in the 
RFE. The petitioner's submissions include the following hourly breakdown of the beneficiary's proposed job 
responsibilities: 
1. [Alpproximately 13 hourslweek researching, developing and overseeing the 
implementation of corporate marketing and sales programs. This entails overseeing the 
staff and analyzing the performance of sales associates with respect to sales and 
marketing strategies. 
2. 
 [Alpproximately 8 hourslweek developing the U.S. market by continuing to explore 
new customer bases and establishing local sales networks. This includes initiating 
high-level sales negotiations with major clients and cultivating and maintaining 
relationship with clients. 
3. [Alpproximately 8 hourslweek formulating mid- and long-term business plans; 
budgeting and monitoring corporate cash flow and liquidity; and issuing final approval 
on budgets, expenditures, sales, purchasing, and personnel decisions. 
4. 
 [Alpproximately 2 hourslweek building and maintaining relationships with selected 
professionals. This includes evaluating options and malung decisions on who to 
contact to develop future business for the company. 
5. 
 [Alpproximately 8 hourslweek making executive decisions concerning inventory and 
pricing[.] 
6. 
 [Alpproximately 1 hourlweek contracting with [sic] necessary services[.] 
The petitioner also provided an organizational chart illustrating a three-tiered organizational hierarchy in 
which the beneficiary occupies the senior-most position. The chart indicates that the beneficiary's only direct 
subordinate is a vice president, whose two subordinates include a sales person and a sales person/accountant. 
In a separate submission, the petitioner provided a general overview of each employee's job responsibilities. 
While the petitioner also provided three of its quarterly tax returns for 2005, the quarterly tax return for the 
third quarter, during which the Form 1-140 was filed, was not submitted. The AAO notes, however, that the 
petitioner filed the Form 1-140 on September 30, 2005. According to the information provided in the 2005 
fourth quarterly tax return, the petitioner had a total of three employees as of October 1, 2005, which is one 
day after the Form 1-140 was filed. As such, even though the third quarterly wage report was technically the 
quarter during which the Form 1-140 was filed, the fourth quarterly wage report is also reliable for the 
purpose of determining the petitioner's staffing composition during the relevant time period. 
Regarding counsel's claim that the beneficiary's position fits the definition of function manager, the 
explanation provided suggests that this claim arose in reaction to CIS'S concern over the petitioner's staffing 
structure. Specifically, counsel suggested that the lack of a large support staff within the petitioner's 
organizational hierarchy is justified if the beneficiary is not charged with the task of supervising subordinate 
employees. However, counsel's assertion is not valid, as it is primarily driven by her apparent attempt to 
explain the petitioner's inadequate staffing composition and fails to identify the beneficiary's essential 
function. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the 
work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within 
the organization. See section 10 l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 10 l(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be 
performed, i.e., identi6 the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and 
establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. 8 
C.F.R. tj 204.56)(5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must 
demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. 
An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Boyang, Ltd. v. I.N.S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 
1995 WL 576839 (9th Cir, 1995)(citing Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 
(Comm. 1988)). In the present matter, the petitioner fails to identify the beneficiary's essential function, or 
the specific duties attributed to managing the purported function. 
Upon considering the petitioner's claim and the various documents submitted in support thereof, the director 
denied the petition in a decision dated September 8, 2006. The director discussed the petitioner's 
organizational structure and the various tax documents submitted in response to the RFE and concluded that 
the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive 
capacity. 
While the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion, various comments made in the supporting analysis 
were inappropriate and must be withdrawn. Specifically, the director discussed the petitioner's 2004 tax 
documentation. However, the instant petition was not filed in 2004. Rather, it was filed in September of 
2005. As the petitioner is only required to establish eligibility at the time of filing its Form 1-140, the 
petitioner's 2004 tax return is irrelevant to issues concerning the beneficiary's employment capacity within the 
U.S. entity. See Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). The director also stated that the 
positions of the staff members within the petitioner's organization do not appear to be professional in nature. 
This comment suggests an oversight of various portions of section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, which 
specifically provides for individuals in a managerial capacity whose duties include overseeing the work of 
supervisory or managerial subordinates as well as professionals. Lastly, the director stated that the 
beneficiary's own job duties "will [not] be so complex that they could be considered professional in nature." 
There is no requirement, either in the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions, which suggests that a 
beneficiary's proposed employment must be of a professional nature. As such, the director's comments 
specifically discussed in this paragraph are hereby withdrawn. 
Notwithstanding the inaccuracies in the director's various comments as discussed above, the AAO supports 
the director's finding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary's proposed employment would 
primarily entail duties within a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's prospective job duties would be within a managerial and an 
executive capacity. She states that the beneficiary's specific knowledge of the petitioner's business will 
increase the petitioner's marketing share in the United States. Counsel claims that the beneficiary's 
responsibilities would include evaluating marketing and analyzing reports from employees. However, based 
on the information provided thus far, the beneficiary would be the one performing the petitioner's marketing- 
related tasks. With regard to analyzing reports, it is unclear who would be providing the reports for the 
beneficiary's review. Counsel's latter claim on appeal becomes increasingly less valid when considered in 
light of prior statements in which she suggested that the beneficiary's prospective role with the U.S. entity 
would be that of a function manager, which involves overseeing an essential function, not individuals. 
Counsel's claim is also contradicted by the petitioner's own job description, which was provided in response 
to the WE and in which the petitioner stated that approximately 13 hours of the beneficiary's total 40-hour 
work week would involve overseeing staff and analyzing the performance of sales associates. Moreover, 
merely claiming that the beneficiary would control daily business operations and have the ultimate say in all 
business decisions is not synonymous with identifying a specific essential function. The beneficiary's 
heightened degree of discretion has been considered. However, it is only one of various factors that must be 
weighed in determining whether the beneficiary would primarily perform tasks of a qualifying nature. More 
specifically, in examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, CIS will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). The actual duties themselves reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 
905 F.2d 4 1 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Tn the present matter, neither the job description provided in support of the Form 1-140, nor the one provided 
in response to the WE specifically identifies the job duties to be performed by the beneficiary on a daily 
basis. Both descriptions are general and primarily convey the beneficiary's level of discretionary authority 
rather than specific tasks. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are 
primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of 
reiterating the regulations. Id. Simply stating that 8 hours, or 20%, of the beneficiary's time would be spent 
formulating goals and using his discretionary authority regarding the petitioner's budget and that another 8 
hours would be spent making decisions regarding inventory provides no insight as to the means by which 
these general responsibilities would be met. Similarly, the petitioner stated that two hours, or 5%, of the 
beneficiary's time would be spent building relationships with certain professionals. However, the petitioner 
failed to explain how the beneficiary would build such relationships or what exactly is meant by "selected 
professionals." While the petitioner further stated that the beneficiary would spend another one hour per 
week contracting for necessary services, no explanation was provided to clarify which services were sought 
and why the beneficiary was charged with seelung out these services even though he purportedly has a 
subordinate support staff. Thus, nearly half of the beneficiary's time at work would be spent performing 
tasks, which the petitioner has failed to specifically define. 
While the petitioner was more specific in discussing the duties that would comprise the remaining portion of 
the beneficiary's time, performing market research, devising marketing strategies, and seeking out customers 
to expand the petitioner's client base cannot be deemed as qualifying tasks. Rather, these are daily 
operational tasks, which the beneficiary would perform due to the petitioner's lack of a sufficient support 
staff. Despite counsel's argument that the petitioner can function with its existing support staff, the fact that 
the beneficiary would be required to perform daily operational tasks for approximately 50% of his time 
suggests that the petitioner would be unable to employ the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity, 
which requires that the majority of the beneficiary's time be spent performing tasks of a managerial or 
executive nature. Thus, while the petitioner may be able to function with its current support staff, it is not yet 
able to support a managerial or executive position. As previously stated, an employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
On review, the record as presently constituted is not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary would 
be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The fact that an individual manages a small 
business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification as an employee in a managerial or 
executive capacity within the meaning of section 101(a)(44) of the Act. Counsel has made a variety of 
inconsistent claims suggesting that the beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity while at the 
same time managing an essential function as well as supervising subordinate employees within the 
organization. While these inconsistencies could have been resolved, or at least clarified, with a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's specific daily job duties, the petitioner described the beneficiary's prospective 
employment using general terms and primarily focused on the beneficiary's discretionary authority rather than 
identifying the specific tasks the beneficiary would perform on a daily basis. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, the record indicates that a preponderance of the beneficiary's duties have been and would continue to 
be dedicated to directly providing the services of the business. Thus, based on the evidence furnished, it 
cannot be found that the beneficiary would be employed primarily in a qualifying managerial or executive 
capacity. For this reason, the petition may not be approved. 
Furthermore, the record does not support a finding of eligibility based on additional grounds that were not 
previously addressed in the director's decision. 
The first issue concerns the provisions of 8 C.F.R. 9 204.56)(3)(i)(C), which states that the petitioner must 
establish that it has a quali*ng relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. In the present matter, 
the petitioner claims that ! the beneficiary's claimed foreign employer, wholly owns the 
petitioner. In support of this claim, the petitioner provides a stock certificate and a stock ledger, which appear 
to support the petitioner's claim. However, in order to fully meet the provisions of 8 C.F.R. 
5 204.56)(3)(i)(C), the petitioner must substantiate the claim that the beneficiary was actually employed by 
the foreign entity that is claimed to own the petitioner. In the present matter, the relevant documentation 
includes several of the foreign entity's bank statements showing that the foreign entity withdrew funds and 
attributed such withdrawals to someone named Sanjay. While the AAO acknowledges that the beneficiary's 
first name is Sanjay, and that the withdrawals may have been made for his benefit, the fact that a last name is 
not included in any of the bank statements precludes the AAO fiom concluding that the funds were 
withdrawn for and paid to the beneficiary. 
Furthermore, even if the petitioner were able to establish that the named in the bank statements is 
actually the beneficiary, there is no indication that the withdrawn amounts represented remuneration drawn by 
the beneficiary as a result of his employment for. If, indeed, the withdrawals represent 
the beneficiary's salary for employment abroad, it is unclear why the withdrawals were sporadic. For 
example, in January of 2004 there were two withdrawals with two weeks in between each withdrawal. 
However, there was only one withdrawal in February of 2004 and only one withdrawal in March of 2004. 
Additionally, the withdrawal amounts range drastically from 157 rupees in March of 2004 to 2,089 rupees on 
January 14, 2004. There is no explanation as to why the beneficiary did not draw a salary within a consistent 
time frame and why the amount of the salary ranged so drastically. 
While the petitioner also provided a salary voucher fiom the foreign entity to account for the beneficiary's 
salary payments from October of 2003 to June of 2004, this document is inconsistent with the bank statements 
discussed above. Specifically, the salary voucher indicates that the beneficia 
 was aid 10,000 rupees during 
each of the nine months accounted for. However, according to February 2004 bank 
statement, which accounts for all transactions made during January of 2004, withdrawals in the name of 
ly amounted to 3,784 rupees, which is far short of the 10,000 rupees claimed in the salary voucher. 
The validity of the salary voucher becomes even more suspect when noting the fact that this document was 
created on March 15, 2005 to account for salaries paid during a random nine-month period that predated the 
creation of the salary voucher by approximately 18 months. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The considerable inconsistencies 
presented in the documentation that was submitted to establish the beneficiary's foreign employment have 
neither been resolved nor acknowledged. As the petitioner has failed to establish the beneficiary's 
employment with the entity claiming to own the petitioner, the AAO concludes that the petitioner has failed to 
satisfy the provisions cited in 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(3)(i)(C). 
The second issue beyond the director's decision is another matter of credibility. Specifically, in Part I of the 
Form 1-140 the petitioner indicated that its business address is , New York, NY 
10036. The petitioner also provided a lease agreement, signed by the beneficiary, which identifies the same 
business address as the location of the leased premises. However, close review of the first page of the lease 
agreement shows that the document has been altered and the name'of the business leasing the premises has 
been scratched out with the exception of the word "Inc.," signifying that a corporation has taken over the 
premises as of April 1, 2004. It is further noted that while the beneficiary signed the lease on the third page 
on behalf of the tenant, th 
 ctly next to the redacted name of the entity, shows the name of the 
petitioner's vice president, 
 as part of the name of the entity leasing the premises. 
Additionally, the petitioner has provided shipping documents and invoices that show at least one other 
company, with whom the petitioner claims to be doing business, has claimed the same address as its 
respective place of business as the address cited in the petitioner's purported lease. Specifically, shipping 
documents from Januarv. Februarv. and March of 2005. where the ~etitioner is identified as the buver of 
goods, show that -he seller of the goods, occupiei the premises purportedly leasedio the 
petitioner. Meanwhile, other shipping invoices for similar time periods show the same business address for 
the petitioner. The petitioner's credibility is further compromised by its submission of an undated letter from 
which claims to be the leaseholder of , which is claimed to have been 
occupied by the petitioner "since April 1, 2004 to the present." This information contradicts information 
provided by the petitioner in Part I of the Form 1-140, the petitioner's various tax documents, a significant 
number of its sales and shippin invoices, as well as the questionable lease itself, all of which indicate that the 
petitioner occupied suite no. a not suite no.- 
With regard to all of the considerable inconsistencies cited above, the AAO notes that a few errors or minor 
discrepancies are not reason to question the credibility of an alien or an employer seeking immigration 
benefits. See, e.g., Spencer Enterprises Inc. v. US., 345 F.3d 683, 694 (9th Cir., 2003). However, anytime a 
petition includes numerous errors and discrepancies, and the petitioner fails to resolve those errors, those 
inconsistencies will raise serious concerns about the veracity of the petitioner's assertions. Doubt cast on any 
aspect of the petitioner's proof may undermine the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence 
offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 59 1. In this case, the discrepancies and 
errors catalogued above lead the AAO to conclude that the evidence of the beneficiary's eligibility is not 
credible. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established the beneficiary's eligibility for the requested 
immigrant visa classification. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 20011, affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the additional grounds of ineligibility as discussed above, 
this petition cannot be approved. 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAOrs enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, affd, 345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. The petitioner has not 
sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.