dismissed EB-1C Case: Language Education

identifying data deleted to 
U.S. Department of flomeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Wash~ngton, DC 20529-2090 
prevent clearly unwmnted 
 U. S. Citizenship 
"1- of personal privacy 
 and Immigration 
LIN 07 132 50446 
IN RE: 
Date: 
FEB 0 2 2009 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
John F. Grissom, Acting Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner was organized in the state of Florida as a business that offers language-based 
education programs. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its owner and language 
director. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based 
immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 
8 U.S.C. fj 1 153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The director denied the petition 
on the following independent grounds of ineligibility: 1) the petitioner failed to establish that it 
would employ the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity; and 2) the petitioner failed to 
establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity that employed the beneficiary 
abroad. 
On appeal, the petitioner disputes both grounds of denial and submits a brief statement in support of 
the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 
1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. 
Page 3 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner would employ the beneficiary in a 
capacity that is managerial or executive. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In support of the Form 1-140, the petitioner submitted a letter dated March 15, 2007 stating that the 
nature of its business is to teach various foreign languages to corporate personnel and to assist 
Page 4 
students in their preparation for taking various standardized college entry exams. The beneficiary, 
on behalf of the petitioner, stated that his proposed duties would include administering agreements 
and contracts, instructing the petitioner's teachers, and providing instruction in the area of 
educational marketing. The beneficiary stated that this list of duties is not exhaustive, but did not 
provide any further description of his proposed position with the U.S. entity. 
On August 10, 2007, the director issued a request for additional evidence (WE) instructing the 
petitioner to provide, inter alia, a detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed employment, 
listing the beneficiary's specific job duties and the types of employees he would supervise. The 
petitioner was also asked to provide its organizational chart showing the beneficiary's position with 
respect to other employees in the organization. Lastly, the petitioner was asked to provide W-2 
statements issued to any employees from 2004 through 2006. 
In response, the beneficiary provided the following description of his proposed employment: 
I prepare general and tailored [sic] made programs according to the needs of the 
corporations, [sic] we contract with in the U[.]S[.] and Spanish [clourses in 
Argentina. I recruit students to study here in the U[.]S[.] and overseas especially 
Spanish in our branch located in Buenos Aires[,] Argentina. I also prepare the 
examinations corresponding to each level in the 3 languages we offer . . . . I 
coordinate group activities and classes at [the petitioning entity] and at different 
corporations we hold contracts with. I design the marketing plan using newspapers, 
magazines, and mailings. Furthermore, I research new materials for use in our 
courses. I write articles about different aspects of the languages we instruct for 
specialized language journals. I also make contracts and agreements with different 
entities around the world, incorporating new courses for the potential students in the 
U[.]S[.], widening their educational experience day by day. I organize all type[s] of 
activities for the students such as field trips especially for the students coming to 
study English . . . . I assist in finding accommodations for their stay. Furthermore, I 
prepare programs for other [llanguage [s]chools who require our services. I 
administer International Language Examinations. I hire qualified personnel and 
faculty . . . . They are trained by me so as to keep the same methodology and 
standards . . . . After their training, I evaluate them to realize their capability to fulfill 
our requirements . . . . I also grade them and remark [on] their weak points . . . . I 
regularly supervise their classes . . . . 
The petitioner did not provide the requested organizational chart. Rather, a job description was 
provided for the position of a language instructor. It is noted that all the tasks listed in the job 
description are referenced in first person, similar to the job description for the beneficiary's proposed 
position. Although the job description contains no signature from an authorized representative of the 
petitioner, it appears likely that the beneficiary performs the duties assigned to the language 
instructor in addition to the duties assigned to him in his proposed position as language director. The 
job duties of the language instructor include teaching students a given language, administering 
examinations, and assessing students' knowledge of the various languages taught to them. 
Page 5 
It is noted that instead of providing the W-2 statements as requested in the RFE, the petitioner 
provided its corporate tax returns from 2003-2006. 
On November 8, 2007, the director denied the petition, concluding that the beneficiary would 
primarily perform the petitioner's daily operational tasks rather than focusing primarily on 
managerial or executive-level duties. The director also noted the petitioner's failure to submit 
requested evidence. The AAO notes, however, that the director's overly broad statement does not 
accurately reflect the record of proceeding, which shows that the petitioner did comply with 
significant portions of the WE. Specifically, the record shows that the petitioner submitted a 
description of the beneficiary's proposed position as well as the position of one other employee, 
whose identity was not made clear. This information was requested in the WE, and the petitioner 
clearly complied with that portion of the request. Although the director's observation did not serve 
as the basis for denial, the AAO will nevertheless withdraw the comment, as it does not reflect the 
record as presently constituted. 
That being said, the petitioner failed to comply with the director's request for an organizational chart 
and the W-2 wage and tax statements issued by the petitioner from 2004-2006. Failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 
8 C.F.R. 8 103.2(b)(14). While the AAO acknowledges the petitioner's submission of its corporate 
tax returns from 2003-2006, this was not the requested documentation. The director specifically 
requested the petitioner's W-2.3, most-likely for the purpose of ascertaining the size of the petitioner's 
support staff. The requested documentation was not provided. The AAO notes, however, that the 
petitioner's corporate tax returns indicate that the petitioner did not pay any wages or salaries during 
any of its years of operation prior to the date the Form 1-140 was filed. As the petitioner has not 
provided an organizational chart, the AAO is unclear as to whether anyone other than possibly the 
beneficiary is providing services for the petitioner. 
On appeal, the beneficiary, on the petitioner's behalf, argues that the RFE response satisfied the 
issues that were previously raised in the director's notice. However, as discussed above, the 
petitioner responded to only a portion of the director's request and failed to provide crucial 
documents that are necessary to gauge the availability of a support staff and, consequently, the 
petitioner's ability to relieve the beneficiary from having to primarily perform the non-qualifying, 
daily operational tasks. 
In summary, the record shows an entity represented and operated by the beneficiary. 
 The 
beneficiary appears to not only manage the company, but also to carry out all or a majority of the 
underlying operational tasks that are directly related to providing the services sold to the petitioner's 
clientele. It is noted that an employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" 
perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). In the present matter, it appears that the 
beneficiary markets the petitioner's services, sells these services, and ultimate provides these 
services to the end user. While the beneficiary, as owner and top-level manager of the petitioning 
entity, may be vested with discretionary authority over most matters concerning the petitioner's 
business, the primary portion of his time would unlikely be spent performing duties within a 
Page 6 
managerial or executive capacity. The fact that an individual manages a small business does not 
necessarily establish eligibility for immigrant classification as an employee in a managerial or 
executive capacity within the meaning of section 101(a)(44) of the Act. As previously discussed, the 
record indicates that a preponderance of the beneficiary's duties have been and will be directly 
providing the services of the business. Therefore, the petition may not be approved on this initial 
basis. 
The other issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has a qualifying relationship with a 
foreign entity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5Cj)(2) states in pertinent part: 
AfJiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same 
share or proportion of each entity; 
* * * 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
In the present matter, the beneficiary, in his initial support letter submitted on behalf of the 
petitioner, stated that he is the owner of the petitioning entity. It is noted that no mention was made 
as to who owns and controls the foreign entity, nor did the petitioner provide documentation to 
establish that the beneficiary in fact owns the U.S. entity as claimed. 
Accordingly, the director addressed this deficiency in the WE by instructing the petitioner to 
provide documentation to establish that the U.S. entity and the beneficiary's foreign employer are 
commonly owned and controlled. 
In response, the petitioner provided a foreign document and its translation establishing that the 
beneficiary is the owner of the foreign entity. While the petitioner had previously provided, and 
subsequently resubmitted, a copy of its articles of incorporation, this document does not establish the 
company's ownership and control. The petitioner also provided copies of its corporate tax returns, 
including Schedule K, where item 5 shows that the petitioner is 100% owned by an individual, 
partnership, corporation, estate or trust. However, the petitioner did not provide the corresponding 
Statement 5, which was intended to elaborate on the details of the petitioner's ownership. Despite 
the beneficiary's insistence that the petitioner fully responded to the director's WE, the record has 
not been supplemented with any documentation to support the claim that the petitioning entity is 
owned and controlled by the beneficiary. As stated previously, failure to submit requested evidence 
that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
5 103.2(b)(14). Furthermore, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 
I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 
(Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign 
entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593; see also Matter ofsiemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of 
Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to 
the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority 
to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
at 595. In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the beneficiary's 
employer abroad have common ownership and control. Therefore, based on this second ground for 
ineligibility, this petition cannot be approved. 
That being said, if the petitioner were to provide sufficient documentation establishing the 
beneficiary as owner of the foreign and U.S. entities as claimed, questions would then arise as to 
whether the beneficiary will be an "employee" of the United States operation. As explained in 
8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(5), the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary will be "employed" in an 
executive or managerial capacity. It is noted that "employer," "employee," and "employed" are not 
specifically defined for purposes of the Act even though these terms are used repeatedly in the context 
of addressing the multinational executive and managerial immigrant classification. Section 
203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C), requires beneficiaries to have been "employed" abroad and to 
render services to the same "employer" in the United States. Further, section lOl(a)(44), 8 U.S.C. § 
1 101 (a)(44), defines both managerial and executive capacity as an assignment within an organization in 
which an "employee" performs certain enumerated qualifying duties. Finally, the specific definition of 
"managerial capacity" in section 101 (a)(44)(A), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A), refers repeatedly to the 
supervision and control of other "employees." Neither the legacy Immigration and Naturalization 
Service nor CIS has defined the terms "employee," "employer," or "employed" by regulation for 
purposes of the multinational executive and managerial immigration classification. See, e.g., 8 
C.F.R. 5 204.5 and 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1). Therefore, for purposes of this immigrant classification, these 
terms are undefined. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that where a federal statute fails to clearly 
define the term "employee," courts should conclude "that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "Darden") 
(quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). That definition is as 
Page 8 
follows: 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law 
of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958); Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (hereinafter "Clackamas"). As the 
common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the 
answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor 
being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 
254,258 (1968). 
Within the context of immigrant petitions seeking to classify the beneficiary as a multinational 
manager or executive, when a worker is also a partner, officer, member of a board of directors, or a 
major shareholder, the worker may only be defined as an "employee" if he or she is subject to the 
organization's "control." See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-450; see also New Compliance Manual at 
2-III(A)(l)(d). Factors to be addressed in determining whether a worker, who is also an owner of 
the organization, is an employee include: 
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and 
regulations of the individual's work. 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual's work. 
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization. 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the organization. 
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed 
in written agreements or contracts. 
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization. 
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-450 (citing New Compliance Manual). 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be an "employee" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. As explained 
above, the petitioner is a corporation, which the petitioner claims is ultimately owned and controlled 
by the beneficiary, who purports to assume a role as the petitioner's principal. While the petitioner's 
organizational chart names another officer within its hierarchy, there is no evidence that this 
individual has an ownership interest or is in a position to exercise any control over the work to be 
performed by the beneficiary. 
In view of the above, if the petitioner established the beneficiary as the owner of both entities, it 
follows that the beneficiary will then be a proprietor of this business and will not be an "employee" 
as defined above. It has not been established that the beneficiary will be "controlled" by the 
petitioner or that the beneficiary's employment could be terminated. To the contrary, the beneficiary 
is the petitioner for all practical purposes. He will control the organization; he cannot be fired; he 
will report to no one; he will set the rules governing his work; and he will share in all profits and 
losses. Therefore, based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be "employed" as an "employee," and the petition may not be approved for this 
additional reason. 
Furthermore, the record does not support a finding of eligibility based on additional grounds that 
were not previously addressed in the director's decision. 
First, 8 C.F.R. fj 204.50)(3)(i)(B) states that the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive position for at least one out of the three 
years prior to his entry to the United States as a'nonimmigrant to work for the same employer. In the 
instant matter, the director specifically addressed this issue in the RFE by instructing the petitioner to 
provide a detailed analysis of the beneficiary's daily activities during his employment abroad as well 
as the foreign entity's organizational chart. However, the petitioner failed to provide the requested 
information; nor did the petitioner provide any information regarding this issue when the Form 1-140 
was initially submitted. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
Second, the record does not establish that the petitioner is a multinational entity. The regulation at 
8 C.F.R. fj 204.50)(2) defines the term multinational as the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or 
subsidiary that conducts business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 204.50)(2) states that doing business means "the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods and/or services by a firm, corporation, or other entity and does not 
include the mere presence of an agent or office." Although the director provided documentation to 
show that the foreign entity was doing business from 2001-2003, there is no documentation to show 
that the foreign entity continued to do business at the time the petition was filed or that it is currently 
doing business. Therefore, the record does not show that the petitioner is a multinational entity. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, IFZC. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), affl, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). Accordingly, based on the 
additional grounds of ineligibility discussed above, this petition cannot be approved. 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a 
challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, affd, 
345 F.3d 683. 
As a final note, counsel makes a brief reference to the petitioner's current approved L- 1 employment 
of the beneficiary. With regard to the beneficiary's L-1 nonimmigrant classification, it should be 
noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are 
given far greater scrutiny by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) than nonimmigrant 
petitions. The AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications 
rely on the same definitions of managerial and executive capacity. See $5 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of 
the Act, 8 U.S .C. 4 1 10 1 (a)(44). Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive 
capacity are the same, the question of overall eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of 
the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and executive capacity. There are significant 
differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the United 
States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa petition, which permits an 
alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for 
naturalization as a United States citizen. CJ: $5 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $5 11 54 and 11 84; 
see also $ 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1427. 
In addition, as noted by the director, because USCIS spends less time reviewing Form 1-129 
nonimmigrant petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimrnigrant L-1 petitions are 
simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29-30 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(recognizing that CIS approves some petitions in error). 
Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a 
separate burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The approval of a 
nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that USCIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on 
behalf of the same beneficiary. USCIS denies many 1-140 immigrant petitions after approving prior 
nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; 
IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Suva, 
724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported 
assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute material and gross 
error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been 
erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 
1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as 
binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a 
court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the 
nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the 
Page 11 
contradictory decision of a service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 
282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1361. The 
petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.