dismissed EB-1C Case: Manufacturing And Sales

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
DATE: JUN 0 6 2013 OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE : 
INRE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C . § 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents 
related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that 
any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional 
information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in 
accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630 . The 
specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file any motion 
directly with the AAO. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i) requires that any motion must be filed 
within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen. 
T:t~ 
j. Ron Rosenberg 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
-www.uscis.gov 
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DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner is a California limited liability company that seeks to employ the beneficiary in the 
United States as president/owner of its manufacturing, sales, consulting, and gas station business. 
Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant 
pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(l)(C) , as a multinational executive or manager. 
In support of .the Form I-140 the petitioner submitted documents which contained relevant 
infonnation pertaining, in part, to the beneficiary 's proposed employment with the petitioning entity. 
The petitioner also provided suppmting evidence in the form of corporate, business, and financial 
documents pertaining to the beneficiary's U.S. employer and its business operations. 
The director reviewed the petitioner's submissions and determined that the petition did not warrant 
approval. The director therefore issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) informing the petitioner 
of various evidentiary deficiencies. The petitioner was instructed to provide evidence establishing 
that it had been doing business for at least one year prior to filing the petition. The director also 
requested evidence to establish that the beneficiary would function at a senior level within the 
organization through the management or direction of a department, subdivision, function or 
component or through the employment of a professional, managerial or supervisory staff that would 
relieve him from primarily performing non-qualifying duties. 
Although the petitioner provided a supplemental job description for the beneficiary's U.S. position, 
brief employee job descriptions, an organizational chart, and additional employee pay stubs for some 
months in 2010, the petitioner failed to provide much additional documentation reflecting the 
business transactions completed by the petitioner in the year preceding the filing of the petition. 
After considering the petitioner's response, the director denied the petition, concluding that the 
petitioner failed to establish: (1) that it would employ the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or 
executive capacity; and (2) that it had been doing business for at least one year prior to filing the 
petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner disputes the denial of the petition and urges consideration of the 
petitioner as a small business. Counsel cites to unpublished AAO decisions in support of the 
asse1tion that the beneficiary may perform some non-qualifying duties and still be employed in a 
position that is primarily managerial or executive. Further, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's role 
as a consultant qualifies him as a function manager. Finally, counsel reasserts that the petitioning 
company has been engaged in the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and 
services. 
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The AAO finds that counsel's assertions are not persuasive and thus fail to overcome the director's 
adverse decision. A comprehensive analysis of the AAO's findings is provided in the discussion 
below. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. --Visas shall first be made available ... to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
* * * 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 
1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. 
The first issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that it had been doing 
business for at least one year prior to the date the Form I-140 was filed. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(j)(2) states that doing business means "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of 
goods and/or services by a firm, corporation, or other entity and does not include the mere presence 
of an agent or office." 
The petitioner submitted Articles of Organization which indicate that the company was established 
on November 20, 2008. The petitioner filed the Form 1-140 on December 31, 2009. Therefore, 
according to the regulatory requirement specified in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(i)(D), the petitioner must 
establish that it has been engaged in the "the regular, systematic, and continuous" course of business 
since December 30, 2008. See 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(j)(2). 
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Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's finding that the petitioner failed to establish that it 
was engaged in business on a "regular, systematic, and continuous" basis during the relevant 12-
month period. See id. While the petitioner stated at the time of filing that it has "shipments already 
arrived, manufacturing started" and that its consultation business is in "full force," it did not provide 
documentary evidence of a full year of business activities . In fact, the record contains evidence of 
only two sales transactions that pre-date the filing of the petition, evidenced by two purchase orders 
from _ dated November 9 and December 10, 2009. The petitioner indicates that the 
first order was delivered in December 2009, the month in which the petition was filed. 
The petitioner submitted numerous documents including emails and correspondence dating back to 
April 2009, which indicate interest, inquiries or intent to engage in the purchase of moth balls, air 
fresheners and other products manufactured by the foreign entity and sold by the petitioner. 
However, as of the date of filing, the only completed transaction documented in the record occurred 
in December 2009. The petitioner also included emails and correspondence p1imarily to and from 
the personal e-mail account belonging to the beneficiar·y's spouse. These e-mails suggest that she 
was engaged in providing consulting services, but the petitioner provided insufficient 
corroborating evidence, such as evidence of invoices issued by the petitioner for these services, or 
evidence of payments received from clients and deposited to the petitioner's account. Without such 
evidence, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary's spouse was providing these services on 
behalf of the petitioner, as the petitioner's name does not appear in any of the e-mails and she did not 
using the company's telephone number or company e-mail account. In fact, thee-mails reference her 
affiliation with ' rather than the petitioning compar1y. Fmther, 
while the petitioner provided evidence that the beneficiary's spouse arranged television advertising 
for the Fengshui services she provides, the invoices requesting payment for advertising services were 
issued to ' ' and not to the petitioner. There is no evidence that the petitioner has 
registered as a fictitious name, or any other evidence to link the consulting 
business with the petitioner's impmt business. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter 
of So.ffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of Cal{fornia , 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). 
The AAO notes that the petitioner indicated on the Form I-140 that its business activities include 
operation of a gas station. However, the petitioner failed to provide any evidence related to this 
claimed component of its business at the time of filing. In response to the NOID, the petitioner 
submitted an organizational chart which identifies a "Manager Gas Station" and two cashiers. The 
accompanying pay stubs for these employees indicates that they first earned wages several weeks 
subsequent to the filing of the petition. The petitioner submitted evidence that it was registered as a 
foreign company authorized to do business in Florida as of January 2010, also subsequent to the 
filing of the petition . The evidence submitted on appeal indicates that the petitioner entered into a 
management agreement with a Florida corporation, , on January 24, 2010, 
under which the petitioner agrees to manage a gas station located in as an independent 
contractor. 
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Finally, the petitioner failed to submit evidence which could have offered corroboration to its claim 
that it has been doing business for one full year, such as a copy of its 2008 and 2009 federal income 
tax returns (IRS Forms 1120 or 1065). Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is 
not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 
I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comrn'r 1998) (citing Matter a.{ Treasure Craft a_{ California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 
(Reg. Comm'r 1972)). 
Therefore, while the petitioner claims to be engaged in three or more types of business activities, it 
has failed to provide probative evidence that it had been doing business as defined in the regulations 
for one year at the time the petition was filed. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The second issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that it would employ 
the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily--
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily--
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(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In reviewing the beneficiary's employment capacity, the AAO gives primary consideration to the 
petitioner's description of the beneficiary's proposed position, as a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's actual daily tasks tends to reveal the tme nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The 
AAO also gives ample consideration to the job duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees , 
the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration of employees, and any 
other facts that contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the beneficiary's actual role in a 
business. 
In the present matter, the AAO finds that the petitioner has not established that it will employ the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner assetted that the 
beneficiary "will spend almost 100% of his time exercising his discretionary authority in managing 
customer relations, marketing, and trading on behalf of [the petitioner], and operating the overall 
business activity in United States." Although the petitioner claims to be engaged in product trading, 
manufacturing and consulting, the evidence reveals that the petitioner has not yet established any 
manufacturing capabilities, but has initiated trading in products manufactured by its claimed foreign 
parent company. In addition to the trade and manufacturing, the petitioner also claimed to be 
engaged in the business of and indicated on the Form 1-140 
that it operates a gas station. 
Notwithstanding the petitioner's claims, the description of the beneficiary's proposed employment 
submitted at the time of filing the petition indicates that a considerable pottion of the beneficiary's 
time would be allocated to daily operational tasks. For example, the petitioner stated that the 
beneficiary will "assist in consultation and marketing" of the business, negotiate contracts 
with vendors and customers, perform market research and "provide consultation and marketing for 
the A review of the submitted evidence, which includes extensive e-mail correspondence 
authored by the beneficiary, indicates that he is very much involved in day-to-day sales negotiations 
with prospective clients. While the AAO acknowledges that no beneficiary is required to allocate 
100% of his or her time to managerial- or executive-level tasks, the petitioner must establish that the 
non-qualifying tasks the beneficiary would perform are only incidental to the proposed position. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services 
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is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International , 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 
(Comm. 1988). 
Further, while the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary oversees the company's activities through 
his subordinate personnel, it did not 
reconcile this claim with the initial position description which 
indicates that he directly performs sales, marketing and consulting activities. 
With respect to the petitioner's staffing, it claimed to employ two full time workers and two contract 
workers. According to the petitioner's organizational chart there were three direct subordinates to 
the beneficiary, including sales manager for marketing in Florida, the beneficiary's 
spouse, consultant, and manager of finance and administration in 
Califomia. The chart identifies a "supervisor manufacturing, ordering, inventory," 
subordinate to the manager of finance and administration. The petitioner provided very brief duty 
descriptions for each worker. The petitioner failed to explain which two workers were full-time and 
which two were contractors. The limited payroll documentation provided by the petitioner failed to 
adequately resolve the matter. 
Nevertheless, the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, but if it is claimed that his duties 
involve supervising employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate employees are 
supervisors, managers or professionals in order to establish that his personnel responsibilities are 
qualifying managerial duties. See§ 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate 
whether the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the 
field of endeavor. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), states that "[t]he term 
profession shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, 
and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term 
"profession" contemplates knowledge or leaming, not merely skill, of an advanced type in a given 
field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and study of at least baccalaureate 
level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the pmticular field of endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 
I&N Dec. 817 (Comm 'r 1988); Matter of Ling , 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); Matter of Shin, 11 I&N 
Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education required by the position, rather than the 
degree held by subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordinate 
employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a 
professional capacity as that term is defined above. In the instant case, the petitioner claimed that all 
four workers had a degree but it was not established that a bachelor's degree was actually necessary 
for any of the positions held. Furthermore, even if the petitioner had established the requirement it 
failed to provide evidence of the education levels attained by the workers. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
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these proceedings. Matter of So.ffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter of 
Treasure Crqft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). 
Thus, the petitioner has not established that these employees possessed or required a bachelor's 
degree, such that they could be classified as professionals. Nor has the petitioner shown that any of 
these employees supervised subordinate staff members or managed a clearly defined department or 
function of the foreign entity, such that they could be classified as managers or supervisors. Thus, 
the petitioner has not shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employees abroad were supervisory, 
professional, or managerial, as required by section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
On appeal the petitioner asserts that the director failed to consider the beneficiary's role as a 
consultant in determining whether he qualifies as a function manager. However, the evidence does 
not support that the beneficiary would be managing the consultation function, rather it shows, at 
most, that he would actually perform the function. The petitioner states that the beneficiary provides 
very specialized consultation services and performs the function which is essential for business 
development. While performing non-qualifying tasks necessary to produce a product or service will 
not automatically disqualify the beneficiary as long as those tasks are not the majority of the 
beneficiary's duties, the petitioner still has the burden of establishing that the beneficiary is 
"primarily" performing managerial or executive duties. Section 101(a)(44) of the Act. Whether the 
beneficiary is an "activity" or "function" manager turns in part on whether the petitioner has 
sustained its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial. The petitioner did not 
meet its burden in this case. 
Finally, although the director based his decision partially on the size of the enterprise and the 
number of staff, the director did not take into consideration the reasonable needs of the enterprise. 
As required by section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, if staffing levels are used as a factor in determining 
whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, USCIS must take into account 
the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of 
the organization. 
At the time of filing, the petitioner was a one-year-old company that claimed to be engaged in 
"trading/manufacturing/consulting " with a projected gross annual income of $300,000. Although 
the petitioner claimed to also have a gas station, it was not staffed since the evidence indicates that 
the petitioner signed a management agreement giving it authority to manage the gas station several 
weeks after the petition was filed. A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a 
petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under 
a new set of facts. Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm'r 1971). The company 
employed the beneficiary as president, plus it claimed to employ a sales manager, a finance and 
administration manager, a consultant, and one subordinate supervisor handling manufacturing­
related issues. The AAO notes that most of the employees have a managerial job titles. Fmther, the 
petitioner explained, and the record reflects, that it was the beneficiary who was negotiating with, 
and in the final order stage, with some customers. Based on the petitioner's representations, it does 
not appear that the reasonable needs of the petitioning company might plausibly be met by the 
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services of the beneficiary as president and the employees described. Regardless, the reasonable 
needs of the petitioner serve only as a factor in evaluating the lack of staff in the context of 
reviewing the claimed managerial or executive duties. The petitioner must still establish that the 
beneficiary is to be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, 
pursuant to sections 10l(a)(44)(A) and (B) or the Act. 
The petitioner maintains the burden of establishing that the beneficiary would more likely than not 
primarily perform tasks within a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. Given the numerous 
deficiencies discussed above, the AAO finds that neither the beneficiary's job description nor the 
petitioner's organizational composition at the time of filing adequately establish that the petitioner 
would be able to relieve the beneficiary from having to allocate 
the primary portion of his time to 
non-qualifying operational tasks. Therefore, on the basis of this conclusion, the instant petition 
cannot be approved and the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that it has the ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proffered wage of $40,000 per year. 
The regulation at 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states the following, in pertinent part: 
Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer 
of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States 
employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate 
this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the 
beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be 
either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial 
statements. 
In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS will first examine whether 
the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner 
establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater 
than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered prima facie proof of the petitioner's ability 
to pay the beneficiary's salary. In the present matter, the petitioner provided no evidence that it had 
previously compensated the beneficiary and it provided no tax returns or any other documentation 
sufficient to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Sojjici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure 
Craft of Cal~fornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). For this additional reason, the petition 
cam10t be approved. 
Additionally, in the present matter the petitioner has not established that a qualifying relationship 
exists with the beneficiary's overseas employer. To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the 
Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary's foreign employer and the 
proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. a U.S. entity with a foreign office) or related as 
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a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally § 203(b )(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 
1153(b)(l)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) (providing definitions of the terms "affiliate" and 
"subsidiary"). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or 
proportion of each entity. 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power over 
the entity ; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls 
the entity. 
In this matter, the petitioner's Certificate of Permanent Registration, Central Excise Registration 
Certificate, import export documents and other foreign tax documents adequately reflect the 
beneficiary's ownership as sole proprietor of the Indian foreign entity. 
However , the petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence of the ownership of the U.S. company. 
The petitioner submitted a letter dated December 20, 2009 , stating that the petitioner is a wholly 
owned U.S. branch office of the Indian foreign entity. In suppmt of the asse1tion, the petitioner 
submitted articles of organization. The articles of organization, dated November 20, 2008, indicate 
that the company has one manager and identify the beneficiary as organizer and agent for service of 
process. This document establishes management but does not establish that the petitioner's manager 
is also its owner. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, a certificate of formation or 
organization of a limited liability company (LLC) alone is not sufficient to establish ownership or 
control of an LLC. LLCs are generally obligated by the jurisdiction of formation to maintain records 
identifying members by name, address, and percentage of ownership and written statements of the 
contributions made by each member, the times at which additional contributions are to be made, 
events requiring the dissolution of the limited liability company, and the dates on which each 
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member became a member. These membership records, along with the LLC's operating agreement, 
certificates of membership interest, and minutes of membership and management meetings, must be 
examined to determine the total number of members, the percentage of each member's ownership 
interest, the appointment of managers , and the degree of control ceded to the managers by the 
members. Additionally , a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of 
interests, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the entity, and any other factor 
affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 
(BIA 1986). Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, USCIS is unable to determine the 
elements of ownership and control. 
For these additional reasons the appeal will be denied and the petition dismissed. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Soltane v. DOl, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 
2004)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each 
considered as an independent and altemative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the 
burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.