dismissed EB-1C Case: Newspaper Publishing

(b)(6)
DATE: MAR 3 1 2014 
INRE : Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER 
U.S. Department of Homeland Securi ty 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office of Administrative Appeals 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case . 
This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish 
agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or 
policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider 
or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form 
I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. Please review the Form I-290B instructions at 
http://www.uscis.gov/forms for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. 
See also 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.5 . Do not file a motion directly with the AAO . 
Thank you, 
~Ron R senberg 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
www.uscis.gov 
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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition 
and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner filed the Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for 
Alien Worker, to classify the beneficiary as an 
employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b )( 1 )(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The petitioner, a New York 
corporation established in 1997, is a newspaper publisher. It claims to be a subsidiary o 
located in Turkey. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of publisher. 
The director denied the petition based on four independent grounds of ineligibility. Specifically, the director 
found that the petitioner failed to establish: (1) that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity; (2) 
that the foreign entity employed the beneficiary in a qualifying executive or managerial capacity; (3) that it 
will employ the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity; and (4) that the foreign entity is 
doing business in a regular, systematic, and continuous manner as defined by the regulations. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director's denial was contrary to the statute and regulations and against the 
weight of the evidence submitted. The petitioner states that it has established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that all eligibility requirements have been met. The appeal consists of counsel's brief and additional 
documentary evidence . 
I. The Law 
Section 203(b) ofthe Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available ... to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
* * * 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers.-- An alien is described 
in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the 
alien's application for classification and admission into the United States 
under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least I year by a firm or 
corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who 
seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the 
same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, 
and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
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Page 3 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b )( 1 )(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the dut.ies to be performed by the alien. 
Additionally, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(i) state that the petitioner must provide the following 
evidence in support of the petition in order to establish eligibility: 
(A) If the alien is outside the United States, in the three years immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition the alien has been employed outside the United States for at 
least one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a firm or corporation, or other 
legal entity, or by an affiliate or subsidiary of such a firm or corporation or other 
legal entity; or 
(B) If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation, or other legal entity by which the 
alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a nonimmigrant, 
the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year in a managerial or 
executive capacity; 
(C) The prospective employer in the United States is the same employer or a subsidiary 
or affiliate of the firm or corporation or other legal entity by which the alien was 
employed overseas; and 
(D) The prospective United States employer has been doing business for at least one 
year. 
II. Qualifying Relationship 
The first issue to be discussed is whether the petitioner has established that it has a qualifying relationship 
with the foreign entity. To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the 
petitioner must show that the beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same 
employer (i.e. a U.S. entity with a foreign office) or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See 
generally § 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l )(C); see also 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(j)(2) (providing 
definitions of the terms "affiliate" and "subsidiary"). 
The pertinent regulation at 8 C.P.R. § 205.5(j)(2) defines a "subsidiary" as follows: 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 
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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, less than half ofthe entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (Comm'r 1988); see 
also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (Comm 'r 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N 
Dec. 289 (Comm'r 1982). In the context ofthis visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal 
right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct 
or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. 
Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
The petitioner has consistently claimed to be a subsidiary of the Turkish company 
_j based on the following stock ownership: 60 percent (300 of 500 issued shares) by 
percent (1 00 shares) by the beneficiary, and 20 percent ( 100 shares) by !he petitioner 
indicates that it has had a total of nine different shareholders since its incorporation in 1997. 
In request for evidence (RFE) issued on May 18, 2011, the petitioner was instructed to submit copies of all 
stock certificates issued since its establishment and a copy of its stock ledger. The petitioner provided copies 
of stock certificates 3, 5, 7, 8 and 11 prior to the adjudication of the petition. The petitioner also submitted 
several documents titled "Written Consent and Action in Lieu of a Meeting of the Board of Directors," in 
which two directors of the company, and authorized the transfer of shares and 
issuance of new stock certificates reflecting each successive owner's shareholding. The petitioner indicated 
that it does not maintain a stock ledger and it provided no explanation for the absence of the missing 
certificates. The director denied the petition, in part, based on the petitioner's failure to provide the requested 
evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
On appeal, counsel asserts the petitioner submitted stock certificates showing the company's current 
ownership as stated in the record and accounted for all outstanding shares. Counsel contends that the 
director's requests for copies of all stock certificates issued to date indicated that he was "seeking evidence 
beyond the standard of proof applicable to this case." Counsel further asserts that the director "did not afford 
any probative value to [the petitioner's] share lineage." 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient 
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The 
corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant 
annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact 
number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate 
control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the 
distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual 
control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra. Without full disclosure of all 
relevant documents, USCIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 5 
The regulations specifically allow the director to request additional evidence in appropriate cases . See 8 
C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(ii). As ownership is a critical element of this visa classification, the director may 
reasonably inquire beyond the issuance of paper stock certificates into the means by which stock ownership 
was acquired. Additional supporting evidence would include stock purchase agreements, subscription 
agreements, corporate by-laws, minutes of relevant shareholder meetings, or other legal documents governing 
the acquisition of the ownership interest. 
Therefore, it was appropriate for the director to request copies of all share certificates issued by the petitioner 
to date, as the record indicated that each current claimed owner had received their shares from a f9rmer 
owner. The petitioner now submits additional stock certificates on appeal and asserts that they could not be 
provided in response to the RFE because the director provided only 33 days for the petitioner to respond. 
However, the petitioner did not indicate at the time it responded to the RFE that it was submitting an 
incomplete response. In fact it indicated that all issued stock certificates were accounted for in its response. 
Where, as here, a petitioner has been put on notice of a deficiency in the evidence and has been given an 
opportunity to respond to that deficiency, the AAO need not accept evidence offered for the first time on 
appeal. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of Obaigbena, 19 l&N Dec. 
533 (BIA 1988). If the petitioner had wanted the submitted evidence to be considered, it should have 
submitted the documents in response to the director's request for evidence . !d. 
Nevertheless, on appeal, the petitioner now submits its stock certificate numbers 2, 4, 5, 6 and 10 for the first 
time and provides a history of the company's ownership. The petitioner also introduces a revised version of 
the company's "share lineage" as counsel states that "[the petitioner] was founded with 200 shares of 
company stock. Ownership interests were controlled by three individuals: ~~ (I 00 shares), 
(50 shares) ." 
In response to the RFE, the petitioner had indicated that all certificates were being submitted and stated: 
Please note that the initial shareholders of [the petitioner] were (50 
shares) and (50 shares) and (100 shares). The former two 
shareholders sold their shares to [the beneficiary] effective January 1, 2001. 
sold his shares to - owns 300 
shares of [the petitioner]. 
Several other unresolved discrepancies and omissions in the petitioner's evidence remain. 
First, none of the nine submitted stock certificates has a date of issuance recorded despite there being a space 
to indicate the date on each certificate. These omissions have not explained and the lack of dates hinders 
USCIS' ability to trace the ownership interests of the company, particularly because many of the certificates 
were inexplicably issued out of order. 
Second, the record reflects that none of the certificates has been canceled. According to the written consents 
of the Board of Directors, the transfer of shares recorded on the reverse side of the certificates was also to be 
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NON-PRECEDENTDEC~ION 
Page 6 
reflected in the issuance of new certificates each time a new owner acquired transferred shares. While new 
certificates were issued, the old certificates were not canceled. 
Third, the petitioner has not accounted for the issuance of its stock certificate No. 1, and instead the record 
seems to indicate that the claimed original shareholders received certificate Nos. 2, 3 and 4. At the same 
time, the petitioner submitted an "Indemnification and Lost Stock Certificate Affidavit" executed by · 
on April 26, 2007, which indicates that he previously owned and lost stock certificate number 1 (100 
shares). There is no other acknowledgement that he was a founding stockholder of the company. According 
to affidavit "the corporation is willing to issue a new certificate evidencing ownership of such 
shares upon being indemnified against any loss resulting from claims by any one presenting the original 
certificate." indicated that he "indemnifies and agrees to hold [the petitioner] harmless from and 
against any liability of any kind to anyone resulting from the presentation of an original certificate No. 1," in 
consideration of the issuance of a new certificate. 
It is unclear when acquired certificate number 1 or how this lost certificate affects his current 
ownership interest in the company. Elsewhere in the record, the petitioner indicated that l . 
acquired his current 100 shares from on January 1, 2005. According to the Board of Directors 
written consent, the company was to issue 1 00 shares to on stock certificate No. 11 . The 
petitioner submitted a copy of this certificate indicating that •wns 100 shares, but there is no 
basis to conclude that this is the re-issued certificate mentioned in his affidavit, rather than the certificate 
issued as a result of his purchase of shares from · . Moreover, other evidence in the record, namely 
the multiple "Written Consent and Action in Lieu of a Meeting of the Board of Directors ," dating back to 
May 2000 are signed by ] in his capacity as a director, suggesting that his role with the company 
pre-dates the issuance of shares to him in 2005. If he has continuously held the 100 shares issued to him on 
stock certificate number 1, and if stock certificate number 1 was the original certificate issued by the 
company, this fact would call into question the petitioner's subsequent claims regarding its ownership. 
Similarly, the petitioner has not established whether its stock certificate no. 9 is issued and outstanding. 
According to a Written Consent and Action in Lieu of a Meeting of the Board of Directors, certificate no. 9 
was to be issued to ' t on July 1, 2000 pursuant to his purchase of 100 shares from the 
owner of stock certificate No. 6. However, the record reflects that ' • ~ ' · received stock certificate no. 
10. Further, the certificate issued to presumably on or about July 1, 2000, was signed by the 
beneficiary in his capacity as "president" five months before he became a shareholder in the company. The 
petitioner did not explain this apparent discrepancy, and there is no evidence that the beneficiary held the 
office of president of the petitioning company or that he had any connection with the company prior to 
January 1, 2001. Absent clarification on the status of stock certificate no. 9, the AAO cannot determine 
whether additional shares of the company are issued and outstanding. 
There are other similar inconsistencies in the record. For instance, according to the written consents from the 
Board of Directors accompanying the transfer of 50 shares from_ ______ __ to the beneficiary and 50 shares 
from to the beneficiary on January 1, 2001, he was to receive stock certificates No.8 and 10. 
The record reflects that stock certificate no. 10 had been issued to _. __ . ____ __ __ the previ~us year, and stock 
certificate no. 8 was issued to the petitioner's claimed parent company in 2007. The only certificate issued to 
(b)(6)
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Page 7 
the beneficiary was stock certificate no. 7 for 100 shares. Again, since none of the share certificates are 
dated, none of the certificates have been canceled, there is no stock ledger, and information in the 
accompanying written consents from the Boards of Directors does not consistently match the stock 
certificates, it is difficult for USCIS to determine the exact ownership of the company. 
Finally, the record contains a letter dated April 17, 2008 from the foreign entity's director of human 
resources, who stated that the beneficiary "owns 60 percent of USA shares," in direct contradiction to 
the petitioner's claims that it is owned b) 
A few errors or minor discrepancies are not reason to question the credibility of an alien or an employer 
seeking immigration benefits. See, e.g., Spencer Enterprises Inc. v. US., 345 F.3d 683, 694 (9th Cir., 2003). 
However, anytime a petition includes numerous errors and discrepancies, and the petitioner fails to resolve 
those errors and discrepancies after USCIS provides an opportunity to do so, those inconsistencies will raise 
concerns about the veracity of the petitioner's assertions. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. 
Matter of Brantigan, 11 l&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of 
evidence that the beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 
376 (AAO 2010). The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that 
the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual 
circumstances of each individual case. !d. at 376 (citing Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm'r 
1989)). In evaluating the evidence, the truth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by 
its quality. !d. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, 
the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both 
individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven 
is probably true. 
Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible 
evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the 
applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See US. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) 
(discussing "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). Ifthe 
director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence 
or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or 
petition. 
Here, due to the discrepancies and omissions in the submitted documentation, the director's denial of the 
petition based on a lack of evidence of the petitioner's qualifying relationship with the foreign entity was 
appropriate. In light of these deficiencies, the appeal will be dismissed. 
(b)(6)
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Page 8 
lll. Employment in a Managerial or Executive (Foreign) 
The next issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was employed in 
a qualifying managerial or executive capacity with the foreign employer. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily--
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section l01(a)(44)(B) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § l10l(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily--
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
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Page 9 
The director concluded that 
the petitioner had not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that foreign entity 
employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. The director noted the prevalence of non­
qualifying operational duties in the beneficiary's duty description. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
beneficiary was employed in a managerial or executive capacity in one of the three years prior to his 
admission to the United States in March 1999. Counsel asserts that the foreign entity employed the 
beneficiary as "associate manager, import and export, and deputy general director" from December 1993 to 
December 1997 and later as legal counsel from December 1997 to March 1999. Counsel states that the 
beneficiary qualified as a personnel manager, function manager and executive in his capacity as associate 
manager, import and export, and as a function manager in his capacity as legal counsel. 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the foreign entity 
employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
In order to determine whether the beneficiary was employed in a qualifying executive or managerial capacity, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will look first to the petitioner's description of the job 
duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(5) . In support of the Form I-140 Petition for an Immigrant Worker, the 
petitioner provided the following description of the beneficiary's duties with the foreign employer in his 
capacity as associate manager, export and import and deputy general director from December 1993 to 
December 1997: 
[The beneficiary] was the person in charge of all matters related to import and export of 
goods needed for the company's operations throughout Turkey, including purchasing 
paper, press equipment, and other auxiliary equipment, which formed the major 
expenditures for the newspaper operations. As nearly all of the required equipment had to 
be imported from outside Turkey, he managed and oversaw an essential function of the 
company's business. As Associate Manager, Import and Export and Deputy General 
Director, [the beneficiary] oversaw an annual $2 million budget and supervised 15 
professional employees. With respect to these employees, [the beneficiary] had authority 
to recommend hiring and firing, as well as other personnel matters such as performance 
reviews, scheduling and reviewing work, and retaining consultants or contractors. He had 
the authority to expend the company's resources in connection with his import/export 
function, and negotiated contracts and other legal documents. [The beneficiary] received 
only general direction from higher level executives, such as the General Director, and 
exercised discretion over day-to-day operations of the import/export function. 
The petitioner also noted that the beneficiary was employed as legal counsel for the foreign employer from 
December 1997 up to his initial Bl!B2 entry into the United States in March 1999. The petitioner did not 
provide a duty description for this position at the time of filing. 
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Page 10 
In the RFE, the director requested that the petitioner submit a definitive statement from the foreign entity 
describing the beneficiary's job duties. The director asked that the foreign entity provide a detailed list of his 
duties and the percentage of time he spent on each task. The director also requested the job titles and job 
descriptions for the employees that the beneficiary supervised while working abroad and requested evidence 
of wages paid to the subordinate employees. 
In response, the petitioner reiterated the previously provided job description and included the following 
breakdown of how the beneficiary allocated his time: 
More specifically, as Associate Manager, Import and Export, and Deputy General 
Director, [the beneficiary] was responsible for overseeing the approval of purchasing 
decisions (15%). He oversaw and approved accounting books (25%) and he evaluated 
balance sheet data (15%). In addition, he oversaw the communication with the 
company's major vendors and customers (15%) and managed the activities of his 
subordinates ( 15% ). 
Further, the petitioner submitted the following duty description for the beneficiary in his capacity as legal 
counsel for the foreign employer: 
From December 1997 until March 1999, [the beneficiary] again' served as Legal Counsel 
[for the foreign employer] until his departure to the United States in March 1999. In this 
position, [the beneficiary] did not directly supervise any subordinate workers- rather, he 
managed the function of providing legal counsel to the company. As legal counsel, [the 
beneficiary] was responsible for overseeing all domestic and international contract 
negotiations and contract management matters for the organization which took 60% of 
his time. He also represented the newspaper in labor negotiations and legal proceedings 
involving the company's employees which he spent 40% of his time. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the 
petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not 
spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d I 533 
(Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the 
regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The duties offered by the 
beneficiary are overly vague and provide little probative value as to the beneficiary's actual day-to-day 
activities. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary's duties included approving purchasing decisions, 
1 
The petitioner also asserts that the beneficiary served as legal counsel for the foreign entity from September 
1990 to December 1993. 
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Page 11 
overseeing and approving accounting books, evaluating balance sheets, and overseeing communication with 
the company's major vendors and customers. Although the director requested information regarding the 
amount of time the beneficiary's allocated to specific tasks, the petitioner assigned percentages to these broad 
areas of responsibility and provided no additional information. In the case of each aforementioned duty, the 
petitioner has not provided details, specifics or supporting documentation to give these asserted duties more 
probative value, such as specific purchasing decisions made or vendors and customers with which the 
beneficiary had direct contact. Further, with respect to the beneficiary's asserted role as legal counsel, the 
petitioner provided an even broader breakdown of how he allocated his time without specifying any day-to­
day tasks. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm 'r 1972)). Specifics are clearly 
an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ajfd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary qualified both as a personnel and function manager in his 
former capacity as the associate manager, import and export, and deputy general director. Counsel also states 
the beneficiary qualified as a function manager pursuant to his role as legal counsel. The statutory definition 
of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and a "function managers." See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). Personnel managers are required 
to primarily supervise . and control the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. 
Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manager," the statute plainly states that a "first line 
supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's 
supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section l0l(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(2). The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not merely skill, 
of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and study of at 
least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of endeavor. Matter 
of Sea, 19 l&N Dec. 817 (Comm'r 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); Matter of Shin, 11 
I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be 
performed in managing the essential function, i.e. identifY the function with specificity, articulate the 
essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the 
duties related to the function. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See sections 10l(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties. 
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Page 12 
The petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary qualified as a personnel 
manager in his capacity as associate manager and deputy general director. The petitioner stated that the 
beneficiary supervised "15 professionals" in this role. It submitted an undated foreign organizational chart 
reflecting that the beneficiary had five subordinates, including a driver and a secretary and three employees 
depicted as supervisors (an accounting generalist, finance generalist, and a purchasing generalist). The 
accounting generalist was depicted as having two subordinates, the finance generalist as having three 
subordinates and the purchasing generalist as having five subordinates. However, the petitioner did not 
submit sufficient supporting evidence to establish that the foreign entity employed the individuals depicted on 
the organizational chart at the time the beneficiary worked for the company. Again, going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
The director specifically requested that the petitioner submit tax forms, or other salary information, for the 
employees that were supervised by the beneficiary. However, the petitioner did not submit this 
documentation . The petitioner stated that tax forms and salary information is only archived for 10 years, and 
therefore not available. The non-existence or other unavailability of required evidence creates a presumption 
of ineligibility. 8 C.F .R. § 103 .2(b )(2)(i). If a required document does not exist or cannot be obtained, the 
petitioner must demonstrate this and submit secondary evidence pertinent to the facts at issue. !d. The 
petitioner was able to provide an organizational chart with names and therefore appears to have maintained 
some type of records dating back to the relevant time period. 
Regardless of whether the evidence is available, it is nonetheless the petitioner's burden to demonstrate that 
these employees worked for the foreign entity during the asserted period and that beneficiary's subordinates 
were supervisors, managers or professionals. However, the petitioner submitted only one-sentence job 
descriptions for these employees that provide little insight into their actual duties and failed to identify any 
supervisory or managerial duties. For instance, the duty description for the accounting generalist states that 
he "coordinate[d] the accounting activities , prepare[d] balance sheet[s], overs[aw] budget." Also, although 
the petitioner notes that all three of the generalists the beneficiary supervised had an "undergraduate" 
education, no documentation or evidence is provided to support this assertion. Further the record does not 
support the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary supervised "15 professionals" given that the supervised 
employees included three office boys, a driver, a clerk and a secretary. As such, the petitioner has not 
demonstrated with sufficient evidence that the beneficiary acted as a personnel manager in his capacity as 
associate manager, import and export, and deputy general director. 
Additionally, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary qualified as a function manager in either 
of his claimed positions with the foreign employer. As discussed above, the petitioner has failed to clearly 
describe beneficiary's duties in managing the claimed essential functions. See 8 C.F .R. § 204.5(j)(5). 
Additionally, the petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary acted in a managerial capacity as legal counsel for 
the foreign employer without any subordinate employees is not credible. While the beneficiary may have 
held authority to negotiate contracts and resolve labor issues as counsel, the petitioner has not established that 
he singlehandedly managed these activities for a company claimed to have over 800 employees. The 
petitioner did not offer an organizational chart reflecting the organization of its legal department, but instead 
submitted a chart depicting the beneficiary as legal counsel, reporting to the general manager, with no 
(b)(6)
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Page 13 
additional employees to assist him with legal issues. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
acted as a function manager in either of his capacities with the foreign employer. 
Lastly, counsel contends that the beneficiary qualified as an executive pursuant to his former role as associate 
manager, import and export, and deputy general director. The statutory definition of the term "executive 
capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major 
components or functions of the organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 
10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B). Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to 
"direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the 
definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of managerial employees for the beneficiary to 
direct and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." I d. 
The petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the foreign entity employed the 
beneficiary in an executive capacity. As noted, the petitioner provided a vague and non-probative duty 
description . As such, the record does not specifically discuss goals and policies that were established by the 
beneficiary or management decisions that were made by the beneficiary. Also as previously discussed, the 
petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary had managerial subordinates as 
necessary to elevate him in a complex organizational hierarchy or allow him to primarily focus on broad 
goals and policies. In fact, the petitioner compared the beneficiary 's duties to that of a purchasing manager, a 
position not typically classified as executive in nature. 
The petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that foreign entity employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity . Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed . 
IV. Employment in a Managerial or Executive Capacity (United States) 
The next issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner established that it will employ the beneficiary in a 
qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
In denying the petition, the director observed that the duty description provided for the beneficiary was overly 
vague. The director also noted that the petitioner had failed to submit an organizational chart for the 
petitioner, and accompanying duties, titles and salaries for the beneficiary's subordinates. The director 
further referenced the petitioner's failure to submit IRS Form W-2's relevant to the beneficiary subordinates, 
as directly requested by the director . 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director misinterpreted the support letter provided by the petitioner and 
failed to consider all of the evidence submitted on the record. Counsel states that the beneficiary supervises 
(b)(6)
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Page 14 
the work of other managerial, supervisory and professional employees, thereby qualifying him as a personnel 
manager. Counsel also asserts that the beneficiary qualifies as an executive. Counsel further notes that the 
director's determination that the petitioner failed to submit requested evidence was in error, since the 
petitioner provided a detailed organizational chart and the requested tax documentation. 
Upon review of the petition and the evidence, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary will be employed in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
Again, in order to determine whether the beneficiary would be employed in a qualifying executive or 
managerial capacity, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCJS) will look first to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). In support of the Form J-140, the petitioner 
described the beneficiary's proposed duties in the capacity of publisher as follows: 
[The beneficiary] will be responsible for overseeing the effectiveness of managers under 
his supervision; oversee the financial results of the company; and have final say on all 
contract negotiations . As the executive representative of [the foreign employer's] board 
of directors to [the petitioner], he will answer only to the executive in 
charge and part-owner of [the foreign employer]. [The beneficiary] will have 
management authority over all employees of [the petitioner], including the CEO, 
Advertisement Manager, IT Manager, and Financial Analyst, as well as several News 
Correspondents, including hiring and firing, vacation requests, promotion and training 
requirements. 
As Publisher, [the beneficiary] makes all strategic decisions about which media outlet 
channels the company should utilize, which service providers to have business 
relationships with, and which product suppliers to contract with. He is responsible for 
making executive decisions on whether and how to expand the business, including hiring 
and promoting employees, and negotiating and signing contracts on behalf of the 
company. [The beneficiary] prepares company budgets and determines methods for 
reaching budgetary goals. He decides whether and how to expand channels for 
advertising sales, and what partnerships to enter. into. In fulfilling his duties as Publisher 
of [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] receives only general direction from the overseas 
parent company. 
In the RFE, the director requested that the petitioner submit a definitive statement describing the beneficiary's 
job duties. The director asked that the petitioner provide a detailed list of duties and the percentage of time to 
be spent on each task. In response, the petitioner provided the following additional explanation: 
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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Having begun the process of building up the [petitioner] since 2005, [the beneficiary] will 
continue to be the leading force in shaping the direction, goals, and policies of [the 
petitioner]. 
As Publisher, [the beneficiary] will exercise discretionary decision-making authority with 
respect to the activities of the company and its expansion. He will continue to establish 
the company's salary structure, pay policies, recruiting and hiring, and performance 
appraisal programs (1 0%). He will be responsible for setting and controlling the 
company's budget, including having authority to expend the company's resources, 
contract with outside providers, and enter into contracts on behalf of the company ( 1 0% ). 
[The beneficiary] will review reports from other employees concerning the day-to-day 
operations of the company (15%); and review the work performed by the other 
employees of the company (1 0% ). He will be responsible for developing [the 
petitioner's] strategic initiatives (20%); approve and evaluate the success of new 
initiatives ( 15% ); and oversee the expansion of the business in the United States (20% ). 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the 
petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not 
spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F .2d 1533 
{Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
Again, reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not 
sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The duties 
offered by the petitioner are overly vague and provide little probative value as to the beneficiary's actual day­
to-day activities. Despite the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary has been the petitioner's publisher since 
2005, the petitioner offers no specifics or details regarding budgetary decisions made, strategic policies or 
goals implemented, or business expansion accomplished. Indeed, the beneficiary's provided duties could be 
the general duties of an executive or manager in any industry and provide little insight into what he does 
within the context of the petitioning organization. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment 
capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfY the 
pe!itioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. at 1108, aff'd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); 
Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
In addition, there are discrepancies and omissions in the record that have not been resolved. As noted above, 
the petitioner failed to provide details and specifics regarding the beneficiary's daily activities. The petitioner 
did submit various distribution contracts entered into with third parties. However, despite stating that the 
beneficiary would be responsible for negotiating and signing contracts on behalf of the company, none of the 
four contracts on the record are signed by the beneficiary nor is any evidence submitted to demonstrate that 
(b)(6)
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Page 16 
the beneficiary was involved in the negotiation of these contracts. 2 In fact, a lease submitted on the record 
dated March 31, 2006 is signed b) who is listed as the publisher of the petitioner. 
Additionally, the petitioner submitted contradictory information regarding the number and types of 
subordinates the beneficiary will supervise. In a support letter submitted with the petition in 2007, the 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary would be supervising an "Advertisement Manager, IT Manager, and 
Financial Analyst, as well as several News Correspondents." The petitioner did not submit an organizational 
chart at the time of filing, nor did it provide position descriptions for these claimed subordinates. The record 
does include an organizational chart dated May 1, 2008. This chart does not include an IT manager or a 
financial analyst, but a CEO/president , a business manager , a business administrative employee , an 
advertising and marketing employee , a customer representative, a writer, a political analyst and two 
correspondents . Later, in response to the director 's RFE, yet another organizational structure is presented 
including a CEO/president, columnist, web editor, editor, education editor, a PR/marketing employee, 
accountant, three correspondents, and a press review employee . The only job duties provided for the 
beneficiary's subordinates accompany the most recent organizational chart submitted in 2011, which 
identifies 12 subordinate employees . A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition 
cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of 
facts. Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm 'r 1971). Notably, the petitioner did not claim to 
employ any editors at the time of filing and it is unclear who would have performed this role. 
On appeal, counsel contends that the beneficiary will supervise other managers, supervisors or professionals, 
and thus qualifies as a manager based on his supervision of personnel. However , the petitioner did not 
provide position descriptions for the employees claimed to report to the publisher position at the time of 
filing, nor did it provide an organizational chart showing the hierarchy of the company. The AAO cannot 
determine that the beneficiary would be supervising supervisors , managers or professionals based solely on 
the job titles of the individuals he would supervise. 
In addition, the petitioner contends that the beneficiary qualifies as an executive in his current, and 
prospective, role as publisher. The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's 
elevated position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
organization , and that person ' s authority to direct the organization. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. § 110l(a)(44)(B). Under the statute , a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" 
and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition , the organization must 
have a subordinate level of managerial employees for the beneficiary to direct and the beneficiary must 
primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day operations of 
the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have an 
executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. The 
beneficiary must also exercise "wide 'latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only "general 
supervision or direction from higher level executives , the board of directors, or stockholders of the 
organization." !d. 
2 
The AAO notes that the record demonstrates that all provided contracts were executed after the 
beneficiary's asserted commencement of employment as publisher in 2005. 
(b)(6)
NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 17 
The petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish it will employ the beneficiary in an executive 
capacity. As noted, the petitioner has submitted a vague and non-probative duty description for the 
beneficiary that provides no detail regarding the nature of his day-to-day tasks, despite the petitioner's claims 
that he already holds this position as an employee of the foreign entity. Additionally, the petitioner has 
submitted inconsistent organizational charts without sufficient explanation. As referenced above, an 
individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have an executive title or 
because they "direct" the enterprise as an owner. The petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
operates within a complex organizational hierarchy as necessary to allow the beneficiary to primarily focus 
on directing management and implementing goals and policies. The petitioner has not provided sufficient 
evidence to establish that the beneficiary is primarily focused, and will focus, on these duties. Therefore, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity as defined by the 
Act. 
Finally, the AAO observes that the petitioner consistently asserts that the beneficiary has been in the United 
States in I nonimmigrant status and, since 2005, has acted in the capacity of publisher for the petitioner on 
behalf of the foreign entity. However, the petitioner has not submitted evidence to support these assertions. 
In fact, the record does not include any specifics, details, or supporting documentation regarding the 
beneficiary 's actions as publisher despite its claims that he has been working in this role since 2005. Rather, 
there is evidence in the record suggesting that others have been acting in the capacity of publisher in direct 
contradiction to the petitioner's statements. Further, the foreign entity's claimed acquisition of the petitioner 
occurred in 2007, not 2005. Thus, the petitioner's claim that the foreign entity has compensated the 
beneficiary to serve as the petitioner's publisher on its behalf since 2005 has not been adequately explained. 
The record does not contain adequate support for the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary currently holds 
this position as an I nonimmigrant and employee of the foreign entity. While there is no requirement that the 
beneficiary be a current employee of the petitioning company to meet the eligibility criteria for this 
classification, the absence of documentation to support the petitioner's claims raises questions regarding the 
U.S. job offer. 
In conclusion, the petitioner has provided a vague and non-specific duty description for the beneficiary in his 
proposed capacity with the petitioner and has failed to provide information regarding the nature of the duties 
performed by his subordinates as of the date of filing. For this additional reason, the appeal must be 
dismissed. 
V. Doing Business Abroad 
The final issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner has established that the foreign employer is 
doing business as defined by the regulations. 
The regulations at Title 8 C.P.R. § 204.50)(2), state that "doing business" means the regular, systematic and 
continuous provision of goods and/or services by a firm, corporation or other entity and does not include the 
mere presence of an agent or office." 
(b)(6)
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Page 18 
The petitioner stated that the foreign employer, ., is a media and publishing 
conglomerate based in Turkey known for publishing the country's largest daily newspaper 
Additionally, the petitioner stated that the foreign employer also publishes additional media including the 
magazines ~ ~ . and that it has a 
substantial online site dedicated to providing the news in Turkey. 
As noted, the director found that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the foreign employer was doing 
business in a regular, systematic and continuous fashion as defined by the regulations. The director noted 
that the petitioner had not submitted any evidence beyond tax documentation reflecting that the foreign 
employer had paid taxes, and that this alone, did not establish the foreign employer as doing business. 
On appeal, counsel states that the petitioner had established by preponderance of the evidence that the foreign 
employer is doing business based on its submission of substantial documentation related to the foreign 
employer's operations . On appeal, the petitioner submits the front pages of numerous publications printed by 
the foreign employer including 
Upon review, the petitioner has established that the foreign entity ts doing business as defined in the 
regulations. 
The director concluded that the petitioner had only submitted evidence illustrating that the foreign employer 
had paid taxes in Turkey, and in tum, that this was not sufficient to establish that the foreign employer was 
doing business in a regular, systematic, and continuous fashion. The AAO concurs with counsel that the 
director's conclusion was in error. The petitioner submitted other substantial evidence of the foreign 
employer's operations, including balance sheets and financial information for multiple years showing 
substantial income, screenshots of the foreign employer's news website, numerous examples of publications 
and periodicals printed by the foreign employer, detailed information regarding the foreign employer's 
circulation of newspapers abroad, along with evidence oftaxes paid by the foreign employer in Turkey. 
In sum, the AAO finds that the evidence is sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
foreign entity is doing business consistent with the regulations. The director's determination with respect to 
this ground for denial will be withdrawn. 
VI. Employment Abroad 
Although not addressed in the director's decision, the record as presently constituted does not contain 
sufficient evidence that the foreign entity employed the beneficiary for one · year during the requisite three­
year time period. 
The pertinent regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 205.5(j)(3)(i) states that the petitioner must submit the following 
evidence to qualifY the beneficiary as a multinational executive or manager: 
(b)(6)
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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
(i) Required evidence. A petition for a multinational executive or manager . must be 
accompanied by a statement from an authorized official of the petitioning United 
States employer which demonstrates that: 
* * * 
(B) If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation, or other legal entity by which the 
alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a 
nonimmigrant, the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year 
in a managerial or executive capacity 
The petitioner indicates that the foreign entity employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity 
from 1993 until March 1999, when he was admitted to the United States as a B-2 visitor. The beneficiary was 
last admitted to the United States on September 21, 1999. 
The petitioner indicates that the beneficiary was granted I nonimmigrant status in October 2001, and that the 
status was approved based on his "continued service to as a journalist and editor. Since 2005 
he has been serving as Publisher of [the petitioner] while remaining employed by ' In 
support of the petition, the petitioner provided pay stubs as evidence of the beneficiary's employment with 
However, the documents were dated January 2000 through December 2002. The petitioner does not 
indicate that the beneficiary was an employee of during the period from March 1999 until October 
200 I so it is unclear what role he held at this time. Although the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary's I 
visa is based on his continued relationship as a journalist and editor with the foreign entity, there is no 
evidence that he ever served in either of these roles before receiving an I visa; rather the petitioner indicates 
that the beneficiary served as an import and export manager and as legal counsel for the foreign entity. It is 
also unclear how he began serving as publisher for the petitioning company in 2005 on an I visa issued under 
the sponsorship of the foreign entity, prior to the formation of the claimed qualifying relationship between the 
companies in 2007. 
Nevertheless, the petitioner is required to provide evidence that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign 
entity prior to his admission to the United States as a nonimmigrant. In a Notice of Intent to Deny issued on 
March 31, 2008, the director advised the petitioner as follows: 
The record indicates that the beneficiary was employed by from 1990 
in various positions until March 1999. Yet, the Service has information that, at this same 
time, the beneficiary was employed as a personal assistant and care provider to [a Turkish 
citizen]. 
The director advised the petitioner that it should submit independent, objective evidence to resolve this 
inconsistency . In response, the petitioner submitted a statement from the beneficiary indicating that he has 
never been employed by the Turkish citizen named by USCIS, but is married to that individual's niece. He 
indicated that he has assisted this individual in his free time but has not been employed or paid by him. 
(b)(6)
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Page 20 
The petitioner did not, however, submit any documentary evidence to corroborate the beneficiary's 
employment with the foreign entity. As noted above, the petitioner's initial evidence documented the 
beneficiary's salary from the foreign entity for the three-year period from January 2000 until December 2002, 
thus suggesting that the petitioner was aware that it needed to corroborate the beneficiary's employment 
abroad. However, the petitioner never offered any documentation for the relevant period prior to March 
1999, even after the director pointed out an apparent discrepancy in the beneficiary's employment history. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed by the claimed parent 
company during the relevant three-year period. For this additional reason, the petition cannot be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identifY all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, l 043 (E.D. Cal. 2001 ), a.ffd. 345 F .3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Soltane v. DOJ, 381 F.Jd 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
VII. Conclusion 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternate basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofOtiende, 26 
I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.