dismissed EB-1C Case: Office Furniture Manufacturing

(b)(6)
DA TE:NOV 1 8 2013 
INRE : Petitioner: 
Beneficiary : 
OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office of Admini strati ve Appeals 
20 Massachusett s Ave., N.W., MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
FILE : 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manag er Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l )(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclo sed please find the decision of the Admini strative Appeal s Office (AAO) in your case. 
This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constru ctions of law nor establish agency 
policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to 
your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration , you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion 
to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 
days of the date of this decision. Please review the Form I-290B instructions at 
http://www.uscis.gov/forms for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See 
also 8 C.P.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO . 
~on Ros nberg 
Chief, Admini strative Appeals Office 
www.uscis.gov 
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Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment -based immigrant visa 
petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal 
will be dismissed. 
The petitioner, a California co oration engaged in office furniture manufacturing, states that it is an 
affiliate of the beneficiary's former foreign employer. It seeks to employ the 
beneficiary as its president. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an 
employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
On August 3, 2013, the director denied the petition concluding that: (1) the petitioner failed to 
establish the existence of a qualifying relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary's 
foreign employer; and, (2) the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a 
qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings and provides an appellate brief laying out the 
grounds for challenging the denial. 
I. The Law 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available ... to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
* * * 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 
year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary . 
(b)(6) NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
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A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed 
by the alien. 
With regard to the petitioner ' s initial filing requirements, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(i) 
state that the petitioner must provide the following evidence in support of the petition in order to 
establish eligibility: 
(A) If the alien is outside the United States, in the three years immediately preceding 
the filing of the petition the alien has been employed outside the United States 
for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a firm or 
corporation, or other legal entity, or by an affiliate or subsidiary of such a firm or 
corporation or other legal entity; or 
(B) If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation, or other legal entity by which 
the alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a 
nonimmigrant, the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year 
in a managerial or executive capacity; 
(C) The prospective employer in the United States is the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation or other legal entity by which the 
alien was employed overseas; and 
(D) The prospective United States employer has been doing business for at least one 
year. 
II. Qualifying Relationship 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner submitted sufficient evidence to establish 
that it has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. To establish a 
"qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. a U.S. 
entity with a foreign office) or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally 
§ 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C); see also 8 C .F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) (providing 
definitions of the terms "affiliate" and "subsidiary"). 
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The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or 
proportion of each entity; 
* * * 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
A. Facts 
In a letter of support dated July 23, 2012, the petitioner explained that it is part of the 
which opened its first U.S. subsidiary, in 1996. 
The petitioner also explained that the "Group has subsidiaries and factories in seven countries." The 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary's former employer, was established on 
April 19, 2004 in In addition, the petitioner explained that, in 2004, 
established a new company in the United States, which has "three wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and [the petitioner]." The petitioner 
provided a chart of the corporate relationships between all the companies which depicts 
as the owner of 100 percent of the foreign company, and 100 percent of 
, the company that owns the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner contends that the 
foreign company its affiliate. 
The petitioner provided a copy of the articles of association of the limited liability company, 
which state that and the beneficiary are the "participants" in the company and 
that Mr. made an initial investment equal to 100% of the authorized capital. 
(b)(6) NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
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The petitioner also submitted a copy of its articles of incorporation filed with the State of 
indicating that the company is authorized to issue 1,000,000 shares. It also provided: (1) a copy of 
the minutes of its organizational meeting which state that 350,000 shares were issued to 
and (2) a copy of its stock certificate number 1 reflecting the issuance of these shares 
to Inc. on January 8, 2005. 
As evidence of the ownership of the petitioner submitted a copy of 
1 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for 
2011. According to the tax return, the owners of are (49.21 %) and 
(49.21 %). The tax return states that 
petitioner. The 2011 Form 1120 was a consolidated tax return which included 
the petitioner, and 
wholly owns the 
The director issued a request for evidence (RFE) on January 4, 2013, in which he advised the 
petitioner that its initial evidence did not support its claim that ultimately owns 100% of 
both the petitioner and the foreign entity. Specifically, the director observed that the evidence 
submitted indicates that Mr. indirectly owns only 49.21% of the petitioner's U.S. parent 
company. Accordingly, the director requested additional evidence to establish the ownership and 
control of 
In a response dated March 22, 2013, counsel for the petitioner emphasized that Mrs. is 
's wife and that the couple are residents of California, "a community property state." 
Counsel asserted that "Mr. retains full control of all companies. 
The petitioner also submitted a copy of its IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for 
2012. The petitioner indicated at Schedule K that it is a subsidiary in an affiliated or parent­
subsidiary controlled group and that is its parent corporation. However, at 
Schedule G, Information on Certain Persons Owning the Corporation's Voting Stock, the petitioner 
indicated that and each directly own 45.00% of the petitioner's voting 
stock. The etitioner did not submit the requested evidence to establish the ownership and control of 
The director denied the petitiOn, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that it has a 
qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's former employer, In denying the 
petition, the director observed that the petitioner failed to submit a complete response to the RFE and 
provided inconsistent evidence regarding the ownership of the petitioner and of its claimed U.S. 
parent company, Further, the director found that none of the submitted 
evidence corr-oborated the petitioner's initial claim that ultimately owns and controls 
the 
100% of the petitioning company. The director acknowledged counsel's claim that Mr. 
(b)(6) NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 6 
controls both his own and his spouse's shares in any marital prope1ty under California law, but 
emphasized that the petitioner failed to submit any evidence to support this assertion. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner states: 
Although the foreign affiliate was under the husband's name, i.e. his 
wife, as his wife, actually owns half of the interest in the 
foreign affiliate. While the Petitioner is owned by a holding company that is owned 
equally under the names of the husband and wife, the ownership and control 
structure satisfies [the regulatory definition of "affiliate"]. 
The 49.21% as reflected in the tax return was caused by the fact that the husband and 
wife gave some portion of the holding company's shares to their children for estate 
planning purpose. As the percentage of shares held by their children (1.58%) was 
way below reporting threshold, the children's ownership was not reflected on the tax 
return. Nevertheless, the husband and wife, as a group, owns 98.42% of the 
Petitioner through the holding company and owns 100% of the foreign affiliate. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review, the petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign 
entity. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined 
in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for 
purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 
(Comm'r 1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (Comm'r 1986); 
Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm'r 1982) . In the context of this visa petition, ownership 
refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and 
authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the 
establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 
19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not 
sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a 
corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, 
and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total 
number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage 
ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all 
agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of 
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the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens 
Medical Systems , Inc., supra. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, USCIS is unable to 
determine the elements of ownership and control. 
The petitioner initiall claimed that it is wholly owned by , which is, in tum , 
wholly owned by However, the petitioner has failed to submit evidence to support this 
claim and has instead introduced inconsistencies into the record with respect to its ownership and the 
ownership of 
The petitioner provided a copy of its stock certificate number 1 indicating that it issued 350,000 of its 
!.million authorized shares to IRS Form 1120 supports 
the petitioner's claim that is its parent company; however, the petitioner stated on 
Schedule G of its own IRS Form 1120 for 2012 that : and each directly own a 
45% interest in the petitioning company. Therefore, in light of this inconsistency, the petitioner' s 
single stock certificate issued in 2005 is insufficient to support its claim that remains 
the petitioner's sole shareholder. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in 
the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to 
where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Although the director noted these inconsistencies in the decision, the petitioner has not addressed the 
2012 tax return on appeal, nor has it provided additional primary evidence of its ownership , such as 
copies of all issued stock certificates or a stock transfer ledger. Accordingly, the petitioner has not 
submitted sufficient evidence to establish the identity of its shareholders. 
In addition, the petitioner initially that is the sole owner of but the 
tax returns indicate that and his spouse are both owners of 
Counsel for the petitioner contends that since Mr. and Mrs. are married and live in Califomia, 
a community property state, has full control of all companies. In addition, on appeal, 
counsel for the petitioner states that although the foreign affiliate is under name only, 
his wife "actually owns half of the interest in the foreign affiliate." However, the petitioner did not 
provide any documentation to support this claim. Without documentary evidence to support the 
claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported 
assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 
1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 
503, 506 (BIA 1980). Further, upon review of the foreign entity's atticles of association , it is unclear 
whether it corroborates the petitioner's initial claim that Mr. is the company's sole owner, as 
the beneficiary is identified along with Mr. as a "participant" in the foreign company. 
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Due to the umesolved inconsistencies and other evidentiary deficiencies in the record, the petitioner 
has not established that it has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. There 
is insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. and his spouse jointly own and control both 
companies, particularly in light of the petitioner's initial claim that Mr. is the sole owner of all 
companies in the Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
III. Managerial or Executive Capacity 
The second issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity . 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily--
(i) manages the organization, or a department , subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other 
employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue 
of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily--
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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives , the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, users will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). Published case law clearly 
supports the pivotal role of a clearly defined job description, as the actual duties themselves reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp . 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); see also 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(j)(5). That being said, however, 
users reviews the totality of the record, which includes not only the beneficiary's job description, 
but also takes into account the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration 
of employees, as well as the job descriptions of the beneficiary 's subordinates , if any, and any other 
facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role within a given entity. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions . 
Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily perform s these specified 
responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion 
World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
Upon review of the petition and evidence, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
At the time of filing, described the beneficiary's position of president by merely restating the statutory 
definitions of managerial and executive capacity found at section 101(a)(44) of the Act. The 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary, as president, currently "directs the management of the company, 
establishes goals and policies of our company, exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision­
making and reports directly to the Board of Directors." The petitioner further stated that the 
beneficiary "is responsible for managing our company, supervising and controlling the works of our 
company's other supervisory professional or managerial employees, hiring and firing . . . and 
exercising discretion over the day-to-day operations of our company." Conclusory assertions 
regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of 
the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. 
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Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Associates, 
Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart depicting the beneficiary as "C.E.O." with four 
direct subordinates: production and assembly supervisor, sales and marketing director, chief finance 
officer, and project manager. The chart listed a total of nine additional employees, including two 
production and assembly workers, two sales and marketing staff, an accountant and four onsite 
laborers/installers. 
In the RFE issued on January 4, 2013, the director requested a definitive statement regarding the 
position, including all specific daily duties to be 
performed and the percentage of time the beneficiary 
would spend on each specific task. In addition, the director requested the petitioner's detailed 
organizational chart, as well as job titles, job duties, educational levels and full- or part-time status for 
all employees. Finally, the director requested copies of IRS Forms W-2 for all employees, as well as 
information and evidence regarding any contract labor used by the petitioner. 
In response, the petltloner provided a list of job duties that was accompanied by a percentage 
breakdown. However, while the petitioner indicates that 100% of the beneficiary's time is spent 
performing various types of "management" responsibilities, the listed areas of responsibility (general 
management, finance management, production management, and sales and marketing management) 
each encompass both qualifying and non-qualifying duties. Further, the description did not include 
the requested level of specificity, and does not provide a meaningful understanding of how much time 
the beneficiary will spend performing qualifying tasks versus those that would be deemed non­
qualifying. 
For instance, in describing the beneficiary's proposed employment, the petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary will spend 15 percent of her time in "general management" to include: "daily meetings 
with personnel"; "maintain daily contact with all employees"; "address any issues and concems that 
arise between staff members"; "oversee maintenance issues and meet with maintenance contractors"; 
"check and answer emails"; and, "correspond with oversee [sic] suppliers." The petitioner did not 
explain how the majority of these duties, which include several administrative tasks, fall within the 
statutory definition of managerial capacity. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or 
broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to provide any detail o'r explanation of the 
beneficiary's activities in the course of her daily routine. The actual duties themselves will reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner also stated that the beneficiary will spend 30 percent of her time on finance 
management. These duties include "work with finance to develop budgets, oversee expenditures and 
(b)(6) NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
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assist with financial reports"; "review activity reports and financial statements to determine progress 
and status in attaining objectives and revise goals and plans in accordance with the current situation"; 
"become familiar with terms of all contracts and agreements"; "control banking AIR and AlP" ; 
"analyze cash flow"; "check prices": and, "calculate bonuses." According to the organizational chart, 
the petitioner employs a chief financial officer and an accountant. However, after reviewing the job 
duties of the chief financial officer and accountant, it appears that the beneficiary will be the only 
person in charge of the contracts and agreements and the analysis of cash flow. Thus, the beneficiary 
may be the only one to carry out these operational functions, which are outside the parameters of the 
definitions of managerial and executive capacity. 
Finally, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will spend 35 percent of her time in sales and 
marketing management. The listed duties include: "meet/negotiate with customers and suppliers"; 
"attend business events to develop new contacts"; "study competitor's prices and marketing 
strategies"; "meet with the customers"; "check and answer e-mails"; "correspond with oversea 
suppliers"; and "checking POs, purchase and sales agreements.'' While the petitioner indicates that it 
employs a sales and marketing director, a sales manager and a marketing manager, several of these 
duties overlap with those of the subordinates and reflect that the beneficiary herself is involved in 
sales and market research activities that do not qualify as managerial. 
No beneficiary is required to allocate 100% of her time to managerial- or executive-level tasks, the 
petitioner must establish that the non-qualifying tasks the beneficiary would perform are only 
incidental to her proposed position. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to 
produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial 
or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" 
perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International , 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Here, the petitioner has failed to establish any clear distinctions 
between the beneficiary's proposed qualifying and non-qualifying duties and thus failed to establish 
that the beneficiary's duties are primarily managerial or executive in nature. 
Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that her duties involve 
supervising employees , the petitioner must establish that the subordinate employees are supervisory , 
professional, or managerial. See§ 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The petitioner has documented that it 
employed a total of twelve full- and part-time employees subordinate to the beneficiary at the time of 
filing, including seven employees with managerial or supervisory job titles. Here, as noted by the 
director, there is a significant amount of overlap between the beneficiary' s job description and the 
brief job descriptions provided for her subordinates . The evidence must substantiate that the duties of 
the beneficiary and his or her subordinates correspond to their placement in an organization's 
structural hierarchy; artificial tiers of subordinate employees and inflated job titles are not probative 
and will not establish that an organization is sufficiently complex to support an executive or manager 
position. While the beneficiary likely allocates some portion of her time to oversight of subordinate 
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supervisors, the petitioner has not described her position with sufficient specificity to warrant a 
finding that she will allocate her time to duties that are primarily within a qualifying managerial or 
executive capacity. 
Overall, the petitioner's claims fail on an evidentiary basis as the job descriptions provided for the 
beneficiary were overly vague, included a number of non-qualifying duties, and overlapped with 
those of her claimed subordinates. Although the director specifically noted these deficiencies , the 
petitioner has not offered further information regarding the beneficiary's actual duties in support of 
the appeal. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes 
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 
1972)). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it will employ the beneficiary in a qualifying 
managerial or executive capacity and the appeal will be dismissed. 
IV. Prior Nonimmigrant Approvals 
The record indicates that the petitioner currently employs the beneficiary pursuant to an approved L-
1A nonimmigrant petition . It must be noted that many I-140 immigrant petitions are denied after 
USCIS approves prior nonimmigrant I-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 
293 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); 
Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Examining the consequences 
of an approved petition, there is a significant difference between a nonimmigrant L-1A visa 
classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily , and an immigrant E-13 
visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if 
granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. Cf §§ 204 and 214 of the Act, 
8 U.S .C. §§ 1154 and 1184; see also§ 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. Because USCIS spends less 
time reviewing 1-129 nonimmigrant petitions than I-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant L-
1A petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; 
see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(i)(requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend 
an L-1A petition's validity). 
Second, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of .proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. USCIS is not required to 
assume the burden of searching through previously provided evidence submitted in support of other 
petitions to determine the approvability of the petition at hand in the present matter. The approval of 
a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that USCIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on 
behalf of the same beneficiary. 
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Finally, the AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to 
suggest that USCIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex 
Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
The AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of appeals and 
a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of the 
beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. Louisiana 
Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
V. Conclusion 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent 
and alternate basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to 
establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; 
Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.