dismissed
EB-1C
dismissed EB-1C Case: Property Management
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily executive capacity. The petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence of its staffing levels at the time of filing to demonstrate that the beneficiary would be relieved of non-executive duties, and also failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage.
Criteria Discussed
Executive Capacity Ability To Pay Staffing Levels Job Duties
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
MATTER OF P-1-, INC.
APPEAL OF TEXAS SERVICE CENTER DECISION
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office
DATE: APR. 10,2018
PETITION: FORM l-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER
The Petitioner, a business that manages and operates vacation rental properties, seeks to permanently
employ the Bcnellciary as its president under the first preference immigrant classification for
multinational executives or managers. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act)
section 203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. § ll53(b)(l)(C). This classillcation allows a U.S. employer to
permanently transfer a qualified foreign employee to the United States to work in an executive or
managerial capacity.
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not
establish, as required, that: (I) the Beneficiary would be employed in the United States in an
executive capacity; and (2) it had the ability to pay the Beneficiary's proffered wage as of the date
the petition was filed.
On appeal, the Petitioner disputes the Director's findings, asserting that the Beneficiary's job duties
arc consistent with those of an executive within the scope of the Petitioner's reasonable needs.
Upon de novo review, we find that the Petitioner has not overcome the Director's findings.
Therefore, we will dismiss the appeal.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
An immigrant visa is available to a bcneliciary who, in the three years preceding the filing of the
petition, has been employed outside the United States for at least one year in a managerial or
executive capacity, and seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render managerial or
executive services to the same employer or to its subsidiary or affiliate. Section 203(b )(I )(C) of the
Act.
The Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, must include a statement from an authorized
official of the petitioning United States employer which demonstrates that the beneficiary has been
employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity for at least one year in the three years
preceding the filing of the petition, that the beneficiary is coming to work in the United States for the
same employer or a subsidiary or aff1liate of the foreign employer, and that the prospective U.S.
employer has been doing business for at least one year. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3).
Malter of P-1-. Inc.
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAPACITY
The first issue to be addressed is whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary will be
employed in an executive capacity. The Petitioner did not claim that ·the Beneficiary would be
employed in a managerial capacity; therefore, our analysis will address only the Petitioner's claim
that the Beneficiary's proposed position would be in an executive capacity.
"Executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily
directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization;
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; exercises wide
latitude in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or direction from
higher-level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. Section
IOI(a)(44)(B) of the Act.
Based on the statutory delinitions of executive capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the
Beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World. Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d
!53 3 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). The Petitioner must also prove that the
Beneliciary will be primarily engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational
activities alongside the Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313,
1316 (9th Cir. 2006): Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533.
The petitioner must provide a job description that clearly describes the duties to be performed by the
beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in a managerial or executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.5(j)(3). Beyond the required description of the job duties, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) examines the company's organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's
subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve a beneticiary from performing
operational duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that will contribute to
understanding a beneliciary's actual duties and role in a business.
Accordingly, we will discuss evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties along with evidence of
the nature of the Petitioner's business and its staffing levels.
A. Stafling
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial
or executive capacity, USC IS takes into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of
the overall purpose and stage of development of the organization. See section IOI(a)(44)(C) of the
Act.
In the initial cover letter, the Petitioner stated that it had four employees at the time of filing and was
looking to add live employees after finalizing its purchase of a gas station/convenience store
operation. The Petitioner further stated that its "organizational structure supports the executive
position" and relieves the Beneficiary from performing non-executive functions, which are
2
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Mauer of P-1-. Inc.
performed by "key personnel " rather than the Beneficiary. The Petitioner did not provide an
organization al chart identifying its employees as of the date of filing in December 2016 . Rather, it
provided prospective organizational charts that originally appeared in an earlier busin ess plan. The
chart showed that, by its third year of operation s, the Beneficiary would supervi se: a marke ting
manager ; a real estate division stafted by a property manager and two maintenance specialists; and a
gas station divi sion staffed by a manager, a convenience store supe rvisor, a car wa sh supervisor, two
store attend ants, and a car wash attendant.
The Petiti oner acknowledged that it had not yet purcha sed a gas statio n/convenience store business.
The Petition er must establi sh that all eligibility requir ements for the immigration benefi t have been
satisf-ied from the time of the l"iling and continuing through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § l03. 2(b)(l).
Therefor e, we will not consider hiring or expansion activities that occurred after the dat e t he peti tion
was tiled.
In a r eque st f or evidence (RF E), the Director instructed the Petitioner to provide an organizational
chart that retlcct s the organi zati onal structure thc:it was in place at t he time the petitio n w as tile d.
The Petiti oner was asked to include the nam es of its emplo yees a nd to identif y the Beneficiar y's
direct subordinates , state whether they work on a full- or part- time basis, and provide their respecti ve
education al levels, job duties, and dates of hire. The Petitioner was als o a sked to provide e mployee
pay stub s for the past 12 month s, all Form W-2s it issued to its emp loyee s in 2016, and evidence of
compensation paid to contracto rs if contractor labor was used.
In r~s pon se, the Petitioner provided an organizational chart depicting a multi-tier ed sta ff-ing structure
with the Benef-iciary at the top as the president, followed by a " manager" as his direct subordina te,
with one maintenance emplo yee and one sales associate /custome r s ervice emp loyee at the bottom
tier of a four-employee starting structure. Although the Peti tioner provided three quarterly tax
returns for 2016 , it did not provide one for the final quarter of 2016 during which thi s petition was
t-iled. The Petitioner also did not submit its payroll summaries, Form W-2 s, or any other ev idence or
wage s paid to its employe es, that would establish precisely whom it empl oyed in December 2016.
The Petiti oner indicated that it established a sub sidiary compan y called in
2017 and acquired an existing gas station. The Petitioner provid ed this com pany' s "W-2 Pre view"
for 20 I 7 and a .July 20 I 7 payroll summary showing wages paid to employees who wor k a t the gas
station and convenience store . Although the Petitioner provided its own "W-2 Preview," the
Beneficiary and his spouse were the only two employees listed in the doc ument, which a ccounted for
salaries p aid in 2017.
In the deni al decision. the Dire ctor correctlv determined tha t the Petitione r had not finali zed the . .,
purchase of a gas station/convenience store at the time of tiling and therefore dec lined to consider
that busine ss in making a determination about · the Beneficiary's proposed employm ent in an
executive capacity. Further , although the Director acknowledged and discussed the organizational
chart that was pr<?vided in resp onse to the RFE , he correctly pointed oufth at the Petiti oner neglected .
to compl y with certain RFE instructions , which asked the Petitioner to prov ide critic al evidence to
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Mauer ofP-1-. Inc.
determine its staffing at the time of filing. In light of the missing evidence, the Director questioned
the Petitioner's ability to relieve the Beneficiary from having to primarily perform non-executive
functions and also noted that the Petitioner did not provide a job description for the Beneficiary's
subordinate manager or explain how this person would support the Beneficiary in an executive
position.
On appeal, the Petitioner disputes the denial and contends that its "active engagement in expanding
its business" justifies its need for an executive employee. The Petitioner also asserts that the
Director must consider its "business practices" and the nature of its business. It does not, however,
specifically identify any of its "business practices" or explain how the nature of its business should
impact our understanding of the Petitioner's staffing needs or its ability to relieve the Beneficiary
tfom having to devote his time primarily to the organization's operational and/or administrative
functions. Although the Petitioner claims that it has enough employees to perform its daily
operational tasks, it must support its assertimp with relevant, probative, and credible evidence. See
Maller of Chml'athe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). As noted earlier, the Petitioner has
provided little evidence to support its claim. Despite having been specifically instructed to provide
job descriptions for the Beneficiary's subordinates as well as evidence to show wages paid to its
employees, the Petitioner did not provide the requested wage evidence, state precisely what
operational tasks the Beneficiary's subordinate "manager" executes, or explain how the Petitioner's
stafling structure at the time of filing was suflicient to relieve the Beneficiary fi-om having to carry
out primarily non-executive functions.
The fact that the Beneficiary will manage or direct a business docs not necessarily establish
eligihility lor classification as a multinational executive in an executive capacity within the meaning
of section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the
duties of a position be "primarily" executive in nature. Section 10l(A)(44)(B) of the Act. While the
Beneficiary's placement at the top of the Petitioner's staffing hierarchy indicates that he may
exercise discretion over its day-to-day operations and possess the requisite level of authority with
respect to discretionary decision-making, these elements are not sufticient to establish that the
Beneficiary had the necessary staffing to support the Beneficiary in an executive position.
The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated posttton
within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the
Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish
the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a
subordinate level of managerial employees for a beneficiary to direct and they must primarily focus
on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day operations of the
enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they
have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial
employee. A beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and
receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or
stockholders of the organization." !d.
4
Malter of P-1-. Inc.
In light of the evidentiary deficiencies described above, we find that the Petitioner has not provided
sufficient evidence to show that at the time of tiling it had the stafting and organizational complexity
to relieve the Beneficiary tfom having to engage in the daily operational fimctions that are associated
with owning and managing rental properties.
B. Duties
In the next portion of our analysis, we will address the Beneficiary's job duties. The initial cover
letter contained a job duty breakdown with time allocations. The Petitioner stated that the
Beneficiary would distribute his time to the following duties:
• 15'Yo directing the company's growth by analyzing its sales and marketing policies;
• I 0% developing and implementing marketing strategies;
• I 0% finding and assessing new business opportunities;
• 5% meeting with vendors about buying products for the convenience store and another
I 0% setting prices;
• 35% assessing "business procedures" and directing "operational activities":
• I 0% overseeing long-term goals; and
• 5% recruiting and hiring subordinates to manage the company's daily functions.
The Petitioner pointed to the Beneficiary's "complete discretionary authority" to direct the
company's operation, set its goals, and determine its "expectations for growth" and stated that the
Beneficiary's primary responsibilities will be to develop, implement, and evaluate policies that affect
the company's finances and "market position" and to evaluate investment opportunities to expand
the business, such as purchasing a full-scn'ice gas station/convenience store.
In the denial decision, the Director found that the Petitioner's job description lacked sufficient detail
and did not lead to a meaningful understanding of the Beneficiary's actual job duties. The Director
stated that the Petitioner did not provide sufticient information about the day-to-day duties involved
in directing the management of a vacation rental business or adequately explain how its operational
tasks arc can·ied out given that it did not provide subordinate employee job descriptions.
On appeal, the Petitioner focuses on its organizational needs, claiming that the Beneficiary's
employment is critical to its continued success. The Petitioner claims that the Beneticiary has
autonomy in making business decisions that will affect the company's growth and financial well
being and fi.1rther states that the Beneficiary will be tasked with identifying additional revenue
sources and business opportunities, such as the gas station/convenience store it purchased shortly
after filing this petition.
We find, however, that the Petitioner did not adequately describe the Beneficiary's underlying daily
job duties or explain what specific tasks are involved in looking for business opportunities. In the
above job description, the Petitioner claimed that 35% of the Beneficiary's time would be allocated
to assessing "business procedures" and directing "operational activities." However, the Petitioner
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Mauer of!'-!-. Inc.
did not spccilically identify any "business procedures" or "operational activities" within the scope of
its business operation. nor did it adequately establish that someone other than the Beneficiary was
available to carry out the "operational activities" at the time of filing. Likewise, the Petitioner did
not establish that developing marketing strategies, meeting with vendors, and recruiting subordinates
to perform daily functions are executive-level tasks.
While the Beneficiary is not required to allocate I 00% of his time to executive-level tasks to meet
the statutory criteria, the Petitioner must establish that the non-qualifying tasks the Beneliciary
would perform are only incidental to the proposed position. An employee who "primarily" performs
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily"
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See. e.g, sections IOI(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); lvlatter of
Church Scientology Int '/, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm'r 1988).
Although the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary has a high degree of discretionary authority
that is consistent with that of an executive, the Director correctly observed that the Petitioner did not
provide suflicient information about the Beneliciary's specific daily job duties, thereby precluding
us from being able to ascertain the nature of the tasks that would occupy the primary portion of his
time .. Reciting the Beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not
sutlicient; the regulations require a detailed description of the Beneficiary's daily job duties. The
actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v.
Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990).
On appeal, the Petitioner broadly states that the Beneficiary's "main responsibilities" will be to
evaluate and implement the company's policies and strategies. However, it does not specify any
strategies or policies or identif)' the specilic tasks that will be involved in meeting these key
responsibilities. Despite the Petitioner's need to employ the Beneliciary in a position where he
would lead the company and be in charge of its business decisions, the Petitioner has not established
that the actual tasks to be performed by the Beneliciary on a daily basis would primarily focus on
directing the management of the organization and establishing its goals and policies.
In light of the above analysis, we find that the Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to
establish that the Beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity.
III. ABILITY TO PAY
The Director also found that the Petitioner did not .establish that it had the ability to pay the
Beneficiary's proffered wage at the time this petition was filed.
When filing a Form l-140, a petitioner is required to provide copies of its annual reports, federal tax
returns, or audited financial statements to establish that it had the ability to pay the beneliciary's
proffered wage at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains
lawful permanent residence. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).
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Mauer of P-1-. Inc.
In the present matter, the Petitioner filed its Form 1-140 in December 2016 stating that the
Beneficiary's proffered wage is $42,000 per year. On appeal the Petitioner provided its 2016 tax
return showing a negative net income of $102,471. Although the tax return indicates that the
Petitioner paid $67,452 in salaries in wages, the record does not include payroll documents or Form
W-2s for 2016 to show the recipient(s) of those wages, nor did the Petitioner provide evidence that it
paid wages to the Beneficiary in 2016.
If the net income the Petitioner had available during the pertinent period added to the wages paid to
the Bencticiary during the period docs not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, we will
review the Petitioner's assets. Net current assets are derived by taking the difference between a
petitioner's current assets and its current liabilities. A corporation's year-end current assets are
shown on Schedule L, lines I through 6; its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through
18. If the total of a corporation's end-of~year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary
(if any) are equal to or greater than the profTered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay
the proffered wage using those net current assets.
In the present matter, the Petitioner's net current assets in 2016 totaled $41,398, which f~1lls short of
the profTered wage. On appeal, the Petitioner requests that we consider its $1,945 security deposit as
a current asset. However, the Petitioner included the security deposit funds in Schedule L, line 14 of
the 2016 tax return as "other assets." Therefore, the Petitioner has not established that the security
deposit can be considered a current asset.
In light of the above, the Petitioner has not established its ability to pay the Beneficiary's proffered
wage as of the time of filing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we lind that the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary
will be employed in the United States in an executive capacity or that it had the ability to pay the
Beneficiary's proffered wage at the time of tiling. The appeal will be dismissed for these reasons.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
Cite as Maller o{P-1-. Inc., ID# I 141813 (AAO Apr. 10, 20!8)
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