dismissed EB-1C Case: Publishing

identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyunwarranted
invasionof personalprivacy
PUBLICCOPY
U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO)
20 MassachusettsAve.N.W., MS 2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
8 U.S.Citizenship
andImmigration
Services
DATE: g g g OFFICE:NEBRASKASERVICECENTER
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionfor Alien WorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveor ManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedtothismatterhavebeenreturnedtotheofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvisedthat
anyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe law wasinappropriatelyappliedby us in reachingour decision,or you haveadditional
informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfile a motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin
accordancewith the instructionson Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha requestcanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directlywith theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresthatanymotionmustbefiled
within30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseekstoreconsiderorreopen.
Thankyou,
PerryRhew
Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscis.gov
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DISCUSSION:Thepreferencevisa petitionwasdeniedby the Director,NebraskaServiceCenter.The
matteris nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)onappeal.Theappealwill bedismissed.
Thepetitioneris a Washingtoncorporationthatseeksto employthebeneficiaryasits advertisingmanager.
Accordingly,thepetitionerendeavorstoclassifythebeneficiaryasanemployment-basedimmigrantpursuant
to section203(b)(1)(C)of the ImmigrationandNationalityAct (theAct), 8 U.S.C.§ ll53(b)(1)(C), asa
multinationalexecutiveormanager.
In supportof theFormI-140thepetitionersubmitteda brief supportingstatementdatedJune14,2010in
whichit wasclaimedthatthebeneficiary'sU.S.employmentwouldentailoversightof sales,graphicdesign,
anddistributionof the petitioner'spublicationsto the Spanish-speakingcommunity. The petitioneralso
providedsupportingdocumentsin theformof taxreturns,a2008and2009FormW-2 forthebeneficiary,and
a stateissueddocumentlistingthepetitioner'sregisteredtradenames.
Thedirectorreviewedthepetitioner'ssubmissionsanddeterminedthattheywerenot sufficientto establish
eligibility. The directorthereforeissueda requestfor additionalevidence(RFE) datedJuly 22, 2010
informingthepetitionerof numerousevidentiarydeficienciesandallowingthepetitionertheopportunityto
supplementthe recordwith evidenceof its eligibility. Thedirectorrequestedevidenceand information
pertainingto thebeneficiary'semploymentabroad,his proposedemploymentwith theU.S.entity,andthe
petitioner'squalifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'sforeignemployer.
Thepetitioneraddressedthedirector'sconcernsin a statementfromcounsel,datedAugust31,2010. The
petitioneralsoprovidedsupportingevidencein the form of U.S. tax documents,pay statements,various
corporatedocumentspertainingto bothentities,organizationalcharts.andstatementsthatwerepreviously
submittedin supportof other,nonimmigrant,visapetitions.
After reviewingtherecord,the directorconcludedthat the petitionerfailed to establisheligibility. The
directorthereforeissueda decisiondatedNovember18,2010denyingthepetitionbasedonthepetitioner's
failureto submitevidenceof (1) the beneficiary'sU.S.employmentin a qualifyingcapacity;and(2)the
petitioner's qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer.
On appeal,counselsubmits a statementdisputing the director's findings accompaniedby a sworn statement
from tndthepetitioner's samplepublication.
TheAAO findsthatneithercounsel'sstatementsnorthepetitioner'ssupportingdocumentsaresufficientto
overcomethedirector'sdenial. Thediscussionbelowwill provideananalysisof therelevantrequirements
andtheshortcomingsin therecord.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) PriorityWorkers.-- Visasshallfirst bemadeavailable. . . to qualifiedimmigrantswho
arealiensdescribedin anyof thefollowingsubparagraphs(A) through(C):
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(C)CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.-- An alienis described
in this subparagraphif the alien,in the 3 yearsprecedingthe time of the
alien'sapplicationfor classificationandadmissioninto the United States
underthissubparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least1yearby a firm or
corporationor otherlegalentityor anaffiliateor subsidiarythereofandwho
seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin orderto continueto renderservicestothe
sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is
managerialorexecutive.
Thelanguageof thestatuteis specificin limiting thisprovisionto only thoseexecutivesandmanagerswho
havepreviouslyworkedfora firm,corporationorotherlegalentity,or anaffiliateor subsidiaryof thatentity,
andwhoarecomingtotheUnitedStatestoworkfor thesameentity,or itsaffiliateor subsidiary.
A UnitedStatesemployermay file a petitionon Form I-140 for classificationof an alien undersection
203(b)(1)(C)of theAct asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis requiredfor this
classification.Theprospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnisha job offer in the form of a
statementwhichindicatesthatthealienis to beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive
capacity.Sucha statementmustclearlydescribethedutiesto beperformedbythealien.
Thefirst issueto be addressedin this proceedingpertainsto thebeneficiary'semploymentwith the U.S.
entityandwhethersuchemploymentcanbedeemedasbeingin amanagerialorexecutivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
The term "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function, or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesand controlsthe work of other supervisory,professional,or
managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunction within the
organization,oradepartmentorsubdivisionof theorganization;
(iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesare directly supervised,hasthe
authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseas well as otherpersonnel
actions(suchaspromotionandleaveauthorization),or if nootheremployee
is directlysupervised,functionsat a seniorlevelwithin theorganizational
hierarchyorwithrespecttothefunctionmanaged;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionovertheday-to-dayoperationsof theactivityor function
for which the employeehas authority. A first-line supervisoris not
consideredto be actingin a managerialcapacitymerelyby virtue of the
supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unless the employeessupervisedare
professional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
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The term "executivecapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily-
(i) directsthemanagementof theorganizationor a majorcomponentor function
of theorganization;
(ii) establishesthe goals and policies of the organization,component,or
function;
(iii) exerciseswidelatitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly generalsupervisionor directionfromhigherlevelexecutives,
theboardof directors,or stockholdersof theorganization.
In denyingthepetition,thedirectorfocusedin partonthepetitioner'staxdocuments,whichindicatethatthe
beneficiaryis thepetitioner'sonly employee.Thedirectordeterminedthatthebeneficiary'seffortsmaybe
gearedprimarily towardmarketingof the petitioner'syellow pagespublicationratherthancarryingout
primarily managerial-or executive-leveljob duties.
Whenexaminingthe executiveor managerialcapacityof thebeneficiary,the AAO will look first to the
petitioner'sdescriptionof thejob duties.See8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(i)(5).Publishedcaselaw supportsthepivotal
role of a clearly definedjob description,as the actualdutiesthemselvesrevealthe true natureof the
employment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.I103, 1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),aff'd,905F.2d41(2d.
Cir. 1990). TheAAO findsthatit is appropriateandoftennecessaryto alsoconsiderthebeneficiary'sjob
descriptionin light of the petitioner'sorganizationalhierarchy,the beneficiary'spositiontherein,andthe
petitioner'soverallability to relievethebeneficiaryfromhavingto primarilyperformthedaily operational
tasks.
In the requestfor evidence,the directorinstructedthe petitionerto providea detaileddescriptionof the
beneficiary'sproposedday-to-daytasksandto supplementthe descriptionwith thepercentageof timethe
beneficiary would allocate to each of his assigned tasks. The petitioner did not, however, provide a response
in accordancewith the requestedformat. Instead,the petitioner provided a responsestatementfrom counsel,
datedAugust 31, 2010, which included generalinformation aboutthe proposedposition. Counselstatedthat
thebeneficiarywill beresponsiblefor ensuringthatthepetitioner'spublicationsgetprepared,printed,and
distributedandthattheadvertisingrevenuethatis derivedfromthedistributionof thepublicationsbeusedto
pay all necessaryexpensesand costs. Counselfurther statedthat the beneficiarywill coordinatethe
advertisingsales,graphicslayout,andpreparationof thepublication,andhewill supervisetheprintingand
distribution. Counselalsoaskedthedirectorto reviewa January24, 2008statement,whichthepetitioner
submittedin supportof a nonimmigrantpetition,wherethebeneficiary'sproposedemploymentwassaidto
includeanalysisin orderto determineadvertisingrates,targetingadvertisers,anddirectingandmanagingthe
commissionedsalespeoplewhowill selladvertising.
On appeal,in an attemptto establishthatthebeneficiarydoesnotprimarilyperformthepetitioner'snon-
qualifyingtasks,counselcontendsthat thepetitioneremploysindependentcontractorsto providegraphic
designprintingandsalesservicesandexplainsthatmuchof thework in thepublishingindustryis donevia
communicationsovertheinternet.
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Thejob descriptionsthatbothcounselandthepetitionerhaveofferedaredeficientin their lack of details
aboutthetasksthebeneficiarywouldcarryoutona dailybasis.Whileit hasbeenrepeatedlystatedthatthe
beneficiarywouldoverseethework of commissionedemployeeswho wouldberesponsiblefor thedesign,
printing,andsalescomponentsof thepetitioner'sbusiness,thepetitionerdoesnotspecifywhatactualtasks
thebeneficiarywouldperformthatareindicativeof coordinatingcomponentsof publishingandmanaging
individualswhocarryouttheunderlyingoperationaltasks.Moreover,merelyestablishingthatthebeneficiary
will be relievedfromhavingto carryout certainnon-qualifyingtasksis not sufficientto establishthatthe
beneficiarywouldallocatetheprimaryportionof histimetocarryingouttaskswithinaqualifyingmanagerial
or executivecapacity. Althoughthe beneficiarymay be taskedwith overseeingcertaincommissioned
workersto performgraphicsdesign,printing,andsalestasks,thereis noevidencethattheseindividuals,who
wouldbesubordinateto thebeneficiary,aresupervisory,professional,or managerialemployees.Seesection
101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of theAct.
Thepetitionerhasprovidednosupportingevidenceto establishthatit hascommissionedcontractworkersto
carryout the necessarygraphicsdesign,printing,andsalesservicesasclaimed. Goingon recordwithout
supportingdocumentaryevidenceis not sufficientfor purposesof meetingthe burdenof proof in these
proceedings.Matter of Soffici,22 I&N Dec. 158,165(Comm.1998)(citingMatter of TreasureCraft of
Cahfornia,14 I&N Dec. 190(Reg.Comm.1972)). Noneof the petitioner'stax returnsshowthat the
petitionerpaidadditionalfundsfor thecostof labor.
In orderto concludethat the beneficiarymeritsthe immigrantclassificationof multinationalmanageror
executive,the petitionermustfirst providea detailedaccountof the actualtasksthe beneficiarywould
performin hisproposedposition. WhiletheAAO acknowledgesthatno beneficiaryis requiredto allocate
100%of histimeto managerial-or executive-leveltasks,thepetitionermustestablishthatthenon-qualifying
tasksthe beneficiarywould performare only incidentalto the positionin question. An employeewho
"primarily"performsthetasksnecessaryto producea productor to provideservicesis notconsideredto be
"primarily"employedin a managerialor executivecapacity.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of theAct
(requiringthatone"primarily"performtheenumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatterof
ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.593,604 (Comm.1988). As thepetitionerhasfailedto
establish what actual tasks would comprise the beneficiary's proposed position, the AAO cannot conclude
that the petitioner hassubmitted sufficient evidenceto establishthat the beneficiary would be employed in a
qualifying managerialor executivecapacity.
Anotherissuein this proceedingis whetherthepetitionerhasa qualifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary's
foreignemployer.To establisha "qualifyingrelationship"undertheAct andtheregulations,thepetitioner
mustshowthatthebeneficiary'sforeignemployerandtheproposedU.S.employerarethesameemployer
(i.e.a U.S.entitywith a foreignoffice)or thatthetwo entitiesarerelatedasa "parentandsubsidiary"or as
"affiliates." Seegenerally §203(b)(1)(C)of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C);see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.5(j)(2)(providingdefinitionsof theterms"affiliate"and"subsidiary").
Theregulationat8C.F.R.§204.5(j)(2)statesinpertinentpart:
Affiliatemeans:
(A) Oneof two subsidiariesbothof whichareownedandcontrolledby thesameparentor
individual:
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(B) Oneof two legalentitiesownedandcontrolledby thesamegroupof individuals,each
individualowningandcontrollingapproximatelythesameshareor proportionof each
entity;
* * *
Multinational meansthat the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary,conducts
businessin twoormorecountries,oneof whichis theUnitedStates.
Subsidiarymeansa firm, corporation,orotherlegalentityof whichaparentowns,directlyor
indirectly,morethanhalf of theentityandcontrolstheentity;or owns,directlyor indirectly,
halfof theentityandcontrolstheentity;orowns,directlyor indirectly,50percentof a 50-50
joint ventureandhasequalcontrolandvetopowerover the entity; or owns,directly or
indirectly,lessthanhalfof theentity,butin factcontrolstheentity.
Precedentcaselaw adheresto theaboveregulatoryprovisionsin its focuson ownershipandcontrolasthe
two key factorsthatmustbeexaminedin determiningwhethera qualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenthe
UnitedStatesandforeignentitiesfor purposesof this visa classification.Matter of ChurchScientology
International, 19I&N Dec.593;seealso Matter of SiemensMedical Systems,Inc., 19I&N Dec. 362 (BIA
1986);Matterof Hughes,18I&N Dec.289(Comm.1982). In thecontextof this visapetition,ownership
refersto thedirector indirectlegalrightof possessionof theassetsof anentitywith full powerandauthority
to control; control meansthe direct or indirect legal right and authorityto direct the establishment,
management,andoperationsof anentity. Matterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.at595.
Theonly evidenceon recordthataddressesthe etitioner'sownershipis ScheduleE of thepetitioner'stax
returnsfrom 2005-2008,all of which name as the ownerof 100%of the petitioner's
commonstock. However,thepetitioner'staxreturnsonly serveasmerereflectionsof thepetitioner'sown
claimsand thusrequiredocumentaryevidenceto establishthe truth of the matter. Corroboratingevidence
may be submittedin the form of a corporatestockcertificateledger,stockcertificateregistry,corporate
bylaws,andthe minutesof relevantannualshareholdermeetingsestablishingthe total numberof shares
issued,theexactnumberissuedtotheshareholder,andthesubsequentpercentageownershipanditseffecton
corporatecontrol. Additionally,apetitioningcompanymustdiscloseall agreementsrelatingto thevotingof
shares,the distributionof profit, the managementand directionof the subsidiary,andany otherfactor
affectingactualcontrolof the entity. SeeMatter of SiemensMedicalSystems,Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362.
Withoutfull disclosureof all relevantdocuments,USCISis unableto determinetheelementsof ownership
andcontrol.
As the petitionerin the presentmatterfailed to submitrelevantcorroboratingevidenceto establishits
ownershipandcontrol,the AAO cannotconcludethatthepetitionerhasa qualifyingrelationshipwith the
beneficiary'sforeignemployerasclaimed.
Whilenotpreviouslyaddressedin thedirector'sdecision,theAAO findsthatthepetitionerfailedto establish
eligibility ontwo additionalgrounds.First,with regardto thebeneficiary'semploymentabroad,8 C.F.R.§
204.5(j)(3)(i)(B)statesthat the petitionermustestablishthat the beneficiarywas employedabroadin a
qualifyingmanagerialor executivepositionfor at leastoneout of thethreeyearsprior to his entryto the
UnitedStatesasa nonimmigrantto work for thesameemployer.Thedirectorspecificallyaddressedthis
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issuein theRFEbyinstructingthepetitionerto provideadetailedanalysisof thebeneficiary'sdailyactivities
duringhis employmentabroad. However,the informationthe petitionerprovidedin responselackedthe
requestedaccountof the beneficiary'sspecificdailyjob dutiesandthepercentageof time thebeneficiary
allocatedto eachtask,Thepetitionerthereforefailedto establishthatthebeneficiarywasemployedabroadin
aqualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity.
Second,theAAO will addresstheprovisionsof 8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(3)(i)(D),whichrequirethepetitionerto
establishthatit hasbeendoingbusinessfor at leastoneyearpriorto filing theFormI-140. Theregulationat
8C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(2)statesthatdoingbusinessmeans"theregular,systematic,andcontinuousprovisionof
goodsand/orservicesbyafirm,corporation,orotherentityanddoesnotincludethemerepresenceof anagentor
office." Thepetitionerclaimedthatits businesspurposeis to publishanddistributeSpanish-languagemedia.
Neitherpayrolldocumentsnorthepetitioner'staxreturnsestablishthatthepetitionerengagedinsuchpublishing
anddistributionactivitiesonaregular,systematic,andcontinuousbasis.Astherecordlacksevidencetoestablish
thatthepetitionerwasdoingbusinessin thetimeandmannerprescribed,theAAO findsthatthepetitionerhas
failedtomeetthecriteriaspecifiedat8C.F.R.§204.5(j)(3)(i)(D).
An applicationor petitionthatfailsto complywith thetechnicalrequirementsof thelaw maybedeniedby
theAAO evenif theServiceCenterdoesnotidentifyall of thegroundsfor denialin theinitial decision.See
SpencerEnterprises.Inc. v. UnitedStates,229F. Supp.2d 1025,1043(E.D.Cal.2001),a[fd, 345F.3d683
(9thCir. 2003);seealsoSoltanev. DOJ, 381F.3d 143,145(3dCir. 2004)(notingthattheAAO reviews
appealsona denovobasis).Therefore,basedontheadditionalgroundsof ineligibilitydiscussedabove,this
petitioncannotbeapproved.
Finally, in responseto counsel'srepeatedreferencesto the petitioner'sapprovedL-l employmentof the
beneficiary,theAAO notesthateachnonimmigrantandimmigrantpetitionis aseparaterecordof proceeding
witha separateburdenof proof;eachpetitionmuststandonitsownindividualmerits.USCISis notrequired
to assumethe burdenof searchingthroughpreviouslyprovidedevidencesubmittedin supportof other
petitionsto determinetheapprovabilityof thepetitionathandin thepresentmatter.Thepriornonimmigrant
approvalsdo not precludeUSCISfrom denyingan extensionpetition. Seee.g. TexasA&M Univ. v.
Upchurch, 99 Fed.Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482(5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition
in no way guaranteesthat USCIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the samebeneficiary.
USCISdeniesmanyI-140 immigrantpetitionsafter approvingprior nonimmigrantI-129 L-1 petitions. See,
e.g.,QData Consulting,Inc. v.INS, 293F. Supp.2dat 25; IKEA USv. USDept.ofJustice,48 F. Supp.2d22
(D.D.C. 1999);FedinBrothersCo.Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.I 103(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
Counsel'srelianceonthepetitioner'spreviouslyapprovedL-1 employmentof thebeneficiaryasevidenceof
thepetitioner'scurrenteligibility is misplaced.If previousnonimmigrantpetitionswereapprovedbasedon
the sameunsupportedassertionsthatarecontainedin the currentrecord,suchapprovalswouldconstitute
materialandgrosserroron thepart of the director. TheAAO is not requiredto approveapplicationsor
petitionswhereeligibility hasnotbeendemonstrated,merelybecauseof priorapprovalsthatmayhavebeen
erroneous.See,e.g.Matterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.at 597. It wouldbeabsurdto
suggestthatUSCISoranyagencymusttreatacknowledgederrorsasbindingprecedent.SussexEngg.Ltd. v.
Montgomery,825F.2d1084,1090(6thCir. 1987),cert.denied,485U.S.1008(1988).
Lastly,theAAO's authorityoverthe servicecentersis comparableto therelationshipbetweena courtof
appealsanda districtcourt. Evenif a servicecenterdirectorhadapprovedthe nonimmigrantpetitionson
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behalfof thebeneficiary,theAAO would not beboundto follow the contradictorydecisionof a service
center.LouisianaPhí/harmonicOrchestrav.INS,2000WL 282785(ED. La.),affd, 248F.3d1139(5thCir.
2001),cert.denied,122S.Ct.51(2001).
The petition will be deniedfor the abovestatedreasons,with eachconsideredas an independentand
alternativebasisfor denial. In visa petitionproceedings,the burdenof provingeligibility for thebenefit
soughtremainsentirelywith thepetitioner.Section291of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361.Thepetitionerhasnot
sustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.