dismissed
EB-1C
dismissed EB-1C Case: Real Estate Investment
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary's proposed employment would be in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner provided a vague and general job description that did not offer sufficient detail about the beneficiary's daily duties to prove the role was primarily high-level and not focused on day-to-day operational functions.
Criteria Discussed
Qualifying Managerial Or Executive Capacity Ability To Pay Detailed Job Description
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U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationservices AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO) 20 MassachusettsAve.N.W., MS 2090 Washington,DC 20529-2090 U.S.Citizenship and Immigration Services DATE: 2 8 2Q12 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER IN RE: Petitioner: Beneficiary: PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionforAlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveorManagerPursuantto Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C) ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER: INSTRUCTIONS: Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments relatedto thismatterhavebeenreturnedto theoffice thatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvised thatanyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice. If you believethe AAO inappropriatelyappliedthe law in reachingits decision,or you haveadditional informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfile a motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin accordancewith theinstructionson Form1-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a feeof $630. The specificrequirementsfor filing sucha motioncanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion directlywith theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresanymotionto befiledwithin 30 daysof the decisionthat the motion seeksto reconsideror reopen. Thankyou, RonRosenberg ActingChief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice www.uscis.gov Page2 DISCUSSION: The preferencevisa petition was deniedby the Director, TexasServiceCenter. Thematteris nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO) on appeal.Theappealwill be dismissed. Thepetitioneris a Floridalimited liability companythatis engagedin realestateinvestment,andit seeksto employthe beneficiaryasits President.Accordingly,thepetitionerendeavorsto classify the beneficiary as an employment-basedimmigrant pursuantto section 203(b)(1)(C) of the ImmigrationandNationalityAct (theAct), 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C),asa multinationalexecutive or manager. The directordeniedthe petitionon August 15, 2011,concludingthat: (1) the petitionerfailed to establishthat the beneficiary'sproposedemploymentwith the U.S. entity would be within a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity';and,(2) thepetitionerfailedto establishthatit hasthe ability to paythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage. On appeal,counseldisputesthe director's findingsandprovidesan appellatebrief laying out the groundsfor challengingthedenial. Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart: (1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrantswho are aliensdescribedin any of the following subparagraphs(A) through(C): * * * (C) CertainMultinational Executivesand Managers.-- An alien is describedin this subparagraphif the alien, in the 3 yearspreceding thetimeof thealien'sapplicationfor classificationandadmissioninto the United Statesunder this subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least1yearby a firm or corporationor otherlegalentityor anaffiliate or subsidiarythereofandwho seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin order to continueto renderservicesto thesameemployeror to a subsidiary or affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is managerialor executive. The languageof the statuteis specific in limiting this provision to only thoseexecutivesand managerswhohavepreviouslyworkedfor a firm, corporationor otherlegalentity,or anaffiliateor subsidiaryof thatentity,andwho arecomingto theUnitedStatesto work for thesameentity,or its affiliateor subsidiary. It appearsthatthedirector'sdenialdecision,datedAugust15,2011,hasa typographicalerroron the secondpage wherethedirectorstatesthatthe"petitionerhasshownthatthebeneficiaryhasbeenemployedfor atleastoneyearin a manageror executiveposition in the United States." In reviewing the entire decision,the director discusseshow the petitionerfailedto establishthatthepetitionerwouldbeemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive capacityandtherefore,theAAO will reviewthisissue. Page3 A United Statesemployermay file a petition on Form I-140 for classificationof an alien under section203(b)(1)(C)of the Act asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis requiredfor this classification. Theprospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnishajob offer in theformof a statementwhich indicatesthatthealienisto beemployedin theUnitedStates in a managerialor executivecapacity. Sucha statementmust clearly describethe dutiesto be performedby thealien. Thefirst issuethatwill beaddressedin this proceedingcallsfor ananalysisof thebeneficiary'sjob duties. Specifically,the AAO will examinethe record to determinewhether the petitioner submittedsufficientevidenceto establishthat the beneficiarywould be employedin the United Statesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity. Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides: Theterm "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which theemployeeprimarily-- (i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function,or componentof theorganization; (ii) supervisesandcontrolsthework of othersupervisory,professional,or managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunctionwithin the organization,or adepartmentor subdivisionof theorganization; (iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesaredirectly supervised,has the authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseas well as other personnelactions(suchaspromotionand leaveauthorization),or if no otheremployeeis directly supervised,functionsat a seniorlevel within the organizationalhierarchyor with respectto the function managed;and (iv) exercisesdiscretionover the day-to-dayoperationsof the activity or functionfor whichtheemployeehasauthority. A first-line supervisor is not consideredto be acting in a managerialcapacitymerely by virtue of the supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unlessthe employees supervisedareprofessional. Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides: Theterm"executivecapacity"meansanassignmentwithin anorganizationin which the employeeprimarily-- (i) directsthe managementof theorganizationor a majorcomponentor function of the organization; Page4 (ii) establishesthe goalsandpoliciesof the organization,component,or function; (iii) exerciseswide latitudein discretionarydecision-making;and (iv) receivesonly general supervisionor direction from higher level executives,theboardof directors,or stockholdersof theorganization. In examiningthe executiveor managerialcapacityof the beneficiary,USCISwill look first to the petitioner'sdescriptionof thejob duties. See8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5). Publishedcaselaw clearly supportsthepivotalroleof a clearlydefinedjob description,astheactualdutiesthemselvesreveal the true natureof the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava,724 F. Supp. I103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41(2d.Cir. 1990);seealso8 C.F.R.§204.5(j)(5).USCISreviews the totality of the record,which includesnot only the beneficiary'sjob description,but alsotakes into accountthenatureof thepetitioner'sbusiness,theemploymentandremunerationof employees, as well as the job descriptionsof the beneficiary'ssubordinates,if any, and any other facts contributingto acompleteunderstandingof abeneficiary'sactualrolewithin agivenentity. The definitionsof executiveand managerialcapacityhavetwo parts. First, the petitionermust show that the beneficiaryperforms the high-level responsibilitiesthat are specified in the definitions. Second,the petitioner must prove that the beneficiaryprimarily performs these specifiedresponsibilitiesanddoesnot spenda majority of his or hertime on day-to-dayfunctions. ChampionWorld,Inc. v.INS,940F.2d1533(Table),1991WL 144470(9thCir. July30, 1991). An analysisof the record doesnot lead to an affirmative conclusionthat the beneficiarywas employedabroador wouldbeemployedin theUnitedStatesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executive capacity. With regardto theprofferedpositionofferedto thebeneficiary,thepetitionerprovideda vagueand generaljob descriptionsuch as the beneficiary"directs, plans, and implementobjectivesand activitiesof organizationto ensurecontinuingoperations,to maximizereturnson investments,and to increaseproductivity"; "manageand overseeoperations,mamtenance,administration,and improvementor properties";and"coordinatesactivitiesof corporation,andresolveproblems."It is unclearwhich specifictasksactuallyfall within thesebroadcategoriesandwhetherthesupervisory tasksthebeneficiarywill performareof aqualifyingnature. Thepetitionerfailedto establishwhat specifictasksthebeneficiarywouldperformin supervisingbusinessaffairsor whatpolicydecisions thebeneficiarywould make. The recordis similarly lackingin specificinformationaboutthejob dutiesinvolvedin securingthegrowthof thepetitioningentity. Recitingthebeneficiary'svaguejob responsibilitiesor broadly-castbusinessobjectivesis not sufficient; the regulationsrequire a detaileddescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily job duties. Thepetitionerhasfailed to provideany detail or explanationof the beneficiary'sactivitiesin the courseof his daily routine.The actual dutiesthemselveswill revealthetrue natureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co- Ltd. v.Sava,724 F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41 (2d.Cir. 1990). Thepetitioner'svague andgeneraldescriptionof the beneficiary'spositiondoesnot identify the actualdutiesperformed, suchthattheycouldbeclassifiedasmanagerialor executivein nature. Page5 The director's requestfor evidencespecifically requestedthat the petitioner establishthat the beneficiary'semploymentqualifiesunderall four criteriato establisha positionin a managerialor executivecapacity. Thejob dutiessubmittedwith the initial filing andthejob dutiessubmittedin responseto the requestfor evidencearealmostidentical. In responseto the director'srequestfor evidence,theonly changeis thatthepetitionerincludeda generalpercentagebreakdowndedicated to a list of duties. Thus,thepetitionerfailedto providethe evidencerequestedby the directorby failing to providegreaterdetailof thedutiesto beperformedby thebeneficiary. Failureto submit requestedevidencethat precludesa material line of inquiry shall be groundsfor denyingthe petition.8 C.F.R.§ 103.2(b)(14). Thejob descriptionsubmittedby thepetitionerprovideslittle insightintothetruenatureof thetasks the beneficiarywill perform. While the petitionerhasprovideda breakdownof the percentageof time the beneficiarywill spendon variousduties,the petitionerhasnot articulatedwhethereach duty is managerialor executive. In addition, the job descriptionincludesseveralnon-qualifyingduties such as the beneficiary "directsandcoordinatescorporation'sfinancialandbudgetactivitiesto fundoperations,maximize investments,and increaseefficiency"; "negotiatesor approvecontractsand agreementswith suppliers,distributors,federaland stateagencies,and other organizationalentities"; "direct and coordinateactivitiesof the businessconcernedwith pricing,rentals,andsalesof properties";and "reviews reports of investigationsof complaints,disturbancesand violations and reviews the resolutionsto seeif they follow managementrulesandregulations." As theonly employeeof the petitioner,it appearsthatthebeneficiarywill bein chargeof preparingthebudget,negotiations,and developingproceduresratherthanmanagingotherindividualsto performthe non-qualifyingtasks. Developing marketing strategy and negotiating deals are both operationalduties that cannot be classifiedasmanagerialor executivetasks. In addition, the job descriptionprovided by the petitioner indicatedthat the beneficiarywill "manageandsupervisethework of the corporation'sgeneralmanager,""reviewreportssubmitted by staff memberto recommendapprovalor to suggestchanges,"and"reviews inspectionreportsof grounds,facilities, and equipmentroutinely to make budgetarydeterminationswith regardsto expensesfor repairsor maintenance."As theonly employeeof thepetitioner,it is unclearhowthe beneficiarywill supervisea generalmanageror reviewreportsmadeby a staff thatdoesnot exist. It is incumbentuponthe petitionerto resolveany inconsistenciesin the recordby independent objectiveevidence.Any attemptto explainor reconcilesuchinconsistencieswill not sufficeunless the petitioner submitscompetentobjective evidencepointing to wherethe truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19I&N Dec.582,591-92(BIA 1988). Neitherthejob descriptionscounselhasprovidednor theorganizationalstructureof thepetitioner establishthatthebeneficiarywouldbe employedin theUnitedStatesin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.As indicated in the organizationalchart, the beneficiarywill be the only employee. The petitionerdoesnot provideevidencethat the petitioneremployedindividualsto assist with the finances, budgeting, bookkeeping, negotiations,inventory, purchases,and distribution; thus,it appearsthat the beneficiaryis performingthe dutiesinherentin operatinga business such as finances, customer service, negotiations,contracts, marketing and sales Page6 development.An employeewho"primarily"performsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor provide a serviceis not consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executive capacity.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of theAct (requiringthatone"primarily"performthe enumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19I & N Dec.593,604(Comm.1988). While the AAO acknowledgesthat no beneficiaryis requiredto allocate100%of his time to managerial-or executive-leveltasks,thepetitionermustestablishthat thenon-qualifyingtasksthe beneficiarywould perform are only incidental to his proposedposition. An employeewho "primarily" performsthe tasks necessaryto producea product or to provide servicesis not consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A)and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). The petitionerhas failed to establishthat the beneficiarywould be employedin aqualifyingcapacity. TheAAO acknowledgescounsel'scontentionthatthebeneficiary'spositionis anessentialfunction within the petitioner's organization. The term "function manager"appliesgenerallywhen a beneficiarydoesnot superviseor controlthe work of a subordinatestaff but insteadis primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii).Theterm"essentialfunction"is not definedby statuteor regulation.If a petitionerclaimsthatthebeneficiaryis managinganessential function, the petitionermust furnish a written job offer that clearly describesthe dutiesto be performedin managingthe essentialfunction,i.e. identify the functionwith specificity,articulate the essentialnatureof the function,andestablishthe proportionof the beneficiary'sdaily duties attributedto managingthe essentialfunction. See8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii).In addition,the petitioner'sdescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily duties must demonstratethat the beneficiary managesthe functionratherthanperformsthe dutiesrelatedto the function. An employeewho primarilyperformsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor to provideservicesisnot considered to be employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. Boyang,Ltd v. IN.S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 1995WL 576839(9th Cir, 1995)(citingMatter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidencethat the beneficiary managesan essentialfunction. The petitioner provided a brief and vaguejob descriptionthat did not discuss how the beneficiaryis managingan essentialfunction. As noted above,the beneficiary'sjob descriptiondoesnot establishthatthebeneficiaryis primarilyperformingin amanagerialcapacity. Beyondthe requireddescriptionof thejob duties,USCISreviewsthe totality of the recordwhen examiningthe claimedmanagerialor executivecapacityof a beneficiary,includingthe petitioner's organizationalstructure,the dutiesof anysubordinateemployees,the presenceof otheremployees to relievethebeneficiaryfrom performingoperationalduties,thenatureof thepetitioner'sbusiness, andanyotherfactorsthatwill contributeto acompleteunderstandingof abeneficiary'sactualduties and role in a business. In the caseof a function manager,whereno subordinatesare directly supervised,theseother factorsmay includethe beneficiary'sposition within the organizational hierarchy,thedepthof thepetitioner'sorganization,theindirectsupervisionof employeeswithin the Page7 scopeof the function managed,and the value of the budgets,products,or servicesthat the beneficiarymanages. As discussedabove,thepetitionerhasnot identifiedemployeeswithin thepetitioner'sorganization, subordinateto the beneficiary,who would relievethe beneficiaryfrom performingroutineduties inherentto operatingthe business.The fact thatthe beneficiaryhasbeengiven a managerialjob title andgeneraloversightauthorityoverthebusinessis insufficientto elevatehispositionto thatof a "function manager"as contemplatedby the governingstatuteand regulations. As discussed above,the petitionerhasnot establishedthat the beneficiary'sdutiesareprimarily managerialin nature,andthushecannotbeconsidereda "functionmanager." Otherthanstatingthattheproposedpositionwill beresponsiblefor managinganessentialfunction, counselprovidesno explanationor evidencein supportof his claim that the beneficiarywould qualify asa functionmanagerpursuantto section101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of the Act. Theunsupported statementsof counselon appealor in a motion arenot evidenceandthus arenot entitledto any evidentiaryweight.SeeINSv. Phinpathya,464U.S. 183,188-89n.6(1984);Matterof Ramirez- Sanchez,17I&N Dec.503(BIA 1980). In summary,thepetitionerhasfailedto providesufficientevidenceto establishthatthebeneficiary would be employedin the United Statesin a qualifying managerialor executivecapacity. Therefore,theinstantpetitioncannotbeapproved. Thesecondissuein this proceedingis whetherthepetitionerhasthe ability to paythebeneficiary's profferedwage. Theregulationat 8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(g)(2)states,in pertinentpart: Any petitionfiled by or for anemployment-basedimmigrantwhichrequiresanoffer of employmentmustbe accompaniedby evidencethattheprospectiveUnitedStates employerhasthe ability to paythe profferedwage. The petitionermustdemonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is establishedand continuing until the beneficiaryobtainslawful permanentresidence. Evidenceof this ability shall be in the form of copies of annualreports, federal tax returns, or auditedfinancial statements. (Emphasisadded.) Thedirectornotedin the denialdecisionthatthe beneficiary'sForm1040showsa lossassociated with thepetitioner. Onappeal,counselfor thepetitionerindicatedthatthepetitioner'snet current assetsare$87,260.52.Thus,thepetitionerhasthe ability to paythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage. TheAAO will withdrawthispartof thedirector'sdecision. Beyondthedecisionof thedirector,therecordlackssubstantivejob descriptionsestablishingwhat job duties the beneficiaryperformedduring his employmentabroad. Conclusoryassertions regardingthebeneficiary'semploymentcapacityarenot sufficient. Merelyrepeatingthe language Page8 of the statuteor regulationsdoesnot satisfythe petitioner'sburdenof proof. FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v. Sava,724 F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990);Avyr Associates,Inc. v.Meissner,1997WL 188942at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). Theactualdutiesthemselveswill revealthetruenatureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.at 1108. Beyondthe findingsin the previousdiscussion,the remainingissuein this proceedingis whether thepetitionerhasestablishedthat aqualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenthepetitioningentityand a foreignentitypursuantto 8 C.F.R.§214.2(1)(1)(ii)(G).Thepetitionerstatedthatthebeneficiary owns50%of the foreigncompanyand 100%of thepetitioner. However,the documentsshowing ownershipof the foreigncompanyarenot sufficientevidence.Thepetitionerprovideda chartof ownershipof the foreign companyand a statementfrom a Venezuelanattorney,to describeownershipof theforeigncompany. The regulationand caselaw confirm that ownershipand control are the factorsthat must be examinedin determiningwhetheraqualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenUnitedStatesandforeign entitiesfor purposesof this visa classification. Matter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19I&N Dec. 593 (Comm'r 1988);seealso Matter of SiemensMedical Systems,Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (Comm'r 1986);Matter of Hughes,18I&N Dec.289(Comm'r 1982). In the contextof this visa petition,ownershiprefersto thedirector indirectlegalright of possessionof theassetsof anentity with full power and authority to control; control meansthe direct or indirect legal right and authorityto directthe establishment,management,andoperationsof an entity. Matter of Church ScientologyInternational,191&NDec.at595. As generalevidenceof apetitioner'sclaimedqualifyingrelationship,stockcertificatesalonearenot sufficient evidenceto determinewhethera stockholdermaintainsownershipand control of a corporateentity. Thecorporatestockcertificateledger,stockcertificateregistry,corporatebylaws, andthe minutesof relevantannualshareholdermeetingsmustalsobe examinedto determinethe total numberof sharesissued,the exactnumberissuedto the shareholder,andthe subsequent percentageownershipandits effecton corporatecontrol. Additionally,apetitioningcompanymust discloseall agreementsrelating to the voting of shares,the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of SiemensMedical Systems,Inc- supra. Without full disclosureof all relevantdocuments, USCIS is unable to determine the elementsof ownership and control. The petitioner did not provideanyof thesedocumentsandthus,hasnot establisha qualifying relationshipbetweenthe beneficiary'sforeignemployerandthepetitioner. An applicationor petitionthat fails to complywith the technicalrequirementsof the law maybe deniedby theAAO evenif the ServiceCenterdoesnot identify all of thegroundsfor denialin the initial decision.SeeSpencerEnterprises,Inc. v. UnitedStates,229F. Supp.2d 1025,1043(E.D. Cal.2001),affd, 345F.3d683(9thCir.2003);seealsoSoltanev.DOJ,381F.3d143,145(3dCir. 2004)(notingthattheAAO reviewsappealson adenovobasis). Basedontheadditionalgroundsof ineligibility discussedabove,thispetitioncannotbeapproved. Thepetitionwill bedeniedfor theabovestatedreasons,with eachconsideredasanindependentand alternativebasisfor denial. In visapetitionproceedings,the burdenof proving eligibility for the Page9 benefitsoughtremainsentirelywith thepetitioner. Section291of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361. The petitionerhasnot sustainedthatburden. ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.
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