dismissed EB-1C

dismissed EB-1C Case: Real Estate Investment

📅 Date unknown 👤 Company 📂 Real Estate Investment

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary's proposed employment would be in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner provided a vague and general job description that did not offer sufficient detail about the beneficiary's daily duties to prove the role was primarily high-level and not focused on day-to-day operational functions.

Criteria Discussed

Qualifying Managerial Or Executive Capacity Ability To Pay Detailed Job Description

Sign up free to download the original PDF

View Full Decision Text
U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationservices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO)
20 MassachusettsAve.N.W., MS 2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
DATE: 2 8 2Q12 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionforAlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveorManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedto thismatterhavebeenreturnedto theoffice thatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvised
thatanyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe AAO inappropriatelyappliedthe law in reachingits decision,or you haveadditional
informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfile a motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin
accordancewith theinstructionson Form1-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a feeof $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha motioncanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directlywith theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresanymotionto befiledwithin
30 daysof the decisionthat the motion seeksto reconsideror reopen.
Thankyou,
RonRosenberg
ActingChief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscis.gov
Page2
DISCUSSION: The preferencevisa petition was deniedby the Director, TexasServiceCenter.
Thematteris nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO) on appeal.Theappealwill be
dismissed.
Thepetitioneris a Floridalimited liability companythatis engagedin realestateinvestment,andit
seeksto employthe beneficiaryasits President.Accordingly,thepetitionerendeavorsto classify
the beneficiary as an employment-basedimmigrant pursuantto section 203(b)(1)(C) of the
ImmigrationandNationalityAct (theAct), 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C),asa multinationalexecutive
or manager.
The directordeniedthe petitionon August 15, 2011,concludingthat: (1) the petitionerfailed to
establishthat the beneficiary'sproposedemploymentwith the U.S. entity would be within a
qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity';and,(2) thepetitionerfailedto establishthatit hasthe
ability to paythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage.
On appeal,counseldisputesthe director's findingsandprovidesan appellatebrief laying out the
groundsfor challengingthedenial.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified
immigrantswho are aliensdescribedin any of the following subparagraphs(A)
through(C):
* * *
(C) CertainMultinational Executivesand Managers.-- An alien is
describedin this subparagraphif the alien, in the 3 yearspreceding
thetimeof thealien'sapplicationfor classificationandadmissioninto
the United Statesunder this subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at
least1yearby a firm or corporationor otherlegalentityor anaffiliate
or subsidiarythereofandwho seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin order
to continueto renderservicesto thesameemployeror to a subsidiary
or affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is managerialor executive.
The languageof the statuteis specific in limiting this provision to only thoseexecutivesand
managerswhohavepreviouslyworkedfor a firm, corporationor otherlegalentity,or anaffiliateor
subsidiaryof thatentity,andwho arecomingto theUnitedStatesto work for thesameentity,or its
affiliateor subsidiary.
It appearsthatthedirector'sdenialdecision,datedAugust15,2011,hasa typographicalerroron the secondpage
wherethedirectorstatesthatthe"petitionerhasshownthatthebeneficiaryhasbeenemployedfor atleastoneyearin a
manageror executiveposition in the United States." In reviewing the entire decision,the director discusseshow the
petitionerfailedto establishthatthepetitionerwouldbeemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive
capacityandtherefore,theAAO will reviewthisissue.
Page3
A United Statesemployermay file a petition on Form I-140 for classificationof an alien under
section203(b)(1)(C)of the Act asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis
requiredfor this classification. Theprospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnishajob
offer in theformof a statementwhich indicatesthatthealienisto beemployedin theUnitedStates
in a managerialor executivecapacity. Sucha statementmust clearly describethe dutiesto be
performedby thealien.
Thefirst issuethatwill beaddressedin this proceedingcallsfor ananalysisof thebeneficiary'sjob
duties. Specifically,the AAO will examinethe record to determinewhether the petitioner
submittedsufficientevidenceto establishthat the beneficiarywould be employedin the United
Statesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
Theterm "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which
theemployeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function,or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesandcontrolsthework of othersupervisory,professional,or
managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunctionwithin the
organization,or adepartmentor subdivisionof theorganization;
(iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesaredirectly supervised,has
the authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseas well as other
personnelactions(suchaspromotionand leaveauthorization),or if
no otheremployeeis directly supervised,functionsat a seniorlevel
within the organizationalhierarchyor with respectto the function
managed;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionover the day-to-dayoperationsof the activity or
functionfor whichtheemployeehasauthority. A first-line supervisor
is not consideredto be acting in a managerialcapacitymerely by
virtue of the supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unlessthe employees
supervisedareprofessional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
Theterm"executivecapacity"meansanassignmentwithin anorganizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) directsthe managementof theorganizationor a majorcomponentor
function of the organization;
Page4
(ii) establishesthe goalsandpoliciesof the organization,component,or
function;
(iii) exerciseswide latitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly general supervisionor direction from higher level
executives,theboardof directors,or stockholdersof theorganization.
In examiningthe executiveor managerialcapacityof the beneficiary,USCISwill look first to the
petitioner'sdescriptionof thejob duties. See8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5). Publishedcaselaw clearly
supportsthepivotalroleof a clearlydefinedjob description,astheactualdutiesthemselvesreveal
the true natureof the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava,724 F. Supp. I103, 1108
(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41(2d.Cir. 1990);seealso8 C.F.R.§204.5(j)(5).USCISreviews
the totality of the record,which includesnot only the beneficiary'sjob description,but alsotakes
into accountthenatureof thepetitioner'sbusiness,theemploymentandremunerationof employees,
as well as the job descriptionsof the beneficiary'ssubordinates,if any, and any other facts
contributingto acompleteunderstandingof abeneficiary'sactualrolewithin agivenentity.
The definitionsof executiveand managerialcapacityhavetwo parts. First, the petitionermust
show that the beneficiaryperforms the high-level responsibilitiesthat are specified in the
definitions. Second,the petitioner must prove that the beneficiaryprimarily performs these
specifiedresponsibilitiesanddoesnot spenda majority of his or hertime on day-to-dayfunctions.
ChampionWorld,Inc. v.INS,940F.2d1533(Table),1991WL 144470(9thCir. July30, 1991).
An analysisof the record doesnot lead to an affirmative conclusionthat the beneficiarywas
employedabroador wouldbeemployedin theUnitedStatesin aqualifyingmanagerialor executive
capacity.
With regardto theprofferedpositionofferedto thebeneficiary,thepetitionerprovideda vagueand
generaljob descriptionsuch as the beneficiary"directs, plans, and implementobjectivesand
activitiesof organizationto ensurecontinuingoperations,to maximizereturnson investments,and
to increaseproductivity"; "manageand overseeoperations,mamtenance,administration,and
improvementor properties";and"coordinatesactivitiesof corporation,andresolveproblems."It is
unclearwhich specifictasksactuallyfall within thesebroadcategoriesandwhetherthesupervisory
tasksthebeneficiarywill performareof aqualifyingnature. Thepetitionerfailedto establishwhat
specifictasksthebeneficiarywouldperformin supervisingbusinessaffairsor whatpolicydecisions
thebeneficiarywould make. The recordis similarly lackingin specificinformationaboutthejob
dutiesinvolvedin securingthegrowthof thepetitioningentity. Recitingthebeneficiary'svaguejob
responsibilitiesor broadly-castbusinessobjectivesis not sufficient; the regulationsrequire a
detaileddescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily job duties. Thepetitionerhasfailed to provideany
detail or explanationof the beneficiary'sactivitiesin the courseof his daily routine.The actual
dutiesthemselveswill revealthetrue natureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co- Ltd. v.Sava,724
F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905F.2d41 (2d.Cir. 1990). Thepetitioner'svague
andgeneraldescriptionof the beneficiary'spositiondoesnot identify the actualdutiesperformed,
suchthattheycouldbeclassifiedasmanagerialor executivein nature.
Page5
The director's requestfor evidencespecifically requestedthat the petitioner establishthat the
beneficiary'semploymentqualifiesunderall four criteriato establisha positionin a managerialor
executivecapacity. Thejob dutiessubmittedwith the initial filing andthejob dutiessubmittedin
responseto the requestfor evidencearealmostidentical. In responseto the director'srequestfor
evidence,theonly changeis thatthepetitionerincludeda generalpercentagebreakdowndedicated
to a list of duties. Thus,thepetitionerfailedto providethe evidencerequestedby the directorby
failing to providegreaterdetailof thedutiesto beperformedby thebeneficiary. Failureto submit
requestedevidencethat precludesa material line of inquiry shall be groundsfor denyingthe
petition.8 C.F.R.§ 103.2(b)(14).
Thejob descriptionsubmittedby thepetitionerprovideslittle insightintothetruenatureof thetasks
the beneficiarywill perform. While the petitionerhasprovideda breakdownof the percentageof
time the beneficiarywill spendon variousduties,the petitionerhasnot articulatedwhethereach
duty is managerialor executive.
In addition, the job descriptionincludesseveralnon-qualifyingduties such as the beneficiary
"directsandcoordinatescorporation'sfinancialandbudgetactivitiesto fundoperations,maximize
investments,and increaseefficiency"; "negotiatesor approvecontractsand agreementswith
suppliers,distributors,federaland stateagencies,and other organizationalentities"; "direct and
coordinateactivitiesof the businessconcernedwith pricing,rentals,andsalesof properties";and
"reviews reports of investigationsof complaints,disturbancesand violations and reviews the
resolutionsto seeif they follow managementrulesandregulations." As theonly employeeof the
petitioner,it appearsthatthebeneficiarywill bein chargeof preparingthebudget,negotiations,and
developingproceduresratherthanmanagingotherindividualsto performthe non-qualifyingtasks.
Developing marketing strategy and negotiating deals are both operationalduties that cannot be
classifiedasmanagerialor executivetasks.
In addition, the job descriptionprovided by the petitioner indicatedthat the beneficiarywill
"manageandsupervisethework of the corporation'sgeneralmanager,""reviewreportssubmitted
by staff memberto recommendapprovalor to suggestchanges,"and"reviews inspectionreportsof
grounds,facilities, and equipmentroutinely to make budgetarydeterminationswith regardsto
expensesfor repairsor maintenance."As theonly employeeof thepetitioner,it is unclearhowthe
beneficiarywill supervisea generalmanageror reviewreportsmadeby a staff thatdoesnot exist.
It is incumbentuponthe petitionerto resolveany inconsistenciesin the recordby independent
objectiveevidence.Any attemptto explainor reconcilesuchinconsistencieswill not sufficeunless
the petitioner submitscompetentobjective evidencepointing to wherethe truth lies. Matter of Ho,
19I&N Dec.582,591-92(BIA 1988).
Neitherthejob descriptionscounselhasprovidednor theorganizationalstructureof thepetitioner
establishthatthebeneficiarywouldbe employedin theUnitedStatesin a qualifyingmanagerialor
executivecapacity.As indicated in the organizationalchart, the beneficiarywill be the only
employee. The petitionerdoesnot provideevidencethat the petitioneremployedindividualsto
assist with the finances, budgeting, bookkeeping, negotiations,inventory, purchases,and
distribution; thus,it appearsthat the beneficiaryis performingthe dutiesinherentin operatinga
business such as finances, customer service, negotiations,contracts, marketing and sales
Page6
development.An employeewho"primarily"performsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor
provide a serviceis not consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executive
capacity.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of theAct (requiringthatone"primarily"performthe
enumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatter of ChurchScientologyInternational,
19I & N Dec.593,604(Comm.1988).
While the AAO acknowledgesthat no beneficiaryis requiredto allocate100%of his time to
managerial-or executive-leveltasks,thepetitionermustestablishthat thenon-qualifyingtasksthe
beneficiarywould perform are only incidental to his proposedposition. An employeewho
"primarily" performsthe tasks necessaryto producea product or to provide servicesis not
consideredto be "primarily" employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. See sections
101(a)(44)(A)and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated
managerialor executiveduties);seealsoMatterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.
593, 604 (Comm. 1988). The petitionerhas failed to establishthat the beneficiarywould be
employedin aqualifyingcapacity.
TheAAO acknowledgescounsel'scontentionthatthebeneficiary'spositionis anessentialfunction
within the petitioner's organization. The term "function manager"appliesgenerallywhen a
beneficiarydoesnot superviseor controlthe work of a subordinatestaff but insteadis primarily
responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section
101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii).Theterm"essentialfunction"is not
definedby statuteor regulation.If a petitionerclaimsthatthebeneficiaryis managinganessential
function, the petitionermust furnish a written job offer that clearly describesthe dutiesto be
performedin managingthe essentialfunction,i.e. identify the functionwith specificity,articulate
the essentialnatureof the function,andestablishthe proportionof the beneficiary'sdaily duties
attributedto managingthe essentialfunction. See8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii).In addition,the
petitioner'sdescriptionof the beneficiary'sdaily duties must demonstratethat the beneficiary
managesthe functionratherthanperformsthe dutiesrelatedto the function. An employeewho
primarilyperformsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor to provideservicesisnot considered
to be employedin a managerialor executivecapacity. Boyang,Ltd v. IN.S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table),
1995WL 576839(9th Cir, 1995)(citingMatter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19 I&N Dec.
at 604. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidencethat the beneficiary managesan
essentialfunction. The petitioner provided a brief and vaguejob descriptionthat did not discuss
how the beneficiaryis managingan essentialfunction. As noted above,the beneficiary'sjob
descriptiondoesnot establishthatthebeneficiaryis primarilyperformingin amanagerialcapacity.
Beyondthe requireddescriptionof thejob duties,USCISreviewsthe totality of the recordwhen
examiningthe claimedmanagerialor executivecapacityof a beneficiary,includingthe petitioner's
organizationalstructure,the dutiesof anysubordinateemployees,the presenceof otheremployees
to relievethebeneficiaryfrom performingoperationalduties,thenatureof thepetitioner'sbusiness,
andanyotherfactorsthatwill contributeto acompleteunderstandingof abeneficiary'sactualduties
and role in a business. In the caseof a function manager,whereno subordinatesare directly
supervised,theseother factorsmay includethe beneficiary'sposition within the organizational
hierarchy,thedepthof thepetitioner'sorganization,theindirectsupervisionof employeeswithin the
Page7
scopeof the function managed,and the value of the budgets,products,or servicesthat the
beneficiarymanages.
As discussedabove,thepetitionerhasnot identifiedemployeeswithin thepetitioner'sorganization,
subordinateto the beneficiary,who would relievethe beneficiaryfrom performingroutineduties
inherentto operatingthe business.The fact thatthe beneficiaryhasbeengiven a managerialjob
title andgeneraloversightauthorityoverthebusinessis insufficientto elevatehispositionto thatof
a "function manager"as contemplatedby the governingstatuteand regulations. As discussed
above,the petitionerhasnot establishedthat the beneficiary'sdutiesareprimarily managerialin
nature,andthushecannotbeconsidereda "functionmanager."
Otherthanstatingthattheproposedpositionwill beresponsiblefor managinganessentialfunction,
counselprovidesno explanationor evidencein supportof his claim that the beneficiarywould
qualify asa functionmanagerpursuantto section101(a)(44)(A)(ii)of the Act. Theunsupported
statementsof counselon appealor in a motion arenot evidenceandthus arenot entitledto any
evidentiaryweight.SeeINSv. Phinpathya,464U.S. 183,188-89n.6(1984);Matterof Ramirez-
Sanchez,17I&N Dec.503(BIA 1980).
In summary,thepetitionerhasfailedto providesufficientevidenceto establishthatthebeneficiary
would be employedin the United Statesin a qualifying managerialor executivecapacity.
Therefore,theinstantpetitioncannotbeapproved.
Thesecondissuein this proceedingis whetherthepetitionerhasthe ability to paythebeneficiary's
profferedwage.
Theregulationat 8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(g)(2)states,in pertinentpart:
Any petitionfiled by or for anemployment-basedimmigrantwhichrequiresanoffer
of employmentmustbe accompaniedby evidencethattheprospectiveUnitedStates
employerhasthe ability to paythe profferedwage. The petitionermustdemonstrate
this ability at the time the priority date is establishedand continuing until the
beneficiaryobtainslawful permanentresidence. Evidenceof this ability shall be in
the form of copies of annualreports, federal tax returns, or auditedfinancial
statements.
(Emphasisadded.)
Thedirectornotedin the denialdecisionthatthe beneficiary'sForm1040showsa lossassociated
with thepetitioner. Onappeal,counselfor thepetitionerindicatedthatthepetitioner'snet current
assetsare$87,260.52.Thus,thepetitionerhasthe ability to paythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage.
TheAAO will withdrawthispartof thedirector'sdecision.
Beyondthedecisionof thedirector,therecordlackssubstantivejob descriptionsestablishingwhat
job duties the beneficiaryperformedduring his employmentabroad. Conclusoryassertions
regardingthebeneficiary'semploymentcapacityarenot sufficient. Merelyrepeatingthe language
Page8
of the statuteor regulationsdoesnot satisfythe petitioner'sburdenof proof. FedinBros.Co.,Ltd.
v. Sava,724 F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990);Avyr
Associates,Inc. v.Meissner,1997WL 188942at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). Theactualdutiesthemselveswill
revealthetruenatureof theemployment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.at 1108.
Beyondthe findingsin the previousdiscussion,the remainingissuein this proceedingis whether
thepetitionerhasestablishedthat aqualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenthepetitioningentityand
a foreignentitypursuantto 8 C.F.R.§214.2(1)(1)(ii)(G).Thepetitionerstatedthatthebeneficiary
owns50%of the foreigncompanyand 100%of thepetitioner. However,the documentsshowing
ownershipof the foreigncompanyarenot sufficientevidence.Thepetitionerprovideda chartof
ownershipof the foreign companyand a statementfrom a
Venezuelanattorney,to describeownershipof theforeigncompany.
The regulationand caselaw confirm that ownershipand control are the factorsthat must be
examinedin determiningwhetheraqualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenUnitedStatesandforeign
entitiesfor purposesof this visa classification. Matter of ChurchScientologyInternational, 19I&N
Dec. 593 (Comm'r 1988);seealso Matter of SiemensMedical Systems,Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362
(Comm'r 1986);Matter of Hughes,18I&N Dec.289(Comm'r 1982). In the contextof this visa
petition,ownershiprefersto thedirector indirectlegalright of possessionof theassetsof anentity
with full power and authority to control; control meansthe direct or indirect legal right and
authorityto directthe establishment,management,andoperationsof an entity. Matter of Church
ScientologyInternational,191&NDec.at595.
As generalevidenceof apetitioner'sclaimedqualifyingrelationship,stockcertificatesalonearenot
sufficient evidenceto determinewhethera stockholdermaintainsownershipand control of a
corporateentity. Thecorporatestockcertificateledger,stockcertificateregistry,corporatebylaws,
andthe minutesof relevantannualshareholdermeetingsmustalsobe examinedto determinethe
total numberof sharesissued,the exactnumberissuedto the shareholder,andthe subsequent
percentageownershipandits effecton corporatecontrol. Additionally,apetitioningcompanymust
discloseall agreementsrelating to the voting of shares,the distribution of profit, the management
and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See
Matter of SiemensMedical Systems,Inc- supra. Without full disclosureof all relevantdocuments,
USCIS is unable to determine the elementsof ownership and control. The petitioner did not
provideanyof thesedocumentsandthus,hasnot establisha qualifying relationshipbetweenthe
beneficiary'sforeignemployerandthepetitioner.
An applicationor petitionthat fails to complywith the technicalrequirementsof the law maybe
deniedby theAAO evenif the ServiceCenterdoesnot identify all of thegroundsfor denialin the
initial decision.SeeSpencerEnterprises,Inc. v. UnitedStates,229F. Supp.2d 1025,1043(E.D.
Cal.2001),affd, 345F.3d683(9thCir.2003);seealsoSoltanev.DOJ,381F.3d143,145(3dCir.
2004)(notingthattheAAO reviewsappealson adenovobasis). Basedontheadditionalgroundsof
ineligibility discussedabove,thispetitioncannotbeapproved.
Thepetitionwill bedeniedfor theabovestatedreasons,with eachconsideredasanindependentand
alternativebasisfor denial. In visapetitionproceedings,the burdenof proving eligibility for the
Page9
benefitsoughtremainsentirelywith thepetitioner. Section291of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361. The
petitionerhasnot sustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.
Using this case in a petition? Let MeritDraft draft the argument →

Avoid the mistakes that led to this denial

MeritDraft learns from dismissed cases so your petition avoids the same pitfalls. Get arguments built on winning precedents.

Avoid This in My Petition →

No credit card required. Generate your first petition draft in minutes.