dismissed EB-1C Case: Restaurant

U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
. U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
identifying data deleted to AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO)
preVent Clearly llnWarranted 20 MassachusettsAve.N.W., MS2090
invasionof personalprivacy " °" ze
PUBLIC COPY and Immigration
services
DATE: AUG 1 3 2012 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionforAlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveorManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedtothismatterhavebeenreturnedto theofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvisedthat
anyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe law was inappropriatelyappliedby us in reachingour decision,or you haveadditional
informationthat you wish to haveconsidered,you may file a motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin
accordancewith the instructionson FormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a feeof $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha requestcanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directlywith theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresthatanymotionmustbefiled
within30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseekstoreconsiderorreopen.
Thankyou,
PerryRhew
Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscis.gov
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DISCUSSION:Thepreferencevisapetitionwasdeniedby theDirector,TexasServiceCenter.Thematteris
nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)onappeal.Theappealwill bedismissed.
Thepetitioneris a Texascorporationthatseeksto employthebeneficiaryasits president.Accordingly,the
petitionerendeavorsto classifythe beneficiaryas an employment-basedimmigrantpursuantto section
203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct (theAct), 8U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C),asa multinational
executiveormanager.
In supportof theForm I-140thepetitionersubmitteda statementdatedApril 24, 2008,which contained
relevantinformationpertainingto the petitioner'seligibility, includingan overviewof the petitioner's
businessanda brief descriptionof thebeneficiary'sproposedemployment.Thepetitioneralsoprovided
supportingevidencein theformof financialandcorporatedocuments.
Thedirectorreviewedthepetitioner'ssubmissionsanddeterminedthatcertaineligibilitycriteriahadnotbeen
met. Thedirectorthereforeissuedarequestfor additionalevidence(RFE)datedJanuary12,2009informing
thepetitionerthattherecordlackedevidenceshowingthatthebeneficiarywouldbeemployedin theUnited
Statesin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.
Thepetitionerprovideda responsestatementdatedFebruary10,2009,whichincludeda briefdescriptionof
thebeneficiary'sU.S.responsibilitiesaswell asthoseof thecooksandwaiterswhomthebeneficiarywould
overseeashisdirectsubordinates.Thepetitioneralsosubmitteda copyof its 2008taxreturn,whichshowed
thatthepetitionerpaid$27,128in salariesandwages.
Afterreviewingtherecord,thedirectorconcludedthatthejob descriptionthepetitionerprovidedwith regard
to the proposedemploymentfailed to establishthat the beneficiarywould be relievedfrom havingto
primarilyperformnon-qualifyingjob dutiesandthathethereforewouldnotbeemployedin theUnitedStates
in a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity. In light of thesefindings,thedirectorissueda decision
datedAugust6,2009denyingthepetition.
On appeal, the petitioner's prior counsel and his current counsel eachprovided an appellate brief disputing the
director's decision. Both attorneys provided overviews of the beneficiary's proposed employment. Current
counselfocuseson the previously approvedL-1 nonimmigrant petitions that were filed on behalf of the same
beneficiary, contendingthat thepetitioner hadestablishedeligibility basedon the samefactsthat arecurrently
beingpresentedin supportof the instant immigrantpetition. Currentcounselprovidesa brief procedural
historyof theapprovalsof thepreviouslyfilednonimmigrantpetitions.Counselalsoseeks"equitablerelief"
in theformof U.S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices'(USCIS)acceptanceof thebeneficiary's"untimely
filing of [the]FormI-485,ApplicationtoAdjustStatus."
TheAAO findsthatneithercounsel'sbriefis persuasivein overcomingthebasisfor denial. Thediscussion
belowwill provideananalysisof therelevantdocumentationandwill explaintheunderlyingreasoningfor
theAAO's decision.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) PriorityWorkers.-- Visasshallfirst bemadeavailable. . . to qualifiedimmigrantswho
arealiensdescribedin anyof thefollowingsubparagraphs(A) through(C):
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* * *
(C)CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.-- An alienis described
in this subparagraphif the alien,in the 3 yearsprecedingthe time of the
alien'sapplicationfor classificationand admissioninto the United States
underthis subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least1yearby a firm or
corporationor otherlegalentityor anaffiliateor subsidiarythereofandwho
seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin orderto continueto renderservicesto the
sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is
managerialor executive.
Thelanguageof thestatuteis specificin limitingthisprovisionto onlythoseexecutivesandmanagerswho
havepreviouslyworkedfora firm, corporationorotherlegalentity,or anaffiliateor subsidiaryof thatentity,
andwhoarecomingtotheUnitedStatestoworkfor thesameentity,or itsaffiliateor subsidiary.
A UnitedStatesemployermayfile a petitionon Form I-140 for classificationof an alienundersection
203(b)(1)(C)of theAct asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis requiredfor this
classification.Theprospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnisha job offer in the form of a
statementwhichindicatesthatthealienis to beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive
capacity. Sucha statementmust clearly describethe dutiesto beperformedby thealien.
Beforeaddressingthebasisfor denial,it is notedthattheAAO hasnojurisdictionto consideranymatters
concerningthefiling of thebeneficiary'sFormI-485. Theauthorityto adjudicateappealsis delegatedto the
AAO by the Secretaryof the Departmentof HomelandSecuritypursuantto the authorityvestedin him
throughtheHomelandSecurityAct of 2002,Pub.L 107-296.SeeDHSDelegationNumber0150.1(effective
March 1, 2003). The AAO exercisesappellatejurisdiction over the mattersdescribedat 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.1(f)(3)(iii)(as in effect on February28, 2003). The AAO only hasjurisdiction over adjustment
applications"when deniedsolely becausethe applicantfailed to establisheligibility for the bona fide
marriageexemptioncontainedin section245(e)of theAct." 8C.F.R.§ 103.l(f)(3)(iii)(JJ)(asin effecton
February 28, 2003). The adjudication of the beneficiary's adjustment application does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the AAO andthus will not beaddressedin this decision.
Proceedingnow to the basis for denial, the AAO will addressthe primary issue in this matter, which is to
determinewhetherthe petitionerprovidedsufficient evidenceto establishthat it would employ the
beneficiaryin theUnitedStatesin aqualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
The term "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function, or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesand controlsthe work of other supervisory,professional,or
managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunction within the
organization,oradepartmentor subdivisionof theorganization;
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(iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesare directly supervised,hasthe
authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseas well as otherpersonnel
actions(suchaspromotionandleaveauthorization),or if nootheremployee
is directlysupervised,functionsat a seniorlevelwithin theorganizational
hierarchyorwith respecttothefunctionmanaged;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionovertheday-to-dayoperationsof theactivityor function
for which the employeehas authority. A first-line supervisoris not
consideredto be actingin a managerialcapacitymerelyby virtue of the
supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unless the employeessupervisedare
professional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
The term "executivecapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) directsthemanagementof theorganizationoramajorcomponentor function
of theorganization;
(ii) establishesthe goals and policies of the organization,component,or
function;
(iii) exerciseswidelatitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly generalsupervisionor directionfromhigherlevelexecutives,
theboardof directors,orstockholdersof theorganization.
In examiningthe executiveor managerialcapacityof the beneficiary,the AAO will look first to the
petitioner'sdescriptionof thejob duties.See8 C.F.R.§204.5(j)(5).Publishedcaselawsupportsthepivotal
role of a clearly defined job description, as the actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the
employment.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd. v. Sava,724F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y. 1989),aff'd, 905F.2d41 (2d.
Cir. 1990);seealso8C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5).
Thejob descriptionsprovidedin this matterstronglyindicatethattheprimaryportionof thebeneficiary's
time would be allocatedto overseemga non-managerialand non-professionalrestaurantstaff, which,
pursuantto theprovisionsof section10l(a)(44)(A)(ii)of theAct, wouldbedeemedto benon-qualifyingjob
duties,andto theperformanceof thepetitioner'sadministrativeandoperationaltasks,whichwouldalsobe
classifiedasnon-qualifying.WhiletheAAO acknowledgesthatnobeneficiaryis requiredto allocate100%
of his timeto managerial-or executive-leveltasks,thepetitionermustestablishthatthenon-qualifyingtasks
thebeneficiarywouldperformareonly incidentalto theproposedposition. An employeewho "primarily"
performsthetasksnecessaryto producea productor to provideservicesis notconsideredto be "primarily"
employedin amanagerialor executivecapacity.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and(B) of theAct(requiringthat
one "primarily" performthe enumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);see also Matter of Church
ScientologyInternational, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Not only doesthe petitioner's
organizationalchartshowthatthebeneficiary'ssubordinatesarethepetitioner'snon-managerialandnon-
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professionalrestaurantstaff,butthevariousjob descriptionsfurtherindicatethatthebeneficiarywould also
conductthepetitioner'smarketresearch.
While the petitionerbroadlyindicatesthat the beneficiarywould review and approvethe petitioner's
marketingstrategyandestablishsalesandmarketinggoals,thepetitioner'sorganizationalchartshowsthat
thepetitionerdoesnothavea marketingor salesstaffto actuallymarketandsellthepetitioner'sproductsand
services.It is thereforelogicalto concludethatthebeneficiaryhimselfwouldassumethe non-qualifying
marketingtasksthatwouldhelppromotethepetitioner'srestaurantbusinesstopotentialcustomers.
Despitethelikelihoodthatthebeneficiarywouldassumea heighteneddegreeof discretionaryauthorityasa
resultof his positionwithin the petitioner'sorganizationalhierarchy,the AAO cannotoverlookthe non-
qualifyingnatureof thejob dutiesthatwouldoccupytheprimaryportionof thebeneficiary'stime. Whilethe
petitionerclaimsthattherestaurantrelatedtaskswouldbeperformedby thecooksandwaiters,thisassertion
doesnot establishthatthepetitioner'snon-qualifyingtasksarelimitedexclusivelyto cookingthefoodand
waitingoncustomers.Asnotedabove,therecordstronglyindicatesthattherearevariousadministrativeand
operationaltasksthat would ultimatelybe performedby the beneficiary,as thereis no onewithin the
organizationalhierarchyotherthanthebeneficiarytoperformthem.
The record is not persuasivein demonstratingthat the beneficiarywould be employedin a primarily
managerialorexecutivecapacity.Thefactthatanindividualoverseesnon-professionalemployeeswithinthe
scopeof a small businessdoesnot necessarilyestablishthat the beneficiarymeritsclassificationas a
multinationalmanagerorexecutivewithinthemeaningof section101(a)(44)of theAct. Asnotedabove,the
recorddoesnot establishthatthebeneficiarywouldallocatehis timeprimarilyto managingprofessionalor
managerialstaff or to directingthe managementof the organization.Rather,therecordindicatesthat a
preponderanceof the beneficiary'sdutieshavebeenand will be directly providingthe servicesof the
business.Thepetitionerhasnotdemonstratedthatthebeneficiarywill beprimarilysupervisingasubordinate
staffof professional,managerial,or supervisorypersonnelwhorelievehim fromperformingnon-qualifying
duties. The petitionerhasnot demonstratedthat it hasreachedor will reacha level of organizational
complexitywhereinthehiring/firingof personnel,discretionarydecision-making,andsettingcompanygoals
and policies constitute significant componentsof the duties performed on a day-to-day basis. Basedon the
evidence furnished, it cannot be found that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a qualifying
managerialor executivecapacity. For this reason,the petition may not beapproved.
Additionally,whilenotpreviouslyaddressedin thedirector'sdecision,theAAO findsthatthepetitioneralso
failedto establishthatthebeneficiarywasemployedabroadin aqualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity.
See8C.F.R.§204.5(j)(3)(i)(B).
An applicationor petitionthatfailsto complywith thetechnicalrequirementsof thelawmaybedeniedby
theAAO evenif theServiceCenterdoesnotidentifyall of thegroundsfor denialin theinitial decision.See
SpencerEnterprises,Inc, v. UnitedStates,229F. Supp.2d 1025,1043(E.D.Cal.2001),aff'd,345F.3d683
(9thCir. 2003);seealsoSoltanev. DOJ, 381F.3d 143,145(3dCir. 2004)(notingthattheAAO reviews
appealsona denovobasis).Therefore,basedontheadditionalgroundof ineligibility discussedabove,this
petitioncannotbeapproved.
Lastly,with regardtocounsel'srelianceonthepetitioner'spreviouslyapprovedL-1A petitionsasevidenceof
eligibility in thepresentmatter,theAAO notesthateachnonimmigrantandimmigrantpetitionis a separate
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recordof proceedingwith a separateburdenof proof andas such,eachpetition muststandon its own
individualmerits. USCISis not requiredto assumetheburdenof searchingthroughpreviouslyprovided
evidencesubmittedin supportof otherpetitionsto determinetheapprovabilityof thepetitionat handin the
presentmatter. The prior nonimmigrantapprovalsdo not precludeUSCISfrom denyingan extension
petition.Seee.g.TexasA&M Univ.v. Upchurch,99Fed.Appx.556,2004WL 1240482(5thCir. 2004).The
approvalof a nonimmigrantpetitionin no way guaranteesthatUSCISwill approveanimmigrantpetition
filed onbehalfof thesamebeneficiary.USCISdeniesmanyI-140immigrantpetitionsallerapprovingprior
nonimmigrantI-129L-1 petitions.See,e.g.,QDataConsulting,Inc.v.INS,293F. Supp.2dat25;IKEA US
v. USDept.of.Iustice,48F. Supp.2d22(D.D.C.1999);FedinBrothersCo.Ltd.v. Sava,724F. Supp.I 103
(E.D.N.Y.1989).
Furthermore,if thepreviousnonimmigrantpetitionswereapprovedbasedonthesameunsupportedassertions
thatarecontainedin thecurrentrecord,theapprovalswouldconstitutematerialandgrosserroronthepartof
the director. TheAAO is not requiredto approveapplicationsor petitionswhereeligibility hasnot been
demonstrated,merelybecauseof prior approvalsthatmayhavebeenerroneous.See,e.g.Matterof Church
ScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.593.597(Comm.1988).It wouldbeabsurdto suggestthatUSCIS
or anyagencymusttreatacknowledgederrorsasbindingprecedent.SussexEngg.Ltd. v.Montgomery,825
F.2d1084,1090(6thCir. 1987),cert.denied,485U.S.1008(1988).
Finally, theAAO'sauthorityoverthe servicecentersis comparableto therelationshipbetweena courtof
appealsanda districtcourt. Evenif a servicecenterdirectorhadapprovedthenonimmigrantpetitionson
behalfof thebeneficiary,theAAO wouldnot be boundto follow the contradictorydecisionof a service
center.LouisianaPhilharmonicOrchestrav.INS,2000WL 282785(E.D.La.),affd, 248F.3d1139(5thCir.
2001),cert.denied,122S.Ct.51(2001).
In visapetitionproceedings,theburdenof provingeligibility for thebenefitsoughtremainsentirelywith the
petitioner.Section291of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1361.Thepetitionerhasnotsustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.