dismissed EB-1C Case: Restaurant

U.S. Department of Iinrneland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
PUBLIC COPY 
identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
kvasion of persona1 privacy 
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: JUL 1 7 2007 
SRC 06040 51160 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
{h4p& Robert P. iemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based visa petition. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant immigrant visa petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager 
or executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
tj 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida that is 
operating a restaurant. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its operations manager. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated that: (I) the beneficiary 
had been employed by the foreign entity or would be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity; or (2) the petitioner and the beneficiary's foreign employer enjoyed a qualifying 
relationship on the date of filing. 
On appeal, counsel challenges the director's denial of the petition and submits additional documentary 
evidence in support of both the beneficiary's employment as a manager or executive and the existence of a 
qualifying relationship between the foreign and United States companies. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 
year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement, which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 1 0 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the immigrant visa petition on November 21, 2005. 
 In an appended letter, dated 
November 1, 2005, the beneficiary was identified as having been in charge of the foreign entity's marketing 
department for three years prior to her entrance into the United States as a nonimmigrant. 
In her October 27, 2006 decision, the director concluded that the beneficiary had not been employed by the 
foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director stated that the beneficiary's 
performance of such tasks as determining promotions, sales and advertising campaigns, preparing the sales 
and marketing budgets, and handling media relations were not managerial or executive in nature, and 
concluded that the "major part of the beneficiary's job assignment in Colombia falls outside the scope of those 
capacities." Consequently the director denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel fails to specifically address the beneficiary's employment in the foreign entity. On the 
Form I-290I3, counsel merely requests that the AAO "review the record on the issues set forth in the denial of 
[the petition]." Included in the documentary evidence, counsel submits the foreign company's payroll records 
from November 16, 2006 through November 30, 2006. The limited evidence is not representative of the 
workers employed during the beneficiary's employment in September 1997 through August 2000 or of the 
capacity in which the beneficiary was employed during this period. Counsel's simple request to review the 
record is not sufficient to overcome the director's findings. The AAO concludes that the director correctly 
reviewed the record with respect to the non-qualifying job duties performed by the beneficiary while 
employed in the foreign company. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of 
counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The petitioner has not 
demonstrated that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
In its November 1, 2005 letter, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would occupy the position of general 
manager of the United States company, during which she would be responsible for the company's human 
resources, purchase orders, sales relationships, and operation, and the supervision of employees. The 
petitioner noted that the beneficiary would oversee employees in the following positions: assistant manager, 
two full-time and one part-time prep cook, two full-time and one part-time grill cook, three cashiers, and "a 
few" drivers. The AAO notes that the petitioner indicated on the Form 1-140 a staff of eighteen employees, 
however, but for the above description, the record is devoid of evidence of the specific staffing levels 
maintained by the petitioner on the date of filing. 
On December 20, 2005, the director issued a request for evidence requesting that the petitioner submit a 
statement describing the beneficiary's proposed employment, including: her position title; a list of all job 
duties and the percentage of time the beneficiary would devote to performing each; the managers or 
supervisors who would report directly to the beneficiary, and a brief description of their job duties and 
educational levels; the qualifications necessary to perform in the beneficiary's position; and, the level of 
authority held by the beneficiary. The director further asked that the petitioner explain who would provide 
the services offered by the petitioner. 
In a letter dated February 14, 2006, the petitioner's president stated that as the general manager of the 
petitioning entity, the beneficiary would be responsible for human resources, including interviewing and 
hiring employees, determining salaries, training, and assigning work schedules. With respect to the 
company's sales and marketing functions, the petitioner noted that the beneficiary would be in charge of the 
company's in-store promotions, and the promotion of its catering service, as well as handling its advertising 
and direct mail campaigns. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary would also be responsible for selecting 
the vendors used by the petitioner, negotiating pricing, placing purchase orders, and determining expenses 
and "food cost." The beneficiary was identified as supervising a marketing assistant, a manager, and an 
assistant manager. 
The petitioner submitted a federal quarterly tax return ending December 3 1, 2005, which indicated that the 
petitioner employed a staff of ten workers in November 2005, the period during which the instant petition was 
filed. The AAO notes that while the petitioner submitted copies of its state quarterly reports for periods prior 
to and subsequent to the instant filing, none was submitted for the fourth quarter of 2005. 
In her October 27, 2006 decision, the director concluded that the beneficiary would not be employed by the 
United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director noted the tasks to be 
performed by the beneficiary, but stated that the petitioner had not provided the requested allocation of the 
amount of time the beneficiary would spend performing each task. The director stated that as a result of the 
petitioner's failure to provide requested evidence, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) could not 
determine whether the primary part of the beneficiary's employment would be managerial or executive in 
nature. Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
On the Form I-290B, counsel claims that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily executive 
capacity. Counsel submits what he describes as a "detailed letter" from the petitioner of the beneficiary's 
proposed employment, but which essentially identifies the beneficiary as the company's general manager, 
stating that she devotes 40 hours a week to the operation and control of the United States business. Counsel 
submits a second letter, dated September 28, 2000, in which the petitioner was accepted as a franchisee of the 
corporate franchise Chicken Kitchen Corporation. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5). 
The job description suggests that the beneficiary would be performing primarily operational tasks related to 
the petitioner's marketing, sales, inventory, and purchasing functions. While the beneficiary would be 
responsible for the petitioner's hiring and firing, tasks that may be considered managerial or executive in 
nature, the remainder of the beneficiary's time would be spent performing such non-managerial and non- 
executive tasks as advertising through direct mailings, devising sales and marketing strategies, reviewing 
inventory, determining purchases, negotiating with vendors, and placing orders. As noted by the director, 
although requested, the petitioner did not designate the amount that the beneficiary would spend performing 
each task. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for 
denying the petition. 
 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
 Based on the limited description, it appears that the 
beneficiary would be responsible for personally performing primarily non-qualifying tasks of the petitioner's 
business. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide 
services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or 
executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int 'I., 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1 988). 
Despite a similar finding by the director, counsel did not attempt to overcome this conclusion on appeal by 
providing an allocation of how the beneficiary's time would be divided among the specific tasks, or by 
submitting supplemental evidence of the beneficiary's proposed employment in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. The petitioner's letter identifying the beneficiary as its general manager is not sufficient 
to overcome the finding that the beneficiary would be performing primarily non-managerial or non-executive 
tasks related to the company's marketing, sales, inventory, and purchasing functions. Again, without 
documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of 
proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 
at 534. 
The AAO notes that the inconsistencies in the petitioner's staffing levels cast doubt on the petitioner's claim 
that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Although the 
petitioner noted the existence of an 18-person staff on the Form 1-140, its federal quarterly wage report 
indicates that the company employed ten workers during the month the immigrant visa petition was filed. 
Also, while the beneficiary was initially noted as overseeing assistant managers, cooks, cashiers, and drivers, 
the petitioner subsequently claimed in response to the director's request for evidence that the beneficiary 
would supervise a marketing assistant, a manager, and an assistant manager, positions not originally noted by 
the petitioner. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the 
petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 
582, 59 1-92 (BIA 1988). Moreover, despite the inconsistencies, none of the subordinate employees were 
identified as relieving the beneficiary from performing the above-stated non-qualifling job duties. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this additional 
reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The third issue in this proceeding is whether at the time of filing, the petitioner and the foreign entity enjoyed 
a qualifling relationship. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity; 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 
joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
In the November 1, 2005 letter submitted 
 er indicated that it was 
a subsidiary of the Unite 
 owned 5 1.79 percent. 
The petitioner stated that 
 subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer, 
thus suggesting an indirect parent-subsidiary relationship between the petitioner and the foreign entity. The 
petitioner did not submit documentary evidence of the claimed qualifying relationship with the original filing. 
In her December 20, 2005 request for evidence, the director asked that the petitioner submit evidence of the 
petitioner's ownership and control, such as copies of stock certificates, corporate by-laws, certified affidavits 
from corporate executives, or published annual reports. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a copy of its articles of incorporation, filed on November 21, 2000, 
ompany to issue 3500 shares of common stock and naming its shareholders as - 
., each owning 1785 shares, or 5 1 percent, and 171 5 shares, or 49 percent, respectively. An 
attached November 12, 2002 amendment to the articles of incorporation increased the co 
 rized 
shares to 4500. In a February 16, 2006 letter, the petitioner's accountant confirmed that 
 . is a 
5 1.75 percent shareholder of the petitioning entity. 
In her decision, the director concluded that the petitioner had not established the existence of a qualifying 
relationship between the United States and foreign entities. The director stated that the petitioner had not 
specified "the precise degrees of ownership and control by the [purported] parent [company]," and that the 
petitioner had not submitted the requested evidence of a qualifying relationship. Consequently, the director 
denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel submits: (1) a copy of the petitioner's amended articles of incorporation; (2) a number ten 
stock certificate, dated November 30, 2000, naming. as the owner of 1812 shares of the 
petitioner's issued stock; and (3) a naming the beneficiary's foreign employer or 
as the sole owner of 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated the existence of a qualifying relationship between the 
United States and foreign entity at the time of filing the immigrant visa petition on November 21, 2005. 
To establish a qualifying relationship under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed United States employer are the same employer (i.e. a United 
States entity with a foreign office) or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See genera& 5 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 153(b)(l)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5Cj)(2) (providing definitions of 
the terms "affiliate" and "subsidiary"). 
Of particular relevance in determining the purported indirect parent-subsidia 
foreign and United States entities is the stock certificate offered on appeal naming 
of 18 12 shares of the petitioner's stock. Although the stock certificate is dated November 30, 2000, it reflects 
the number of shares authorized to the petitioner in its November 12, 2002 amendment to the articles of 
incorporation. In other words, the petitioner was not authorized to issue 4500 shares of stock until 
' Based on the company's articles of incorporation, 
 is a Florida corporation established on 
November 20,2000. 
approximately two years after the date referenced 
 rtificate. As a result, the authenticity of the 
stock certificate and the corresponding claim that 
 holds a majority interest in the petitioning 
entity is highly questionable. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a 
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 59 1. 
Even if the AAO were to consider as the owner of 1812 shares of the petitioner's stock, 
would own only 40.26 percent of the United States company, as the company is authorized to 
issue an additional 2688 shares of stock. The AAO notes that the petitioner had not documented whether the 
remaining authorized stock has been issued, and if so, to whom. Also, the petitioner's original articles of 
incorporation naming as the majority owner of 5 1 percent of the corporation are not probative 
of the parent-subsidiary relationship, as it represents the company's ownership prior to its November 12, 2002 
amendment, and does not correspond to the information presented on the stock certificate. It is incumbent 
upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any 
attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent 
objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
Moreover, the present record of proceeding does not establish as the subsidiary of the 
beneficiary's foreign employer, an element essential to establishing a qualifying relationship between the 
petitioner and the foreign entity. The only evidence submitted in support of the purported arent subsidiary 
naming either the beneficiary's foreign employer or 
owner of 
s the 
The limited documentary evidence does not support the suggestion of an indirect 
parent-subsidiary relationship between the petitioning entity and the beneficiary's foreign employer, as 
has not been established as a wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign entity. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Crap of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
AAO cannot determine whether the petitioner is a subsidiary of 
and whether 
 . is a subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer. Thus, the record is not 
consistent with the petitioner's claim of an indirect parent-subsidiary relationship with the foreign entity. The 
unresolved discrepancies prevent a finding of a qualifLing relationship between the foreign and United States 
entities at the time of filing. For this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the petitioner had the ability to pay the 
beneficiary her proffered wages at the time of filing. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(g)(2) states: 
Any petition filed by or for any employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of 
employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer 
has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the 
time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful 
permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual 
reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. 
The petitioner indicated on the Form 1-140 that the beneficiary would receive wages in the amount of $650 
per week, or an annual salary of $33,800. In response to the director's second request for evidence, issued on 
July 20, 2006, cou 
 tioner stated that the beneficiary was not compensated by the petitioner, but 
rather, was paid by 
 . in accordance with a management agreement between the two companies. 
Counsel stated that evidence of the beneficiary's compensation is reflected on Schedule C of the beneficiary's 
personal income tax return. Counsel submitted a copy of the beneficiary's 2004 and 2005 personal income tax 
the amount of $2,350. Schedule C of the beneficiary's 2004 income tax return identified the beneficiary as 
receiving $42,322. The address provided on the tax return for the business was actually that of the 
beneficiary's personal residence. As a result, it is not clear from where the beneficiary received the $42,322 
in income during 2004. 
The AAO notes that the regulations specifically require the beneficiary's prospective United States employer, 
or the petitioner, to demonstrate its ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages. 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(g)(2). 
In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner 
employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by 
documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, 
this evidence will be considered prima facie proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the beneficiary's salary. In 
the present matter, the petitioner did not establish that it had previously employed the beneficiary at the 
proposed salary. 
As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay, the AAO will next examine the 
petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the federal income tax return, without consideration of 
depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a 
petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. Elatos Restaurant 
Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Tongatapu WoodcraJ2 Hawaii, Ltd. v. 
Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 7 19 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. 
Texas 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F. 
Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), ufd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, the court 
held the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now CIS) had properly relied on the petitioner's net income 
figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than on the petitioner's gross income. 
623 F. Supp. at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered 
income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the 
petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." Chi-Feng Chang v. 
Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. at 537; see also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. 
As the petition's priority date falls on November 21, 2005, the AAO must examine the petitioner's tax return 
for 2005. The petitioner's IRS Form 1120 for calendar year 2005 presents a net taxable income of -$22,685. 
The petitioner could not pay a proffered wage of $33,800 per year. 
Finally, if the petitioner does not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered salary, the AAO will review 
the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets 
and current liabilities. Net current assets identi@ the amount of "liquidity" that the petitioner has as of the 
date of filing and is the amount of cash or cash equivalents that would be available to pay the proffered wage 
during the year covered by the tax return. As long as the AAO is satisfied that the petitioner's current assets 
are sufficiently "liquid" or convertible to cash or cash equivalents, then the petitioner's net current assets may 
be considered in assessing the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. Here, the petitioner's 
current liabilities are significantly higher than its current assets, resulting in a -$268,732 in net current assets. 
As a result, the petitioner has not demonstrated its ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages. Therefore, 
the petition will be denied for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.