dismissed EB-1C Case: Retail Investment

identifying dgfa deleted to 
prevent clemly mmanted 
invasion of ,:cxonal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
dministrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. The matter is 
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a Louisiana corporation that claims to be operating as a "retail investment" business. It seeks 
to employ the beneficiary as its vice-president. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the 
beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The director denied the petition based on four independent grounds of ineligibility: 1) the petitioner failed to 
establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer; 2) the petitioner failed to 
establish the foreign entity continues to do business; 3) the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ 
the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity; and 4) the petitioner failed to establish that it has the 
ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage. On appeal, counsel disputes the director's conclusions and 
submits a brief in support of her arguments. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described 
in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the 
alien's application for classification and admission into the United States 
under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or 
corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who 
seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the 
same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, 
and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must hrnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity 
that employed the beneficiary abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Af$liate means: 
(A) 
 One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual; 
(B) 
 One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each 
entity; 
*** 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 
joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
In support of the Form 1-140, the petitioner provided a letter dated March 14, 2006 in which it referred to the 
beneficiary's foreign employer as the "parent company," thereby indicating that the foreign company owns a 
majority of the petitioner's stock. The petitioner also provided a copy of a stock purchase agreement dated 
September 2, 2002 and signed by in her capacity as the petitioner's shareholder. The document 
showed that 5 1 % of the petitioner's stock would be sold to Kings and Queens Pizza Parloer, Clt., the foreign 
entity that employed the beneficiary abroad, for consideration in the amount of $5,000. It is noted that this 
document only contains the signatures of the seller. None of the signatures belong to anyone purporting to 
represent the purchaser to establishing that the foreign entity agreed to purchase the shares offered by the 
seller. The stock purchase a eement was accompanied by a Certificate of Share Ownership showing that as 
of September 3, 2002 was the owner of 490 shares or 49% of the petitioning entity, while the 
remaining 5 10 shares, or 5 1 % of the petitioner, were owned by the beneficiary's foreign employer. It is noted, 
however, that the petitioner did not provide documentation establishing Msm initial ownership interest, 
whch would vest in her the power to sell the petitioner's stock. It is also noted that the petitioner's 2005 tax 
return, which is neither dated nor signed to show that it had actually been filed with the Internal Revenue 
Service, contains information in Schedule L, item 22(b) showing that the petitioner received only $1,000 as 
consideration for sale of its common stock, rather than $5,000 as indicated in the stock purchase agreement. 
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective 
evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner 
submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591- 
92 (BIA 1988). 
Page 4 
On August 16, 2007, the director issued an adverse decision, concluding that the petitioner had failed to 
provide any evidence of a qualifying relationship with the foreign corporation. The director noted that the 
petitioner had not established who owns the foreign entity. While the AAO concurs with the director's 
ultimate conclusion regarding the qualifying relationship issue, the comment that no evidence was submitted 
in this regard is erroneous and must be withdrawn. In fact, as previously noted, the petitioner did submit 
some evidence in an effort to establish the existence of a qualifying relationship. However, as discussed 
above, the probative value of the evidence was compromised as a result of the significant inconsistency 
regarding the amount paid for the sale of the petitioner's stock and no documentation at all was provided to 
establish the ownership of the foreign entity. As such, while signed the Certificate of Share 
Ownership, dated September 3, 2002, on behalf of the foreign entity, this document does not establish Ms. 
s signatory power with respect to that entity. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Cornm. 1972)). 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's conclusion, asserting that the purchase agreement discussed above 
establishes that a majority of the petitioner's stock is owned by the foreign company. However, in light of the 
deficient documentation provided to support the existence of a qualifying relationship, counsel's argument is 
without merit. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 
I&N Dec. 533,534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 
17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). In the present matter, the petitioner has not submitted credible and 
probative documentation to establish the existence of a qualifying relationship. Therefore, based on this 
initial adverse finding, this petition cannot be establish. 
The second related issue is whether the petitioner has established that the foreign entity continues to do 
business. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 204.5(j)(2) states that doing business means "the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods andlor services by a firm, corporation, or other entity and does not include the 
mere presence of an agent or office." 
Counsel also asserts that the petitioner has provided sufficient documentation to establish that the foreign 
entity meets the above definition. Specifically, counsel states that the petitioner provided documentation that 
establishes that the foreign company was doing business in 2004 and 2005. However, the record shows that 
the Form 1-140 that is the subject of the present proceeding was filed on March 16, 2006. As such, the 
petitioner must establish that its alleged parent entity continued to do business as of the date of the filing of 
the present petition. Documents pertaining to business conducted in 2004 and 2005, i.e., prior to the filing of 
the instant petition, are not relevant for the purpose of establishing whether the foreign entity was doing 
business on March 16, 2006 and beyond. The lack of this documentation is particularly noteworthy in light of 
the director's observation that -and three other employees that previously worked for the foreign 
entity are now in the United States. In order to determine that the petitioner is a multinational entity, it must 
establish that it conducts business in at least two countries, one of which is the United States. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(j)(2). By failing to submit documentation showing that the foreign entity was doing business at the time 
the Form 1-140 was filed, the petitioner has failed to establish that it meets the criteria of a multinational entity. 
The third issue in this proceeding is whether the U.S. petitioner would employ the beneficiary in a capacity 
that is primarily managerial or executive. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In the petitioner's March 14, 2006 letter, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary's proposed employment 
requires that the beneficiary assume responsibility for "the overall direction and operation of the company." 
The petitioner also stated that the beneficiary would be "involved in all facets of the business, including new 
Page 6 
hires of the management staff strategy." The petitioner stated that the beneficiary reports directly to the 
company's president and is in charge of the company's expansion plans. The petitioner provided another job 
description in a document dated March 6,2006. The beneficiary's position was described as follows: 
Reviews sales to determine customer needs, volume potential, price schedules, and discounts; 
[dlirects product simplification and standardization to eliminate unprofitable items from [the] 
sales line. [The beneficiary plrepares [the] periodic sales report showing sales volume and 
potential sales; [dlirects and coordinates activities of sales; [cloordinates sales and 
promotional activities of [the] store managers;; [sic] [alnalyzes marketing potential of new 
and existing store locations and recommends additional sites or deletion of existing area 
stores; [plarticipates in formulating and administering company policies and developing long 
range goals and objectives; [rleports directly to [the plresident. 
The record also contains an organizational chart, which depicts the petitioner as a multi-tiered organization, 
where the beneficiary assumes the second to the highest position within the hierarchy, second only to the 
company's president. The beneficiary's direct subordinate is an operations manager whose position is 
supervisory to two store managers. 
The petitioner's organizational chart is supported by W-2 statements issued to the employees that are listed in 
the chart as well as a photocopied Form W-3, which shows the total amount of salaries the petitioner 
purportedly paid in 2005. It is noted, however, that while the amount shown in the Form W-3 matches the 
issued Form W-2s when totaled, i.e., $1 85,257.57, these documents do not match the total amounts shown in 
Nos. 12 and 13 of the petitioner's 2005 tax return, where the petitioner indicated that it paid $32,000 in 
compensation to officers and $109,971 in salaries and wages for a total of $141,971. As previously noted, the 
petitioner must resolve such inconsistencies with independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or 
reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. The fact that the petitioner has 
submitted inconsistent documents suggests that some or all of the documents may be invalid. 
On June 5, 2006, the director issued the first of two requests for additional evidence (WE) instructing the 
petitioner to provide the following documentation to assist Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) in 
determining the beneficiary's employment capacity in the proposed position in the United States: I) a list of 
the beneficiary's job duties accompanied by a percentage of time assigned to each job duty; 2) a discussion of 
the employees, if any, who will report directly to the beneficiary, including their respective job titles, job 
descriptions, and educational levels; 3) in the event that the beneficiary's proposed employment does not 
require overseeing other employees, the petitioner was instructed to essential function the beneficiary would 
be expected to manage; 4) the beneficiary's specific position in the scheme of the petitioner's organizational 
hierarchy; and 5) a discussion of who provides the petitioner's products andlor services. 
In response, the petitioner provided a letter dated August 22, 2006, essentially reiterating the deficient job 
description previously provided in the March 6, 2006 letter. The only additional information that was 
provided in the more recent job description was that the operational manager and store managers report 
directly to the beneficiary and that 100% of his time is spent on these supervisory duties as well as all of the 
Page 7 
job duties and responsibilities previously listed. It is noted that this information appears to be in conflict with 
the organizational chart previously submitted, where the only individual shown as the beneficiary's direct 
subordinate was the operations manager. Contrary to the new information provided, the organizational chart 
showed the two store managers as being directly subordinate to the operations manager. Furthermore, 
although specifically instructed to do so, the petitioner failed to provide a specific list of job duties and a 
percentage of time the beneficiary would spend performing each duty on the list. 
On September 20, 2006, the director issued the second RFE, informing the petitioner that the job description 
provided in response to the first RFE referred to a Javed Iqbal, which is different from the beneficiary's name. 
In response, counsel provided a letter dated November 10, 2006, explaining that the beneficiary Javed Iqbal 
and Javed Islam are both the names of the beneficiary. However, the unsupported statements of counsel on 
appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary weight. See INS v. 
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503. The petitioner 
provided no actual documentation to corroborate counsel's explanation. 
Accordingly, the director addressed this discrepancy again in the denial, stating that the petitioner failed to 
provide clarification. Nevertheless, the director made a determination stating that, aside from the name 
discrepancy, the job descriptions provided were inadequate. The director noted that the petitioner failed to 
elaborate on the beneficiary's broad job description or to explain how the beneficiary would carry out his job 
responsibilities. The director also noted that most of the U.S. employees are convenience store clerks and 
questioned whether they are professionals. See section 101(a)(32) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees and manages an essential function. It is noted, however, that counsel's statement is 
confusing and suggests an overall lack of her understanding of the difference between a personnel and 
function manager. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or 
control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential 
function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). 
While the term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation, any petitioner claiming that its 
beneficiary is managing an essential function must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties 
to be performed by that beneficiary, i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature 
of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the 
essential function. 8 C.F.R. 8 204.56)(5). In the present matter, counsel lumps together two distinct 
concepts, i.e., the concept of a personnel manager and that of a function manager, without providing an 
adequate description of the beneficiary's proposed job duties and without specifying the essential function the 
beneficiary would purportedly manage. 
That being said, regardless of which type of manager the petitioner claims the beneficiary would be, the 
primary step in establishing that the beneficiary qualifies for classification as a multinational manager or 
executive is to provide a detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed job duties where the primary 
portion of time is attributed to tasks within the managerial capacity.' It is noted that an employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be 
"primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comrn. 1988). 
In the present matter, the petitioner has provided an overly broad job description without properly delineating 
specific job duties and assigning an approximate percentage of time to any of the tasks. Without further 
explanation, a number of job responsibilities are suggestive of non-qualifying tasks, particularly in the context 
of the petitioner's retail operations. For example, it is unclear why, in the presence of an adequate support 
staff, the beneficiary would be called upon to determine customer needs, volume potential, price schedules, 
and discounts. The petitioner has indicated in the organizational chart provided that it has two store managers 
who have direct contact with the retail operation as well as an operations manager who has direct contact with 
the store managers. It is also unclear why the beneficiary would have to prepare sales reports when its 
organization is purportedly equipped with two tiers of managerial employees, all of whom are shown as being 
subordinate to the beneficiary, either directly or indirectly, and who are purportedly present on the sales floor 
while the store products are being sold. 
Additionally, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary would direct and coordinate sales activities, analyze 
marketing potential of new store locations, participate in formulating and administering company policies, 
and develop goals and objectives. However, the petitioner has failed to attribute specific daily job duties to 
these generalized responsibilities. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's 
duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a 
matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 
905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Id. 
Based on the current record, the MO is unable to determine whether the claimed managerial duties constitute 
the majority of the beneficiary's duties, or whether the beneficiary primarily performs non-managerial 
administrative or operational duties. Although specifically requested by the director, the petitioner's 
description of the beneficiary's job duties does not establish what proportion of the beneficiary's duties is 
managerial in nature, and what proportion is actually non-managerial. See Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 
F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 199 1). Any failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(14). 
Thus, in an overview of the beneficiary's job description, the MO cannot determine what specific job duties 
the beneficiary would perform on a daily basis and what portion of his time would be attributed to qualifying 
tasks as opposed to the non-qualifying ones. 
1 
 Similarly, if the petitioner is attempting to establish that the beneficiary qualifies in the category of 
multinational executive, it must establish that the primary portion of time is allotted to executive level tasks. 
The MO here refers only to the managerial capacity in light of counsel's assertion that the beneficiary would 
perform duties of a personnel and function manager. 
Page 9 
Lastly, the job description, regardless of its deficiencies, is dependent upon a multi-tiered organizational 
structure. However, in the present matter, the petitioner has provided tax documentation with questionable 
validity, thereby precluding the AAO from being able to determine whether the petitioner was properly 
staffed at the time of filing such that the beneficiary would be relieved from having to primarily perform of 
non-qualifying operational tasks. As properly pointed out by the director, the petitioner's primary source of 
income is the two retail outfits that were operating at the time the Form 1-140 was filed, where the primary 
portion of the work force was comprised of sales clerks. Without specifically explaining what job duties the 
beneficiary would perform that would fit the definition of managerial or executive, the AAO cannot 
determine that the petitioner was able to employ the beneficiary in a qualifying capacity. 
The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a capacity that is primarily 
managerial or executive. The petition must be denied for this reason.. 
The last issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that it had the ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proffered wage at the time the Form 1-140 was filed. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part: 
Ability ofprospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment- 
based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence 
that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The 
petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and 
continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability 
shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial 
statements. 
In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner 
employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by 
documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, 
this evidence will be consideredprima facie proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the beneficiary's salary. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided a 2005 tax return and the beneficiary's 2005 W-2 statement 
indicating that the beneficiary was being paid the proffered wage in 2005, or prior to the filing of the petition. 
However, as discussed above, the AAO questions the validity of these documents when the petitioner fails to 
resolve the considerable inconsistency between the amount of salaries and wages shown in the 2005 W-3 and 
the amounts of compensation of officers and salaries and wages shown in the 2005 tax return. Doubt cast on 
any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of 
the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591. If CIS 
fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, CIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 5 1154(b); see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, 
Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 
2001). Due to the inconsistencies discussed earlier, the AAO cannot determine that the photocopied W-2 
statements submitted in support of this petition are accurate representations of the salaries that were in fact 
paid by the petitioner in 2005. The same reasoning formulates the basis for the AAO's rejection of the 
petitioner's 2005 tax return as a valid document. As the petitioner has not provided a reliable document for 
further analysis, the AAO cannot conclude that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proffered wage as required by regulation. 
Furthermore, the record does not support a finding of eligibility based on additional grounds that were not 
previously addressed in the director's decision. 
First, 8 C.F.R. fj 204.56)(3)(i)(B) states that the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was employed 
abroad in a qualifLing managerial or executive position for at least one out of the three years prior to his entry 
to the United States as a nonimmigrant to work for the same employer. In the instant matter, the director 
specifically addressed this issue in the RFE by instructing the petitioner to provide a detailed analysis of the 
beneficiary's daily activities during his employment abroad. However, the petitioner provided a job 
description that was similarly lacking in the necessary degree of detail as the job description addressing the 
beneficiary's proposed employment. The statements of the foreign entity merely conveyed the sense that the 
beneficiary had discretion over employees and company policies. However, only a few actual duties were 
stated without any explanation as to the context in which such duties were performed or their relation to the 
foreign entity's overall organizational and staffing structure. As such, the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary was employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. The petition must be 
denied for this additional reason. 
Second, 8 C.F.R. fj 204.56)(3)(i)(D) states that the petitioner must establish that it has been doing business for 
at least one year prior to filing the Form 1-140. As previously stated, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 204.56)(2) 
states that doing business means "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services by a 
finn, corporation, or other entity and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office." In the present 
matter, the petitioner has provided numerous invoices to establish that the retail operations that belong to the 
petitioner are doing business. However, the petitioner itself stated that the nature of its business is retail 
investment. Thus, in order to determine that the petitioner meets the definition of doing business, it must 
provide documentation to establish that it invests in retail investment on a "regular, systematic, and 
continuous" basis. See id. The record is void of such documentation. As such, the AAO cannot conclude that the 
petitioner has been doing business in the manner and for the time period prescribed by the above regulation. 
Again, the petition must be denied for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the additional grounds of ineligibility discussed above, this 
petition cannot be approved. 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, afd, 345 F.3d 683. 
Page 11 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. The petitioner has not 
sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.