dismissed EB-1C Case: Sporting Goods

identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyunwarranted
invasionofpersonalprivacy
PUBLICCOPY
U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)
20MassachusettsAve.N.W.,MS2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
8 U.S.Citizenship
andImmigration
Services
DATE: OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER FIL
AUG142012 SR(
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionfor AlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveor ManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8 U.S.C.§ l 153(b)(1)(C)
ON BEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase. All of thedocuments
relatedtothismatterhavebeenreturnedtotheofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvisedthat
anyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadetothatoffice.
If you believethe AAO inappropriatelyappliedthe law in reachingits decision,or you haveadditional
informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfHea motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin
accordancewith the instructionson FormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a fee of $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha motioncanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directly with theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresanymotionto befiled within
30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseeksto reconsideror reopen.
Thankyou,
PerryRhew
Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscas.gov
Page2
DISCUSSION: Thepreferencevisapetitionwasinitially approvedby the Director,TexasServiceCenter.
On furtherreviewof the record,thedirectordeterminedthatthepetitionerwasnot eligiblefor the benefit
sought.Accordingly,thedirectorproperlyservedthepetitionerwith a noticeof his intentionto revokethe
approvalof the preferencevisa petition,andhis reasonstherefore) The directorultimatelyrevokedthe
approvalof thepetition. Thematteris nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOfñce(AAO) onappeal.The
appealwill bedismissed.
Thepetitioneris a Texascorporationwhich claimedñve employeesat the time of filing the petitionand
currentlyseeksto employthe beneficiaryas its executivevice president. Accordingly,the petitioner
endeavorsto classifythebeneñeiaryasanemployment-basedimmigrantpursuantto section203(b)(1)(C)of
the ImmigrationandNationalityAct (the Act), 8 U.S.C.§ l 153(b)(1)(C),asa multinationalexecutiveor
manager.
The petitionerwasestablishedin 1995andfiled the presentpetitionon January15, 1998. The director
approvedthe petitionon November25, 1998. In 2010,uponfurther reviewof the record,the director
determinedthatthepetitionerfailedto providesufficientprobativeandreliableevidenceto establishthatit
hasaqualifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'sclaimedforeignemployer.Thedirectorthereforerevoked
thepetitiononJune25,2010.
On appeal,counseldisputesthe director'sñndings,contendingthat U.S. Citizenshipand Immigration
Services(USCIS)issuedadversefindingsagainstthe petitionerbasedon evidencepertainingto the
petitioner'spriorcounsel.Counselprovidesadditionalevidencein anattemptto overcometherevocation.
I. TheLaw
Section203(b)of theAct states,in pertinentpart:
(l) PriorityWorkers.- Visasshallfirst bemadeavailable. . . to qualifiedimmigrantswho
arealiensdescribedin anyof thefollowingsubparagraphs(A) through(C):
(C) CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.- An alienis described
in this subparagraphif thealien,in the 3 yearsprecedingthe time of the
alien'sapplicationfor classificationand admissioninto the United States
underthis subparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least1yearby a firm or
g otherissues,thedirectorobservedin thenoticethatthepetitioner'spreviouscounsel,
hadbeenconvictedof immigrationfraudin 2009. Specifically,onAugust24,2009,ajudgmentin a
criminalcasewasenteredin theU.S.DistrictCourtfor theSouthernDistrictof Texas,HoustonDivision,
afterMr. pleadedguiltytoconspiracytoengageinvisafraud,encouragingandinducingaliensforthe
purposeof commercialadvantageandprivatefinancialgainto cometo the UnitedStates,makingfalse
statements,andmoneylaundering.
Page3
corporationor otherlegalentityor anafñliateor subsidiarythereofandwho
seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin orderto continueto renderservicesto the
sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is
managerialorexecutive.
Thelanguageof thestatuteis specificin limitingthis provisionto onlythoseexecutivesandmanagerswho
havepreviouslyworkedfor the Arm,corporationor otherlegalentity,or an affiliate or subsidiaryof that
entity,andarecomingto theUnitedStatesto workforthesameentity,or itsafAliateorsubsidiary.
A United Statesemployermay file a petitionon Form I-140 for classificationof an alien undersection
203(b)(1)(C)of theAct asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis requiredfor this
classification. Theprospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnisha job offer in the form of a
statementwhich indicatesthatthealienis to beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive
capacity.Suchastatementmustclearlydescribethedutiesto beperformedbythealien.
To establisha "qualifyingrelationship"undertheAct andtheregulations,thepetitionermustshowthatthe
beneficiary'sforeignemployerandtheproposedU.S.employerarethesameemployer(i.e.a U.S.entitywith
a foreignoffice)or relatedasa "parentandsubsidiary"or as"afñiiates" Seegenerally§203(b)(1)(C)of the
Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C);seealso8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(2)(providingdefinitionsof theterms"affiliate"
and"subsidiary").
Theregulationat8C.F.R.§204.5(j)(2)statesin pertinentpart:
Affiliate means:
(A) Oneof two subsidiariesbothof whichareownedandcontrolledby thesameparentor
individual;
(B) Oneof two legalentitiesownedandcontrolledby thesamegroupof individuals,each
individualowningandcontrollingapproximatelythesameshareor proportionof each
entity;
* * *
Multinational meansthat the qualifying entity, or its afAliate,or subsidiary,conducts
businessintwoormorecountries,oneofwhichistheUnitedStates.
Subsidiarymeansafirm, corporation,orotherlegalentityof whichaparentowns,directlyor
indirectly,morethanhalfof theentityandcontrolstheentity;or owns,directlyor indirectly,
halfof theentityandcontrolstheentity;orowns,directlyor indirectly,50percentof a 50-50
joint ventureandhasequalcontrolandveto powerover the entity; or owns,directly or
indirectly,lessthanhalfof theentity,butin factcontrolstheentity.
Page4
A petitionermustestablisheligibility atthetimeof filing; a petitioncannotbeapprovedatafuturedateafter
thepetitioneror beneficiarybecomeseligibleundera newsetof facts. MatterofKatigbak, 14I&N Dec.45,
49(Comm'r1971).
IL QualifyingRelationship
The primary issuein this matteris whetherthe petitionerhassubmittedsufficientcredibleevidenceto
establishthatit hadat thetime of filing, andcontinuesto have,a qualifyingrelationshipwith TianjinNew
WorldStationary& SportingGoods,Co.Ltd, thebeneficiary'sclaimedforeignemployer.
In supportof the FormI-I40, the petitionerprovidedownershipevidencein the form of two photocopied
stockcertificates,datedNovember30, 1995,which indicatedthatthe petitionerissueda total of 100,000
sharesof its stock40,000 sharesto theforeignentitynamedaboveandanother40,000sharesto
givingthe beneficiary'sclaimedforeignemployermajorityownershipandcontrolof thepetitionmg
entity.
Thepetitioneralsoprovidednumeroustaxdocuments,includinga copyof its 1996taxreturncompletewith
relevantschedules.ScheduleK, No. 5 showsthatthe petitionerclaimedto be 100%ownedby a single
individual,partnership,corporation,estateor trustandScheduleK, No. 10(a)specifiedthattheowningparty
wasforeign. A supplementto ScheduleK andForm5472bothnamedthe beneficiary'sclaimedforeign
employerastheentitythatownsthepetitioner. PartIV of Form5472furtherindicatesthatthe petitioner
borroweda total of $2,750from its foreignowner,but receivedno otherconsiderationor goodssuchas
inventory.Lastly,ScheduleL, No. 22(b)of thesametaxreturnshowsthatthepetitionerreceived$5,000in
exchangefor issuanceof itsstock.
Althoughthedirectorapprovedthe petitioner'sFormI-140,uponfurtherreviewanduponlearningcertain
informationaboutthe petitioner'sprior counsel,who filed the FormI-140andsubmittedevidenceon the
petitioner'sbehalf,thedirectordeterminedthatthepetitionmayhavebeenapprovedin errorandtherefore
issuedanotice,datedMay7,2010,informingthepetitionerof theintentto revoke(NOIR)thepriorapproval
and the reasons therefore. One of the director's observations was made with regard to the tax return
(describedabove)whichthepetitionerprovidedin supportof theFormI-140 Thedirectorpointedoutthat
the informationconcerningthepetitioner'sownership,foundon Form5472of the return,washandwritten,in
contrastto theremainderof thereturn,wheretheinformationwastyped. Thedirectoralsomadenoteof the
fact that the petitionersubmittedonly copiesof stock certificatesto establishits allegedqualifying
relationshipwith the foreign entity and questionedwhy the petitioner'sstate FranchiseTax Public
InformationReport,filed onJanuary13,2005,did notmakeanymentionof anycompaniesthatowned10%
ormoreofthepetitioningentity.Thedirectordeemedthevalidityofthepetitioner'sFormI-140assuspectin
lightof thefraudulentactionsof thepetitioner'sformerattorney,whowasconvictedof conspiracytoengage
2Althoughthedirectorreferredto thepetitioner'ssubmissionof a 1997taxreturn,therecordshowsthatthe
taxreturnthatthepetitionersubmittedin supportof theFormI-140wasfor the 1996taxyear,whichcovered
a seven-monthtimeperiodthatcommencedonNovember28,1996andendedonJune30,1997.
Page5
in visafraud. Thedirectoralsoreliedona GooglesearchandDunandBradstreetreport,whichheclaimed
madenomentionof thepetitioner'sallegedforeignownership.
In response,currentcounselfor thepetitionerprovideda statementdatedJune3, 2010in whichheasserted
thatthestockcertificatethatwasissuedbythepetitioneronNovember30, 1995establishedtheforeignentity
asthepetitioner'smajorityowner. Counseldismissedthedirector'sfindingsbasedontheGooglesearchand
the Dun and Bradstreetreport,claimingthatbothmediumsaresourcesfor generalinformation. Counsel
urgedthedirectorto reviewthepetitioner'sIRSForm5472fromyear2000to 2001andtheAmendedTexas
FranchiseTaxformsfrom2004to 2010.
After reviewingthe petitioner'srecord,the directordeterminedthat neithercounsel'sstatementsnor the
supplementaldocumentsprovidedby thepetitionerweresufficientto overcometheadverseinformationand
issuesof credibilitythatstemmedfromthepetitioner'spriorcounsel'sconvictionregardingvisafraud. The
directorthereforeissuedanoticeof revocationdatedJune25,2010.
Onappeal,counselrestateshisobjectiontothedirector'srelianceonaGooglesearchandDunandBradstreet
reportandurgestheAAO to refrainfrom undulyrelyingon theconvictionof thepetitioner'sprior counsel
whenmakingadeterminationastothepetitioner'seligibility. Counselpointsto thestockcertificatesthatthe
petitioneroriginally issuedandaskstheAAO to considera previouslyfiled assumednamecertificateand
companyletterheadin determiningwhetherthe requisitequalifying relationshiphas beenestablished.
Counselfurthercontendsthatthereis norequirementthattheinformationin thepetitioner'staxreturnsmust
betypewrittenandcontendsthathavingportionsof thedocumenthandwrittenshouldnot leadto questions
concerningthevalidityof saiddocument.
After reviewingtherecordin its entirety,theAAO findsthatthepetitionerhasfailedto providesufficient
evidenceto establishthatit hasaqualifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'sallegedforeignemployer.The
petitionerhasfailedtoovercometheinconsistenciesanddeficienciesintherecordof proceeding.
Generally,with regardto revocations,section205of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1155,states:"TheAttorneyGeneral
may, at any time, for what he deemsto be good and sufficient cause,revoke the approval of any petition
approvedby him undersection204."
Regardingthe revocationon noticeof an immigrantpetitionundersection205 of the Act, the Boardof
ImmigrationAppealshasstated:
In MatterofEstime,. . . thisBoardstatedthatanoticeof intentionto revokeavisapetitionis
properlyissuedfor "goodandsufficientcause"wheretheevidenceof recordatthetimethe
noticeis issued,if unexplainedandunrebutted,wouldwarranta denialof thevisapetition
baseduponthepetitioner'sfailuretomeethisburdenof proof.Thedecisiontorevokewill be
sustainedwheretheevidenceof recordat thetimethedecisionis rendered,includingany
evidenceor explanationsubmittedby thepetitionerin rebuttalto thenoticeof intentionto
revoke,wouldwarrantsuchdenial.
Page6
MatterofHo, 191&NDec.582,590(BIA 1988)(citingMatterofEstime,19I&N 450(BIA 1987)).
In thepresentmatter,therecordshowsthatthedirectorproperlyissuedtheNOIR. In light of thefraudulent
actscommittedbythepetitioner'spriorcounsel,thedirectorhadgoodandsufficientcauseto issueanoticeof
intentto revokeontheclaimedqualifyingrelationshipbetweenthepetitioneranda foreignentity,particularly
giventhatthepetitionerprovidedlittle morethantwophotocopiedstockcertificatesto corroborateitsclaimed
ownership. While the criminalconvictionof the petitioner'sprior counsel,by itself, is not sufficientto
invalidatethe petitioner'sassertionsof fact, it wasreasonablefor the directorto look beyondthe mere
assertionsof counselandthepetitioner'sinternallygeneratedstockcertificatesfor evidenceof theclaimed
qualifyingrelationship.
Asgeneralevidenceof apetitioner'sclaimedqualifyingrelationship,stockcertificatesalonearenotsufficient
evidenceto determinewhethera stockholdermaintainsownershipandcontrolof a corporateentity. The
corporatestockcertificateledger,stockcertificateregistry,corporatebylaws,andthe minutesof relevant
annualshareholdermeetingsmustalsobeexaminedto determinethetotalnumberof sharesissued,theexact
numberissuedto the shareholder,andthe subsequentpercentageownershipand its effect on corporate
control. Additionally,apetitioningcompanymustdiscloseall agreementsrelatingto thevotingof shares,the
distributionof profit,themanagementanddirectionof thesubsidiary,andanyotherfactoraffectingactual
controlof the entity. SeeMatter of SiemensMedicalSystems,Inc., 19 I&N Dec.362 (Comm'r 1986).
Withoutfull disclosureof all relevantdocuments,USCISis unableto determinetheelementsof ownership
andcontrol
Here,the petitionerrelied on its stock certificatesas primary evidenceof its qualifying relationship.
However,whencomparingtheinformationprovidedinthestockcertificateswiththeinformationprovidedby
thepetitionerin ScheduleK of its 1996taxreturn,theAAO findsthatthetwodocumentsareatoddswith one
another.Whilethestockcertificatesindicatethatthepetitionerhastwo owners,onebeingtheforeignentity
wherethebeneficiarywasallegedlyemployed,theinformationfoundin the 1996taxreturnshowstheforeign
entityasthepetitioner'ssoleowner. This informationis restatedagainin Form5472of thesametax return,
despitethestockcertificatesthatwerepreviouslyissued.Whilebothdocumentsnamethesameforeignentity
as its majority owner,thusseeminglymeetingthe requirementsof a parent-subsidiaryrelationship,the AAO
cannotdiscount the overall significance of this inconsistencyin termsof the petitioner's credibility.
Etis furthernotedthatthepetitionerdid notexplainwhythe 1996IRSForm1120wastypewritten,while the
IRSForm5472,InformationReturnof a25%ForeignOwnedU.S.Corporation,washandwritten.Onappeal,
counselsimplyaccusesthedirectorof "manufactur[ing]a requirementthathandwritteninformationin the
1997[sic] federaltax returnsomehowweakensthe validity of the supportingdocument." Neitherthe
petitionernor counselexplainswhy the documentis visibly anddemonstrablydifferentfrom the other
accountant-preparedtaxforms.SuchinconsistenciesmighthavebeenresolvedbyevidencesuchasanIRS-
certifiedcopyof the2006taxreturn,demonstratingthatthetaxformswereactuallyfiledasrepresented.By
leavingthe discrepanciesunexplained,thepetitionerallowsthedirectorandtheAAO to concludethatthe
[RSForm5472wasnotconcurrentlypreparedalongwith the IRSForm1120,or thatit mayhavebeen
materiallyalteredsincethefilingoftheoriginaltaxreturn.
Page7
To determinewhethera stockholdermaintainsownershipandcontrolof a corporateentity, USCISwill
typically lookto thestockcertificates,corporatestockcertificateledger,stockcertificateregistry,articlesof
incorporation,corporatebylaws,andtheminutesof relevantannualshareholdermeetings.Theserecordswill
documentthetotalnumberof sharesissued,theexactnumberissuedto theshareholder,andthesubsequent
percentageownershipandits effecton corporatecontrol.SeeMatterofSiemensMedicalSystems,Inc., 19
I&N Dec.at 362.
In the presentmatter,the petitionersubmittedthe articlesof incorporationwhich, at Article IV, limit the
corporationtotheissuanceof 1,000sharesofcommonstockataparvalueofonedollar($1).Thisisindirect
conflictwith thestockcertificateswhichpurportto represent100,000sharesof stock. Additionally,at a par
valueof onedollarpershare,theAAOwouldexpectto seeanentryfor $100,000on ScheduleL, lineno.
22(b),of the IRSForm1120,ratherthanthe$5,000of commonstockthatis representedon the form.
Finally,asnotedbythedirector,thepetitionersubmittedadocumenttitled "RatificationandConsentin Lieu
of OrganizationalMeeting,"butthedocumentwassignedmorethanayearaftertheeventthatthedocument
purportsto memorialize.
It is incumbentuponthe petitionerto resolveany mconsistenciesin the recordby independentobjective
evidence.Any attemptto explainor reconcilesuchinconsistencieswill not suffice unlessthe petitioner
submitscompetentobjectiveevidencepointingto wherethetruthlies. Matterof Ho, 19I&N Dec.582,591-
92 (BIA 1988). Moreover,doubtcaston anyaspectof the petitioner'sproofmay,of course,leadto a
reevaluationofthereliabilityandsufficiencyoftheremainingevidenceofferedin supportofthevisapetition.
Id at591.
Furthermore,with regardto counsel'sclaimthat the foreignentity "supplied[the petitionerwith] goods,
salaries,humanresources,supplychainservices,andsupportingmanufacturingcapabilities,"theAAO notes
that without documentaryevidenceto supportthe claim, the assertionsof counselwill not satisfy the
petitioner'sburdenof proof. Theunsupportedassertionsof counseldo not constituteevidence.Matter of
Obaigbena,19I&N Dec.533,534(BIA 1988);MatterofLaureano,19I&N Dec.1(BIA 1983);Matterof
Ramirez-Sanchez,17I&N Dec.503,506(BIA 1980).Thisclaimisalsoin conflictwiththe1996IRSForm
5472,which indicatesthatthepetitionerborroweda totalof $2,750from its foreignowner,butreceivedno
otherconsiderationorgoodssuchasinventory.
In proceedingsto revoketheapprovalof a visapetition,theburdenof proofto establisheligibility for the
benefitsoughtis on thepetitioner. Id. at 589;Matterof Cheung,12I&N Dec.715(BIA 1968);seealso
MatterofBrantigan, 11I&N Dec.493(BIA 1966). TheBoard'sdecisionin Matterof Ho furtherclarified
that,by itself,thedirector'srealizationthata petitionwasincorrectlyapprovedis goodandsufficientcause
for theissuanceof anoticeof intentto revokeanimmigrantpetition.MatterofHo,supraat590.
in thepresentmatter,therecordlackedsufficientreliableevidenceof a qualifyingrelationshipbetweenthe
petitionerandthenamedforeignentity. Theregulationandcaselawconfirmthatownershipandcontrolare
thefactorsthatmustbeexaminedin determiningwhethera qualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenUnited
Statesand foreign entitiesfor purposesof this visa classification. Matter of ChurchScientology
International,19I&N Dec.593(Assoc.Comm'r1988);seealsoMatterofSiemensMedicalSystems,Inc., 19
Page8
l&N Dec.362; Matterof Hughes,18I&N Dec.289(Comm.1982). In the contextof this visa petition,
ownershipreferstothedirector indirectlegalrightofpossessionoftheassetsofanentitywithfull powerand
authorityto control;controlmeansthedirector indirectlegalrightandauthorityto directtheestablishment,
management,andoperationsof anentity. Matterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.at 595.
As the petitionerfailedto provideadequatedocumentationestablishingits ownership,theAAO concludes
thattherecordlacksoneof thekeyelementsnecessaryto establishtheexistenceof aqualifyingrelationship.
Therefore,onthebasisof thisconclusion,theinstantpetitioncannotbeapproved.
IH. BeyondtheDecisionof theDirector
Additionally,whilethisdecisionwill bebasedentirelyon thefindingsdiscussedabove,therecordindicates
thatthereis furtherevidenceof ineligibilitythatwasnotpreviouslyaddressedin thedirector'sdecision.
Specifically,therecordindicatesthatthepetitionerfailedto establishthatthebeneficiarymeetstheforeign
employmentrequirementsset out in 8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(3)(i)(A),which statesthat the petitionermust
establishthatthe beneficiarywasemployedabroadin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivepositionfor at
leastoneoutof thethreeyearspriorto filing theFormI-140. Therecordfurtherindicatesthatthepetitioner
failedto providesufficientevidenceshowingthatthebeneAciarywouldbeemployedin theUnitedStatesina
qualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity,
Turningfirst to theissueof thebeneficiary'semploymentabroad,theAAO notesthatthepetitionerdid not
provideany supportingevidencefrom the foreignentityto verify the beneficiary'sclaimedperiodof
employmentfromJune1993to 1996.Next,in reviewingthejob descriptionthatthepetitionerprovidedin its
January14,1998supportstatement,theAAO findsthatthepercentagebreakdownof thebeneficiary'sduties
doesnot establishthatthe beneficiary'stime wasprimarilyallocatedto the performanceof taskswithin a
qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.Namely,thebeneficiary'sallegedemploymentwith theforeign
entity involvedsuchtasksas preparingbalancesheets,preparingprofit and loss statements,conducting
varioustypesof audits,andrepresentingthe companybeforegovernmentagencies.Cumulatively,these
administrativeandoperationaltasksconsumedapproximately50%of thebeneficiary'stime.
Althoughthe petitionerstatedthat another50%of the beneficiary'stime was allocatedto directingand
coordinatingthe work of employeesin generalaccountingandaccountsandrecords.,the petitioneronly
generallyindicatedthatthebeneficiarysupervisedtheworkof supervisorypersonnel;thepetitionerdid not,
however,provideany informationaboutthe subordinates'job titles,job duties,or respectiveplacements
within the foreignentity'sorganizationalchartsuchthatwould supporttheclaimsbeingmade. Goingon
recordwithoutsupportingdocumentaryevidenceisnotsufficientfor purposesof meetingtheburdenof proof
in theseproceedings.MatterofSoffici,22I&N Dec.158,165(Comm.1998)(citingMatterof TreasureCraft
of California,14l&N Dec.190(Reg.Comm.1972)).Moreover,thepetitionerdid notspecifytheactual
supervisorytasksthebeneficiaryperformedin thecourseof dailybusiness.
In light of theabove,therecordindicatesthatthepetitionerfailedto establishthattherequirementssetout in
8C.F.R.§204.5(i)(3)(i)(A)hadbeenmet.
Page9
Finally,turningto the issueof the beneficiary'sproposedemploymentwith the U.S.entity,the AAO first
notesthe discrepancybetweenthe organizationalchartthat wassubmittedin supportof the Form I-140,
wherethepetitionerillustrateda hierarchyconsistingof six employees,andthe informationprovidedin the
FormI-140itself,wherethepetitionerclaimedtohavehadatotalof fiveemployeesatthetimeof filing. As
previouslynoted,the petitioneris expectedto resolveany mconsistenciesm the recordby submitting
independentobjectiveevidence.Any attemptto explainor reconcilesuchinconsistencieswill not suffice
unlessthepetitionersubmitscompetentobjectiveevidencepointingto wherethetruthlies. MatterofHo, 19
I&N Dec.at591-92.
Furthermore,afterexaminingthepercentagebreakdownofferedin thesupportstatement,theAAO findsthat
the petitionerprovidedoverlygeneralizedinformationwithoutdisclosingwhatactualtasksthe beneficiary
wouldperformonadailybasis.Specificsareclearlyanimportantindicationof whethera beneñeiary'sduties
areprimarilyexecutiveor managerialin nature;otherwisemeetingthedefinitionswouldsimplybea matter
of reiteratingtheregulations.FedinBros.Co.,Ltd v. Sava,724F. Supp.I 103(E.D.N.Y.1989),affd, 905
F.2d41 (2d.Cir. 1990). Accordingly,publishedcaselaw supportsthepivotalroleof a clearlydefinedjob
description,astheactualdutiesthemselvesrevealthetruenatureof theemployment.Id
Whena petitionerreliesonvaguegeneralitiesto describea givenposition,theonlyelementthatis conveyed
clearlyis the beneficiary'sdiscretionaryauthority. However,merelyestablishingthatthebeneficiaryis in
chargeof personneland/orbusinessmattersdoesnotexcludethepossibilitythatthe beneficiaryis heavily
engagedin theperformanceof non-qualifyingoperationaltasks,particularlywhenthesizeof thesupportstaff
is limited.Whileadeterminationof thebeneficiary'semploymentcapacitywill notbebasedonstaffingsize
alone,this factorishighlyrelevantandshouldbeconsidered,asit allowstheAAO to determinetheextentto
whichthepetitioneriscapableof relievingthebeneficiaryfromhavingto primarilyperformtasksof anon-
qualifyingnature.
It is appropriatefor USCISto considerthesizeof thepetitioningcompanyin conjunctionwith otherrelevant
factors,suchasa company'ssmallpersonnelsize,theabsenceof employeeswho would performthe non-
managerialor non-executiveoperationsof thecompany,or a "shellcompany"thatdoesnotconductbusiness
in a regularandcontinuousmanner.See.e.g.Family Inc. v. USCIS.469 F.3d 1313(9th Cir. 2006);Systronics
Corp. v. INS, 153F. Supp.2d 7, 15(D.D.C. 2001). Thesizeof a companymaybeespeciallyrelevantwhen
USCIS notes discrepanciesin the record and fails to believe that the facts assertedare true. SeeSystronics,
153F.Supp.2dat 15.
In thepresentmatter,thedeficientinformationconcerningthebeneficiary'sproposedemploymentdoesnot
lead to the conclusionthat the beneficiarywould more likely than not be engagedprimarily in the
performanceof taskswithin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity.As thepetitionerfailedto meet
thiscrucialstatutoryrequirement,theAA0 findsthatthepetitionwasapprovedinerroronthisbasisaswell.
Thus,evenif the petitionerhadbeenableto overcomethe singlegroundcited in theoriginalNOIR, this
matterwould neverthelesshavebeenremandedto thedirectorfor possiblerevocationonthetwo remaining
groundsthatwerediscussedabove.Regardless,thepetitionerfailedtoovercometheadverseconclusionthat
Page10
wasoriginallyaddressedin director'sNOlR andtheapprovalof theinstantpetitionwill berevokedonthat
basis.
IV. Conclusion
In visapetitionproceedings,theburdenof provingeligibility for thebenefitsoughtremainsentirelywith the
petitioner.Section291of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1361.Thepetitionerhasnotsustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealisdismissed.