dismissed EB-1C Case: Trading

U.S. Department of Homeland Seeuritv 
20 ~asi. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
I 
FILE: Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: - 
WAC 94 22950633 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition foi  lien Worka as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any fintha inquiry must be made to that office. 
I Administrative Appeals office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, initially approved the employment-based visa 
petition. Upon review of the record, the director properly issued a notice of intent to revoke and ultimately 
revoked approval of the petition. The Administrative Appeals Office (MO) dismissed a subsequently filed 
appeal. The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reopen and reconsider. The motion will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of California in June 1991 under the name of ANEC 
International Trading, Inc. The petitioner later changed its name to Yee Top, Inc. m August of 1993. The 
petitioner claims to be engaged in the import, expoit, and trading business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as 
its vice-president. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based 
immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
5 1 153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The director initially approved the petition on September 27, 1994. On September 26, 1996, the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Los Angeles District Office issued an intent to revoke the 
approved petition. The intent to revoke was based on the findings of a consulate investigation that determined 
that the claimed parent company in Shenyang, China no longer existed. After properly issuing a notice of 
intent to revoke, the director revoked the approval of the petition on August 2, 1998. In a May 20, 2002 
decision, the AAO affirmed the director's decision. The MO also determined, beyond the decision of the 
director, that the petitioner had not established a qualifymg relationship with the beneficiary's foreign 
employer. 
On June 18,2002, counsel for the petitioner submitted a motion to reconsider and reopen the AAO's decision. 
Counsel asserts that the AAO's decision was based on an incomplete file. Counsel points out that the AAO 
acknowledged that the appellate review was completed on a reconstructed file. Counsel argues that it is 
unreasonable for the MO to determine that the evidence in the record does not substantiate that the foreign entity 
employed anyone when the petition was filed, when the legacy INS had lost the file. Counsel also assumes that 
the foreign entity's business income tax forms filed prior to 1995 were provided in the original file and that the 
petitioner's stock certificates and stock ledger were provided in the origmal fde but not in the reconstmcted file. 
Counsel contends that the documents in the original file were sufficient to justify approval of the petition and that 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) should not use its own inefficiency and negligence to deny the 
petition. Counsel contends that CIS is estopped @om denying a petition it once approved and asserts that the 
foreign entity is doing business and that a quallfylng relationship exists between the petitioner and the 
beneficiary's foreign employer. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 103.5(a)(2) states, m pertinent part: ''A motion to reopen must state the new facts to 
be provided in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence." Based 
on the plain meaning of "new," a new fact is found to be evidence that was not available and could not have been 
discovered or presented in the previous proceeding. The petitioner has not submitted new facts supparted by 
affidavits or other documentary evidence. Counsel's assertions regarding the reconstructed file do not constitute 
new facts. Counsel does not submit new evidence or explanations regarding the lack of documentzry evidence in 
the file. Motions for the reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are 
petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. INS v. Doherty, 502 
U.S. 314,323 (1992)(citing INiS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)). A party seeking to reopen a proceeding bean a 
"heavy burden!' llVS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110. With the current motion, the movant has not met that burden. 
The motion to reopen will be dismissed. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $103.5(a)(3) states, in pertinent part: 
A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any 
pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application 
of law or Service policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must, 
when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the 
time of the initial decision. 
Neither counsel nor the petitioner has submitted any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the AAO 
decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy. Section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1155, states: 
"The Attorney General may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the 
approval of any petition approved by him under section 204." 
Regarding the revocation on notice of an immigrant petition under section 205 of the Act, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals has stated: 
In Matter of Estime, . . . this Board stated that a notice of intention to revoke a visa petition is 
properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" where the evidence of record at the time the 
notice is issued, if unexplained and unrebutted, would wanrant a denial of the visa petition 
based upon the petitioner's failure to meet his burden of proof. The decision to revoke will be 
sustained where the evidence of record at the time the decision is rendered, including any 
evidence or explanation submitted by the petitioner in rebuttal to the notice of intention to 
revoke, would warrant such denial. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,590 (BIA 1988)(citing Matter of Estime, 19 I&N 450 (BIA 1987)). 
Counsel has not provided a proper basis to reopen or reconsider the previous decision. Counsel, on motion, 
had opportunity to present any evidence he believed had not been included in the reconstructed filed, or 
reasonable explanations detailing why the supporting documents were not available. However, counsel did 
not provide evidence not previously considered or explanations regarding the location of and ability to obtain 
pertinent documents. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure CraJ of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Cornm. 1972). Further, counsel's assertions that the foreign entity was doing business 
when the petition was filed and that the petitioner and foreign entity enjoy a qualifying relationship are not 
supported on motion with affidavits or other documentary evidence. The statements of counsel on appeal or 
in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 
US. 183, 188-89 a6 (1984); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980). 
Finally, the AAO, like the Board of Immigration Appeals, is without authority to apply the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel so as to preclude a component part of CIS from undertaking a lawful course of action that 
it is empowered to pursue by statute or regulation. See Matter ofHernandez-Puente, 20 I&N Dec. 335, 338 
(BIA 1991). Estoppel is an equitable form of relief that is available only through the courts. The AAO's 
jurisdiction is limited to that authority the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security 
specifically granted to it. See DHS Delegation Number 0150.1 (effective March 1, 2003); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 2.1 (2004). The jurisdiction of the AAO is limited to those matters described at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.1(4)(3)(E)(iii) (as in effect on February 28, 2003). Accordingly, the AAO has no authority to address 
the petitioner's equitable estoppel claim. 
The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. 
The petitioner has not sustained that burden. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4) states: "[a] motion that does 
not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed." Accordingly, the motion will be dismissed, the 
proceedings will not be reopened, and the previous decisions of the directar and the AAO will not be disturbed. 
ORDER: The motion is dismissed.