dismissed EB-1C Case: Trading

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF H-S-T- INC. 
APPEAL OF TEXAS SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: MAY 17,2017 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, identified as a trading company, seeks to permanently employ the Beneficiary as its 
president under the first preference immigrant classification • for multinational executives or 
managers. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(l)(C). This classification allows a U.S. employer to permanently transfer a qualified foreign 
employee to the United States to work in an executive or managerial capacity. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition after issuing a notice of intent to 
dismiss, concluding that the record did not establish, as required, that: ( 1) the Petitioner has a 
qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer; (2) the Beneficiary has been 
employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity; (3) the Beneficiary will be employed in the 
United States in a managerial or executive capacity; (4) the Petitioner has been doing business for at 
least one year prior to the petition's filing date; and (5) the Petitioner has the ability to pay the 
Beneficiary's proffered wage. The Director also found that unresolved derogatory evidence 
discredited the Petitioner's claims regarding its location, the Beneficiary's employment history, and 
its relationship to its claimed foreign parent company. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence and states that the Director "did not fully 
understand or g[i]ve reasonable consideration to the facts and the evidence." 
Upon de novo review, and following the issuance of our own notice of intent to dismiss, we will 
dismiss the appeal. We will also enter a finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 203(b )(1 )(C) of the Act makes an immigrant visa available to a beneficiary who, in the three 
years preceding the filing of the petition, has been employed outside the United States for at least one 
year in a managerial or executive capacity, and seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to 
render managerial or executive services to the same employer or to its subsidiary or affiliate. 
A United States employer may file Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, to classify a 
beneficiary under section 203(b )(1 )(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. This 
classification does not require a labor certification. 
Matter of H-S- T- Inc. 
The petition must include a statement from an authorized official of the petitioning United States 
employer which demonstrates that the beneficiary has been employed abroad in a managerial or 
executive capacity for at least one year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, that the 
beneficiary is coming to work in the United States for the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate of 
the foreign employer, and that the prospective U.S. employer has been doing business for at least one 
year. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(3). 
II. WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The Director identified derogatory evidence relating to three elements of the petition. We agree with 
two of the Director's points, as discussed below. The Director also stated that the Petitioner's 
income tax returns do not reflect the ownership structure that the Petitioner claims. We have not 
ruled out misrepresentation in that respect, but due to the consequences of finding that a foreign 
national has engaged in the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact, we must "closely 
scrutinize" the factual basis behind such a finding. See Matter of Shirdel, 19 I&N Dec. 33, 35 (BIA 
1984). The Petitioner has provided a plausible explanation for the discrepancy on the tax returns, 
and the evidence of misrepresentation is more persuasive with respect to the other grounds. 
The Director found that the Petitioner had claimed a rented mailbox as the company's actual, 
physical place of business. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that it occupies and does business at 
the disputed address. In an effort to corroborate that claim,. the Petiti.oner submits additional 
documents showing that address. Following further inquiries, and an attempt to notify the Petitioner 
of additional findings, we agree with the Director that the Petitioner does not do business at the 
address claimed, and we find that the Petitioner has willfully misrepresented a material fact about the 
address in an attempt to demonstrate that it is actively doing business. ( 
The Director also raised concerns about the Beneficiary's past employment history. Our inquiries 
uncovered additional derogatory information in this regard. As above, we attempted to notify the 
Petitioner of the additional evidence in a notice of intent to dismiss, but the notice was not 
deliverable because the Petitioner did not provide a valid address. 
Any foreign person who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or 
has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United 
States or other benefit provided under the Act is inadmissible. See section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 
As outlined by the Board of Immigration Appeals, a material misrepresentation requires that one 
willfully makes a material misstatement to a government official for the purpose of obtaining an 
immigration benefit to which one is not entitled. Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289-90 
(BIA 1975). The term "willfully" means knowing and intentionally, as distinguished from 
accidentally, inadvertently, or in an honest belief that the facts are otherwise. See Matter of Tijam, 
22 I&N Dec. 408, 425 (BIA 1998); Matter of Healy and Goodchild, 17 I&N Dec. 22, 28 (BIA 
1979). To be considered material, the misrepresentation must be one which "tends to shut off a line 
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Matter of H-S- T- Inc. 
of inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility, and which might well have resulted in a proper 
determination that he be excluded." Matter of Ng, 17 I&N Dec. 536, 53 7 (BIA 1980). 
Accordingly, for an immigration officer to find a willful and material misrepresentation in visa 
petition proceedings, he or she must determine: 1) that the petitioner or beneficiary made a false 
representation to an authorized official of the United States government; 2) that the 
misrepresentation was willfully made; and 3) that the fact misrepresented was material. See Matter 
ofM-, 6 I&N Dec. 149 (BIA 1954); Matter ofL-L-, 9 I&N Dec. 324 (BIA 1961); Kai Hing Hui, 15 
I&N Dec. at 288. 
A. The Petitioner's Location 
One principal basis for our finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact concerns the 
Petitioner's claimed place of business. Throughout this proceeding, the Petitioner has identified its 
place ofbusiness as New York. Asked, on Form 1-140, for 
an alternate address where the Beneficiary would work, the Petitioner answered "n/a," short for "not 
applicable," meaning that the Beneficiary would work at the address claimed on the 
petition form. The Petitioner submitted a copy of a five-year office lease agreement between the 
Petitioner and dated April 28, 2013, and specifying that occupies 
"1860 square feet," and a copy of a "Monthly Rent" invoice, dated June 1, 2013, from 
billed to the Petitioner at the address. The Petitioner also submitted several 
interior photographs of an office location, one of which showed a door, numbered ' 'with the 
Petitioner's name on a sign. 
The Director issued a notice of intent to deny the petition, stating that "[a] US CIS investigation 
shows [that the address is a mail box drop." In response, the Petitioner stated that the 
address is the Petitioner's physical location, and that it rented a mailbox at the same 
location for security reasons. 
The Petitioner submitted copies of tax documents from various years. The documents from 2013 
and later show the address. The Beneficiary signed IRS Forms 941, Employer's 
Quarterly Federal Tax Returns, dated 2014 and 2015, in her claimed capacity as president of the 
petitioning company. Each of these forms indicated that the Petitioner paid $146,250 in taxable 
wages to 17 employees. The Petitioner also submitted copies of invoices, again showing the 
address. 
The Director denied the petition, stating that the Petitioner's evidence did not overcome the prior 
finding that the Petitioner's claimed address is a mail drop. The Director also noted that the 
Petitioner has offered no proof that the photographs were taken at the location. On 
appeal, the Petitioner maintains that the photographs and lease are authentic, and submits copies of 
what purport to be recent sales contracts, showing the address. 
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Matter of H-S- T- Inc. 
' 
The Director stated that the information about the Petitioner's address arose from an "internal 
i.pvestigation" but did not elaborate. In an effort to clarify the issue, USCIS officers visited 
They found no evidence of the petitioning company. Furthermore, they found 
evidence that is not the owner or landlord of the property as stated in the 
lease. This finding is consistent with property records, which do not identify 
as the owner ofthe site. Therefore, the lease is not authentic. 
The officers took photographs of the property, whiCh do not match the photographs that the 
Petitioner had previously submitted. We further note that the Petitioner's photographs show a type 
of window that does not exist on the structure. Therefore, the photographs submitted by 
the Petitioner do not depict as the Petitioner has claimed. 
The above evidence discredits the Petitioner's claim that its actual, physical place of business is at 
In the absence of any evidence of an alternative location, we must conclude that 
there is no independent evidence that the Petitioner actually exists as a functioning business, and that 
the Petitioner has misrepresented its place of business. By signing tax documents listing the 
fictitious business address, the Beneficiary actively participated in the misrepresentation. 
We find that the Petitioner and the Beneficiary were aware that their representations to USCIS were 
false; we can envision no plausible situation in which the Petitioner and the Beneficiary shared the 
mistaken belief that the company operated at the address claimed. In providing false lease and tax 
docum,ents to the agency, the Petitioner and the Beneficiary knew that these documents did not 
reflect the Petitioner's place of business. The evidence further indicates that the Petitioner 
knowingly transmitted the false documents to users along with its petition in order to obtain an 
immigration benefit under the Act. 
A misrepresentation is material where the benefit request should have been denied, or where the 
misrepresentation tends to shut off a relevant line of inquiry which might well have resulted in denial 
ofthe application. See_Matter ofS- and B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436,447 (AG 1961). Under this test, the 
Petitioner and Beneficiary 
made a material misrepresentation regarding the company's claimed place 
ofbl!_,siness by submitting false lease and tax documents. The Petitioner seeks an employment-based 
immigrant classification for the Beneficiary, and therefore the verifiable existence of the employer 
and the job offer are material to the petition. 
By misrepresenting the company's address and submitting false documents to USCIS, the Petitioner 
and the Beneficiary sought to procure a benefit provided under the Act through a · willful 
misrepresentation of a material fact. The Beneficiary provided the fraudulent or false documentation 
and the Petitioner transmitted these documents to USCIS in support of its petition. As a result, both 
Petitioner and Beneficiary are culpable in committing a material misrepresentation. 
We issued a notice of intent to dismiss the appeal, advising the Petitioner of our findings and of the 
consequences for willful misrepresentation of a material fact. We addressed the notice to the 
Petitioner at the address, because the record provides no other current address for the 
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Matter of H-S- T- Inc. 
petitioning entity. The U.S. Postal Service returned the notice, marked "Return to Sender I Unable 
to Forward." This outcome is consistent with our finding that the Petitioner is not actually at the 
claimed address. Therefore, having first made a good faith effort to 'issue the notice to the 
Petitioner's address of record, we enter a finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact. 
B. The Beneficiary's Prior Employment 
When the Petitioner filed the Form I-140 petition, the Beneficiary concurrently filed Form I-485, 
Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. With her adjustmentapplication, the 
Petitioner filed Form G-325A, Biographic Information. On Form G-325A, the Beneficiary stated 
that she had worked for the Petitioner's claimed foreign parent company, first as department 
manager from October 2003 to May 2008, and as vice general manager from June 2008 onward. By 
signing the form, the Beneficiary attested to the accuracy of the information on the form. On the 
same form, the Beneficiary indicated that she had resided in Delaware, since June 2010. 
In a letter 
submitted with the petition, the Petitioner stated: 
[The Beneficiary] has been the Vice General Manager [of the Petitioner's foreign 
parent company] since June of2008. On June 21, 2010, [the Beneficiary] was sent by 
the parent company to pursue advanced studies at in the U.S. 
in F -1 [nonimmigrant student status] . 
. . . She began to serve as a vice market & sales manager in our U.S. Company since 
August of2010. In June 2012, the parent company appointed [the Beneficiary] as the 
Vice President and Market & Sales Manager in our US office .... She frequently 
c[a]me to during weekends and school breaks to report to the 
President about performance of her department and to discuss [and] plan business 
strategies together with the President. 
The Petitioner submitted copies of Forms I-20 A-B, Certificates of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant 
(F -1) Student Status, respectively filed in June 20 I 0 and December 2012, relating to the 
Beneficiary's studies at the The 2010 form indicated that the Beneficiary 
would be studying English until she became proficient enough to pursue graduate studies in the 
United States. The 2012 form indicated that the Beneficiary would study "Business Administration 
and Management." Both forms specified the Beneficiary's means of support as "Family Funds." 
In the notice of intent to deny, the Director stated that the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary 
"was sent by the parent company to pursue advanced studies" was not consistent with the 
Beneficiary's stated reliance on "Family Funds" for support. The Director requested "documentary 
evidence the foreign entity sent the beneficiary to the United States to pursue advanced studies 
and 
paid her fees and tuition," as well as evidence of the Beneficiary's employment from 2010 to 2013 
and evidence to show where the Beneficiary performed her optional practical training (which is 
generally the only off-campus employment authorized for F-1 nonimmigrant students). 
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Matter of H-S- T- Inc. 
In response, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary initially paid her own educational expenses, 
and the foreign entity reimbursed her later. The Petitioner submitted copies of "Reimbursement 
Forms" with uncertified translations, indicating that the Petitioner's foreign parent company had 
_ paid the Beneficiary's tuition. The partially handwritten forms were not supported by primary 
evidence such as bank documentation. The Petitioner also acknowledged that, when the Beneficiary 
first applied for optional practical training, the company that the Beneficiary named was "not our 
company." The Petitioner did not elaborate or explain why, if the Beneficiary had traveled to the 
United States on behalf of the Petitioner's parent company, she originally sought employment with a 
different company. The Petitioner did not identify the other company or provide any evidence as to 
whether or not the Beneficiary actually worked for that company. 
The Petitioner submitted what purport to be dopies of IRS Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, 
for 2012 through 2014. One form indicates that the Petitioner paid the Beneficiary $50,000 in 2014, 
but the Beneficiary's name does not appear on the 2012 or 2013 forms. A statement attributed to the 
foreign company stated that the Beneficiary had worked for the Petitioner since August 2010, but 
because she did not have employment authorization , the foreign company P,aid her salary.1· 
' In the denial notice, the Director acknowledged the Petitioner's claim to have employed the 
Beneficiary without interruption, but fourid this claim to be in conflict with the Petitioner's 
admission that the Beneficiary initially sought optional practical training with a different employer. 
The Director also found that the translated reimbursement forms were not certified as required by 
8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3). Furthermore, the Director observed that the Petitioner had not documented 
the Beneficiary's claimed employment activities before the petition's filing date or the Beneficiary's 
claimed frequent travel between Delaware and New York while the Beneficiary was a full-time 
student at the 
On appeal, the Petitioner repeats its prior claims and submits copies of contracts and correspondence 
signed by the Beneficiary and dated between 2010 and 2014. The Petitioner also submitted a letter, 
dated April 5, 2011, instructing the Beneficiary to meet with another company official "on the 8th of 
April at 9:00A.M Easte:n time." April 8, 2011, fell on a Friday while classes were in session at the 
The submitted documents are internally generated correspondence, invoices, and related documents, 
rather than independently verifiable cmtside evidence of the Beneficiary's claimed employment. 
Because the Petitioner and the Beneficiary have made false statements about the Petitioner's place of 
1 We note that paying the salary for U.S. employment from a foreign source does not circumvent the Beneficiary's prior 
Jack of employment authorization. The Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary worked in the United States without 
authorization for more tha~ three years. If true, this information would make the Beneficiary ineligible to adjust status. 
See section 245(c)(2), (8) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2), (8). Section 245(k)(2)(B) of the Act waives the provision 
relating to unauthorized employment, but only when the aggregate period of such employment was 180 days or less. 
Here, the Petitioner 
claims that the Beneficiary worked for several years. 
2 See http:/J added to record Aprill9 , 2017. 
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Matter of H-S- T- Inc. 
business, their overall credibility is in question and documents that they themselves have created 
have questionable and diminished evidentiary weight. See Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
During appellate review, additional derogatory information came to light. U.S. government records 
show that the Beneficiary filed two nonimmigrant visa applications at the U.S. Consulate in 
China. The application forms asked about the Beneficiary's current and former employment. On 
her first application, filed in June 2010, the Beneficiary identified her employer as the 
She denied any prior 
employment. 
In December 2011, the Beneficiary identified herself as a graduate student at the 
Asked to identify her previous employer, the Beneficiary stated that she had worked for 
from July 2003 to June 2010. On 
both applications, the Beneficiary stated that her duties related to preparations for the 2012 
. held in 
The Beneficiary did not mention the Petitioner's claimed foreign parent company, or any managerial 
position there, on either of the above applications, even though she claims to have held such a 
position at the time of each filing. 
We attempted to advise the Petitioner of this additional information in our notice of intent to dismiss. 
As noted above, the notice was undeliverable because the Petitioner did not provide a valid address. 
The Beneficiary's employment history is material to the outcome of the petition because she must 
have held a managerial position for a qualifying organization for at least one year during the three 
years prior to entering the United States to work for the Petitioner or a qualifying related entity. See 
8 C.P.R. § 204.5G)(3)(i)(B). If the Beneficiary did not work for the Petitioner's claimed parent 
company prior to her entry into the United States, then she is not eligible for the classification 
sought. Also, if the Beneficiary was not working for the Petitioner or a related entity from 2010 to 
2013, when she was studying at the then she cannot qualify for the 
classification sought because (1) she did not enter the United States to work for the Petitioner or a 
related entity and (2) she was not working abroad for a qualifying organization. 
The misrepresentation of the Beneficiary's employment history is willful because the Beneficiary 
and her claimed employers would have known whether or not the Beneficiary was actually 
employed as claimed. The Beneficiary participated in the misrepresentation by signing what appear 
to be backdated documents as well as the Form G-325A, which presents an employment history that 
contradicts the Beneficiary's own previous statements to the U.S. government. The Beneficiary filed 
the Form G-325A as part of an effort to obtain immigration benefits. 
From the available evidence, some of which the Petitioner has not contested, we conclude that the 
Beneficiary worked for the rather than the Petitioner's claimed 
foreign parent company. We further conclude that the Petitioner has not submitted credible evidence 
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Matter of H-S-T- Inc. 
to show that the Beneficiary worked for the Petitioner or any related entity in the United States 
during the time she was a student in Delaware. 
The Petitioner and the Beneficiary have provided false information regarding the Petitioner's place 
of business and the Beneficiary's prior employment. This false information bears directly on core 
requirements for the immigration benefit sought in this proceeding. We find that the Petitioner and 
the Beneficiary have willfully misrepresented material facts in an effort to procure immigration 
benefits under the Act. 
III. ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR DENIAL 
Apart from the finding of willful misrepresentation, the Director 9ited five different grounds for 
denial based on the merits of the petition. Rather than reach separate decisions on these grounds, we 
will dismiss the appeal based on the derogatory evidence discussed above, reserving the additional 
issues in the event that thy Petitioner chooses to pursue the matter further. We note that the 
derogatory evidence bears directly on most of the five merits issues. For example, given the finding 
that the Petitioner does not conduct business at its only current claimed location, we have no reason 
to believe that the Petitioner exists as an active business, and therefore we cannot reasonably find 
that the Beneficiary will perform managerial or executive tasks for the Petitioner, or that the 
Petitioner's business activities produce sufficient income to pay her salary. Similarly, based on the 
finding that the Petitioner misrepresented facts regarding the Beneficiary's prior employment, we 
cannot conclude that the foreign entity employed her in a managerial or executive capacity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the Petitioner has willfully misrepresented material facts relating to its location 
and the Beneficiary's prior employment. Key claims of eligibility rely on information that we have 
found to be false. In the face of this unrebutted information, we cannot find that a legitimate job 
offer exists or that the Petitioner has established the Beneficiary's eligibility for the benefit sought. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of H-S-T- Inc., ID# 124544 (AAO May 17, 2017) 
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