dismissed EB-1C Case: Water Purification

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
ftkntifying data deleted to 
 ODce of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
prevei-it clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
 U.S. Citizenship 
W'BLIC COPY and Immigration 
Services 
FILE: 
LIN 07 01 7 52254 
 Date: SE P 0 2 2009 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 11 53(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the 
specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a 
Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the 
decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa 
petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal 
will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of North Carolina that engages in the water 
purification treatment business. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its general manager 
and chief executive officer. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an 
employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
On January 9, 2008, the director denied the petition determining that the petitioner failed to establish 
that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive 
capacity. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's conclusions and asserts that the beneficiary is employed by 
the U.S. company in an executive capacity as well as a managerial capacity. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) 
 Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) 
 Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years 
preceding the time of the alien's application for classification and 
admission into the United States under this subparagraph, has 
been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or 
other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who 
seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render 
services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers 
who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary 
of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or 
subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for 
this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form 
of a statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or 
executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
See 8 C.F.R. 8 204.56)(5). 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary will 
be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other 
employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is 
not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of 
the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the immigrant petition on October 20,2006. In a letter dated September 26,2007, the 
petitioner indicated that the beneficiary was employed as general manager of Superior Water Systems 
(HK) Limited (SWS), the petitioner's affiliate in Hong Kong, fi-om March 14, 2005 until August 21, 
2006, when he was transferred to the U.S. company. Since August 21,2006, the beneficiary has been in 
the United States in L-1A status working in the capacity of general manager of the U.S. company, while 
still retaining his title and responsibilities at the foreign entity. The petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary has assumed the general management of both companies since that time. The petitioner 
submitted a job description setting forth the duties of the beneficiary in the newly combined general 
manager position as follows: 
1. Maximizing the profit of the business 
2. Oversee the entire operation to ensure all departments work effectively and efficiently. 
3. Oversee the business of [the foreign entity] in US including periodically visit [sic] to 
manage the business in Hong Kong. 
4. Introduce and implement of short, medium and long term objectives to the company 
[sic]. 
5. Set up, update and implement of company policy and procedure from time to time to 
manage the whole operation [sic]. 
6. Perform accountancy duty including preparation of financial reports and audit reports. 
7. Perform financial controller duty including approval of payments, management of 
payroll and taxes filing. 
8. Perform human resources work including recruitment, staff appraisal, leave approval, 
etc. 
9. Supervise Shop Manager, Office Executive and Office Assistant to perform general 
administration and clerical duties. 
The petitioner also submitted a combined organizational chart for both companies. On the chart, the 
beneficiary is listed as general manager for both companies, reporting directly to the owners of the 
companies. The chart shows the beneficiary directing or managing twelve other employees in the U.S. 
company; the job descriptions for some of these subordinate employees were also submitted. 
On July 31, 2007, the director issued a request for further evidence (WE) to demonstrate that the 
beneficiary's position with the United States entity qualifies under all four statutory criteria for 
managerial capacity. The director requested a more detailed list of specific day-to-day duties performed 
by the beneficiary, including an estimate of the percentage of time spent at each individual task, in his 
role as general manager. 
In a letter responding to the WE, the petitioner noted that while the director requested evidence 
establishng the beneficiary as a manager, the beneficiary role would be more properly categorized under 
the definition of "executive capacity." The petitioner provided an expanded description of the 
beneficiary's duties in the U.S. company, in which the beneficiary's responsibilities are divided into seven 
different categories with the percentage of time spent per category indicated as follows: 
Daily accounting work - 20% 
Human resources - 5% 
Administration - 10% 
Tax filing - 5% 
Management accounting - 3 0% 
Business development - 5% 
General Management - 25% 
The petitioner also provided an organizational chart for the U.S. company, dated August 6, 2007, which 
shows the beneficiary as general manager and administration manager at the head of the organization 
with thirteen additional employees. The beneficiary's subordinates include an office executive directly 
under the supervision of the beneficiary in his role as administrative manager; a sales director supervising 
six sales representatives and one marketing manager in the sales & marketing department; and in the 
service department, a service manager supervising a senior service technician, a delivery route technician, 
and a service technician. 
On November 3, 2007, the director denied the petition, finding that the record is insufficient to establish 
that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a qualifllng managerial or executive 
capacity. Focusing on the description of the beneficiary's job duties in the U.S. company, the director 
observed that most of the claimed duties appear to be essential operational tasks that are typically 
performed by subordinate personnel. The director further concluded that based on the nature of the 
business, including its size, organizational structure and the service it provides, it does not appear that the 
reasonable needs of the organization warrant or support an executive/managerial position. The director 
further found that the petitioner has not established that there is a subordinate staff of professional, 
managerial, or supervisory personnel who will relieve the beneficiary from performing the non- 
qualifjllng tasks. 
On appeal, counsel contends that the evidence submitted clearly establishes that the beneficiary is 
employed primarily in an executive capacity, and, alternatively, the evidence also establishes that the 
beneficiary is employed in a managerial capacity. Counsel asserts that the description of the 
beneficiary's job duties was not intended to be the sole evidence of the beneficiary's executive 
capacity. Counsel refers to a number of other documents in the record -- such as business plans, 
management reports, policy memoranda, contracts and offers of employment -- which counsel claims 
demonstrate that "the beneficiary functions at a senior level within the organization and maintains the 
requisite level of autonomy and authority over all decisions that affect corporate policies." Counsel 
asserts that the evidence shows that the beneficiary "establishes policies and procedures for the 
company, negotiates and executes contracts with vendors and distributors, engages professionals such 
as CPAs, develops and implements business plans, hires and fires employees and otherwise directs all 
of the company's business activities." Counsel asserts that the beneficiary has wide latitude in 
performing such actions and does so without any direct oversight, reporting only to the owners of the 
company. As such, counsel contends, the beneficiary functions in an executive capacity within the 
U. S . company. 
Counsel further emphasizes that the beneficiary heads a staff of twelve employees, including three 
managers, who in turn manage the work of front-line employees. Counsel claims that as the highest 
ranking employee, the beneficiary manages the organization and each department within the 
organization, directs and supervises the work of two subordinate managers who in turn manage other 
staff, has the authority to hire and fire and take personnel action with respect to the subordinate 
employees, and has the authority to exercise discretion over the day-to-day operations of the business, 
as demonstrated by the business documents submitted into evidence. As such, counsel contends, the 
beneficiary also functions in a managerial capacity within the U.S. company. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's determination that the petitioner has not established 
that the beneficiary would be employed by the U.S. company in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.50)(5). The petitioner's description of 
the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether 
such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. Beyond the required description of 
the job duties, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) reviews the totality of the 
record when examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the 
petitioner's organizational structure, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, the 
presence of other employees to relieve the beneficiary fiom performing operational duties, the nature 
of the petitioner's business, and any other factors that will contribute to a complete understanding of a 
beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. 
Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified 
responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion 
World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). Whether the 
beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on whether the petitioner has sustained its 
burden of proving that the beneficiary's duties are "primarily" managerial or executive. See sections 
10 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. 
1n this instance, while the evidence indicates that the beneficiary is the highest ranking employee 
within the U.S. company and performs some of the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the 
definition, the record does not sufficiently establish that the beneficiary primarily performs these 
specified responsibilities, and does not spend a majority of his time on day-to-day functions. As 
previously noted, the job description provided in response to the RFE divides the beneficiary's 
responsibilities into different categories and assigns percentages of time spent on each general 
category. However, the AAO notes that, within each category, there are a number of tasks listed that 
are not managerial or executive in nature. Examples of these non-qualifying tasks include: 
Daily Accounting Work (20%) 
-- daily bookkeeping and cash flow monitoring 
-- monitoring accounts receivables 
-- managing bank accounts by signing check and making bank deposits 
Human Resources ( 5%) 
-- maintaining and updating employment records 
Administration (1 0%) 
-- prepare and authorize payroll 
Tax filing (5%) 
-- prepare and submit all tax related returns 
Management Accounting (30%) 
--prepare annual budget, monthly and annual financial statements, 
and monthly result analysis reports 
General Management (25%) 
-- handle and monitor all customers' complaints 
Although there are other responsibilities listed under each category that would qualifl as executive or 
managerial duties, the above responsibilities appear to be administrative or operational tasks that do 
not fall within the statutory definition of managerial or executive capacity. Because the petitioner has 
provided a breakdown of time spent for each category of tasks rather than for the individual tasks, the 
AAO cannot determine based on the record what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would qualify 
as managerial or executive and what proportion would be non-qualifying. See Republic of Transkei v. 
INS, 923 F.2d 175,177 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
Counsel contends on appeal that the evidence clearly indicates that the beneficiary is supported by a 
staff of twelve, at least two of whom are managerial employees, who would relieve the beneficiary 
from performing non-qualifying tasks. It is noted that the petitioner submitted job descriptions for 
some of the employees of the U.S. company. However, these job descriptions reflect the names and 
positions of employees of the company in October 2005, before the beneficiary's arrival in the United 
States. By the time the petition was filed, some of the individuals listed in the job descriptions no 
longer held the same position, and other positions appear to have been eliminated altogether (the shop 
manager and the office assistant positions, e.g.). Consequently, it cannot be determined whether and 
to what extent the distribution of duties among the company's employees has been altered to 
accommodate the addition of the beneficiary to the organization. Counsel contends that the 
beneficiary's subordinate employees -- specifically the sales manager, the marketing manager, and 
office executive and a service manager - actually perform the day-to-day tasks of the company, rather 
than the beneficiary. Even assuming that the 2005 job descriptions for the other employees of the 
company are still up-to-date, the AAO finds them to be vague and insufficiently detailed and do not 
indicate that the beneficiary's non-qualifying tasks listed above are in fact handled by his subordinates. 
Further, it is noted that in addition to being general manager, the beneficiary is also listed on the most 
current organizational chart as the administrative manager. As such, it would appear that he also 
handles much of the day-to-day administrative tasks of the company that area attributed to the 
administrative manager. Consequently, counsel's claim that the beneficiary's subordinate staff 
relieves him from performing non-qualifying duties does not find support in the record. Without 
documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's 
burden of proof. 
 The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of 
Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); 
Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
Counsel also claims that the director erred in relying solely on the beneficiary's job description in 
determining whether he functions in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. Counsel refers to a 
number of other documents in the record which counsel claims demonstrate essential aspects of the 
beneficiary's direction of the business or his establishment of goals and policies for the companies. 
The AAO acknowledges that the documents to which counsel refer illustrate to some extent the level 
of the beneficiary's involvement in the U.S. company. However, taken together, these documents are 
still insufficient to demonstrate that the beneficiary's involvement in the company is primarily at the 
executive or managerial level, as required by the statute. The actual duties themselves reveal the true 
nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Finally, it is noted that counsel refers to an unpublished decision in which the AAO determined that 
the beneficiary of an employment-based immigrant petition met the requirements of serving in an 
executive capacity. Counsel contends that the same factors relied upon by the AAO in the cited 
decision apply in the instant petition and establish that the beneficiary here is employed in an 
executive capacity. However, counsel has furnished no evidence to establish that the facts of the 
instant petition are analogous to those in the unpublished decision. Further, while 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) 
provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all USCIS employees in the administration of 
the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. 
Because the petitioner has failed to meet the essential requirement of establishing that the beneficiary 
would be employed by the U.S. entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, the petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary is eligible for the benefit sought. For this reason, the 
petition will be denied. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO also finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that, 
in the three years preceding entry as a nonimmigrant, the beneficiary was employed by the entity 
abroad for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity, as required under the regulation at 8 
C.F.R. § 204.5Cj)(3)(1)(B). 
In its September 26, 2006 letter, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary was instrumental in the 
establishment of the petitioner's affiliate in Hong Kong, and was employed officially by SWS as its 
general manager as of March 2005. 
 The petitioner provided the following description of the 
beneficiary's job duties in the foreign entity: 
1. Set up and develop new business in Hong Kong for the marketing of PHSI Water 
Cooler in Hong Kong 
2. Research and develop the marketing of PHSI Water Cooler in Southern China. 
3. Oversee the entire operation to ensure all departments work effectively and 
efficiently. 
4. Introduce and implement of short, medium and long term objectives to the company 
[sic]. 
5. Perform accountancy duty including preparation of financial reports and audit reports. 
6. Perform financial controller duty including approval of payments, management of 
payroll and taxes filing. 
7. Perform human resources work including recruitment, staff appraisal, leave approval, 
etc. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary hired his first subordinate employee in the foreign entity, 
the sales manager, in November 2005, and later hired a part-time service technician. 
In the RFE, the director requested a more detailed list of the beneficiary's specific day-to-day duties, 
including an estimate of the percentage of time spent at each individual task. The director also 
requested an explanation of the job duties, level of authority, responsibilities and starting dates of the 
beneficiary's subordinates within the foreign entity, as well as hrther evidence of the staffing level in 
the foreign entity during the year preceding the filing of the petition, including the number of hours 
worked per week by all employees and contractors. 
In response, the petitioner provided descriptions of the beneficiary's job responsibilities in the foreign 
entity in four different stages - the "development" stage (March-May 2005), the "kick-ofr' stage 
(June-August 2005), the "implementation stage" (September 2005-February 2006), and the 
"developed" stage (March-August 2006). Like the description of the beneficiary's U.S. position, the 
petitioner divided the beneficiary's job responsibilities into different categories and assigned a 
percentage of time spent to each category. 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the foreign entity, dated August 1, 2005, 
showing the beneficiary as general manager, and under him, a sales manager, an administration officer 
and a service technician. Under the sales manager are four sales representative positions, all vacant. 
Job descriptions for the beneficiary's subordinates in the foreign company indicate that the sales 
manager has been in that position since March 2005 and works 176 hours per month, spending 85% of 
his time prospecting, making sales calls, and obtaining referrals.' According to the petitioner, the 
' It is noted that in the September 2006 support letter, the petitioner indicated that the sales manager was not hired by the 
beneficiary until November 2005. The petitioner has not explained this discrepancy. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to 
resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
administration officer was hired in August 2006 and works part-time, at 40 hours per month. The 
service technician, hired in November 2005, works 10-20 hours per month on average and spends 
70% of his time on on-site delivery and installation and service of water coolers, and 30% of his time 
on in-shop service, including inventory control, inspection, maintenance and repair. 
Upon review, the AAO finds the record does not show that the beneficiary was employed in an 
executive or managerial capacity by the foreign entity for the requisite time period. 
Based on the evidence, prior to his arrival in the United States in August 2006, the beneficiary was 
employed as general manager by the foreign entity since March 2005. The evidence also shows that 
from March through November 2005, the beneficiary was the sole employee of the foreign entity. 
The record further shows that throughout the 18 months of his employment with the foreign entity, the 
beneficiary spent the majority of his time engaged in tasks that were necessary to produce the 
company's product or to provide the company's services. An employee who "primarily" performs the 
tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be ""primarily7' 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also 
Matter of Church of Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). For example, 
from March through May 2005, the beneficiary spent 75% of his time applying for business 
registration for the company, preparing a feasibility study, developing the business plan, performing 
market research, and receiving sales and product training from the U.S. company. In June through 
August 2005, the beneficiary spent 70% of his time developing the business plan, performing market 
research, arranging for financing, and setting up the company's physical office. In September 2005 
through February 2006, the beneficiary spent 50% of his time on sales and marketing activities, 
including receiving sales training from the U.S. office, preparing sales kits ands materials, conducting 
direct mailings and making sales calls, and spent another 10% on technical and service-related tasks. 
In March through August 2006, the beneficiary continued to spend 50% of his time preparing sales 
kits and materials, prospecting (through cold calls and direct mailing), and making sales calls. 
In addition, while the sales manager and the service technician were hired in November 2005, their 
job descriptions indicate that their responsibilities comprised primarily sales and technical service 
functions. The administration officer, whose job duties included general administrative tasks, 
bookkeeping, filing, managing bank accounts, monitoring accounts receivables, preparing monthly 
financial statements, and sales administration, was not hired until the beneficiary's departure in August 
2006. Thus, it would appear that, in addition to his involvement in sales and technical service as 
noted above, the beneficiary was also solely responsible for conducting the day-to-day administrative 
and operational tasks of the foreign company throughout his tenure there. 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily 
executive or managerial capacity within the foreign entity for the requisite period. For this additional 
reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identie all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 
2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). When the AAO denies a petition on 
multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO 
abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, 
Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
The AAO acknowledges that USCIS has previously approved an L-1A petition filed by the petitioner 
on behalf of the instant beneficiary. It must be noted that many 1-140 immigrant petitions are denied 
after USCIS approves prior nonimmigrant L-1A petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 
293 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); 
Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Examining the consequences of 
an approved petition, there is a significant difference between a nonimmigrant L-1A visa 
classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily, and an immigrant E-13 
visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if 
granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. CJ: $5 204 and 214 of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. $5 1154 and 1184; see also 5 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1427. Because USCIS spends less 
time reviewing I- 129 nonimmigrant petitions than 1-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant L- 
1A petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; 
see also 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(i)(requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend 
an L-1 A petition's validity). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, USCIS does not 
have any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of 
proof in a subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act. Based on the lack of required evidence of 
eligibility in the current record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the 
previous nonimmigrant petition approval by denying the instant petition. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, 
that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition 
will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.