dismissed EB-1C Case: Wholesale Trade

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarr~nted 
invasion of personal pnvac) 
PUBLlCCOPY 
FILE: 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
u.s. Citizenship 
and Immigrationn 
Services 
Date: 
FEB 2 B 2011 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(I)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I I 53(b)(I)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents 
related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that 
any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional 
infonnation that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The 
specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be 
submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Fonn 1-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, 
with a fee of $630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(I)(i) requires that any motion must be filed 
within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen. 
Thank you, 
t,.4iL 
/,-Perry ew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
www.uscis.gov 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant 
petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal 
will be dismissed. 
The petitioner, a Georgia corporation that claims to be operating as a wholesale representative, seeks 
to employ the beneficiary as its vice president. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the 
beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § I I 53(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the denial of the petition is in error because it fails 
to take into account the approval of two previous non-immigrant L-1 A petitions filed by the 
petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary. No brief or additional evidence were submitted on appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(I) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available ... to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
* * • 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years 
preceding the time of the alien's application for classification 
and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, 
has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation 
or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and 
who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to 
render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language 0 f the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate 
or subsidiary of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in 
-Page 3 
a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). 
At issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity by the United States entity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § II 01 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assigmnent within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
Page 4 
(iv) receives only general supervisIOn or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders ofthe organization. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, on May 7, 2007. The 
Form 1-140 lists the beneficiary's proposed position as vice president of the U.S. company and 
describes his job as "responsible for the representation of manufacturers of durable goods wholesale 
in the U.S. market." The Form 1-140 also indicates that the U.S. company had eight employees at 
the time of filing. 
The petitioner also submitted a chart depicting its organizational structure in "2005-2007." The 
chart places the beneficiary as a who is based in China. 
Under the beneticiary is a director who is also listed as 
"Research Department," and a "Sell market Department," "Trade Department," "Accounting 
Department," and "Investment Department," each with one employee's name listed on the chart. No 
other evidence relating to the beneficiary's functions and duties, or the U.S. company's 
organizational structure and statTIng, was provided. 
On December 4, 2007, the director issued a request for further evidence (RFE). With respect to the 
beneficiary's position in the U.S. company, the petitioner was instructed to submit a statement 
describing the beneficiary's proposed U.S. job assignment in greater detail, including all of the exact 
duties/functions he will perform, and how the reasonable needs of the organization allow the 
beneficiary to function primarily as an executive or manager. The petitioner was also asked to state 
the number of the beneticiary's subordinates and their job titles, degrees and job duties and describe 
the beneficiary's position in the organizational hierarchy of the company and the supervision he will 
receive. The director also requested an organizational chart for the U.S. company and evidence of 
the company's current statTIng level as well as the statTIng level and volume and frequency of 
business during the year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. 
In a letter dated January 8, 2008 responding to the RFE, the beneficiary, writing on behalf of the 
U.S. indicated that the has two other subsidiaries in addition to the 
and stated the following with respect 
[The beneficiary 1 acts as general manager. He has a bachelor degree and is a senior 
engineer. He is in charge of human resources, signing all documents including 
contracts and agreements, plus making plans and setting goals etc. 
doctor, State Massage Therapist and he is the manager of 
Page 5 
electric engineer and he is the manager 
_ has graduated from college and he is the manager in charge of customer 
services and trading department. 
has graduated from high school and he is the manager of accounting, 
shipping and receiving. 
has graduated from high school and he is the manager of sales. 
_ has graduated from high school. He is the member of the board and in 
charge of marketing research and developing. 
The petitioner provided an organizational chart with the name of the U.S. company. However, the 
chart appears to incorporate the staff of the petitioner's U.S. claimed affiliates as well. The chart 
places the beneficiary under the direction of the general manager, who is based in China. _ 
who is both a director and the "research department," reports directly to the beneficiary. The other 
six employees described above are also placed under the beneficiary. However, unlike the original 
chart submitted with the Form 1-140, the employees in the trade, 
departments all appear to report to both the beneficiary and the ~~~ 
who also reports to the beneficiary. 1 The manager of the 
to the beneficiary, appears to be the only employee in that entity. It is not clear based on the chart 
whether the employees listed under the beneficiary are employed by the named petitioner or its 
affiliates. The petitioner did not submit the requested detailed description of the beneficiary's job 
duties, nor were there any descriptions of job duties for the rest of its staff, as the director requested. 
No other evidence of the U.S. company's staffing level at the time of filing or during the preceding 
year was provided. 
The petitioner submitted its IRS Form 1l20-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Return, 
for the year 2006, which indicates that the company paid $6,000 in "compensation of officers" and 
$26,000 in "salaries and wages" that year. The petitioner also submitted the beneficiary's Form W-2 
for the year 2006, which discloses that the beneficiary was paid $25,999.92 in wages, tips, and other 
compensations by the U.S. company during that year. 
On February 25, 2009, the director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not 
established that the beneficiary will be employed by the U.S. entity in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. Specifically, the director observed that the "petitioner's claim is primarily based 
on a set of broad job responsibilities, which suggest a general sense of the beneficiary's heightened 
degree of discretionary authority but which fail to convey any understanding of what the beneficiary 
would actually be doing on a daily basis." The director also noted that the petitioner failed to submit 
I It is noted that the "Investment Department" from the original chart does not appear on the new 
chart, and a different person was Department" on the original chart. The 
person identified as the manager not appear on the original chart. 
Page 6 
the detailed description of the duties of the beneficiary and his subordinates as requested. Further, 
the director observed, although the petitioner claimed that two of the beneficiary's subordinates have 
baccalaureate or bachelor's degrees, no evidence of the degrees was offered. Finally, the director 
noted that the letter responding to the RFE was written by the beneficiary and not the petitioner. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USC IS) has previously 
approved an L-l initial petition and extension filed by the same petitioner for the same beneficiary, 
in the same position, based on the same evidence that was presented in this petition. Counsel 
contends that the director failed to acknowledge that the beneficiary, as vice president, is an officer 
of the petitioner and duly authorized to execute documentation on behalf of the petitioner. Counsel 
further contends that the director failed to explain why the fact that only two out of six of the 
beneficiary's subordinates have bachelor's degrees would be a disqualifying factor. 
Upon review, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties, which must clearly describe the duties to be performed 
by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5G)(5). Beyond the required description of the job duties, USCIS reviews the 
totality of the record when examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, 
including the petitioner's organizational structure, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate 
employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the beneficiary from performing operational 
duties, the nature of the petitioner's business, and any other factors that will contribute to a complete 
understanding of a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
In addition, it is noted that the definitions of executive and managerial capacity each have two parts. 
First, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are 
specified in th~ definitions. Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily 
performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to­
day functions. Champion World. Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 
30, 1991). Whether the beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on whether the 
petitioner has sllstained its burden of proving that the beneficiary's duties are "primarily" managerial 
or execlltive. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. 
Initially, the AAO notes that the record contains inconsistent references to the title of the petitioner's 
proposed position within the U.S. company. The Form 1-140 states the petitioner's title as "vice 
president." However, in the letter responding to the RFE, the petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary "acts as general manager" within the company, and on the organizational chart, the 
beneficiary is listed as "vice general manager." The petitioner has not explained these inconsistent 
references to the beneficiary'S job title. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile 
such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Page 7 
Further, the petitioner has not provided requested information regarding the beneficiary's proposed 
job duties. In the Form 1-140, the petitioner indicated only that the beneficiary is "responsible for 
the representation of manufacturers of durable goods wholesale in the U.S. market." Even though 
the director expressly requested that the beneficiary's jobs duties in his U.S. position be described in 
greater detail, the petitioner failed to provide that information. The petitioner's response to the RFE 
stated only that the beneficiary "is in charge of human resources, signing all documents including 
contracts and agreements, plus making plans and setting goals etc." This vague and nonspecific 
description of the beneticiary's duties fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day 
basis. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily 
executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of 
reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 
905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Further, a detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed duties is 
critical in the determination of whether the beneficiary would be functioning in an executive or 
managerial capacity. The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that 
clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8). The 
failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for 
denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
In addition, although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary supervises other employees of the 
company, information in the record regarding the U.S. company's staff is insufficient and 
inconsistent. The petitioner claims on the Form 1-140 that the company has eight employees, but the 
organizational chart submitted with the Form 1-140 lists nine persons, two of whom are "in China." 
Further, the January 8, 2008 letter and the organizational chart provided in response to the RFE 
suggest that the employees under the beneficiary's supervision may work for the petitioner's claimed 
U.S. affiliates rather than the petitioner itself.2 It is noted that the information provided in response 
to the RFE is not consistent with the organization chart in the initial submission. Further, the 
staffing structure of the petitioner's U.S. affiliates, and the beneficiary's role within those entities, are 
not relevant to this analysis. Altogether, the evidence of record fails to reveal the staffing and 
organizational structure of the U.S petitioner itself. 
Furthermore, the petitioner's tax documentation for 2006 does not support the claim that the 
petitioner was paying the salary of any employee other than the beneficiary. The petitioner's IRS 
Form 1120A showed that the petitioner paid $6,000 in "compensation of officers" and $26,000 in 
"salaries and wages" that year, whereas the beneficiary's Form W-2 for 2006 discloses that the 
beneficiary was paid $25,999.92 in salary for that year. The petitioner provided no explanation for 
the inconsistency between its claims regarding the number of employees on its staff and the apparent 
lack of salary paid to employees as evidenced by its tax return. Again, any attempt to explain or 
reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective 
nf>titinnf>r submitted certain supplemental documentation relating 
to However, such documentation does not 
constitute sufficient evidence of the claimed affiliate relationship between those entities and the 
petitioner. 
Page 8 
evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. Doubt cast on any 
aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation ofthe reliability and sufficiency 
of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. 
Without accurate and detailed information regarding the existence, functions or duties of other 
employees on the U.S. company's staff, it is not possible to determine to what extent the non­
managerial duties relating to the operations of the company are actually performed by personnel 
other than the beneficiary to allow the beneficiary to function in a primarily managerial capacity. 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and 
"function managers." See section I 01 (a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1IOJ(a)(44)(A)(i) 
and (ii). Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, professional. or managerial employees. See § IOI(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. Contrary to 
the common understanding of the word "manager," the statute plainly states that a "first line 
supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
IOI(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. In this instance, as the evidence submitted does not allow for a 
definitive determination of the beneficiary's subordinate staff within the U.S. company, the AAO 
cannot determine whether the beneficiary primarily supervises and controls the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees and therefore would quality as a "personnel 
manager." 
The record also dOeS not support the conclusion that the beneficiary would quality as a "function 
manager." The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or 
control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an 
"essential function" within the organization. See section IOI(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 
I 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a 
written job ofTer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, 
i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish 
the proportion of the beneficiary'S daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 
C.F.R. § 204.SG)(S). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary'S daily duties must 
demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the 
function. 
Here, the petitioner's cursory description of the beneficiary'S job responsibility falls far short of 
establishing that the beneficiary's daily duties are in fact primarily attributable to managing a 
function rather than performing the duties related to the function. Further, given the lack of evidence 
regarding the beneficiary'S subordinate stafT, it is unclear that the beneficiary actually has an 
adequate staff that would relieve him from performing non-qualifying duties. Again, an employee 
who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
10I(a)(44)(A) and (8) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Maller of Church Scientology Int'/., 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Accordingly, 
Page 9 
the AAO cannot conclude that the petitioner has established that the beneficiary manages an 
essential function, such that he could be considered a function manager. 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the petitioner has 
failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily executive or managerial 
capacity in the United States. For that reason, the petition will be denied. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that the 
beneficiary was employed overseas in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. 
Section 203(b)(l )(C) of the Act requires the petitioner to establish that "in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United States under this 
subparagraph, the alien has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal 
entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof," and that such foreign entity has a qualifying relationship 
with the U.S. company (as discussed further below). The relevant regulation further specifies that if 
the beneficiary is already in the United States "working for the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate of the firm or corporation, or other legal entity by which the alien was employed overseas, 
[the petitioner must demonstrate that] in the three years preceding entry as a nonimmigrant, the alien 
was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity." 8 
C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3). 
In the initial petition, the petitioner did not provide any evidence or indication that the beneficiary 
was employed by a foreign entity for the requisite period of time prior to his entry to the United 
States in L-l A status. In response to the director's express request for additional evidence of foreign 
~mer stated that the co-founded 
__ in 1992 and found 
_ in December 1998, and was vice chairman of the board and vice general manager of both 
entities during an unspecified time period. The petitioner further stated that the beneficiary founded 
the U.S company in August 2001 and came to the United States in October 2003 as vice general 
manager, and then as general manager from November 2004 to the present. The petitioner further 
stated that "there's no any title [I'ic} in China companies." In response to the RFE, the petitioner did 
not provide any information relating to the beneficiary's position overseas, as requested by the 
director. The regulation states that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in 
his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit 
further information that clarities whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of 
the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.2(b)(14). 
In the absence 0 f any evidence relating to his position and job responsibilities overseas prior to his 
transfer to the United States, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that the 
beneficiary was employed abroad in an executive or managerial capacity for at least one out of the 
three years preceding the tiling of Ihis petition, as required by the statute. For this additional reason, 
the petition will be denied. 
Page 10 
In addition, in order to qualify for this visa classification, the petitioner must establish that a qualifying 
relationship exists between the United States and foreign entities in that the petitioning company is the 
same employer or an affiliate or subsidiary of the foreign entity. See section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act. 
The AAO finds the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with a 
foreign entity that had employed the beneficiary prior to the filing of the petition. 
The regulation at 8 c.r.R. § 204.5(j)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(8) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same 
share or proportion of each entity. 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
SubsidiUf:Y means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power over 
the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls 
the entity. 
entity in ~11111,a, 
that was the beneficiary's employer 
pnor to entrance to status In support of this claim the 
petitioner submitted a of three undated stock certificates, numbered 1 through 3, each certifying 
that shares of the U.S. 
on 30,000 of the 
petitioner's shares. However, each certificate states on its face that the number of shares authorized 
by the company is 10,000. The petitioner did not account for this inconsistency regarding its share 
issuance and ownership. Again, any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not 
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter ojHo, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of 
course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in 
support of the visa petition. /d. 
Moreover, as general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates 
alone are not sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and 
Page II 
control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, 
corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to 
determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the 
subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning 
company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the 
management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the 
entity. See Matter afSiemens Medical Systems, Inc., 191&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986). The petitioner has 
not provided any documentation evidencing its ownership, other than the stock certificates. Without 
full disclosure of all relevant documents, USCIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership 
and control. 
Accordingly, the AAO finds the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the U.S. petitioner has a 
qualifying relationship with the foreign entity that employed the beneficiary overseas. For this 
additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
Finally, the AAO recognizes that USCIS previously approved two L-IA nonimmigrant visa petitions 
filed by the petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary, as counsel pointed out. However, in general, 
given the pemlanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny 
by USCIS than nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and 
nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of managerial and executive capacity. 
See §§ 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory definitions 
for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall eligibility requires a 
comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and executive 
capacity. There arc significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which 
allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an 
immigrant visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States 
and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. Cj §§ 204 and 214 of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154 and 1184; see also § 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. Because USCIS 
spends less time reviewing L-I petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant 
L-I petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting. Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25 
(D.D.C.2003). 
Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a 
separate burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. See 8 C.F.R. § 
103.8(d); 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l6)(ii). The prior nonimmigrant approvals do not preclude USCIS 
from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 
2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval ofa nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees 
that USCIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. USCIS 
denies many 1-140 petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-I petitions. See, e.g., Q 
Dala Consulting. Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 
at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Lid v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported 
and contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute 
· . 
Page 12 
material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications 
or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may 
have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 
(Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that USCIS or any agency must treat acknowledged 
errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084,1090 (6th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Due to the material deficiencies in the present record, as 
discussed above, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the previous 
nonimmigrant approval by denying the present immigrant petition. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997,1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). When the AAO denies a petition 
on multiple altemative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the 
AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer 
Enterprises. Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
altemative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, 
that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.