remanded EB-1C Case: Financial Consulting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
InRe: 7051168 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : JAN. 24, 2020 
PETITION: Form I-140, Petition for Multinational Managers or Executives 
The Petitioner claims to be a financial management and consulting company. It seeks to permanently 
employ the Beneficiary as its general manager under the first preference immigrant classification for 
multinational executives or managers . See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 
section 203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish, as required, that: (1) it has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer; 
(2) the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity; (3) the Beneficiary's 
proposed U.S. employment would be in a managerial or executive capacity; and (4) the Petitioner had 
the ability to pay the Beneficiary ' s proffered wage since the date of filing this petition. The Director 
also entered a separate finding of fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner 's burden to establish 
eligibility for the requested benefit. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S .C. § 1361. Upon de nova review, 
we find that the Director did not provide an adequate analysis to support the finding of willful 
misrepresentation of a material fact. Therefore, we will remand the matter for entry of a new decision. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
An immigrant visa is available to a beneficiary who, in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, 
has been employed outside the United States for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity, 
and seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render managerial or executive services to the 
same employer or to its subsidiary or affiliate. Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act. 
The Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, must include a statement from an authorized 
official of the petitioning United States employer which demonstrates that the beneficiary has been 
employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity for at least one year in the three years preceding 
the filing of the petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3) . 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Withdrawal of the Finding of Fraud or Willful Misrepresentation of a Material Fact 
First, we will address the Director's finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact, which was 
premised on the Petitioner's submission of fraudulent documents in support of one immigrant and 
three nonimmigrant petitions that the Petitioner previously filed on the Beneficiary's behalf 1 In 
support of this finding, the Director stated, "The submission of false tax returns, false organizational 
charts, and other misrepresentations constitute material representation." The Director added that "the 
submission of evidence in the present matter which conflicts with the petitioner's and beneficiary's 
attestations constitutes misrepresentation." 
Any foreign person who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure ( or has 
sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or 
other benefit provided under the Act is inadmissible. See section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 
As outlined by the Board of Immigration Appeals, a material misrepresentation requires that one 
willfully makes a material misstatement to a government official for the purpose of obtaining an 
immigration benefit to which one is not entitled. Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289-90 
(BIA 1975). The term "willfully" means knowing and intentionally, as distinguished from 
accidentally, inadvertently, or in an honest belief that the facts are otherwise. See Matter of Tijam, 22 
I&N Dec. 408, 425 (BIA 1998); Matter of Healy and Goodchild, 17 I&N Dec. 22, 28 (BIA 1979). To 
be considered material, the misrepresentation must be one which "tends to shut off a line of inquiry 
which is relevant to the alien's eligibility, and which might well have resulted m a proper 
determination that he be excluded." Matter of Ng, 17 I&N Dec. 536,537 (BIA 1980). 
Accordingly, for an immigration officer to find a willful and material misrepresentation in visa petition 
proceedings, he or she must determine: 1) that the petitioner or beneficiary made a false representation 
to an authorized official of the United States government; 2) that the misrepresentation was willfully 
made; and 3) that the fact misrepresented was material. See Matter ofM-, 6 I&N Dec. 149 (BIA 1954); 
Matter of L-L-, 9 I&N Dec. 324 (BIA 1961 ); Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. at 288. 
Here, the Director issued a finding of willful misrepresentation without providing the requisite 
analysis. Namely, the Director did not: (1) state whether the finding of material misrepresentation 
was made with respect to the Petitioner, the Beneficiary, or both; (2) clarify what the "other 
misrepresentations" were or point to specific evidence that is deemed to conflict with the Petitioner's 
and the Beneficiary's attestations, which were also not identified in the Director's discussion of 
material misrepresentation; or (3) explain how these evidentiary deficiencies are material to the 
Petitioner's eligibility. 
1 In November 2011 the Petitioner filed a Form 1-140 (with receipt number~-----, on the Beneficiary's behalf 
In April 2015, the Petitioner withdrew this petition prior to its adjudication. The Petitioner also previously filed three 
Form I-129s in 2010, 2011, and 2013, respectively, on behalf of the same Beneficiary. All three petitions were approved. 
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Further, the Director incorrectly cited regulatory provisions for skilled workers and professionals, 
referring to the labor certification process and stating that a beneficiary's education is material to 
eligibility. Because the Petitioner seeks to classify the Beneficiary as a multinational manager or 
executive, provisions that apply to another immigrant classification are not material in this matter and 
as such, they should not be considered when making a determination as to whether the Petitioner or 
Beneficiary made a material misrepresentation. Thus, the Director erred when he considered the 
materiality of the claimed misrepresentation within the context of regulatory requirements for skilled 
workers and professionals, which do not apply to this case. 
Accordingly, we must remand the matter for the Director to analyze the material misrepresentation 
issue anew and enter another decision into the record. We note that, although we are returning the 
matter to the Director, we agree with him that the Petitioner is not eligible for the immigration benefit 
sought herein for reasons unrelated to the alleged misrepresentation. 
B. Eligibility Findings 
First, we agree that the Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence demonstrating the existence of a 
qualifying relationship. However, the Director's decision provided an incomplete and somewhat 
confusing analysis that lacked an accurate discussion of critical evidentiary deficiencies in this record. 
To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, a petitioner must show that 
the beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e., one 
entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(i)(C). 
The qualifying relationship in this instance is premised on the claim that the purported foreign 
employer,~---------~owns the majority of the Petitioner and is therefore the parent 
in a parent-subsidiary relationship where the Petitioner is the subsidiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(i)(2) 
(for the definition of the term "subsidiary"). This claim rests on the presumption that the Petitioner 
met the basic threshold requirement of establishing the existence of 1 t' the 
business that is claimed to have been the Beneficiary's foreign employer, without which a qualifying 
relationship cannot exist. We find, however, that the Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence 
demonstrating that I I was established and existed as a business where the Beneficiary 
could have been employed. Although the Petitioner's index of supporting exhibits indicates that the 
foreign employer was registered and leased business premises from which business operations were 
conducted, the evidence that was actually submitted included a partial translation of a commercial 
lease agreement naming I I as the tenant and a translated document titled "Federal 
Administration of Public Revenue Prlof of Registration" withl Is name at the top. As 
these documents name [ as the tax payer and tenant, respectively, neither effectively 
establishes that a business by the name of1 I was established. 
Furthermore, any document in a foreign language must be accompanied by a full English language 
translation accompanied by a translator's certification attesting to the completion and accuracy of the 
translation as well as the translator's competency to translate from the foreign language into English. 
8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3). As the commercial lease contains only a partial translation of the original 
document, it does not meet the regulatory criteria. Thus, aside from its deficient content, the 
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translation was incomplete and therefore would not be deemed as probative evidence capable of 
supporting the Petitioner's claim. 
Also, the Petitioner provided its stock certificates and a stock transfer ledger, which directly contradict 
the claim thatl I has a parent-subsidiary relationship with the Petitioner. 
Namely, the Petitioner provided stock certificate no. 1, which was issued in July 2010 and shows D I I as owner of all 10,000 shares of the Petitioner's stock. The Petitioner also provided stock 
certificate nos. 4 and 5, which were issued in December 2014 and show that subsequent to a stock 
transfer by I L she was left owning 8100 shares of the Petitioner's stock whilel I 
I O lwas issued the remaining 1900. The corresponding stock transfer ledger corroborates the 
information contained in the listed stock certificates and lists stock certificate nos. 2 and 3 as "void." 
In any event, none of the submitted stock certificates name I I as the 
Petitioner's owner. Therefore, even if the record contained evidence o~ ts 
existence, the stock certificates and stock transfer ledger undermine the claim that the Petitioner is a 
subsidiary of.__ _________ __. 
The Petitioner also has not provided evidence showing that it and the claimed foreign employer qualify 
as affiliates that are both owned and controlled by the same parent or individual, in this case I I I I See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) (for the definition of the term "affiliate"). As discussed above, 
the only evidence submitted to establish the existence of I L the claimed 
foreign employer, consists of a tax document naminr I I as a registered tax payer in 
Argentina and a commercial lease naming I as the tenant. It is unclear how either of these 
documents can be interpreted as evidence tha~ I was a business that was 
established and is owned by I The Petitioner must support its assertions with 
relevant, probative, and credible evidence. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 
~he Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence demonstrating that I I 
L___J existed and continues to exist, and we cannot rely on internally generated payroll or other 
business documents - even those that contain J ~ logo - as proof that the Beneficiary 
was employed abroad by the Petitioner's parent or affiliate. 
Accordingly, regardless of the information about the Beneficiary's claimed employment with._l _ __. 
I O I the lack of evidence showing the existence of this employer precludes the 
Petitioner from demonstrating that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Likewise, the same evidentiary deficiency precludes the Petitioner from being able to 
establish that the Beneficiary's foreign employer has been and continues to do business, which requires 
the employer to engage in the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2). Thus, although not discussed in the Director's decision, the Petitioner 
would have to overcome this additional adverse finding in order to establish eligibility. 
Lastly, the Director correctly concluded that the Petitioner did not establish its ability to pay the 
Beneficiary's wage as of the date this petition was filed and that the Beneficiary's U.S. employment 
would not be in a managerial or executive capacity. These conclusions were based in part on the 
Director's observation of evidentiary deficiencies concerning the Beneficiary's job description, the 
Petitioner's staffing, and the lack ofIRS transcripts for employee W-2 wage and tax statements. 
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ORDER: The decision of the Director is withdrawn. The matter is remanded for farther 
proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. 
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