remanded EB-1C Case: Financial Software

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 8981477 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: AUG . 12, 2020 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Multinational Executive or Manager 
The Petitioner, a provider of financial and banking software systems, seeks to permanently employ the 
Beneficiary as a Principal Technical Consultant under the first preference immigrant classification for 
multinational executives or managers. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 
section 203(b)(l)(C) , 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C). This classification allows a U.S. employer to 
permanently transfer a qualified foreign employee to the United States to work in an executive or 
managerial capacity. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish that it would employ the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity in the United States. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director disregarded pertinent evidence and did not provide an 
adequate explanation for the adverse decision. 
In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon de nova review, we will remand the matter to the 
Director for further consideration and entry of a new decision. 
I. LAW 
An immigrant visa is available to a beneficiary who, in the three years preceding the filing of the 
petition, has been employed outside the United States for at least one year in a managerial or executive 
capacity, and seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render managerial or executive 
services to the same employer or to its subsidiary or affiliate. Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act. 
The Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, must include a statement from an authorized 
official of the petitioning United States employer which demonstrates that the beneficiary has been 
employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity for at least one year in the three years preceding 
the filing of the petition, that the beneficiary is coming to work in the United States for the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate of the foreign employer, and that the prospective U.S. employer 
has been doing business for at least one year. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5U)(3). 
"Managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization; 
supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or 
manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the 
organization; has authority over personnel actions or functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and exercises discretion over the 
day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. Section 
101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL CAPACITY 
As noted, the Director denied the petition based on a finding that the Petitioner did not establish that 
it would employ the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity. In analyzing the Beneficiary's position 
description, the Director found that the Petitioner appeared to claim that the Beneficiary would be "a 
hybrid function manager and personnel manager," and observed that an individual "cannot primarily 
perform the duties of a personnel manager and a functional manager." The Director acknowledged 
the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary will allocate 70% of his time to managerial duties and did 
not identify any non-qualifying tasks among these duties. However, the Director determined that 30% 
of the overall duties appeared to be those of a function manager, while 20% were readily classifiable 
as those of a personnel manager. The Director also found that there were some unexplained 
discrepancies in the Petitioner's organizational charts when comparing the evidence submitted with 
the initial filing to the Petitioner's response to a request for evidence (RFE). 
On appeal, the Petitioner cites to Matter of G-, Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017), 
noting that it explicitly states that "[a] function manager may also directly oversee personnel." The 
Petitioner also asserts that the observed differences between the two organizational charts were neither 
material nor derogatory, particularly in light of the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary acts as a 
function manager. 
Upon de nova review, the Petitioner's assertions are persuasive, and we find sufficient evidence to 
establish that the Beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a managerial capacity. 
If a petitioner claims that a beneficiary will manage an essential function, it must clearly describe the 
duties to be performed in managing the essential function. In addition, the petitioner must demonstrate 
that "(1) the function is a clearly defined activity; (2) the function is 'essential,' i.e., core to the 
organization; (3) the beneficiary will primarily manage, as opposed to perform, the function; (4) the 
beneficiary will act at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and (5) the beneficiary will exercise discretion over the function's day-to-day 
operations." Matter of G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). 
Here, while the Beneficiary has subordinates, the record reflects that he is primarily responsible for an 
essential function by leading the Petitioner's Lending Technology professional services practice with 
an annual revenue stream of over $4.3 million. Specifically, the Beneficiary is responsible for profit 
and loss for this business segment, developing high level strategy, and providing oversight of ongoing 
project activities across client programs. The record further reflects that other staff are responsible for 
delivering professional services to clients and supporting the Beneficiary's planning and strategy 
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efforts, while he has discretion over the day-to-day activities within the Lending Technology 
professional services practice. Finally, the Beneficiary's duties as described in the record are primarily 
managerial in nature. 
Accordingly, we will withdraw the Director's decision. 
Ill. BASIS FOR REMAND 
Although the Petitioner has overcome the sole ground for denial of the petition, the record does not 
establish that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial capacity for at least one year in 
the three-year period preceding his entry to the United States as an L-1B specialized knowledge 
intracompany transferee in April 2015. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5U)(3)(i)(B). 
The Petitioner indicates that its foreign affiliate employed the Beneficiary as a Senior Software 
Engineer from 2010 until December 2014, and as an Expert Software Engineer from December 2014 
until April 2015.1 The Petitioner claimed that the Beneficiary "established and led teams of software 
professionals in carrying out software development for [the foreign entity's] Lending Division, 
specifically for its proprietary I I software solution." The Petitioner also 
identified these software development activities as a "core function" of the business and stated that as 
an Expert/Senior Software Engineer, the Beneficiary acted "as the manager of our Development 
Scrum Team" and "managed that function at a high level." 
The submitted position descriptions, however, do not demonstrate how the Beneficiary was 
responsible for an essential function nor do they demonstrate that his actual duties, particularly in the 
Senior Software Engineer position, were primarily managerial in nature. Although the Director 
addressed the Beneficiary's foreign employment in the RFE, the Petitioner did not submit any 
additional information regarding the Beneficiary's duties or placement in the foreign entity's 
organizational hierarchy in its response. 
With respect to the Senior Software Engineer position, the Petitioner indicated that the Beneficiary 
spent 70% of his time on managerial duties and 30% of his time on non-managerial duties. However, 
several of the duties characterized as "managerial" were described in vague terms and appeared to be 
typical of a senior engineering role, rather than those of a manager. For example, the Petitioner did 
not explain how duties such as ensuring that "the team is following agile software development 
practices" or "reviewing framework issue fixes" are managerial in nature. Further, the Petitioner did 
not describe the specific tasks the Beneficiary performed to "direct and oversee on day-to-day basis 
all aspects of software development and work streams." Reciting a beneficiary's vague job 
responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The actual duties themselves will reveal the true 
nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
1 The record reflects that the Beneficiary was transferred to the United States as an "Expert Business Consultant" in 2015, 
and later promoted to his current position as a Principal Technical Consultant (also referred to as a "Practice Lead") in 
December 2016. 
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Further, we note that the Petitioner submitted a copy of the Form l-129S, Nonimmigrant Petition Based 
on Blanket L Petition, that the Beneficiary submitted in order to obtain a nonimmigrant L-1 
intracompany transferee visa in 2012, when he held the senior software engineer position abroad. 
Where asked to describe his duties in this position, the Petitioner indicated that the Beneficiary was 
"responsible for developing and supporting projects involving our proprietary! I financial 
product for key clients," including: analyzing client business needs and system requirements; 
developing, implementing and customizing I I systems for clients; and contributing to 
enhancements, developing code, and designing database models," none of which are managerial 
duties. The Petitioner indicated that the Beneficiary "acted as the development team's Project Lead 
for internal backlog reduction and basket transactions" but overall, the description is not consistent 
with the level of authority that the Petitioner now attributes to the senior software position, which the 
Beneficiary held from 2010 until 2014. 
In addition, although the Petitioner indicated that the Beneficiary managed software development for 
the company's ~-------~software solution, it did not clearly define this function or 
explain or document how his role as "manager" of the "Development Scrum Team" placed him at a 
senior level within the foreign entity's organizational hierarchy or with respect to this function. The 
only organizational chart provided for the foreign entity, which is undated and labeled "Dev Scrum 
Organization Chart," shows the Beneficiary supervising a team of seven support consultants, software 
engineers and senior software engineers and reporting to a "Senior Dev Manager." The chart does 
not show that the Beneficiary occupied the senior position with respect to this function or team, nor 
does it show how it fit into the larger organization, or even within the larger function of software 
development for the I I software solution." 
Finally, the Petitioner initially emphasized that the Beneficiary supervised subordinate professionals 
and had the authority to recommend personnel decisions in both his senior software engineer role and 
his expert software engineer role. While it appears that the Beneficiary undertook additional personnel 
related duties as an expert software engineer, the duty description for the former position is limited to 
interviewing technical candidates for the scrum team. The record does not contain sufficient evidence 
to establish that the Beneficiary had the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions as a senior software engineer, which would preclude a finding that he acted, in the 
alternative, as a personnel manager. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(iii) of the Act. 
For al I of these reasons, the record as presently constituted does not establish that the Beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a managerial capacity for at least one year in the three years preceding his entry 
to the United States as a nonimmigrant in 2015. As the matter will be remanded, the Director should 
request any additional evidence deemed warranted and allow the Petitioner to submit such evidence 
within a reasonable period of time. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Although we will withdraw the Director's decision, we cannot sustain the appeal for the reasons 
discussed above and will remand the matter to the Director for entry of a new decision. 
ORDER: The decision of the Director is withdrawn. The matter is remanded for the entry of a 
new decision consistent with the foregoing analysis. 
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