sustained EB-1C Case: Maritime

(b)(6)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Servict 
Office of Admillistrative Appeals 
20 Massac husetts Ave. N.W. , MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
DATE: FEB 0 5 2014 OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER FILE: 
INRE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary : 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant 
to Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case. This is a 
non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency 
policy through non-precedent decisions. 
Thank you, 
Ron Rosenberg 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
www. uscis.gov 
(b)(6)
NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will 
be sustained. 
The petitioner is a cruise 
line that seeks to employ the beneficiary as its Manager, Deck 
Manning, in its Shipboard Human Resources Department. Accordingly , the petitioner endeavors 
to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b )(1)(C) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational 
executive or manager. 
The director denied the petition on September 24, 2013, after determining that: (1) the petitioner 
failed to establish that the beneficiary ' s proposed employment with the U.S. entity would be 
within a qualifying managerial or executive capacity; and, (2) the petitioner failed to establish 
that the beneficiary's employment abroad was within a qualifying managerial or executive 
capacity. 
On appeal, the petition er disputes the director's findings and provides an appellate brief laying 
out the grounds for challenging the denial. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available ... to qualified 
immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) 
through (C): 
* * * 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding 
the time of the alien's application for classification and admission 
into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed 
for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or 
an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United 
States in order to continue to render services to the same employer 
or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate 
or subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, 
or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
(b)(6)
NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 3 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b )(1 )(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United 
States in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to 
be performed by the alien. 
Upon review, the AAO will withdraw the director's decision and sustain the appeal. The petitioner 
has provided sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary has been employed abroad and 
would be employed in the United States in a qualifying 
executive capacity. 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and a 
"function managers." See sections 101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). 
Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of 
the word "manager," the statute plainly states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the 
employees supervised are professional." Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 C.P.R. 
§ 204.5(j)( 4)(i). If a beneficiary directly supervises other employees, the beneficiary must also 
have the authority to hire and fire those employees, or recommend those actions, and take other 
personnel actions. 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(j)(2). 
The term "function manager," on the other hand, applies 
when a beneficiary does not directly 
supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for 
managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or 
regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the 
petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in 
managing the essential function, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential 
nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(j)(5). 
In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide 
services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See 
sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Boyang, Ltd. v. J.N.S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 
1995 WL 576839 (9th Cir, 1995)(citing Matter of Church Scientology International , 19 I&N 
Dec. 593, 604 (Comm ' r 1988)). 
(b)(6)
NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 4 
The director noted in the decision that the petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to 
establish that the beneficiary had been employed by the foreign company and would be 
employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. However , the 
petitioner provided a detailed job description of the job duties performed by the beneficiary and 
provided detailed job descriptions and specific roles of every employee in the petitioner and the 
affiliate organization abroad. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the beneficiary managed an essential function 
while employed abroad. Specifically, as Safety Officer, he reported directly to the Master and Staff 
Captain of the ship to which he was assigned, managing all aspects of shipboard safety and 
emergency systems related to guests and crew for the entire vessel. The petitioner established that 
the beneficiary directly and indirectly managed the safety function relating to approximately 400 
crew members. Specifically, the beneficiary had managerial authority with respect to the following 
critical functions: 
1. Safetly and navigation equipement; 
2. All safety and emergency equipment installed in engineering spaces; 
3. All safety and emergency equipment installed in catering spaces; 
4. All safety and emergency equipment installed in hotel spaces; 
5. Fire doors, watertight and semi-watertight safety doors; 
6. All safety and emergency equipment installed in the guest and public spaces; and 
7. The ship's life boats and fire response systems. 
To allow the broad application of the term "essential function" to include any minor or low-level 
function within a business would render the term meaningless. The term "essential" is defined as 
"inherent" or "indispensable." Webster's II New College Dictionary 392 (2005). Here, the 
petitioner has established that the safety and emergency systems that the beneficiary managed are 
critical and indispensable to the cruise line business and not a low-level or collateral tasking. 
The petitioner also demonstarated that the beneficiary was not primarily performing non-qualifying 
tasks necessary to produce a product or service, but instead managing the essential duties and 
functions through direct or indirect subordinate employees. Section 101(a)(44) of the Act; see also 
Boyang, Ltd. v. I.N.S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 1995 WL 576839 (9th Cir, 1995)(citing Matter of 
Church Scientology Int '1, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm 'r 1988)). 
Finally, the petitioner explains that in the proffered position of Manager, Deck Manning, the 
beneficiary "manages the activities ofthe Deck and Engine Officers for [the petitioner's] fleet of 
twenty-four luxury passenger vessels." The petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that 
the beneficiary will be employed in the U.S. in a primarily managerial capacity. 
The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the 
applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the 
factual circumstances of each individual case. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 
(b)(6)
NON-PRECEDENT DECISION 
Page 5 
(AAO 2010) (citing Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm'r 1989)). In evaluating the 
evidence, the truth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Id. 
Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the 
director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, 
both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the 
fact to be proven is probably true. 
Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, 
and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more 
likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See U.S. v. 
Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (discussing "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 
percent prob ability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is 
appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the 
director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. 
Here, the petitioner has submitted relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the AAO 
to conclude that the beneficiary will, more likely than not, be employed in an managerial 
capacity. 
In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the 
immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N 
Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is sustained.