dismissed EB-3 Case: Accounting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: JAN. 31 , 2025 In Re: 36553648 
Motions on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (Professional) 
The Petitioner, a provider of financial accounting services, files its sixth round of combined motions 
to reopen and reconsider the 2018 revocation of its petition's approval by the Director of the Texas 
Service Center. The company continues to argue that the Director should have excused the untimely 
filing of its first motion to reopen and did not properly serve the notice of intent to revoke (NOIR) the 
petition. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating eligibility for the requested benefit by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matter ofChawathe , 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon 
review, we conclude that the company's current motion to reopen does not meet applicable 
requirements and that its current motion to reconsider does not demonstrate our misapplication of law 
or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy. We will therefore dismiss the motions. 
I. LAW 
A motion to reopen must state new facts, supported by documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). 
In contrast, a motion to reconsider must establish that our latest decision misapplied law or USCIS 
policy based on the evidence at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Regulations limit the 
scope of our review on motion to our latest decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i), (ii) (referencing 
"the prior decision" and "the latest decision in the proceeding"). We may grant motions that satisfy 
these requirements and demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. 
II. MOTION TO REOPEN 
Contrary to 8 
C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2), the Petitioner's current motion to reopen lacks new facts and 
documentary evidence. "A motion that does not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed." 
8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). We must therefore dismiss the motion to reopen. 
III. MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Before considering the Petitioner's latest arguments, we will summarize the relevant facts. 
The Petitioner filed the petition in June 2006, seeking to permanently employ the Beneficiary as an 
accountant. The company requested his classification under the employment-based, third-preference 
(EB-3) immigrant visa category as a "professional." See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 
section 203(b )(3)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § ll 53(b )(3)(A)(ii). Businesses may sponsor aliens for U.S. 
permanent residence in this category to work in jobs requiring at least bachelor's degrees. Id. 
USCIS approved the petition in November 2007. In September 2018, however, the Director mailed 
the NOIR to the Petitioner at its last address listed in the petition and afforded the company 33 days 
to respond. See section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (allowing USCIS to revoke a petition's 
approval for "good and sufficient cause" "at any time" before a beneficiary obtains permanent 
residence). After receiving no NOIR response during the relevant period, the Director mailed her 
revocation decision to the company in November 2018 at the same address listed on the NOIR. The 
following month, the U.S. Postal Service returned the decision to USCIS as undeliverable. 
In April 2020, the Petitioner submitted its first motion to reopen. The motion stated that the company 
received neither the NOIR nor the revocation decision. The company stated that it learned of the 
petition's revocation the prior month in a USCIS notice regarding its nonimmigrant work visa petition 
for the Beneficiary. 
USCIS must generally receive motions within 33 days of mailed decisions. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5(a)(l)(i), 
l 03.8(b ). The Agency may excuse an untimely motion to reopen "where it is demonstrated that the 
delay was reasonable and was beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner." Id. The Director 
found that the Petitioner's delay in filing the motion to reopen did not merit an excuse and dismissed 
the motion as untimely. We dismissed the company's appeal and its following five rounds of 
combined motions. 
Our latest decision affirmed the Director's dismissal of the untimely 2020 motion to reopen. On 
current motion, the Petitioner contends that "USCIS' restrictive interpretation [of the terms 
"reasonable" and "beyond the control" in 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i)] is violative of the petitioner's 
property rights in that [it was] deprived of an approved I-140 [petition] without an effective notice and 
the required opportunity to respond to the allegations." 
The Petitioner cites no legal authority for its claimed "property rights" in its petition. Federal courts 
have ruled that petitioners have no constitutionally protected property interests in approved Forms 1-
140, Petitions for Alien Workers. See, e.g., Musunuru v. Lynch, 831 F .3d 880, 891 (7th Cir. 2016). 
To validly claim a due process violation, a claimant must have a liberty or property interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings. Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176, 1185 (10th Cir. 2020) 
(quotation omitted). Thus, the Petitioner's argument does not persuade us. 
Also, as we have explained in prior decisions in this matter, the Director properly served notice of the 
intended revocation to the Petitioner. USCIS must notify a petitioner of the Agency's intent to revoke 
and the revocation decision. 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b), (c). "Routine service consists of mailing the notice 
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by ordinary mail addressed to the affected party and [their] attorney or representative of record at 
[their] last known address." 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(a)(l). "Service by mail is complete upon serving." 
8 C.F.R. § 103.8(b). The record shows that the Petitioner did not have an attorney or representative. 
Thus, by mailing the NOrR and the revocation decision to the company at its last known address, 
users complied with the applicable regulations. The company's address on the NOIR and revocation 
decision matches the last address the company listed in its petition. Upon mailing the notices to the 
last known address, users completed the required service. See Wah Yuet (USA) Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. 
CV 04-9145 CAS (SSx), 2006 WL 8430892, *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2006) (affirming the validity of 
USCrS' service of a NOIR to a petitioner at its last known address rather than at its then-current 
address). 
The Petitioner claims that, even if USCIS complied with its regulations when issuing the NOrR, an 
additional "constitutional requirement" mandates that the company receive actual notice of the 
intended revocation. The company describes USCIS' actions in these revocation proceedings as a 
"gross misapplication of the spirit of the notice regulations and constitutionally protected rights." 
As previously indicated, the Petitioner has not established a constitutionally protected interest in the 
petition's approval. The company therefore cannot make a Fifth Amendment due process claim. See 
Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1185 ("[T]o make out a claim for a violation of due process, a claimant 
must have a liberty or property interest in the outcome of the proceedings.") Thus, contrary to the 
Petitioner's claim, it need not have received additional notice of users' intent to revoke. 
The Petitioner also contends that USCIS should have mailed the NOIR and the revocation decision to 
the Beneficiary. The company cites a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F .3d 721 (2d Cir. 2015). 
The beneficiary in Mantena, however, qualified for "portability." See Mantena, 809 F.3d at 724. 
Under the Act's portability provision, r-140 petitions for beneficiaries who have filed adjustment 
applications that have remained unadjudicated for at least 180 days "shall remain valid," if the 
beneficiaries change jobs or employers and their new jobs are in the same or similar occupational 
classifications as listed in their petitions. Section 204(i) of the Act; 8 U.S.C. § 1154(i). If beneficiaries 
in revocation proceedings qualify for portability and properly requested to "port" to new jobs, USCIS 
treats them as affected parties, including mailing them copies ofNOrRs and decisions. Matter of V­
S-G- lnc., Adopted Decision 2017-06, *10 (AAO Nov. 11, 2017). 
Unlike the beneficiary in Mantena, however, the Petitioner has not demonstrated the Beneficiary's 
qualifications for portability. users records include two Forms r-485 Supplements J, Confirmations 
of Valid Job Offer or Requests for Job Portability under INA Section 204(i), signed by the Beneficiary: 
one dated in July 2018; and the other filed in November 2022. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.25(a). The 2018 
form, dated about two months before the NOrR's issuance, indicates the Beneficiary's continued 
acceptance of the Petitioner's original job offer. In the 2022 submission, received a few months after 
we dismissed the company's first round of combined motions, the Beneficiary requested permission 
to port to a new job. users, however, denied the 2022 portability request. The Agency had already 
revoked the petition's approval at the time of the request and the Beneficiary therefore had no basis to 
port. See Herrera v. US. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 571 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[I]n order 
for a petition to 'remain' valid [for portability purposes], it must have been valid from the start"). 
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Thus, the Beneficiary does not qualify for treatment as an affected party, and Mantena does not apply 
to this case. 
Finally, the Petitioner contends that our latest decision misinterpreted a U.S. Supreme Court case, 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The company cites the case to 
support its argument that USCIS, upon receiving the returned revocation decision as undeliverable, 
should have searched the Agency's records for the company's new address and remailed the NOTR to 
it. Mullane required notice by ordinary mail "[w ]here the names and post office addresses of those 
affected by a proceeding are at hand." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. The Petitioner contends that the 
factors in its case closely resemble those in Mullane and states: "USCTS and AAO appear[] to be fully 
focused on finding excuses to defeat this paramount purpose of protecting the rights of an affected 
party." 
But we need not argue further about Mullane. Mullane found that, under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, trust beneficiaries had protected property interests in the settlement of a 
fund's accounts. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312. Thus, Mullane discussed the type of notice that due 
process required them to receive. As previously indicated, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that it 
has a constitutionally protected due process interest in its approved petition. Even if it did, federal 
courts have found that USCTS' revocation procedures satisfy due process requirements. See, e.g., 
Karpeeva v. US. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 432 Fed.App'x 919, 925-26 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, the 
company has not demonstrated Mullane's applicability to this case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The motion to reopen does not meet applicable requirements. The motion to reconsider does not 
demonstrate that our latest decision misapplied law or USCIS policy. We will therefore affirm the 
appeal's dismissal. 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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