dismissed EB-3 Case: Culinary Arts

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF E-, INC. 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: MAR. 2, 2016 
APPEAL OF NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, an owner and operator of a restaurant, seeks to permanently employ the Beneficiary as a 
cook specializing in Chinese cuisine under the immigrant classification of skilled worker. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) § 203(b )(3)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b )(3)(A)(i). 
The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition on June 22, 2015. The Director 
concluded that the record did not establish the Petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered 
wage from the petition's priority date onward. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. The Petitioner argues that the Director misconstrued the 
purpose of the ability-to-pay regulations and erred in discounting the personal assets of its 
president/sole shareholder. Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. ABILITY TO PAY THE PROFFERED WAGE 
A petitioner must demonstrate its ability to pay a proffered wage from a petition's priority date until 
a beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Evidence of ability to pay 
must include copies of annual reports, federal income tax returns, or audited financial statements. 
!d. 
In the instant case, the petition's priority date is July 30, 2011, the date the U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) accepted the accompanying ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment 
Certification (labor certification), for processing. Sr!e 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).
1 
A. The Proffered Wage 
The accompanying labor certification states the proffered wage of the offered position of Chinese 
specialty cook as "$226,000" per year. However, this amount appears to reflect a typographical 
1 The record indicates the Petitioner's timely submission of the labor certification in support of a prior, unsuccessful 
petition on behalf of the Beneficiary. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(b)(l) (stating that an approved labor certification granted 
after July 16,2007 expires ifnot filed in support of a petition within 180 calendar days of its certification date). 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
error. The Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, and its supporting documentation state 
the proffered wage as "$26,000" per year. The labor certification states the prevailing wage as 
$25,334 per year. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(c)(l) (requiring an employer to attest that the proffered 
wage equals or exceed the prevailing wage). 
The Petitioner did not explain the discrepancy bet~en the proffered wage amounts on the Form I-
140 and the accompanying labor certification as the Director asked in his request for evidence (RFE) 
of January 24, 2013, in the prior visa petition proceedings. See Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 
591-92 (BIA 1988) (requiring a petitioner to resolve inconsistencies of record by independent, 
objective evidence). However, in response to the RFE, the Petitioner submitted a June 30, 2011, 
letter from the Oregon Employment Department, indicating advertisement of the offered position in 
a job order at an annual salary of$26,000. 2 
The Petitioner did not state that the proffered wage of $226,000 listed on the accompanying labor 
certification was incorrect and inadvertent. However, the record demonstrates the Petitioner's 
advertisement of the offered position to U.S. workers at an annual salary of $26,000, indicating an 
intended annual proffered wage of $26,000. Therefore, like the Director, despite the contrary 
amount stated on the accompanying labor certification, we will consider the proffered wage of the 
offered position to be $26,000 per year for the purposes of this discussion. 
B. The Petitioner's Annual Amounts ofNet Income and Net Current Assets 
In determining a petitioner's ability to pay, we first examine whether it paid a beneficiary the full 
proffered wage each year from a petition's priority date. If a petitioner did not pay a beneficiary the 
full proffered wage each year, we next examine whether it possessed sufficient annual amounts of 
net income or net current assets to pay the differences between wages paid, if any, and the proffered 
wage. If a petitioner's amounts of net income or net current assets are insufficient to demonstrate its 
ability to pay the proffered wage, we may also consider other evidence of its ability to pay. See 
Matter ofSonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612, 614-15 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).3 
In the instant case, the record does not indicate any payments by the Petitioner to the Beneficiary. 
The record therefore does not demonstrate the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage based on 
wages paid to the Beneficiary. 
The record contains copies of the Petitioner's federal income tax returns from 2011 through 2014. 
The tax returns reflect the following annual amounts of net income and net current assets: 
2 The Petitioner also submitted a copy of a newspaper advertisement for the offered position and an identical position. 
However, the ad does not contain proffered wage(s). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.17(£)(5), (7) (indicating that employers need 
not include proffered wages in newspaper ads). 
3 Federal courts have upheld our method of determining a petitioner's ability to pay. See Tongatapu Woodcraft Haw., 
Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); see also River St. Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d Ill, 118 
(1st Cir. 2009); Estrada-Hernandez v. Holder,-- F. Supp. 3d--, 2015 WL 3634497, *5 (S.D. Cal. 2015); Rivzi v. Dep't of 
Homeland Sec., 37 F. Supp. 3d 870, 883-84 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff'd, --Fed. Appx. --, 2015 WL 5711445, *1 (5th Cir. 
Sept. 30, 2015). 
2 
(b)(6)
Matter of E-, Inc. 
Year Net Income4 Net Current Assets 
2011 $23,237 -$15,078 
2012 -$1,700 -$21,040 
2013 $2,825 $15,685 
2014 $12,104 -$13,564 
None of the annual amounts of net income or net current assets equal or exceed the annual proffered 
wage of $26,000. Thus, based on examinations of the wages paid to the Beneficiary by the 
Petitioner and its annual amounts of net income and net current assets, the record does not establish 
its ability to pay the proffered wage from the petition's priority date onward. 
C. Another Pending Petition 
Also, US CIS records indicate the Petitioner's filing of an additional Form I -140 on behalf of another 
beneficiary that remained pending after the instant petition's priority date. 5 
A petitioner must demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage of each petition it files. See 8 
C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Therefore, the instant Petitioner must demonstrate its ability to pay the 
combined proffered wages of the instant Beneficiary and the beneficiary of the other petition that 
remained pending after the instant petition's priority date. The Petitioner must demonstrate its 
ability to pay the combined proffered wages from the instant petition's priority date until the other 
beneficiary obtained lawful permanent residence, or until the other petition was denied, withdrawn, 
or revoked. See Patel v. Johnson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 108, 124 (D. Mass. 2014) (upholding our denial of 
petition where the petitioner did not demonstrate its ability to pay multiple beneficiaries). 
The proffered wage of the Petitioner's other pending petition is also $26,000 per year. USCIS 
records indicate that the Petitioner did not pay any wages to the other beneficiary. As previously 
discussed, the record does not demonstrate the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wages of the 
instant Beneficiary based on examinations of the wages it paid to him and its annual amounts of net 
income and net current assets. Therefore, based on the same analysis, the record also does not 
establish the Petitioner's ability to pay the combined proffered wages of both beneficiaries. 
4 The record indicates the Petitioner's filings of its federal income tax returns as an S corporation. S corporations with 
income adjustments from sources other than their trades or businesses report their reconciled income amounts on Schedules 
K of IRS Forms 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Returns for S Corporations. See U.S. Internal Revenue Serv., Instructions to Form 
1120S, 22, at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf (accessed Jan. 14, 2016). Because the Petitioner reported income 
adjustments in 2011 and 2013, our annual net income amounts for 2011 and 2013 refer to the reconciled income amounts on 
lines 18 of the Schedules K of the Petitioner's tax returns for those years. 
5 USCIS records identify the receipt number of the other pending petition as That petition is also 
before us on appeal. However, we will address that appeal in a separate decision. 
3 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
D. The Petitioner's Arguments 
The Petitioner argues that a demonstration of ability to pay is not intended to "guarantee" payment 
of a beneficiary's proffered wage, but rather "to provide some reasonable indicia of the good faith 
nature of the ... employer's job offer." Citing Construction & Design Co. v USCIS, 563 F.3d 593 
(7th Cir. 2009), the Petitioner argues that demonstration of ability to pay is designed to prevent 
employers from sponsoring foreign workers without intending to actually employ them. 
The Construction & Design decision was not issued by a U.S. court of appeals with jurisdiction over 
the area of intended employment in this matter. It therefore does not bind us in this case. See Matter 
of U Singh, 25 I&N Dec. 670, 672 (BIA 20 12) (holding that an agency need not apply the law of a 
circuit in cases arising outside that jurisdiction). 
Also, Construction & Design interprets the purpose of the ability-to-pay requirement based on 
statements from a U.S. Attorney's Office. Constr. & Design, at 594 (citing Dep't of Justice, U.S. 
Arty's Office for the S. Dist. of Iowa, "Media Release: 11 Arrested, Indicted in Multi-State 
Operation in Targeting Visa and Mail Fraud," Feb. 12, 2009)). We do not find the statements of 
another agency regarding the purpose ofUSCIS regulations to be authoritative. 
A review of regulatory history shows that.the ability-to-pay regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) was 
intended to implement pre-existing case law. See Proposed Rule for Employment-Based 
Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 30703, 30704 (July 5, 1991) (stating that the regulations will reflect the 
case-law requirement that a petitioner demonstrate its ability to pay as of a petition's priority date). 
In Matter of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977), the petitioning corporation 
suffered operating losses in a 12-month period before the petition's filing, but asserted its ability to 
pay the proffered wage in the future. Id. at 143-44. However, the Acting Regional Commissioner 
of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) held that a petitioner must demonstrate 
its ability to pay from a petition's priority date. Id. at 145. "The petitioner in the instant case cannot 
expect to establish a priority date for visa issuance for the beneficiary when at the time of making the 
job offer and the filing of the petition with this Service he could not, in all reality, pay the salary as 
stated in the job offer." Id. The decision also cited the purpose of the Act's labor certification 
requirement "to provide strong safeguards for American labor and to provide American labor 
protection against an influx of aliens entering the United States for the purpose of performing skilled 
or unskilled labor where the economy of individual localities is not capable of absorbing them at the 
time they desire to enter this country." Id. at 144 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1365 (1952), reprinted in 
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1705). 
Thus, contrary to the Petitioner's argument, we find Great Wall to govern the purpose of the ability­
to-pay regulations in this matter. Great Wall indicates that the ability-to-pay requirement is intended 
not merely to confirm a petitioner's intention to employ a beneficiary, but its financial ability to pay 
a specified proffered wage from a petition's priority date onward. 
4 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
The Petitioner also argues that USCIS erred in refusing to consider the personal assets of its 
president/sole shareholder in determining its ability to pay. Copies of the Petitioner's tax returns 
from 2008 through 2014 indicate loans totaling more than $325,000 from the president/sole 
shareholder to the corporation. The Petitioner asserts that cases cited by USCIS in support of its 
refusal are distinguishable from the instant matter. 
The Director's decision cited Matter of Aphrodite Invs., Ltd., 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980) and 
Sitar Rest. v. Ashcroft, No. Civ. A. 02-30197-MAP, 2003 WL 22203713 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) 
for the proposition that USCIS cannot consider the personal assets of shareholders in determining a 
corporation's ability to pay a proffered wage. The Petitioner notes that ability to pay was not at 
issue in Aphrodite. It also argues that Sitar is distinguishable from the instant case because a 
corporate director in Sitar sought to guarantee a beneficiary's proffered wage "without any evidence 
that he or she had funded the applicant restaurant." 
Although Aphrodite did not involve a petitioner's ability to pay, the Director appropriately cited the 
case's specific holding that a corporation is "a separate legal entity from its owners or even its sole 
owner." Aphrodite, 17 I&N Dec. at 531. Aphrodite in turn cited Matter of M-, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 
1958; A.G. 1958), which stated: 
It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a legal entity entirely separate and 
distinct from its stockholders; and this is true even though one person may own all or 
nearly all of the capital stock .... The fact that one person owns a majority or all of 
the stock in a corporation does not, of itself, make him liable for the debts of the 
corporation, and this rule applies even where an individual incorporated his business 
for the sole purpose of escaping individual liability for corporation debts. 
M-, 8 I&N Dec. at 50-51 (citations omitted). 
Thus, Aphrodite supports the Director's finding that USCIS cannot consider the personal assets of 
the Petitioner's president/sole shareholder because he lacks any legal obligation to pay the proffered 
wage on behalf of the corporation. 
Similarly, Sitar found that "[t]he regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) does not permit the AAO to 
consider the financial resources of individuals or entities with no legal obligations to pay a proffered 
wage." Sitar, 2003 WL 22203713 at *3. Whether the corporate director who offered to pay the 
beneficiary's wage in Sitar had funded the restaurant was immaterial. The court ruled that, absent a 
legal obligation by the director to pay the proffered wage, USCIS "had no need to determine whether 
his income was sufficient to pay [the beneficiary's] salary." !d. Like the petitioner in Sitar, the 
instant Petitioner does not provide any authority to support its argument that we must consider the 
promise of its president/sole shareholder to pay the proffered wage. 
The Petitioner argues that other cases have considered assets of companies and individuals other 
than petitioners in determining ability to pay. In Matter of Ohsawa Am., 1988-INA-00240, 1988 
(b)(6)
Matter of E-, Inc. 
WL 235836 (BALCA Aug. 30, 1988), the Petitioner argues that the Board of Alien Labor 
Certification Appeals (BALCA) approved reliance on a financial commitment by a major 
shareholder of an employer. In Matter of Ranchito Coletero, 2002-INA-00105, 2004 WL 192974 
(BALCA 2004) (en bane), the Petitioner argues that BALCA considered the personal assets of a sole 
proprietor. In Full Gospel Portland Church v. Thornburgh, 730 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1988), 
reversed in part on other grounds at 927 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the Petitioner argues that a U.S. 
district court considered financial support from a church's parent organization. 
In Ohsawa America, the employer corporation reported losses and negative working capital at the 
time of the labor certification's filing. Ohsawa America, 1988 WL 235836 at *3. Nonetheless, a 
BALCA panel found the employer's demonstration of funds sufficient to pay the proffered wage 
based in part on the financial worth and continuing financial support of a major shareholder. !d.; see 
also 20 C.F .R. § 656.1 0( c )(3) (requiring an employer to attest to its possession of "enough funds 
available to pay the wage or salary offered the alien"). 
We do not find the decision in Ohsawa America persuasive. BALCA decisions do not bind us. 
Moreover, in addition to the shareholder's personal worth and willingness to continue funding the 
employer, the panel in Ohsawa America considered evidence that the employer had "increased sales 
and reduced operating losses." !d. The instant record does not similarly establish a pattern of 
increased sales and reduced operating losses by the Petitioner. 
In Ranchito Coletero, the BALCA held that individual assets may be considered when assessing a 
sole proprietorship's ability to pay a proffered wage. Ranchito Coletero, 2004 WL 192974 at *3. 
However, the record establishes the instant Petitioner as a corporation, not a sole proprietorship. We 
therefore do not find Ranchito Coletero persuasive in this matter. 
The Petitioner argues that its president/sole shareholder effectively constitutes a sole proprietor. It 
argues that he has a substantial interest in the Petitioner's financial success because he owns the 
building in which the Petitioner is housed and relies on the Petitioner's rental payments to fund the 
building's mortgage. 6 However, unlike a sole proprietor, the Petitioner's president/sole shareholder 
lacks personal liability for the Petitioner's debts and obligations. We therefore decline to treat him 
as a sole proprietor by considering his personal assets. 
In Full Gospel Portland Church, the court reopened the revocation of a petition's approval in part 
because the court found that INS erred in refusing to consider the promised financial support of the 
petitioning church's national organization. Full Gospel, 730 F. Supp. at 449. The court stated: 
6 The record identifies the Petitioner's president/sole shareholder as a member of a limited liability company (LLC) that 
owns the building in which the Petitioner is housed. The Petitioner submitted a copy of an April 4, 2013, amended LLC 
operating agreement, identifying the Petitioner's president/sole shareholder as the LLC's sole member. However, online 
government records also identify his spouse as an LLC member. See Or. Sec'y of State, Corp. Div., at 
- - - -
(accessed Jan. 14, 2016). The record does not explain the discrepancy in the number ofLLC members. 
6 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
Clearly, if Full Gospel (church] is financially linked to the larger church, the INS 
must consider these resources. New divisions in businesses or new parishes of larger 
churches may not themselves be financially profitable, but if documents show that 
they may rely on the larger body for support, it is arbitrary and capricious for the INS 
not to consider the resources of the larger organization in making its evaluation to 
pay. 
!d. at 449-50. 
We are not bound to follow published decisions of U.S. district courts, even in cases arising within 
the same district. Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 718 (BIA 1993). Even if we were, however, the 
instant case appears distinguishable from Full Gospel. Unlike the national church in Full Gospel, 
the Petitioner's president/sole shareholder is not its "larger organization." Rather, the Petitioner is a 
separate legal entity from its president/sole shareholder. 
Moreover, Full Gospel's decision is inconsistent with the ability-to-pay regulations and their 
purpose. We agree with the U.S. district court in Sitar that 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) "does not permit 
[us] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities with no legal obligations to pay a 
proffered wage." Sitar, 2003 WL 22203713 at *3. Also, recognizing promises to pay proffered 
wages by companies or individuals without legal obligation to do so would not result in realistic job 
offers and protect the jobs of U.S. laborers pursuant to the purpose of the ability-to-pay regulations. 
See Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. at 144-45. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner's arguments do not establish its ability to pay the proffered 
wage. 
E. Matter of Sonegawa 
However, we agree with the Petitioner that we must consider factors beyond its net income and net 
current assets in determining its ability to pay to pay the proffered wage. As previously indicated, 
we may consider other evidence of a petitioner's business activities in determining its ability to pay. 
See Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. at 614-15. 
In Sonegawa, the petitioner conducted business for more than 11 years, routinely earning a gross 
annual income of about $100,000 and employing at least four full-time workers. !d. at 612. In the 
year of the petition's filing, however, the petitioner's financial documentation did not reflect its 
ability to pay the proffered wage. !d. at 614. During that year, it relocated its business, causing it to 
pay rent on two locations for a five-month period, to incur substantial moving costs, and to briefly 
suspend its business operations. !d. Despite these setbacks, the Regional Commissioner determined 
that the petitioner would likely resume successful business operations and had established its ability 
to pay the proffered wage. !d. at 615. The record established the petitioner as a fashion designer 
whose work had been featured in national magazines. Id. Her clients included the then Miss 
Universe, movie actresses, society matrons, and women on lists of the best-dressed in California. !d. 
(b)(6)
Matter of E-, Inc. 
The record also indicated the petitioner's frequent lectures at design and fashion shows throughout 
the United States and at California colleges and 
universities. Id. 
As in Sonegawa, we may consider such factors as: the number of years a petitioner has conducted 
business; the growth of its business; its number of employees; the occurrence of any uncharacteristic 
business expenditures or losses, its reputation in its industry; whether a beneficiary will replace a 
current employee or outsourced service; or other evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the 
proffered wage. 
In the instant case, the record indicates the Petitioner's continuous business operations since 
The Petitioner employs 12 people, although its president/sole shareholder stated that most of them 
work on a part-time basis. Its tax returns from 2008 through 2014 reflect largely stable gross annual 
revenues and costs of labor. 
The Petitioner's president/sole shareholder stated the Beneficiary's possible replacement of current 
part-time cooks. However, the proposed replacement was not definite. The Petitioner also did not 
provide evidence of the hours and wages of the cooks to be replaced. See Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N 
Dec. 358, 365 (Comm'r 1998) (citation omitted) (finding that unsupported assertions do not meet the 
burden of proof in visa petition proceedings). 
Unlike in Sonegawa, financial documents do not reflect the instant Petitioner's ability to pay the 
proffered wage in any relevant year. The record also does not indicate any uncharacteristic business 
expenditures or losses. Also unlike in Sonegawa, the instant Petitioner must demonstrate its ability 
to pay the combined proffered wages of two beneficiaries. Thus, assessing the totality of the 
circumstances in this individual case, the record does not establish the Petitioner's continuing ability 
to pay the proffered wage pursuant to Sonegawa. 
For the foregoing reasons, the record does not establish the Petitioner's continuing ability to pay the 
proffered wage from the petitions' priority date onward. We will therefore affirm the Director's 
decision and dismiss the appeal. 
II. THE BENEFICIARY'S QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE 
Beyond the Director's decision, the record also does not establish the Beneficiary's qualifying 
experience for the offered position. 
A petitioner must establish a beneficiary's possession of the education, training, and experience 
specified on an accompanying labor certification by a petition's priority date. 8 C.F.R. §§ 
103.2(b)(l), (12); see also Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l 
Comm'r 1977); Matter ofKatigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45,49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). 
In evaluating a beneficiary's qualifications, we must examine the job offer portion of an 
accompanying labor certification to determine the minimum requirements of the offered position. 
We may neither ignore a term of the labor certification, nor impose additional requirements. See 
(b)(6)
Matter of E-, Inc. 
K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Madany v. Smith, 696 
F.2d 1008, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Mass., Inc. v. Coomey, 661 
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981). 
In the instant case, the accompanying labor certification states the minimum requirements of the 
offered position of Chinese specialty cook as 24 months experience in the job offered. The labor 
certification does not require any education or training. Part H.14 of ETA Form 9089 states that the 
offered position does not require any special skills or other requirements "beyond use of kitchen 
tools and utensils traditionally & normally used in performance of listed job duties: stoves, woks 
etc." 
The Beneficiary attested on the accompanying labor certification to almost 16 years of full-time 
qualifying experience before the petition's priority date. The Beneficiary stated employment as a cook 
by China from December 
1, 1995 to July 30, 2011. The Beneficiary also stated his employment as a cook's assistant at the same 
restaurant from March 1, 1992 to December 1, 1995. 
A petitioner must support a beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience with a letter from an employer. 
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(A). The letter must provide the name, address, and title of the employer, and a 
description of a beneficiary's experience. I d. 
The Petitioner submitted an October 28, 2004, "certificate of work experience" stating the Beneficiary's 
employment by as a kitchen helper from March 1992 to November 1995 and as a 
cook since December 1995. However, contrary to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(A), the certificate does not 
include the name or title of the employer or describe the Beneficiary's e xperience. The certificate 
therefore does not establish the Beneficiary' s claimed qualifying experience. 
The Petitioner also submitted a July 8, 2012, "employment certification" from a manager of a "food 
restaurant." The certification states the Beneficiary's employment as a cook since 2007 and describes 
his duties. 
However, the record does not establish issuance of the 2004 and 2012 documents by the same employer 
claimed by the Beneficiary on the accompanying labor certification. Both documents state the 
Beneficiary's employment in the same city. However, the 2012 certification generically identifies the 
employer as a "food restaurant." The record therefore does not establish the certification's issuance by 
as specified on the labor certification. 
See Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92 (requiring petitioners to resolve inconsistencies of record by 
independent, objective evidence). 
Also, the 2012 certification states the start date of the Beneficiary's qualifying employment as a cook as 
"2007." The Beneficiary attested on the accompanying labor certification that his employment as a 
cook began on December 1, 1995. The unexplained discrepancy in the Beneficiary's start date of 
employment casts further doubt on his claimed qualifying experience. Id. 
9 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
For the foregoing reasons, the record does not establish the Beneficiary's possession of the qualifYing 
experience for the offered position by the petition's priority date. We will therefore dismiss the appeal 
for this additional reason. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The record does not establish the Petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the 
petition's priority date onward. We will therefore affirm the Director's decision and dismiss the 
appeal. In addition, the record does not establish the Beneficiary's possession of the qualifying 
experience for the offered position by the petition's priority date. We will therefore also dismiss the 
appeal on this ground. 
The petition will be denied for reasons indicated above, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, a petitioner bears the burden of proving 
eligibility for the benefit sought. INA§ 291; 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofOtiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 
128 (BIA 2013). Here, the Petitioner did not meet that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofE-, Inc., ID# 15944 (AAO Mar. 2, 2016) 
10